UK Nuclear Horn Votes On Trident (Daniel 7)

 
Trident: MPs could vote on nuclear weapons before Christmas
By Tim Ross, Senior Political Correspondent
9:30PM BST 10 Oct 2015

Ministers want to settle the question replacing Trident within weeks to stop the SNP turning next year’s Holyrood elections into a referendum on the nuclear deterrent

The future of Britain’s nuclear weapons is set to be decided within weeks as ministers plan to call an early Commons vote on Trident.

The government wants the question to be settled “by Christmas” to stop Nicola Sturgeon and Jeremy Corbyn turning next year’s Scottish parliament elections into a referendum on Britain’s nuclear deterrent, senior sources said.

Senior figures fear that a divisive debate over national defence would weaken Britain’s image abroad at a time of increased threat to national security.

A vote in the Commons in December would also expose the deep split on the issue within Labour. The party’s new leader, Mr Corbyn, is certain to oppose replacing the nuclear-armed submarines but many of his shadow Cabinet members and MPs want to maintain the missile system.
The vote had been expected by the end of 2016, which would allow enough time for the first of the new submarines to be built before the existing fleet is taken out of service in the late 2020s.
However, the critical decision on whether to proceed with replacing Trident now looks likely to be brought forward.

The UK’s deterrent consists of four Vanguard-class submarines, each capable of carrying up to 16 Trident II D-5 ballistic nuclear missiles.

At least one submarine is constantly on patrol, while one undergoes maintenance and the other two carry out manoeuvers. The missiles are capable of hitting a target up to 7,500 miles away.
However, the Trident missile system, which was launched in the 1990s as a replacement for the predecessor, Polaris, is due to end its service from 2028. It takes about a decade to build and prepare a new submarine for service.

The full, like-for-like replacement of Britain’s nuclear deterrent would cost more than £25 billion and by some estimates up to £100 billion.

The parliamentary vote on whether to approve the replacement of all four submarines had been expected to take place in June 2016.

But ministers fear that this will make the future of Trident a defining issue at the Edinburgh parliament elections in May. The Scottish National Party leader, Ms Sturgeon, would be likely to campaign against replacing the submarines.

Alex Salmond, Ms Sturgeon’s predecessor as Scottish First Minister, has warned that going ahead with a replacement for Trident could trigger a new referendum on independence for Scotland, because so many Scots opposed nuclear weapons.

Three separate senior government sources said a vote could take place before Christmas this year, or in January 2016, on the principle of whether to go ahead with a “like for like” replacement.
“We want to get this decision soon to stop the SNP turning the Scottish elections into a referendum on Trident,” one government source said.

Senior Tories are also keen to resolve the question over Trident to prevent damage being done to Britain’s image as a country with a strong commitment to defence.This is seen as especially important at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin has been aggressive in his recent rhetoric about nuclear strikes and increasingly provocative in launching military interventions in Syria and Ukraine.

Last week, Nato allies proposed to re-start nuclear weapons exercises for the first time since the end of the Cold War in order to ensure that Western military commanders are ready for any scenario.
“It takes at least 10 years to build and trial a new submarine so we need to get on with the first one fairly soon,” another senior government figure said. “We are not going to lose a vote on Trident. But the Scottish elections in May are a complicating factor. We need to stop Sturgeon spending the whole campaign talking about Trident.”

Last week, David Cameron told the Conservative conference in Manchester that his government wanted to go ahead and order a replacement nuclear missile system as an essential part of Britain’s defences.

Mr Corbyn’s Labour party may choose to allow his MPs a “free vote” to avoid a damaging rebellion against the leader’s anti-nuclear stance.

The crucial vote would be on the headline, or “main-gate” decision on whether to proceed. A vote in favour would authorise ministers to negotiate the best deal for replacing the submarines from military manufacturers.

The submarines would then be ordered and built individually, and in stages, to ensure that the overall bill is kept as low as possible. Before the vote can take place, however, the government must conclude the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which examines the threats facing Britain and defence planning and funding for the years ahead.

Trident will be part of this review, which is expected soon after the Chancellor delivers his Autumn Statement on November 25. A vote on Trident could then take place at some point before December 17, when the Commons breaks for Christmas.

The India Pakistan Dilemma (Daniel 8:8)


SOUTH ASIAN DILEMMA
Abrar Hussain

Saturday, October 10, 2015 – South Asia has been a region of significance to the major powers for centuries. It has always been under consistent study owing to its unique geography in between the sea routes of the Indian Ocean and the possible land route of Central Asia to connect Europe to the East. The struggle between the major powers owed to its vital geostrategic posture and maritime lines of communication has diluted the regional balance of power. Major Powers invariably prefer resource rich, logistic vital South Asia for their economic and strategic gains over regional stability. US pivotal role, China’s policy of “Peaceful Rise” and the quest of Russian geopolitical aims, introduced South Asia to a new Great Game. It includes the competition over maritime advancements, transit routes, economic zones and strategic points.

‘Vietnam Syndrome’ of US in South Asia is aimed against China’s aggressive soft power diplomacy of providing loans with uncomplicated repayment terms, investment in infrastructure buildup, military assistance and political support. China’s strive to access maritime extension via Indian Ocean has threatened Delhi and Washington. Robert D Kaplan sees China’s excessive involvement in South Asian waters as insecurity of US and a reason of turmoil in the region.

Aiming to restrain China’s ambitions of extending its regional plus global sphere of influence, Indo-US strategic nexus is going beyond the ideology of non-proliferation and arms control. Their ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership’ through which US intended to assist India with its space programme, high technology deals and missile defence. This will not only restrain China’s rise in Indian Ocean but also it will ease US engagements in Far-East and Southeast Asia. Accordingly US power play adds fuel to the existing fire of Indo-Pak relations. Pakistan is concerned about the long term implications of Indo-US nuclear deal and the growing strategic partnership between the two countries.

Russo-American interest in the defence market of India as a well-off investment has drastically altered Indo-Pak military balance. Indian multidimensional modernization in military architecture has compelled Pakistan to enhance its nuclear programme to deter Indian massive conventional arms buildup and offensive doctrinal shifts. In the face of unsettled disputes and harsh hostility between India and Pakistan, the discriminatory defence agreements raised more red flags in the conflict-ridden South Asia. Another rationale of South Asian ugly stability is the nuclear imbalance. The non-proliferation regime has failed to produce non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally effective treaty. Secondly the commitment of non-proliferation regime seriously weakened by Indo-US nuclear deal and welcoming waiver for India into NSG. Through the deal India can freely import Uranium, which will enable it to produce significant amounts of fissile material. Though its peaceful purpose is being highlighted, but owing to the critical regional geopolitics, it will not take long for India to develop atoms of peace into war machinery.

In such an unstable environment, there is no question for Pakistan to endorse the loose abbreviation of arms control treaties. Various international actors are taking benefit of Pakistan’s refusal to permit talks on NPT and FMCT, despite of the fact to highlight the prerequisites and inability of international non-proliferation regime to go after the big fish.

NPT being the most widespread treaty on non-proliferation of nukes, needs a considerable revision according to the politico-strategic canvas of Nuclear South Asia. Its core agenda of Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation remained unfulfilled because the P5 inability to assure national security interest and objectives of strategic stability equally to both India and Pakistan. The status-quo of P5 in the series of NPT review conferences without any agreeable conclusion sets NPT itself in trouble. Furthermore, FMCT itself is objectionable; it implies only a halt in future production of fissile material. It never emphasized about existing stockpiles and reactor grade Plutonium in which India supersedes Pakistan. Pakistan always wants a solution to the problem of existing uneven stockpiles.

—Islamabad

Chaos From The Ten Horned Beast (Daniel 7)

 
Foreign Interventions in the Middle East: More Havoc, Nuclear Weapons, Less Order
OCTOBER 9, 2015
By Frank Thomas

U.S. foreign regime change interventions – by military engagement, funding, training insurgency groups, supporting coups d’etats, protecting regional dictatorships – have boosted instability and mayhem in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Egypt, etc. Emerging unscathed in these interventions, the U.S. departs leaving the wreckage behind to go on to the next trouble-spot.

The common enemy is ISIS. If Syria falls, ISIS will take it over. Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Europe will be the next targets. The question arises, should both Assad’s regime and ISIS be removed to restore Middle East stability? How to do this? Russia and Iran would have to agree to Assad’s removal. Capitalizing on Obama Administration’s hesitating, ineffective removal of ISIS and latter’s proxies, Russia is now inserting itself into the civil war taking no prisoners including anti-Assad rebels such as the Al Nusra /Al Qaeda alliance. Putin’s support for Assad’s government was never restricted to attacks on just ISIS

But Israel favors the Sunni ISIS and Al Qaeda’s Nusra Front in fight to seek over-throw of Assad’s regime backed by Iran and Hezbollah. Israel prefers the Sunni evil over Assad. Obama has gotten himself in a corner with two stark options: continue trying to remove Assad with help of ISIS, Al Qaeda and other Sunni extremists or join Russia, Iran, and the Syrian military to defeat the Sunni jihadists. This shows how complex the Syrian and regional sectarian conflict is.

Russia militarily supports the amoral dictator, Assad, in bombing ISIS and anti-Assad forces. America bombs ISIS and attacks Assad’s forces to get rid of Assad. How complicated can it get? What is the lesser evil? It’s the dilemma faced at the onset of WWII – do we join Russia in a coalition to fight with Stalin (Assad) against Hitler (ISIS) in Syria and with Russia to fight ISIS elsewhere? America did just that back then. The Syrian mayhem is so catastrophic for everyone in the region and the world, that question should be asked.

Putin’s recent words are on the mark : “Healthy common sense and responsibility for global and regional safety demand a united effort from the international community against the threat posed by ISIS.” What’s critically vital is to spark debate of counter-arguments that force engagement of constructive alternatives to quell the unending Middle East civil wars.

NUCLEAR CONSIDERATIONS COMPLICATE THINGS EVEN FURTHER

Proliferation of advanced nuclear weapons in the Middle East is another ominous complication that could end up igniting a nuclear-armed confrontation between U.S. and Russia. Distrust of Iran’s nuclear intentions is also triggering Arab states and Saudis to adapt existing and new civilian nuclear power plants with “latent” nuclear weapon capability for clandestine military nuclear program as the ultimate guarantee of existence.

Iran’s nuclear uranium enrichment program started in the 1980s. A facility in Natanz was built to install 50,000 centrifuges. This clandestine facility was exposed in 2002. Under the Nonproliferation Treaty, Iran was legally bound to inform the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about this program but did not do so. In the past, Iran often lied about its nuclear weapons work and was not forthcoming about possible military dimensions of its nuclear program.

This started Arab states and Saudis on a path of soliciting bids from U.S. and France for nuclear power facilities. Gulf states could live with Israel’s concealed nuclear weapon capability but were fearful of nuclear weapons coming into Iran’s hands and disturbing the balance of power. Since 2002, Washington and Paris have been providing nuclear power plant infrastructure know-how and aid to Arab states and Saudis. Nuclear power technical assistance has also been sought from China and Russia and provided.

Increasing Arab investments in nuclear power is telling Iran that Arab states and Saudis can also convert civilian nuclear power technology to nuclear weapons – thereby holding Iran at risk should it be caught enriching uranium in violation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) accord. The accord reduces Iran’s installed centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,000. For 15 years, it limits uranium enrichment to 3.67% and ceases enrichment at the Fordow facility. Changes at several Iranian facilities will be made to prevent them from being used to create nuclear weapons.

If this “cap and constrain” deal had not been reached, Iran might well be emboldened to risk development of a nuclear weapon arsenal. Are there still some weak conditions in the JCPOA accord? Yes. These include:

Iran can continue running nuclear centrifuges at an underground site once suspected of housing illicit activities.

Iran says inspectors will be removed if they try to enter sites Iran considers “sensitive.”
Iran is permitted to keep many of its controversial military sites closed to inspections.
Iran can delay inspections of disputed facilities for at least 24 hours which gives time to sanitize the site.

Iran can only use IR-1 centrifuges but has begun using IR-8 centrifuges that enrich uranium 20 times faster than IR-1 centrifuges.

Can Iran still cheat? Yes. Will it inevitably be detected in time? Yes. Why? Unlike North Korea which China now reports has 20 nuclear warheads – a tough regime of IAEA inspections plus close observations of U.S. and Israel make it highly improbable any cheating by Iran is not timely spotted. Will the repercussions for cheating be severe? Yes. To avoid (or greatly limit) a regional nuclear arms race, is it worth the risk to test whether Iran will abide by the JCPOA accord, restricting Iranians to civilian nuclear power and conventional weapons capabilities? Yes.

Why is it that Iran is inciting a major counteraction of Arab civilian nuclear power proliferation when Israel – the arch enemy of Arab states in two major wars – started developing nuclear weapons and an atomic bomb 40 years ago and has since had an active military posture without inciting a counteraction?

Arab states are accelerating investments in nuclear power plants and modern, longer-range ballistic missiles. This is creating a latent nuclear weapon capability – coming from the spread of plutonium produced by civilian nuclear power reactors, easing the ability to technically transition to deliverable nuclear weapons fast. The more nuclear power plants and plutonium produced, the more latent nuclear weapon proliferation – enhancing the risk of future small nuclear wars and nuclear terrorism.
So again, why is Iran’s civilian nuclear power program seen as a more acute future threat than Israel’s advanced nuclear weapons program and atomic bomb capability?

Israel’s nuclear weapon capability was initially seen and is still seen as being a deterrent strategy, for defense only and not for aggressive expansion of its territory. So bombing Iran’s nuclear power facilities, ongoing occupation of West Bank, wars of 2008-09 and 2012, the Gaza slaughter, buying of U.S. Arrow ballistic missiles and Iron Dome anti-rocket systems (and possibly cruise missile submarines) qualify as self-defense for Israel. On other hand, Arab States and Saudis automatically see the JCPOA accord as inherently dangerous, opening the door for Iranian territorial aggression and regional hegemony.

Iran’s support of Shiite factions in Syria, Yemen, and Iraq adds to Saudi Arabia’s grossly overstated fears of being permanently encircled by Iran. As most experts agree, Iran is not controlling events in the region. It is mostly reacting to them. Like the U.S., it is filling trouble spot holes but not with the intention of taking over land territory.

Nevertheless, Arab states, Saudis and Israel view Iran as a potential military and nuclear weapons adversary despite following deterrents :

JCPOA accord forbidding Iran under strict protocols and inspections from embarking on uranium enrichment or reprocessing technology.added security measure of Arab states and Saudis to match the dual-use feature of Iran’s civilian nuclear power capability enabling a possible conversion to producing nuclear weapons in distant future

The civilian nuclear power push by Iran’s Arab neighbors, led by Saudi Arabia, is a security hedge to provide a means for nuclear weapons if Iran does not cease its uranium enrichment activities. Given these this deterrent force, why would Iran be so recklessly stupid as to invite unfathomable military destructive retaliation by getting aggressive territorially or by being caught covertly developing nuclear weaponry or an atomic bomb capability?

Iran’s priorities are to renew its infrastructure and spur broad economic growth. But eventual resurgent Iranian competition, wealth and economic progress helped by vast oil reserves sparks fears of Iran’s growing regional influence. This bolsters the Gulf States to match Iran’s latent nuclear capability and thus reinforce their own security and influence.

Nuclear plant equipment and weapon sales are booming, profitable businesses. American, French, Russian, Chinese and others have long been selling their nuclear power wares and technical assistance for billions of dollars annually to Middle Eastern states. The West, notably U.S., has been aggressive in selling high-performance aircraft that can be adapted to carry nuclear warheads. The Pentagon has just completed a $1 billion weapons deal with Saudi Arabia. China and Russia are capable of offering modern ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Russia’s military presence in Syria might lead to the setting up of missile defense systems against Western aircraft missions.
U.S. failed regime change policies, huge weapon inflows have affected the falling apart process in Syria, Iraq and Libya, Egypt. Such policies and the vacuums created have advanced ISIS’s rise. Middle East violence has forced 11 million Syrians to flee their homes, over 4 million of whom have fled their country to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon and in huge waves to Europe. Refugees are not admitted into Saudi Arabia and Qatar – countries that funded ISIS’s birth, oblivious to the ‘evil incarnate’ they were creating for the world. One has to question also Israel’s choice of ISIS and Al Nusra over Assad.

EinsteinUpgraded military weapon flows and contiguous civil wars are bringing the Gulf States closer to seeing nuclear weapons as the ultimate security guarantee of their existence – Israel’s long-held position. Ever more sophisticated military weaponry in the Middle East capable of having nuclear warheads risks touching off a human Holocaust of calamitous global dimensions. Einstein warned, “I know not with what weapons WW III will be fought, but WW IV will be fought with sticks and stones.”

Hopefully, a subtle, slow wave of nuclear weapons proliferation and a widening arms race can be contained. China, India, and U.S. know the importance and their dependence on Middle East stability to ensure the free flow of oil. Good things could happen if an east-west coalition powers could come together on securing regional security by other means than ‘scorched earth’ military bombing that’s exterminating, mutilating innocent families, children and inciting the most massive refugee flight since WWII.

Will the U.S. follow Russia’s lead to work together in a broad coalition to resolve the Syrian conflict? If not, Russia will go its own way with all the cold war paranoia and concerns that will bring.