This is The Prophecy. The Prophecy is much more than seeing into the future. For The Prophecy sees without the limits of time. For The Prophecy sees what is, what was, and what always shall be.
If the past is any indication, New York can be hit by an earthquake, claims John Armbruster, a seismologist at Columbia University’s Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory.Based on historical precedent, Armbruster says the New York City metro area is susceptible to an earthquake of at least a magnitude of 5.0 once a century.According to the New York Daily News, Lynn Skyes, lead author of a recent study by seismologists at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory adds that a magnitude-6 quake hits the area about every 670 years, and magnitude-7 every 3,400 years.A 5.2-magnitude quake shook New York City in 1737 and another of the same severity hit in 1884.
“The problem here comes from many subtle faults,” explained Skyes after the study was published.
He adds: “We now see there is earthquake activity on them. Each one is small, but when you add them up, they are probably more dangerous than we thought.”
“(Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant) specialists carried out a number of compensatory measures to control the radiation situation in the area,” the management said on the Telegram messaging app.
Radiation levels, the management added, do not exceed safe levels.
There was no immediate comment from Ukraine.
Russian troops seized the Zaporizhzhia plant in the early days of Moscow’s invasion on Ukraine in February 2022 invasion, and Moscow and Kyiv have since routinely accused each other of endangering safety around it.
CAIRO (Reuters) -Israeli forces pounded several areas across Gaza on Wednesday, and residents reported fierce fighting overnight in Rafah in the south of the Palestinian enclave.
Residents said fighting intensified in the Tel Al-Sultan neighbourhood in western Rafah, where tanks were also trying to force their way north amid heavy clashes. The armed wings of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad said fighters attacked Israeli forces with anti-tank rockets and mortar bombs.
Since early May, ground fighting has focused on Rafah, abutting Egypt on Gaza’s southern edge, where around half of the enclave’s 2.3 million people had been sheltering after fleeing other areas. Most have since had to flee again.
Later on Wednesday, an Israeli strike killed three Palestinians and wounded others near the northern Jabalia camp, one of the Gaza Strip’s eight historic refugee camps, medics said.
Residents and Hamas media said the casualties were among a group of people who gathered outside a store to get an internet signal to communicate with relatives elsewhere in the enclave.
Medics said earlier that two Palestinians were killed in one Israeli missile strike in Rafah.
The Israeli military said in a statement its forces killed a Hamas militant who had been involved in the smuggling of weapons through the border between Rafah and Egypt.
It said jets struck dozens of militant targets in Rafah overnight, including fighters, military structures and tunnel shafts.
In the northern Gaza town of Beit Lahiya, an Israeli air strike destroyed a house, killing four Palestinians and wounding several others, medics said.
The Israeli offensive in retaliation has so far killed 37,658 people, of them 60 in the past 24 hours, the Gaza health ministry said on Tuesday, and has left the tiny, heavily built-up Gaza Strip in ruins.
More than eight months into the war, international mediation backed by the U.S. has failed to yield a ceasefire agreement. Hamas says any deal must bring an end to the war and full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, while Israel says it will accept only temporary pauses in fighting until Hamas is eradicated.
SEVERE FOOD SHORTAGE
In the northern Gaza Strip, Palestinians complained of a severe lack of food and soaring prices, and health officials said thousands of children were suffering from malnutrition that has already killed at least 30 since Oct. 7.
“There is only flour and canned food, there is nothing else to eat, no vegetables, no meat, and no milk. I have lost over 25 kilos of my weight,” said Abu Mustafa, who lives in Gaza City, with his family.
Their house was struck in the past week by an Israeli tank, that destroyed most of the upper floor, forcing them to stay in the lower floor. “No safe places exist in Gaza anyway,” he said.
“Apart from the bombing, there is another Israeli war taking place in northern Gaza, starvation. People meet in the street and many can’t recognise one another because of weight loss and older looks,” Abu Mustafa told Reuters via a chat app.
Gaza remains at high risk of famine, though delivery of some aid has limited the projected spread of extreme hunger in northern areas, a global monitor said on Tuesday.
More than 495,000 people across the Gaza Strip are facing the most severe, or “catastrophic”, level of food insecurity, according to an update from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) a global partnership used by the United Nations and aid agencies.
That is down from a forecast of 1.1 million in the previous update three months ago, but is still more than one-fifth of Gaza’s population.
(Reporting and writing by Nidal al-Mughrabi; Editing by Alex Richardson)
Shafaq News/ Prominent Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s announcement on April 11 to re-enter Iraq’s formal political process has sent ripples through the nation’s political landscape.
Through his mouthpiece on X, Wazir al-Iraqi, Al-Sadr revealed the formation of “al-Tayyar al-Waṭani al-Shi’i,” sparking extensive commentary and speculation about his plans.
In an analysis published by The Washington Institute, Mohammed Salih, a Kurdish journalist and Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania’s Annenberg School for Communication, explained the political landscape in Iraq with the return of Al-Sadr to the scene.
The writer explained the goal behind the ame of Al-Sadr’s Movement, “The new appellation that Sadr has chosen for his political group is significant in multiple ways. First, there is a question of translation when it comes to rendering the name of this new group in English. While it is typically translated as the National Shia Movement or Shia National Movement, I suggest a more pointed rendition: the Patriotic Shia Current. There is a subtle, often neglected difference in the meanings of the words “waṭani” and “qawmi” in Arabic, often interchangeably used to denote “national(ism)” in English. However, “waṭani(yya)” pertains to state-centered nationalism and, hence, is a better equivalent to the English term patriotic (patriotism), while “qawmi(yya)” corresponds more strongly with ethnicity-based nationalism, which can be pursued within or across several existing states. The choice of the word waṭani demonstrates Sadr’s hopes to be recognized as someone with a patriotic, cross-sectarian (i.e., willing to engage beyond the Shia realm) and cross-ethnic agenda (i.e., not a solely Arab group). But the word patriotic is realistic only to the extent that Sadr will be able/willing to engage with other parties from other ethnicities and sects. It should not be taken to mean that he can gain votes from among other communities and claim to represent (portions of) them.”
Saleh further explained that the use of the term “Shia” in the new group’s name is “notable for more than one reason. First, it is the first time that Sadr has used the term in any of the groups he has set up. None of his previous or current groups—from Jaysh al-Mahdi (Mahdi Army) to the Sadrist Movement/Current to Ahrar, Sa’irun, and Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades)—carries this explicitly sect-centered signifier (Mahdi is a revered figure in both Shia and Sunni belief, though admittedly more central among the Shia). The use of the qualifier “Shia” in the group’s new name reveals an acknowledgment that the Shia political landscape is Sadr’s immediate arena of political activity and exhibits a determination to challenge his pro-Iran Shia rivals gathered within the Coordination Framework on this shared turf.”
“Sadr has already sought to reaffirm his leadership position within the Shia political arena by publicly pushing for the ratification of a controversial piece of legislation that recognized Al-Ghadeer Day as a national holiday. According to Shia tradition, Al-Ghadeer is the day on which the Prophet Mohammed appointed his cousin Ali as his successor. Sunnis reject this narrative. The designation of Al-Ghadeer as a holiday faced resistance among Sunni groups in the Iraqi Parliament and beyond. Furthermore, as the scion of a prominent Shia religious family, Sadr enjoys extensive symbolic capital and charisma among Shia constituents, particularly those of lower socio-economic status and rural backgrounds. His reception last year by Shia Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani also boosted his credentials within the Shia landscape as the only major Shia leader/politician received by Sistani in recent years.”
“The first part, i.e. “Shia”, is fact, and the second part, i.e. “patriotic”, is a wish. A multi-communal federation, Iraq lacks a federation-wide political party that can perform reasonably across all ethnic and religious/sectarian communities. Sadr might aspire to play that role, but he will not be able to as his rhetoric and past baggage will not allow him to cross the existing boundaries (especially the memories of Jaysh al-Mahdi and its participation in the sectarian conflict post-2003).”
Other Ideological Underpinnings
“Sadr has ensured that anti-American (albeit of a non-violent variety) and anti-Israeli orientations remain staples of this new stage in his political venture. While the governing Shia Coordination Framework in Iraq includes more liberal and/or pragmatic elements such as Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, Haider al-Abadi, Ammar al-Hakim, and, to a lesser extent, Nouri al-Maliki, it also encompasses staunchly pro-Iranian figures who openly take pride in violent confrontations, past and present, against the United States and, since October 7, Israel.” the writer said.
“Against this backdrop, Sadr has emphasized his anti-American and anti-Israeli credentials. Sadrists have reminded their rivals that they led the original anti-American “resistance” in Iraq, fighting U.S. forces as early as 2004 under the banner of Jaysh al-Mahdi. Since October 7, he has publicly demanded the closure of the U.S. embassy in Baghdad and called for the expulsion of the ambassador on at least two occasions, though he has urged non-violent means to achieve these objectives. Additionally, Sadr has made several anti-Israeli remarks, often drawing on provocative religious texts, and has organized humanitarian aid campaigns for the population in the Gaza Strip.”
Sadr’s Prospects in Next Elections and Arm Wrestling with Iran
The report also mentioned the prospects of Al-Sadr in the next Parliamentary elections, “The launch of the Patriotic Shia Current comes amid preparations for the next parliamentary election, expected by November 2025. Although the Sadrist Current was the top vote-recipient in the 2021 elections, winning 73 out of 325 seats, Sadr ultimately failed to secure a coalition of two-thirds of the parliamentary seats needed to form the government and subsequently withdrew from the entire political process in an astonishing move.”
“Undoubtedly, Sadr is maneuvering to emerge as the dominant Shia force in the next election. He is well aware of the unpopularity of the current ruling class (with the relative exception of Sudani), as demonstrated by the all-time low voter turnout in last year’s provincial council elections (26 percent of all potentially eligible voters). He will be strategically positioning himself to capitalize on this massive popular disgruntlement with the rival Coordination Framework by presenting himself as an anti-corruption and patriotic force that is not beholden to either Iranian or U.S. interests.”
Salih revealed there have been reports of a possible alliance between Sadr and Sudani to form the next major parliamentary coalition within the Shia scene.
“Sudani has presented himself as a technocrat, interested in providing good governance and focusing on public services, avoiding being seen as wedded to deeper ideological camps within the Shia or Iraqi political landscape. He has tried to keep doors open to working with all sides, and has strategically avoided sacking Sadrist officials from the managerial government posts they have held since previous cabinets. Realizing the possibility of a Sadr-Sudani alliance, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (an arch-nemesis of Sadr) has reportedly begun making overtures to Sadr in the hope of undermining Sudani and his chances of winning a significant parliamentary bloc. Maliki recently controversially proposed for early elections to be held by the end of 2024. Sadr might also see some value in partnering with Sudani after the next elections, given the prime minister’s favorable rating among Iraqis (though it remains to be seen if Sudani can translate this general favorable rating to votes in the coming elections). But Sadr faces a dilemma here. While he would like to undermine his rivals in the governing Shia Coordination Framework by peeling Sudani away from them, he would certainly not be pleased with the prospect of another popular Shia figure emerging in the form of Sudani, who might have more appeal to average Shia voters than either him or his Framework rivals.”
“In addition to that, no government can be formed without partnering with some Kurdish and Sunni Arab groups. This is where Sadr might run into some serious hurdles. Sadr’s last-minute abandonment of his Kurdish and Sunni Arab allies—namely the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Masoud Barzani and the Taqadoum Party of Mohammed al-Halbousi—following the 2021 elections left those groups hanging by a thread. This will make those elements highly cautious, if not unwilling, to seek a renewed political alliance with Sadr alone. The KDP and Taqadoum have paid heavily for their now-defunct alliance with Sadr, as Iran and its allies within Iraq have employed multiple methods to undermine the autonomous Kurdistan Region, whose main governing party is the KDP, and successfully got Halbousi sacked from his coveted parliamentary speaker position through a ruling by the Federal Supreme Court. In short, Sunnis and Kurds will not antagonize Iran again by partnering with Sadr against pro-Iran factions in Iraq.” He said.
“Finally, there is the question of just how far Sadr is willing to go to materialize his vision of a majority government led by his group. When push came to shove in the aftermath of the 2021 elections, Sadr avoided a decisive showdown with pro-Iran groups who appeared willing to resort to violence if necessary. The experience of the past two decades in Iraq has demonstrated that no matter the size of a party or a coalition’s votes, a government cannot be formed without Iran’s approval. Sadr has reportedly begun to mend fences with Iran in recent months, but the road to an eventual full rapprochement will be long and arduous. Although Iran will not entirely alienate Sadr, it will likely manipulate him against other Shia rivals to maintain its influence over the broader Shia political landscape. However, Tehran is unlikely to entrust Sadr with the reign of state power in Iraq due to Sadr’s perceived unpredictability and unreliability, and Iraq’s tremendous strategic importance in Iranian regional designs.”
“This means Sadr, at best, would have a shot at being in the government alongside other more loyal groups to Iran but would not be allowed to establish a majority government that would sideline pro-Iran groups. A repeat of the post-2021 election scenario would likely not get Sadrists anywhere better than in the 2021-2022 period, as power in Iraq is ultimately not defined through electoral performance.”
Salih pointed out that Al-Sadr’s re-entry into formal politics after a years-long hiatus “will likely destabilize the internal Shia political landscape. However, he has shown a pragmatic willingness to avoid violence (despite small-scale clashes here and there) to counter pro-Iran groups, as this would be a lose-lose scenario for Shia, who have finally brought the Iraqi state under their control after two decades of intense and bloody conflict. Hence, Sadr will have to navigate a difficult terrain and likely make bitter compromises with Iran and its allies in Iraq.”
“In short, Sadr’s ambitions are not matched by his means of realizing them. The rebranded movement signifies more of a fresh stage in his political work rather than a new political project altogether or a new political reality in Iraq. In other words, there will be more continuity than change in the Sadrist Current’s behavior and Iraqi politics at large—though with more emphasis placed on its immediate Shia arena of support and rivalry. While maneuvering for a spectacular electoral gain through a rejuvenated and rebranded movement is understandable, and Sadr could possibly increase his share of votes given widespread dissatisfaction with other political groups, translating electoral gains into his long-held desire for a majoritarian government is unlikely. Iran and its Iraqi allies will continue to be the insurmountable barrier to Sadr’s ambitions of leading a majoritarian government.” The report concluded.
Disclaimer: The views presented by the author do not necessarily reflect the official standpoint of Shafaq News Agency.
Hakan Fidan said the war in Ukraine is fraught with the potential for further expansion and could develop into a nuclear conflict if a deal is not struck between Kyiv and Moscow.
Speaking to Turkish broadcaster Haberturk, Mr Fidan said: “The cost of the ongoing war for the region and the entire world is very high.
“What is even more alarming is that this risk may grow and expand. It may expand geographically and the potential use of nuclear weapons may be put on the agenda.”
Fidan warned extending the fight increases the chance of nuclear being put on the agenda. (Image: Getty)
The Turkish diplomat said his government remains committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the ongoing conflict.
Mr Fidan added: “As long as the war continues, the risk of its extension will stay in place and there is no escaping it.
“Each party will be forced to use methods that may change the course of events leading to a situation when the flames may spread to other places.”
The week kicked off with a renewed war of words between Russia and the United States, a key ally to Kyiv, over the use of US-made missiles to attack Russian-annexed Crimea over the weekend.
The United States last month relaxed its ban on the use of US-provided weaponry to carry out attacks on Russian territory, sparking the fury of the Kremlin.
The Russian Foreign Ministry summoned the American ambassador and raged that Washington DC “has effectively become a party” to the war.
Men search through the rubble of the home of Ismail Haniyeh’s sister in the Shati camp near Gaza City [Omar al-Qattaa/AFP]
Israeli forces kill 24 Palestinians in three attacks as Hamas blames Biden administration for war of ‘extermination’.
Published On 25 Jun 202425 Jun 2024
An Israeli air strike has killed 10 members of Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh’s family in northern Gaza’s Shati refugee camp, according to the Palestinian group and the enclave’s civil defence agency.
Confirming the attack on the Haniyeh family and the number of the dead, Hamas said on Tuesday that it held the administration of US President Joe Biden responsible for the continuation of the war of “extermination” against the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip.
It said the United States was continuing to give Israel “political and military cover and time to accomplish the task of destruction and extermination in the Strip”.
Mahmud Basal, a spokesman for the civil defence agency, told the AFP news agency that the Tuesday morning attack targeted the Haniyeh family home in Shati.
Civil defence crews transferred the bodies to al-Ahli Hospital in nearby Gaza City, Basal said, also reporting “several wounded” in the attack.
In a statement, Hamas called “on the international community and the United Nations to shoulder their responsibilities towards these ongoing horrific crimes, to take urgent action to protect innocent civilians, and to hold the terrorist leaders of the occupation accountable for their crimes”
The Israeli military said two buildings were targeted overnight in Shati and Daraj Tuffah, claiming that fighters who had been involved in the October 7 attack on Israel, ahead of the current conflict, were hiding inside. Its statement posted on social media did not mention striking the Haniyeh family home.
Al Jazeera’s team on the ground said the dead from the Haniyeh family included Zahr Abdel Salam Haniyeh, Nahed Haniyeh Abu Ghazi, Iman Haniyeh Umm Ghazi, Ismail Nahed Haniyeh, Muhammad Nahed Haniyeh, Moamen Nahed Haniyeh, Zahra Nahed Haniyeh, Amal Nahed Haniyeh, Shahad Nahed Haniyeh and Sumaya Nahed Haniyeh.
In April, an Israeli air strike in central Gaza killed three sons and four grandchildren of Haniyeh, with the military accusing them of “terrorist activities”.
Haniyeh at the time said that about 60 members of his family had been killed since Israel’s war on Gaza broke out on October 7 last year. The war has killed more than 37,600 people in the territory.
After the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, the European continent has been under the cloud of a nuclear war. As the conflict lingers on and neither party seems able to take the absolute upper hand, a nuclear war looms even closer and the almost-nuclear game between the conflicting parties is getting white heated. To make things worse, except two UN treaties, all other bilateral nuclear arms control treaties in the global nuclear arms control system have basically lost effect.
The UN treaties for nuclear arms control include the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The former was adopted at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on June 12, 1968 and had been verified and joined by 190 countries as of December 2011, including nuclear states such as the US, Russia (Soviet Union), the UK, France, and China. The latter was adopted at the UNGA in September 1996 and has been signed by 181 countries and verified by 150. Russia verified it in 2000, but the US never did. On November 2, 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law to revoke the verification of CTBT. The rejection by the US and the revoked verification by Russia have put its taking effect in limbo.
At present, there is no treaty to bind the two powers on nuclear arms control and disarmament. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) , the Treaty on Open Skies , and the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) previously signed by the US and Russia (Soviet Union), however, have come out of effect.
To respond to the possible nuclear war and to get a head-start in the nuclear competition, nuclear states have been enlarging their nuclear arsenal in recent years, including developing new types of nuclear weapons and modernizing the old ones.
Russian President Putin said on February 23 this year that 95% of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces had been modernized, and its strategic nuclear triad is in a good state of constant upgrading. On June 12, a Russian naval fleet comprising a frigate, a rescue tug, an oil tanker, and a nuclear submarine arrived at the Port of Havana, Cuba. It was the largest Russian naval fleet to ever arrive at the Caribbean Sea after the Cold War, and the first time the country dispatched a nuclear submarine to visit Cuba after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
All the information shows that while the nuclear arms control system is collapsing, a nuclear arms race is all but on. As the Russia-Ukraine conflict drags on in growing intensity and bloc confrontation becomes increasingly fierce, the cloud of a nuclear war is more palpable than ever.
(The author is from the Information and Communication College, the PLA National University of Defense Technology.)
Editor’s note: Originally published on zqb.cyol.com, this article is translated from Chinese into English and edited by the China Military Online. The information and opinions in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of eng.chinamil.com.cn.
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