This is The Prophecy. The Prophecy is much more than seeing into the future. For The Prophecy sees without the limits of time. For The Prophecy sees what is, what was, and what always shall be.
Minuteman III Launch. Photo: U.S. Space Force/Michael Peterson
The head of the U.S. Strategic Command recently impressed upon lawmakers the need to continue modernizing the country’s nuclear triad, noting the threats posed by Russia, China, North Korea and Iran.
U.S. Air Force Gen. Anthony Cotton said at a House Armed Services Committee hearing on March 21 that this modernization effort covers not only the nuclear weapons themselves and their delivery platforms but the nuclear command, control and communications system as well, the U.S. Space Command website reported Friday.
Echoing Cotton’s sentiments, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb said during the same hearing, “We have competitors who are modernizing and diversifying and expanding their nuclear arsenals.”
Plumb went on to discuss the fiscal year 2025 budget the Department of Defense is requesting for the modernization effort. The budget request includes $49.2 billion for the nuclear triad, $33.7 billion for space capabilities and $28.4 billion for missile defeat and defense.
“All of these capabilities — nuclear, space and missile defense — remain central to our ability to deter and also central to our ability to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails,” Plumb said.
Alexander Gates, a geology professor at Rutgers-Newark, is co-author of “The Encyclopedia of Earthquakes and Volcanoes,“ which will be published by Facts on File in July. He has been leading a four-year effort to remap an area known as the Sloatsburg Quadrangle, a 5-by-7-mile tract near Mahwah that crosses into New York State. The Ramapo Fault, which runs through it, was responsible for a big earthquake in 1884, and Dr. Gates warns that a recurrence is overdue. He recently talked about his findings.
Q. What have you found?
A. We’re basically looking at a lot more rock, and we’re looking at the fracturing and jointing in the bedrock and putting it on the maps. Any break in the rock is a fracture. If it has movement, then it’s a fault. There are a lot of faults that are offshoots of the Ramapo. Basically when there are faults, it means you had an earthquake that made it. So there was a lot of earthquake activity to produce these features. We are basically not in a period of earthquake activity along the Ramapo Fault now, but we can see that about six or seven times in history, about 250 million years ago, it had major earthquake activity. And because it’s such a fundamental zone of weakness, anytime anything happens, the Ramapo Fault goes.
A. I found a lot of faults, splays that offshoot from the Ramapo that go 5 to 10 miles away from the fault. I have looked at the Ramapo Fault in other places too. I have seen splays 5 to 10 miles up into the Hudson Highlands. And you can see them right along the roadsides on 287. There’s been a lot of damage to those rocks, and obviously it was produced by fault activities. All of these faults have earthquake potential.
Q. Describe the 1884 earthquake.
A. It was in the northern part of the state near the Sloatsburg area. They didn’t have precise ways of describing the location then. There was lots of damage. Chimneys toppled over. But in 1884, it was a farming community, and there were not many people to be injured. Nobody appears to have written an account of the numbers who were injured.
Q. What lessons we can learn from previous earthquakes?
A. In 1960, the city of Agadir in Morocco had a 6.2 earthquake that killed 12,000 people, a third of the population, and injured a third more. I think it was because the city was unprepared.There had been an earthquake in the area 200 years before. But people discounted the possibility of a recurrence. Here in New Jersey, we should not make the same mistake. We should not forget that we had a 5.4 earthquake 117 years ago. The recurrence interval for an earthquake of that magnitude is every 50 years, and we are overdue. The Agadir was a 6.2, and a 5.4 to a 6.2 isn’t that big a jump.
Q. What are the dangers of a quake that size?
A. When you’re in a flat area in a wooden house it’s obviously not as dangerous, although it could cut off a gas line that could explode. There’s a real problem with infrastructure that is crumbling, like the bridges with crumbling cement.
There’s a real danger we could wind up with our water supplies and electricity cut off if a sizable earthquake goes off. The best thing is to have regular upkeep and keep up new building codes. The new buildings will be O.K. But there is a sense of complacency.
And why Putin and Trump present major danger to the United States’ nuclear paradigm.
Twenty-four minutes.
That’s how long it would take—just 1,440 seconds—for a nuclear warhead to travel from North Korea to the largest nuclear power plant in California, where it could set off a chain reaction of events that bring human civilization back to the Stone Age. It’s a situation that may seem, to most, inconceivable. Yet, it’s one that author Annie Jacobsen plays out with disconcerting details in her new book, Nuclear War: A Scenario, which walks readers through what is known of the United States’ secret emergency protocols in the event of global Armageddon. “Since the end of World War II, the US government has been preparing for, and rehearsing plans for, a General Nuclear War,” she writes. “A nuclear World War III that is guaranteed to leave, at minimum, 2 billion dead.”
It starts, Jacobson explains, with a radar screen blip, touching off a chaotic countdown in which the president—and their uppermost military advisers—must decide if, when, where, and how to retaliate. The federal choreography from there is profound, demanding operational perfection from staff in countless agencies tasked with missile interception, international diplomacy, disaster response, and continuity of government—all in a haze of incomplete information. “Nuclear war,” as she argues, “robs man of reason.”
Pentagon employees note how its center looks like a bull’s-eye.Library of Congress, Theodor Horydczak.
In an interview with Vanity Fair, which has been edited for length and clarity, Jacobsen sounds the alarm about everything from Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling to the “gaping holes” in America’s defense technology, and the chilling implications of a second Donald Trumppresidency. “If you have a ‘mad king’ ruler in office,” she tells me, “it would behoove the entire world to make clear that that mad king behavior is unacceptable.”
Vanity Fair:From my vantage point, nuclear war has been a much hotter topic this year than in the recent past. Of course, in Hollywood, we hadOppenheimer,but there’s also been a lot of nuclear fear around Russia’s war in Ukraine. You probably started researching the book well before all this. What led you to want to dive into this topic specifically?
Annie Jacobsen: How many sources have said to me with chest-swelling pride that they dedicated their lives to preventing a nuclear World War III. And this out of the mouths of, like, the now deceased first director of science and technology at the CIA. You know, very high-level, upper-echelon, top-tier national security people proud that they prevented World War III. And I would always be confronted with this idea of deterrence, also known as prevention. In the former administration with President Trump, I heard his rhetoric—“fire and fury” comes to mind—and thought for the first time in my reporting career, My God, what if deterrence failed? And it stems a little from the “madman theory,” which is sort of entwined in nuclear nonproliferation issues. So, I then put that question to some of my sources. (And again, I’m talking about people who advise the president in the event of this god-awful situation.) And I was shocked that people were very forthcoming with me. I suddenly found myself on Zoom with people like former secretary of defense Bill Perry. So, there, my reporting began. And, of course, you are absolutely right on point because, my God, I never expected it to be headline news. You know, for Vladimir Putin to be, in the most terrible way, promoting the reading of my book because my book demonstrates in appalling detail just how horrific nuclear war would be.
I want to return to something you said about the madman theory. Deterrence is predicated on the notion that the president is a rational actor with the country’s best interests in mind. What is the danger, then, when it comes to the potential reelection of Donald Trump, a man who regularly put his own interests over the country’s and even onceflippantly discussedusing nuclear weapons on North Korea in 2017? Can the Biden administration do anything now to guard against the mad king scenario?
I don’t think since President Kennedy has there been someone in office who has been so educated about the absolute dangers, not just of nuclear war but of rhetoric. Many other presidents have been silent, which doesn’t mean they’re necessarily educated. So whether or not anyone’s madman-type rhetoric is coming from a place of ignorance or information doesn’t matter; nuclear saber-rattling is profoundly dangerous. It isn’t just about American leaders to my eye, it is about everyone. And therefore, if you have a mad king in office, it would behoove the entire world to make clear that that mad king behavior is unacceptable. I used North Korea as an example in my scenario because North Korea is the only nuclear-armed nation that doesn’t adhere to “normal” behavior. For example, North Korea launches ballistic missile tests without notifying anyone. It’s profoundly dangerous when you read my scenario and realize what happens in the first seconds and minutes that a ballistic missile is launched anywhere around the globe: The Defense Department has eyes on it, and a massive alert system goes into effect that could lead to catastrophe, as I show.
Something that struck me was how inevitable catastrophe actually feels. You talk about the Proud Profit war game, where, in the 1980s, a bunch of defense officials played out a ton of scenarios around nuclear war. Time and again, they arrived at the same result: basically complete Armageddon. Could you walk me through why restoring deterrence is so hard once you know a country has launched an attack?
Absolutely. I can give you a concept like “escalate to de-escalate.” That is such an Orwellian concept. This is the whole paradox of nuclear weapons, nuclear war, nuclear deterrence— because you first think this is something out of Dr. Strangelove. Then you realize, Well, perhaps there’s a logic: If North Korea sends one nuclear weapon, we send 82 in return. That is escalate to de-escalate. And then you think, That’s sheer madness, 82 nuclear weapons launched at North Korea will kill tens of millions of people. So, I attempt to demonstrate that there are no good scenarios in a nuclear war scenario. There are no good answers, as the Proud Prophet shows us. We, the public, now know that no matter how nuclear war begins in various scenarios—whether NATO’s involved, whether China’s involved, whether it’s a tactical weapon or a strategic weapon—it ends in a nuclear apocalypse.
In your book, you describe the sheer breadth and meticulousness of America’s nuclear defense protocols. But as you say, it would actually happen so chaotically in real life. What were some of the most gaping holes in the federal government’s playbook? Are there obvious areas where it could improve?
Even having studied this and reported on this issue peripherally for 15 years, I had the same reaction: Oh, my God, this is all thought through. It is a systematic mechanization: A follows B follows C.Once a launch is detected, the sequence goes into effect. People are rehearsing this 24/7/365. And yet, here we are all going about our business. It is literally like an asteroid coming toward Earth, which is the only other event, as in the words of FEMA, that could end civilization in a couple of hours. Another sort of grand theme is that these war plans were originally made by a bunch of admirals and generals who believed that they could actually fight and win a nuclear war, which is such insanity. And now, we essentially allege that deterrence is such that we never have to fight and win a nuclear war. However, the protocols are still the same. The nuclear triad [the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea] is still the same. The number of warheads has been reduced, but there are still enough nuclear weapons on ready-to-launch status that literally can launch in seconds or minutes. There are enough of them on the planet to destroy civilization. So we are stuck with this legacy, like it or not.
Louis Slotin’s Los Alamos badge (left) and a laboratory mock-up of the experiment that killed him (right) at Los Alamos, New Mexico in 1946.Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The gaping holes, interestingly, exist in technology. It’s shocking that in 2024, you might think the technology would have filled in the holes—but, instead, they’ve created worse holes. And when we say “holes,” we mean the potential for disaster. The two that come to mind right off the bat are that America has this incredibly advanced satellite system in geosync parked above our enemy nations so that the hot rock exhaust on an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launch can be seen in under one second. To learn that is remarkable. If that should get any comfort, it doesn’t; when you read the scenario, you learn that’s exactly when the sequence begins, thanks to our launch-on-warning policy. But even more frightening is that, because of all this nuclear posturing over the decades, Russia alleges to have a system that is on par with our system. But I learned that their Tundra satellite system is really compromised. It does not have the same look-down capability from space as the American system. As a result, the Tundra can mistake hot rocket exhaust for clouds and sunlight.
Another thing you mention in the book is America’s nuclear interception capabilities, which seem futile technologically and financially. Your book says it’s akin to “shooting a bullet with a bullet.”
And that’s a quote from a defense scientist!
Right. Given that, do you think the federal government is better off pursuing efforts at prevention and disarmament—and that interception is just a lost cause?
The interceptor program is a brilliant example of when you go to a dinner party and say, ‘Oh, we could have a nuclear war. You should read this book,’ and then will almost immediately say, ‘That’s ridiculous. We have an interceptor system like the Iron Dome.’ That has actually happened to me. Learned people have tried to correct me. We have 44 interceptor missiles. Russia alone has over 1,670 nuclear weapons on ready-for-launch status. So, how are our 44 going to go up against them, particularly when it comes down to trying to “shoot a bullet with a bullet?”According to congressional Oversight Committee documentation, the success rate is between like 45% and 55%. And that is on a curated test. We do not have interceptor capability that means much of anything. I certainly felt and hope readers feel this after reading the book: Trying to become more supreme in the nuclear arms race only accelerates weapons development, only accelerates the threat, and does not make anyone safer. Therefore, the only solution is communication, diplomacy, and agreements.
That’s a good entry point for my next question: Is there any logic to America sharing some of its technological advances multilaterally with a nation like Russia or North Korea? Or is that strategic nonsense?
Atomic test Baker burst through the lagoon surface, lofting 2 million cubic yards of radioactive seawater and sediment into the air in 1946.Library of Congress.
I think that it is irrational not to communicate with your partners in whatever capacity that may be. There are many people more qualified to answer that question. But fundamentally, there have been efforts in that direction. I also write about one of them in the book, with professors Ted Postol and Richard Garwin having gone to the powers that be in Washington. Both had huge, long-standing relationships with all of this: Garwin drew plans for the first thermonuclear bomb, Ivy Mike. Postol advised the Pentagon. He’s now a professor emeritus at MIT. In the early 2000s, when North Korea began building up its nuclear arsenal, they went to the powers that be and said, ‘Look, we should have a program with Russia together to look at this threat because it affects all of us.’ And that was unilaterally rejected. And I use that as an anecdote to demonstrate that, for the most part, pairing up with anybody is somehow seen as weak.
I want to discuss mutual assured destruction (MAD) a bit more. You had a great quote in the book: “The madness of MAD is that the two sides are like a mirror…a madman stares in a pond, sees his image on the surface of the water, and mistakes himself for his enemy.” Could you put this in layperson’s terms and explain why MAD is a fundamentally flawed foreign policy paradigm?
Mutual assured destruction is a very Cold War warrior concept—that we will have such a massive arsenal of weapons pointed at the other side on hair-trigger alert that no one will dare strike us. At its core, deterrence says, ‘The more nuclear weapons you have, the safer you will be.’ And so I believe the only way out is to look in the mirror. You have to really ask yourself, ‘What is going on here? What is the point of all of this?’ I think all things begin with the personal. You have the political, sure, but a person or group of people is at the core of every decision. And that’s why I use that analogy, the poetic idea of looking in the mirror. You could be like, Wow, there I am. Or you can be like, That’s my enemy trying to kill me! This is the only way through some of this madness—to move the world off the razor’s edge—and that is where we stand. The president of the United States, President Biden, said we are closer to nuclear Armageddon than we have been since the Cuban Missile Crisis. That frightens me.
Russian leader Putin doesn’t exclude the possibility of using the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant as an improvised nuclear device, writes former commander of the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Regiment, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon for The Times.
The Kremlin chief threatens the world with a nuclear attack every week. “Nuclear energy can either save the planet from climate change or destroy it in the hands of tyrants like Putin, Assad, and other despots. First and foremost, the UN and the IAEA must ensure the safety of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to prevent radioactive contamination across Europe and further escalation of war,” the expert writes.
In the event of an accident at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, contamination is likely to spread westward rather than eastward, placing all European countries at risk. Meanwhile, Putin currently faces no constraints, and he may believe he is capable of using any weapon, even nuclear or chemical, to achieve his goals.
During Russia’s recent attacks on Ukraine, the security of the ZNPP was once again threatened, notes Hamish de Bretton-Gordon. “Vital power supplies to keep the reactors cold were cut off; the potential meltdown and catastrophic nuclear ‘accident’ were only averted by ancient generators,” the text states.
The IAEA and the UN need to establish a demilitarized zone around the ZNPP to prevent a repeat of the Chornobyl disaster. The author suggests that countries like China and India could provide troops for this task, as Putin is unlikely to attack them.
Israeli forces pounded besieged Gaza on Wednesday in the war sparked by the October 7 attack and fought Hamas around several hospitals despite a UN Security Council demand for a ceasefire.
Talks in Qatar towards a truce and hostage release deal, involving US and Egyptian mediators, have brought no result so far, with Israel and the Palestinian militant group blaming each other.
Tensions have risen between Israel and its top ally the United States over the soaring civilian death toll and dire food shortages in Gaza, and Israeli plans to push its ground offensive into the far-southern city of Rafah, which is packed with displaced civilians.
In heavy overnight bombardment, Israeli strikes again hit Gaza City and Rafah, where a fireball lit up the sky over the city crowded with up to 1.5 million people, most of them displaced by the war.
The health ministry in Hamas-run Gaza said 66 people were killed in overnight bombardment and combat.
Fighting has raged for nine days around Gaza City’s Al-Shifa Hospital, the territory’s largest, and more recently near two hospitals in the main southern city of Khan Yunis, Al-Amal and Nasser.
The army and Shin Bet security service said they were “continuing to conduct precise operational activities” in both cities “while preventing harm to civilians, patients, medical teams and medical equipment”.
The army said “troops continued to eliminate terrorists and locate terror infrastructure and weapons” around Al-Shifa.
“Thus far, hundreds of terrorists have been apprehended and dozens of terrorists have been killed in the area of the hospital,” it said.
Israeli tanks and armoured vehicles have also massed around the Nasser Hospital, the Gaza health ministry said, adding that shots were fired but no raid had yet been launched.
The Palestinian Red Crescent warned that thousands were trapped inside and “their lives are in danger”. The Israeli army has yet to comment on the situation in and around the hospital.
Gaza has endured almost six months of war and a siege that has cut off most food, water, fuel and other supplies, and the UN has warned that its 2.4 million people are on the brink of a “man-made famine”.
Donor governments have airdropped food into Gaza where desperate crowds have rushed towards aid packages drifting down on parachutes. At least 18 people have been reported killed in stampedes or drowned in the Mediterranean Sea.
Hamas has urged an end to the airdrops and called for stepped-up road deliveries instead. The United States said it would keep airdropping humanitarian supplies while also pushing for more overland deliveries.
The war broke out when Hamas launched its unprecedented October 7 attack that resulted in about 1,160 deaths in Israel, mostly civilians, according to an AFP tally of Israeli official figures.
The militants also took about 250 hostages. Israel says that, after an earlier truce and hostage deal, about 130 captives remain in Gaza, including 34 who are presumed dead.
Israel’s retaliatory campaign has killed at least 32,414 people in Gaza, most of them women and children, according to the health ministry.
Israel also charges that Palestinian militants sexually assaulted October 7 victims and hostages.
Soussana, who was abducted from a kibbutz on October 7 and released in November, said she was repeatedly beaten and sexually assaulted at gunpoint by her guard inside Gaza.
Israeli military spokesman Daniel Hagari said that her abuse “is a wake up call to the world to act. To do everything and pressure Hamas. To free our hostages. To bring our hostages home.”
The UN Security Council on Monday passed its first resolution demanding an “immediate ceasefire” in Gaza and the release of the captives.
The United States, which had blocked previous resolutions, abstained, drawing an angry rebuke from Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The right-wing premier cancelled an Israeli delegation’s planned visit to Washington, although Defence Minister Yoav Gallant was already there.
Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin stressed, before meeting Gallant, that “the number of civilian casualties is far too high, and the amount of humanitarian aid is far too low” in Gaza.
Despite the tensions, Rear Admiral Hagari said security cooperation was closer than ever, “encompassing the entire US military and the US intelligence services”.
Israeli and Hamas envoys have engaged in weeks of indirect talks aimed at halting the fighting, but both sides said this week the talks were failing.
Qatari foreign ministry spokesman Majed al-Ansari has said that, although the CIA and Mossad chiefs had left Doha, the talks were “ongoing” at a technical level.
Hamas leader Ghazi Hamad charged that Israel “is being intransigent and wants to keep the war going, despite international positions and in defiance to UN Security Council’s decision to cease fire during Ramadan,” the ongoing Muslim holy month of fasting.
“There hasn’t been any progress in ceasefire talks or negotiations for prisoners’ exchange,” he said. “The Israeli government’s procrastination is just a way to gain time and keep their aggression going.”
On March 11, 2024, India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced the successful test of a land-based nuclear missile equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology. The missile test, named Mission Divyastra, launched from Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam Island in the Indian state of Odisha, positioning India among the select nations possessing MIRV capability. This exclusive club includes the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France. Notably, Pakistan conducted its maiden MIRV test in January 2017, employing the Ababeel medium-range ballistic missile.
The latest test is the tenth test of Agni-V, but the first with MIRV technology. With MIRV technology, a single missile can carry multiple warheads with independent guidance systems and navigation controls that are capable of independent targeting at varying speeds and distances spanning hundreds of miles apart. According to Indian sources, the Agni-V MIRV has an indigenous avionics systems and contains high-precision sensor packages to ensure precise targeting. The official statement following the test did not specify the number of warheads, but it is generally believed that it can carry four to six warheads, whereas some estimates even claim the number of warheads to be up to 10 to 12.
India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) announced the successful test of a land-based nuclear missile equipped with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology.
The timing and projection of the news surrounding the latest test are indeed notable. Similar to the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test conducted before the 2019 elections, domestic and international observers expected a technological demonstration of the same level ahead of upcoming elections. While the BJP-led government is hailing it as a significant development, it’s important to acknowledge that operationalizing this technology will require numerous additional tests. This is especially pertinent given the fact that achieving successful miniaturization of warheads suitable for MIRVing capabilities took the United States and the Soviet Union several years.
Regional Implications
The latest test is supposedly a response to China, as India’s existing missile ranges already cover the entire landmass of Pakistan. But regardless of the declaratory intent, the test is likely to impact Pakistan’s strategic thinking in a significant manner. Pakistan’s first reaction was to raise its concern over New Delhi’s failure to adhere to the missile notification agreement which, according to the Foreign Office spokesperson, was not followed in letter and spirit. According to the statement, “The advance notification was shared by India, but it did not follow the 3-day timeline as stipulated in Article 2 of the Agreement on Pre-notification of the Fight Testing of Ballistic Missiles.”
MIRVing is an offensive strategy in nature and was largely viewed as a first strike weapon during the Cold War. In that regard, claiming that this will enhance deterrence is rather misplaced, especially given its potential to exacerbate the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, it has the potential to spark an expensive arms race in the region.
On the other hand, it presents a disadvantagehttp://andrewtheprophet.com by enabling an adversary to more easily neutralize multiple warheads with a strike against a single target, thereby undermining deterrence. Additionally, while MIRVing could potentially serve as an effective countermeasure against a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, it is worth noting that Pakistan does not have a BMD, and China’s BMD capability is not a dominant factor in the India-China deterrence dynamic as it is mainly positioned against the U.S. missile threat. As duly noted by Hans Kristian, “Unless China develops an efficient missile defense system with capability against intermediate-range ballistic missiles, there seems to be no military need for MIRVs on Indian missiles.” Similarly, Agni-V is primarily designed to cover the entire landmass of China; equipping it with MIRVs will increase its weight, which will reduce its range, thereby undermining its primary deterrent role against China.
Pakistan’s response is likely to be diversifying its nuclear options and perfecting its own MIRV capability.
The MIRVing of Agni-V further erodes the sanctity of India’s nuclear doctrine. New Delhi’s official nuclear policy is centered around the principles of credible minimum deterrence and assured retaliation. However, its recent strides into MIRVing contradicts the notion of minimum deterrence and defensive posturing. If anything, the test is a further confirmation of India’s evolving nuclear posture in its bid to shift to counterforce targeting against Pakistan. In 2019, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang noted that “if India used MIRVed missiles intended for China against Pakistan (by lofting or depressing their missile trajectories), what it pursues for survivability against the former could be employed as a potential first-strike weapon against the latter.”
This development is going to intensify the nuclear arms competition and give incentive to a dangerous warhead race in South Asia. Looking ahead, Pakistan’s response is likely to be diversifying its nuclear options and perfecting its own MIRV capability. These developments will further undermine an already fragile regional stability between New Delhi and Islamabad by generating first-strike instability where each side will be incentivized to attack first. It was this risk to stability that pushed the United States to call for the de-MIRVing of its ICBMs in its tenth nuclear posture review in 2010. In the absence of reliable risk reduction measures and crisis de-escalation mechanisms in South Asia, every crisis runs the risk of escalating, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to the nuclear threshold. With the employment of MIRVs, that risk rises a few notches up.
Israel Foreign Minister Israel Katz told Israeli Army Radio on Tuesday that the United Nations Security Council’s approved resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the release of all hostages held in Gaza emboldened Hamas to reject the proposed deal. He also criticized the United States, Israel’s top ally, for not vetoing the resolution over its lack of a condemnation of Hamas and its Oct. 7 attack.
An independent expert working with the U.N.’s top human rights body said Monday that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe Israel is carrying out genocide in Gaza. International aid officials say the entire population of the Gaza Strip — 2.3 million people — is suffering from food insecurity and that famine is imminent in the hard-hit north.
More than 32,000 people have been killed in the besieged territory and more than 74,000 wounded, according to Gaza’s Health Ministry, which doesn’t differentiate between civilians and combatants in its tally. It says women and children make up two-thirds of the dead.
Some 1,200 people were killed on Oct. 7 when militants launched a surprise attack out of Gaza, triggering the war, and abducted another 250 people. Hamas is still believed to be holding some 100 Israelis hostage, as well as the remains of 30 others.
Currently:
— The U.N.’s demand for a cease-fire in Gaza provokes the strongest clash between the U.S. and Israel since the war began.
— U.S. and Israeli defense chiefs will meet Tuesday as tensions rise over Gaza.
— Trump urges Israel to “finish up” its Gaza offensive and warns about global support fading.
— Jerusalem marks the festive holiday Purim in shadow of war.
JERUSALEM — The United Nations Security Council’s approval of a resolution calling for an immediate end to hostilities emboldened Hamas to reject the latest cease-fire proposal, Israel Foreign Minister Israel Katz said Tuesday.
Israel and Hamas are negotiating a cease-fire deal in exchange for the release of dozens of hostages still held by the militant group in Gaza. Hamas said late Monday that it was rejecting the latest proposal and sticking to its core demands, which include an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza.
Katz told Israeli Army Radio that the U.N. resolution indicated to Hamas that international pressure was closing in on Israel and that it need only wait for the war to end through that pressure rather than agreeing to make any concessions.
“The message delivered to Hamas yesterday … is that you don’t have to hurry,” Katz said. He also criticized the United States, Israel’s top ally, for not vetoing the resolution over its lack of a condemnation of Hamas and its Oct. 7 attack.
HAMAS REJECTS THE LATEST CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL, SAYING ISRAEL IS IGNORING KEY DEMANDS
RAFAH, Gaza Strip — Hamas has rejected the latest cease-fire proposal, accusing Israel of ignoring its core demands, which include an end to the war and a full withdrawal from Gaza.
In a statement late Monday, the militant group said it had informed mediators that it was sticking to its original position, conveyed earlier in March. It said Israel had not responded to its core demands of a “comprehensive cease-fire, an (Israeli) withdrawal from the Strip, the return of displaced people and a real prisoner exchange.”
The statement came shortly after the United Nations Security Council approved a resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and the release of all hostages held in Gaza.
Hamas is still believed to be holding some 100 hostages, as well as the remains of around 30 others. More than 100 hostages were freed during a weeklong cease-fire in November in exchange for the release of 240 Palestinian prisoners.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has rejected Hamas’ demands, calling them “delusional.” He has vowed to resume Israel’s offensive after any hostage release and keep fighting until Hamas is destroyed.
If today a magnitude 6 earthquake were to occur centered on New York City, what would its effects be? Will the loss be 10 or 100 billion dollars? Will there be 10 or 10,000 fatalities? Will there be 1,000 or 100,000 homeless needing shelter? Can government function, provide assistance, and maintain order? At this time, no satisfactory answers to these questions are available. A few years ago, rudimentary scenario studies were made for Boston and New York with limited scope and uncertain results. For most eastern cities, including Washington D.C., we know even less about the economic, societal and political impacts from significant earthquakes, whatever their rate of occurrence. Why do we know so little about such vital public issues? Because the public has been lulled into believing that seriously damaging quakes are so unlikely in the east that in essence we do not need to consider them. We shall examine the validity of this widely held opinion. Is the public’s earthquake awareness (or lack thereof) controlled by perceived low Seismicity, Seismic Hazard, or Seismic Risk? How do these three seismic features differ from, and relate to each other? In many portions of California, earthquake awareness is refreshed in a major way about once every decade (and in some places even more often) by virtually every person experiencing a damaging event. The occurrence of earthquakes of given magnitudes in time and space, not withstanding their effects, are the manifestations of seismicity. Ground shaking, faulting, landslides or soil liquefaction are the manifestations of seismic hazard. Damage to structures, and loss of life, limb, material assets, business and services are the manifestations of seismic risk. By sheer experience, California’s public understands fairly well these three interconnected manifestations of the earthquake phenomenon. This awareness is reflected in public policy, enforcement of seismic regulations, and preparedness in both the public and private sector. In the eastern U.S., the public and its decision makers generally do not understand them because of inexperience. Judging seismic risk by rates of seismicity alone (which are low in the east but high in the west) has undoubtedly contributed to the public’s tendency to belittle the seismic loss potential for eastern urban regions. Let us compare two hypothetical locations, one in California and one in New York City. Assume the location in California does experience, on average, one M = 6 every 10 years, compared to New York once every 1,000 years. This implies a ratio of rates of seismicity of 100:1. Does that mean the ratio of expected losses (when annualized per year) is also 100:1? Most likely not. That ratio may be closer to 10:1, which seems to imply that taking our clues from seismicity alone may lead to an underestimation of the potential seismic risks in the east. Why should this be so? To check the assertion, let us make a back-of-the-envelope estimate. The expected seismic risk for a given area is defined as the area-integrated product of: seismic hazard (expected shaking level), assets ($ and people), and the assets’ vulnerabilities (that is, their expected fractional loss given a certain hazard – say, shaking level). Thus, if we have a 100 times lower seismicity rate in New York compared to California, which at any given point from a given quake may yield a 2 times higher shaking level in New York compared to California because ground motions in the east are known to differ from those in the west; and if we have a 2 times higher asset density (a modest assumption for Manhattan!), and a 2 times higher vulnerability (again a modest assumption when considering the large stock of unreinforced masonry buildings and aged infrastructure in New York), then our California/New York ratio for annualized loss potential may be on the order of (100/(2x2x2)):1. That implies about a 12:1 risk ratio between the California and New York location, compared to a 100:1 ratio in seismicity rates. From this example it appears that seismic awareness in the east may be more controlled by the rate of seismicity than by the less well understood risk potential. This misunderstanding is one of the reasons why earthquake awareness and preparedness in the densely populated east is so disproportionally low relative to its seismic loss potential. Rare but potentially catastrophic losses in the east compete in attention with more frequent moderate losses in the west. New York City is the paramount example of a low-probability, high-impact seismic risk, the sort of risk that is hard to insure against, or mobilize public action to reduce the risks. There are basically two ways to respond. One is to do little and wait until one or more disastrous events occur. Then react to these – albeit disastrous – “windows of opportunity.” That is, pay after the unmitigated facts, rather than attempt to control their outcome. This is a high-stakes approach, considering the evolved state of the economy. The other approach is to invest in mitigation ahead of time, and use scientific knowledge and inference, education, technology transfer, and combine it with a mixture of regulatory and/or economic incentives to implement earthquake preparedness. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) has attempted the latter while much of the public tends to cling to the former of the two options. Realistic and reliable quantitative loss estimation techniques are essential to evaluate the relative merits of the two approaches. This paper tries to bring into focus some of the seismological factors which are but one set of variables one needs for quantifying the earthquake loss potential in eastern U.S. urban regions. We use local and global analogs for illustrating possible scenario events in terms of risk. We also highlight some of the few local steps that have been undertaken towards mitigating against the eastern earthquake threat; and discuss priorities for future actions.
Since Russia ’s invasion of Ukraine more than two years ago, the fear of a nuclear conflict has risen with tensions between Russia and the West at its highest point since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Russia is known to have the largest nuclear stockpile in the world – and Putin has threatened to use them.
But Prof John Strawson told The Mirror that he does not see Russia as the main for causing a nuclear war as it is a “centralised” country with a clear power base in Putin and he knows that using a bomb would be devastating for everyone.
Instead he believes that a bigger threat comes from Pakistan as it is a “far less stable country” and “we don’t know who is running it”. The professor of Law, Policing and Justice said: “I wouldn’t say Putin is looking for a nuclear conflict but the longer we go the more likely we are to have a nuclear conflict at some point and we are lucky not to have had one since 1945.
“But Russia is a lot more cautious than Pakistan, I would predict it is more likely that Pakistan would use a nuclear bomb as it is a far less stable country. Russia is a centralised country but Pakistan is unstable, we don’t know who is running it, it is not very clear. Their position with the Taliban was not very clear. With Russia they know that a nuclear war would be devastating for everyone on both sides and so the situation is more rational with forces avoiding the situation getting out of control.”
Image: Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
Prof Strawson also pointed to how Putin is now in a strong position in Russia. “Putin has shown himself able to recover from the shock of not overthrowing Ukraine straight away, he immediately recovered, saw off the Wagner threat and so in that sense he is clearly acting rationally. He has his own peculiar style and is very security conscious, he plays games with political elite,” he said. “His speech on February 24 was very clear his picture of the world and his play book.”
And Prof Anthony Glees, of the University of Buckingham, also believes that it is not in Putin’s plan to start a nuclear war, but both are also clear that the Russian leader does have ambitions on expansionism beyond Ukraine.
“So in my opinion, Putin’s conventional war against us and against NATO which is his policy, stated time and time again, of reconstituting the strategic and geopolitical entity that was the Soviet Union before 1989, has already started, indeed it has been underway in the UK for some time,” he said.
“Putin’s strategy is not to nuke us but to make us so labile and malleable that in effect we in the UK will dance to his tune. His tactics are to start with subversion, something he’s been doing here in the UK for at least a decade. Russian money has softened up our political class, especially many in the Conservative party. Russia loathes the European Union and in Brexit Putin saw something that he thought would weaken both the UK and, importantly, the EU. He was dead right about this.
“Remember Putin was a KGB officer, not a Red Army officer. His skill set is the skill set of the Soviet intelligence community, subversion and hollowing us out, softly softly if he can get away with it – he’s furious with Ukraine in part because they didn’t knuckle under as he thinks, with some justification, we in the UK and in Germany and France might do so. Arms would be a last resort and might not even be necessary.
That’s how long it would take—just 1,440 seconds—for a nuclear warhead to travel from North Korea to the largest nuclear power plant in California, where it could set off a chain reaction of events that bring human civilization back to the Stone Age. It’s a situation that may seem, to most, inconceivable. Yet, it’s one that author Annie Jacobsen plays out with disconcerting details in her new book, Nuclear War: A Scenario,which walks readers through what is known of the United States’ secret emergency protocols in the event of global Armageddon. “Since the end of World War II, the US government has been preparing for, and rehearsing plans for, a General Nuclear War,” she writes. “A nuclear World War III that is guaranteed to leave, at minimum, 2 billion dead.”
It starts, Jacobson explains, with a radar screen blip, touching off a chaotic countdown in which the president—and their uppermost military advisers—must decide if, when, where, and how to retaliate. The federal choreography from there is profound, demanding operational perfection from staff in countless agencies tasked with missile interception, international diplomacy, disaster response, and continuity of government—all in a haze of incomplete information. “Nuclear war,” as she argues, “robs man of reason.”
In an interview with Vanity Fair, which has been edited for length and clarity, Jacobsen sounds the alarm about everything from Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling to the “gaping holes” in America’s defense technology, and the chilling implications of a second Donald Trump presidency. “If you have a ‘mad king’ ruler in office,” she tells me, “it would behoove the entire world to make clear that that mad king behavior is unacceptable.”
Vanity Fair:From my vantage point, nuclear war has been a much hotter topic this year than in the recent past. Of course, in Hollywood, we hadOppenheimer,but there’s also been a lot of nuclear fear around Russia’s war in Ukraine. You probably started researching the book well before all this. What led you to want to dive into this topic specifically?
Annie Jacobsen: How many sources have said to me with chest-swelling pride that they dedicated their lives to preventing a nuclear World War III. And this out of the mouths of, like, the now deceased first director of science and technology at the CIA. You know, very high-level, upper-echelon, top-tier national security people proud that they prevented World War III. And I would always be confronted with this idea of deterrence, also known as prevention. In the former administration with President Trump, I heard his rhetoric—“fire and fury” comes to mind—and thought for the first time in my reporting career, My God, what if deterrence failed? And it stems a little from the “madman theory,” which is sort of entwined in nuclear nonproliferation issues. So, I then put that question to some of my sources. (And again, I’m talking about people who advise the president in the event of this god-awful situation.) And I was shocked that people were very forthcoming with me. I suddenly found myself on Zoom with people like former secretary of defense Bill Perry. So, there, my reporting began. And, of course, you are absolutely right on point because, my God, I never expected it to be headline news. You know, for Vladimir Putin to be, in the most terrible way, promoting the reading of my book because my book demonstrates in appalling detail just how horrific nuclear war would be.
I don’t think since President Kennedy has there been someone in office who has been so educated about the absolute dangers, not just of nuclear war but of rhetoric. Many other presidents have been silent, which doesn’t mean they’re necessarily educated. So whether or not anyone’s madman-type rhetoric is coming from a place of ignorance or information doesn’t matter; nuclear saber-rattling is profoundly dangerous. It isn’t just about American leaders to my eye, it is about everyone. And therefore, if you have a mad king in office, it would behoove the entire world to make clear that that mad king behavior is unacceptable. I used North Korea as an example in my scenario because North Korea is the only nuclear-armed nation that doesn’t adhere to “normal” behavior. For example, North Korea launches ballistic missile tests without notifying anyone. It’s profoundly dangerous when you read my scenario and realize what happens in the first seconds and minutes that a ballistic missile is launched anywhere around the globe: The Defense Department has eyes on it, and a massive alert system goes into effect that could lead to catastrophe, as I show.
Something that struck me was how inevitable catastrophe actually feels. You talk about the Proud Profit war game, where, in the 1980s, a bunch of defense officials played out a ton of scenarios around nuclear war. Time and again, they arrived at the same result: basically complete Armageddon. Could you walk me through why restoring deterrence is so hard once you know a country has launched an attack?
Absolutely. I can give you a concept like “escalate to de-escalate.” That is such an Orwellian concept. This is the whole paradox of nuclear weapons, nuclear war, nuclear deterrence— because you first think this is something out of Dr. Strangelove. Then you realize, Well, perhaps there’s a logic: If North Korea sends one nuclear weapon, we send 82 in return. That is escalate to de-escalate. And then you think, That’s sheer madness, 82 nuclear weapons launched at North Korea will kill tens of millions of people. So, I attempt to demonstrate that there are no good scenarios in a nuclear war scenario. There are no good answers, as the Proud Prophet shows us. We, the public, now know that no matter how nuclear war begins in various scenarios—whether NATO’s involved, whether China’s involved, whether it’s a tactical weapon or a strategic weapon—it ends in a nuclear apocalypse.
In your book, you describe the sheer breadth and meticulousness of America’s nuclear defense protocols. But as you say, it would actually happen so chaotically in real life. What were some of the most gaping holes in the federal government’s playbook? Are there obvious areas where it could improve?
Even having studied this and reported on this issue peripherally for 15 years, I had the same reaction: Oh, my God, this is all thought through. It is a systematic mechanization: A follows B follows C. Once a launch is detected, the sequence goes into effect. People are rehearsing this 24/7/365. And yet, here we are all going about our business. It is literally like an asteroid coming toward Earth, which is the only other event, as in the words of FEMA, that could end civilization in a couple of hours. Another sort of grand theme is that these war plans were originally made by a bunch of admirals and generals who believed that they could actually fight and win a nuclear war, which is such insanity. And now, we essentially allege that deterrence is such that we never have to fight and win a nuclear war. However, the protocols are still the same. The nuclear triad [the ability to launch nuclear weapons from land, air, and sea] is still the same. The number of warheads has been reduced, but there are still enough nuclear weapons on ready-to-launch status that literally can launch in seconds or minutes. There are enough of them on the planet to destroy civilization. So we are stuck with this legacy, like it or not.
The gaping holes, interestingly, exist in technology. It’s shocking that in 2024, you might think the technology would have filled in the holes—but, instead, they’ve created worse holes. And when we say “holes,” we mean the potential for disaster. The two that come to mind right off the bat are that America has this incredibly advanced satellite system in geosync parked above our enemy nations so that the hot rock exhaust on an ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launch can be seen in under one second. To learn that is remarkable. If that should get any comfort, it doesn’t; when you read the scenario, you learn that’s exactly when the sequence begins, thanks to our launch-on-warning policy. But even more frightening is that, because of all this nuclear posturing over the decades, Russia alleges to have a system that is on par with our system. But I learned that their Tundra satellite system is really compromised. It does not have the same look-down capability from space as the American system. As a result, the Tundra can mistake hot rocket exhaust for clouds and sunlight.
Another thing you mention in the book is America’s nuclear interception capabilities, which seem futile technologically and financially. Your book says it’s akin to “shooting a bullet with a bullet.”
And that’s a quote from a defense scientist!
Right. Given that, do you think the federal government is better off pursuing efforts at prevention and disarmament—and that interception is just a lost cause?
The interceptor program is a brilliant example of when you go to a dinner party and say, ‘Oh, we could have a nuclear war. You should read this book,’ and then will almost immediately say, ‘That’s ridiculous. We have an interceptor system like the Iron Dome.’ That has actually happened to me. Learned people have tried to correct me. We have 44 interceptor missiles. Russia alone has over 1,670 nuclear weapons on ready-for-launch status. So, how are our 44 going to go up against them, particularly when it comes down to trying to “shoot a bullet with a bullet?”According to congressional Oversight Committee documentation, the success rate is between like 45% and 55%. And that is on a curated test. We do not have interceptor capability that means much of anything. I certainly felt and hope readers feel this after reading the book: Trying to become more supreme in the nuclear arms race only accelerates weapons development, only accelerates the threat, and does not make anyone safer. Therefore, the only solution is communication, diplomacy, and agreements.
That’s a good entry point for my next question: Is there any logic to America sharing some of its technological advances multilaterally with a nation like Russia or North Korea? Or is that strategic nonsense?
I think that it is irrational not to communicate with your partners in whatever capacity that may be. There are many people more qualified to answer that question. But fundamentally, there have been efforts in that direction. I also write about one of them in the book, with professors Ted Postol and Richard Garwin having gone to the powers that be in Washington. Both had huge, long-standing relationships with all of this: Garwin drew plans for the first thermonuclear bomb, Ivy Mike. Postol advised the Pentagon. He’s now a professor emeritus at MIT. In the early 2000s, when North Korea began building up its nuclear arsenal, they went to the powers that be and said, ‘Look, we should have a program with Russia together to look at this threat because it affects all of us.’ And that was unilaterally rejected. And I use that as an anecdote to demonstrate that, for the most part, pairing up with anybody is somehow seen as weak.
I want to discuss mutual assured destruction (MAD) a bit more. You had a great quote in the book: “The madness of MAD is that the two sides are like a mirror…a madman stares in a pond, sees his image on the surface of the water, and mistakes himself for his enemy.” Could you put this in layperson’s terms and explain why MAD is a fundamentally flawed foreign policy paradigm?
Mutual assured destruction is a very Cold War warrior concept—that we will have such a massive arsenal of weapons pointed at the other side on hair-trigger alert that no one will dare strike us. At its core, deterrence says, ‘The more nuclear weapons you have, the safer you will be.’ And so I believe the only way out is to look in the mirror. You have to really ask yourself, ‘What is going on here? What is the point of all of this?’ I think all things begin with the personal. You have the political, sure, but a person or group of people is at the core of every decision. And that’s why I use that analogy, the poetic idea of looking in the mirror. You could be like, Wow, there I am. Or you can be like, That’s my enemy trying to kill me! This is the only way through some of this madness—to move the world off the razor’s edge—and that is where we stand. The president of the United States, President Biden, said we are closer to nuclear Armageddon than we have been since the Cuban Missile Crisis. That frightens me
The Prophecy Blog 