The Prophecy is much more than seeing into the future. For the Prophecy sees without the element of time. For the Prophecy sees what is, what was, and what always shall be. 11:11 LLC
He’s not a general and he’s not a politician, at least in the conventional sense. But with a single speech he can spark a protest that ends up in with hundreds of Iraqi Shiites storming their parliament. He’s commanded a militia of thousands, some who fought and killed U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. And he’s been on TIME Magazine’s annual list of the 100 most influential people on the planet.
This is how he’s managed to gain such prominence — and retain it.
The Sadr family
Sadr was born in 1973 in the Shiite holy city of Najaf to a prominent family.
The city, which is about 100 miles south of Baghdad, is home to the Imam Ali shrine, where the eponymous cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad is buried. Shiites believe that Ali was the rightful successor to Muhammad.
Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was an important Shiite figure in Iraq who openly spoke out against Saddam Hussein and his ruling Baath party.
The elder Sadr and two of his sons were assassinated in 1999 in Najaf, and many believe that he was killed either by the dictator’s forces or Sunnis loyal to him.
Despite the cult of personality Muqtada al-Sadr has developed in recent years, he is still a relatively private man. He does not appear in public often and his exact age was not known until recently.
Protesters in Kadhimiya, Iraq, hold up pictures of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father.
The Mehdi Army
Sadr is best known to Western audiences for his role leading the Mehdi Army, which he formed in 2003 during the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The militia is considered the armed wing of the Sadrist movement, which followed the teachings of Sadr’s father. Its power base was in Najaf and the massive Sadr City in eastern Baghdad, which is home to more than 2 million Shias.
Sadr himself opposed the presence of outside forces in Iraq — be they al Qaeda’s Sunni fighters or U.S. forces — and hoped to establish Islamic rule within the country, clashing with the Iraqi Army, U.S. forces and fellow Shias.
By 2004, forces loyal to Sadr battled the U.S. for control of Najaf. President George W. Bush labeled him an enemy and ordered the U.S. military to take him out.
“We can’t allow one man to change the course of the country,” he said, according to Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez.
Within a week, Bush changed course and decided not to go after him.
“That reversal was the turning point in al-Sadr’s rise to power,” Sanchez, who commanded U.S. forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, said. “It gave him legitimacy and enhanced his stature within the broader Iraqi community.”
Later that year, Sadr made peace with the most powerful Shia religious figure in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who brokered a truce between U.S. forces and the Mehdi Army. The deal brought together the unquestioned spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shia population and the man who could mobilize the Shia “street.”
The Mehdi Army in Najaf in 2007.
As part of the agreement, the Iraqi government agreed not to press charges after a judge issued an arrest warrant for Sadr in connection with the killing of another prominent Shia leader, Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei.
But the Mehdi Army became even more deadly as the war dragged on.
The militia was linked to much of the sectarian violence that reached fever pitch in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. It was accused of running death squads, killing Sunni Arabs and fighting with rival Shiite factions, though Sadr would denounce the violence from time to time.
After more than 200 people were killed in an attack on Sadr City in 2006 — one of the deadliest periods in the Iraq war — Shiite militants responded by burning people to death and attacking Sunni mosques.
By the end of the year, Pentagon leaders assessed that the Mehdi army had replaced al Qaeda as “the most dangerous accelerant” of sectarian violence in Iraq.
But the Mehdi Army also clashed with other Shiite militias. The group often clashed with Badr Brigades for control of parts of Iraq’s Shiite-dominate south. At one point the Badr Brigades partnered with Iraqi security forces to fight the Mehdi Army.
However, the Mehdi Army’s power and influence began to subside by the end of 2007, in part due to the U.S. troop surge.
Kingmaker
Sadr’s capacity to reinvent his role in Iraqi politics, and to tap into a strong vein of Shia protest, has helped him survive and outmaneuver many rivals over the past 13 years. His latest initiative reinforces his place as one of the most influential figures in Iraq.
He and the Iraqi government signed a ceasefire in 2008, and later that year he formally disbanded the Mehdi Army.
The organization is now called Saraya al-Salam, which means the Peace Brigades.
His plan was to transition it into a socio-political populist movement to help Iraq’s poor Shiites through a combination of political and grassroots activities — following a similar model to the structure of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Sadr would move to Iran later that year for religious study. Some believed that he hoped to achieve a higher religious standing, like Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, in order to strengthen his leadership position.
Muqtada al-Sadr delivers a speech in Najaf in 2011.
He returned to Iraq permanently in 2011 — more than three years later — without a new title, but with ambitions to become an Iraqi nationalist leader who could make a difference by growing his movement and pushing his followers to the ballot box.
“We have not forgotten the occupier. We remain a resistance,” he said in one of his first speeches back. Sadr did strike a conciliatory tone with fellow Iraqis: “Whatever struggle happened between brothers, let us forget about it and turn the page forever and live united,” he said. “We do not kill an Iraqi.”
Though Sadr rarely makes public appearances, his plan seems to have worked so far.
During Iraq’s 2010 elections, his supporters were key to helping then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki secure a second term; today they make up the second-largest bloc in Iraq’s Parliament.
Muqtada al-Sadr and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in 2006.
But Sadr and Maliki have since had a nasty falling out, and now are considered rivals in Baghdad.
After the 2010 election, Sadr referred to Maliki as a “dictator.”
He often called for the government to better include moderate Sunni elements, a faction that most say was marginalized by the Maliki government, which led to his ouster (and in part contributed to the rise of ISIS).
His support for Iraq’s current Prime Minster, Haider al-Abadi, is lukewarm at best.
Sadr is now focusing his efforts on reshaping Iraq’s government — he wants more technocrats appointed and to go after corrupt politicians.
Sadr’s supporters held massive protests earlier this year to push Abadi to form a new government and enact reforms. The demonstrations were called off after Abadi trimmed the size of his Cabinet and submitted a new list of nonpolitical ministers for approval by parliament.
And it was Sadr’s impassioned speech late April that spurred protesters to occupy the Iraqi Parliament and Baghdad’s Green Zone, a normally off-limits area housing government buildings and foreign embassies.
CNN’s Tim Lister, Hamdi Alkhshali, Mohammed Tawfeeq and Elise Labott contributed to this report
The Muhandis General Company (Sharakat al-Muhandis al-Amma) takes its name from Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the former deputy commander of Iran-backed Shiite militia Hashd al-Shaabi — also known as the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — and a close comrade of former IRGC’s extraterritorial Quds force commander Qasem Soleimani. They were killed together in January 2020 by a US drone strike.
Muhandis was himself a graduate of civil engineering and in the late 1970s joined the Islamic Dawa Party, which fiercely opposed the Baathist government of Iraqi autocrat Saddam Hussein and led an insurgency against him during the Iran-Iraq war.
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, a commander in the Popular Mobilization Forces, attends a funeral procession of Hashd al-Shaabi (paramilitary forces) members.
According to our sources, the establishment of the company and its growing sway in Iraq’s construction projects has led to the opposition of the Iraqi army and even the Shiite leaders in Najaf. Influential Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr — who seeks to curb the influence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraqi politics – has once and again called against an Iranian-linked government or a subordinate one in Baghdad.
The Muhandis company seeks to become the Iraqi version of Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, IRGC’s engineering and contracting arm. Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarter is one of Iran’s largest contractors in industrial and development projects. The IRGC business conglomerate was created during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War to help rebuild the country and has diversified over the years into companies dealing with mechanical engineering, energy, mining, and defense.
Earlier in May, London-based pan-Arab website Al-Araby Al-Jadeed reported that Al-Muhandis company is increasing its work in the field of contracting and infrastructure in the private and public sector through several projects in the capital Baghdad and several other cities, describing it as the Islamic Republic’s effort to create “a parallel state” inside Iraq.
The report claimed that via its growing network, the company aims to provide financial resources to support Hashd al-Shaabi and its affiliated armed factions.
“Some see the establishment of the company as an attempt to replicate the experience of the Revolutionary Guard in Iran, aimed at controlling economic and commercial sectors in Iraq, towards building a parallel economy, under the management of the Popular Mobilization Forces, which gives the group financial independence,” claimed the report.
According to the report, the company was established in November 2022 with a capital of 100 billion dinars ($68.5 million) and it is exempt from paying any taxes.
In March, US-based think-tank The Washington Institute for Near East Policy reported that the company launched its inaugural project — a commitment to plant one million trees in a large parcel of government-provided land in al-Muthanna province. It said: “The launch event was attended by both PMF chairman Faleh al-Fayyad, a US-designated human rights abuser, and PMF chief of staff Abdul-Aziz al-Mohammadawi (aka Abu Fadak), a US-designated terrorist.”
The think-tank added that Iraqi ‘resistance’ groups – affiliated with the Islamic Republic — have long sought a company “with preferential access to lucrative state contracts, and the Sudani government is finally providing them after years of opposition.”
By Stefano Freyr Castiglione March 11, 2016 09:51 GMT Supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr burn a US flag during a protest demanding the government prevent the entry of U.S. troops into Iraq at Al-Tahrir Square in Baghdad, September 20, 2014.REUTERS/Ahmed Saad
While he opposed the Baathist regime, his rise to prominence came with his resistance to the Anglo-American occupation after 2003, founding a militia known as the Mahdi Army, which was involved in the post-invasion insurgency, and accused of sectarian violence. Being able to count on both large popular support and a powerful military force, he soon became one of Iraq’s leading political and religious figures.
Sadr’s stance with regards to Iraqi politics has been rather ambiguous, leading some to describe him as “a hybrid of anti-establishment positions while being part of the establishment himself.” His involvement in the country’s public life has seen him make moves and take positions which are sometimes in contrast with the Shia ruling majority’s orientations. He is a steadfast opponent of sectarian politics, although some members of his bloc, the Sadrist Movement, have held, and continue to hold, positions in governments based on quota-sharing.
A common thread since 2003 has been the opposition to foreign interference in Iraq, regardless whether it comes from the West (US, UK) or the East (Iran). His disenchantment as to the possibility of pursuing an alternative to sectarian politics was one of the reasons that led him to suddenly announce his withdrawal from political life in 2014, as one of his movement’s officials stated. Since then, things have evolved in Iraq. The rise of Islamic State (Isis) in which sectarian politics undoubtedly played a role has posed a serious threat to the stability of the country, exacerbated by the political tensions of Maliki’s government at the time. Despite enormous difficulties (the constant threat of extremism, the recent fall of oil prices), his successor Haidar al-Abadi has managed to keep the country afloat as the Hashd al-Shaabi (PMU) and the Security Forces have regained territory from Daesh.
Abadi has been able to ease tensions with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to take some anti-corruption measures, and to purge the army of inefficient officials. Some issues which have taken root in Iraq have not yet been entirely solved, such as poor public services, corruption, lack of transparency, and sectarianism.
These are the plagues that Sadr has vowed to fight against, on the base of a populist vision of national unity in which religiosity and patriotism are often conflated, as the slogan “Love for one’s country is part of the faith” suggests. The Shia leader supported Abadi’s pledge to carry out a government reshuffle, aimed at installing a technocratic cabinet, as well as to fight corruption, restore services, and implement public accountability.
People in Iraq are getting more and more frustrated at Abadi-led government’s inability to move forward in the reform process — which some elements in the ruling majority actually oppose, seeing it as a threat to their interests. As talks between political factions have not led to concrete results so far, Sadr has seen an opportunity to mobilise the Iraqi masses and push for more audacious measures. After having a member of his own political bloc, Baha al-A’raji (PM deputy), arrested on corruption and embezzlement charges, he disavowed the corrupt officers in his movement and is currently going to investigate how they have caused corruption.
Looking at the causes that may have led Sadr to such a steadfast return to public life, it has been suggested that he hopes to prevent other Shia groups from asserting their influence in the country, on both a political and a military level. After a government reshuffle was proposed, factions have been in disagreement over how this is to be done: while one side prefers the ministries to be chosen by political parties, another side, led by Sadr, asserts that parties should not interfere. Sadr has also threatened the current government with a vote of no-confidence if no agreement is reached within 45 days. It is also worth noting that Sadr does not oppose Abadi, but he thinks he should take the chance to promote reforms before it’s too late.
How is Sadr’s comeback to be evaluated? This week, the third demonstration led by the Shia leaexpected to be held, which threatens to storm the Green Zone in the Iraqi capital. There are mixed feelings in the Iraqi street regarding Sadr’s role. Some support his push for change, frustrated at Abadi government’s poor performance in terms of reforms.
Others, however, are afraid that if a breach in security occurs during the protests, it will undermine the rule of law and set a precedent that Sadr is taking the law into his own hands. This is why some of the Green Zone residents have allegedly left the area lest the situation gets out of control. Despite being characterised by some clearly populist motifs, Sadr’s pledge to fight against corruption and for the sake of the most vulnerable classes of Iraqi society can function as an incentive for the large-scale reforms proposed by Abadi. At the same time, though, Sadr’s uncompromising stances may lead to political stalemate in a country that still needs to recapture the remaining areas under Daesh control.
His call for a more transparent and efficient administration, then, can be beneficial as long as his long-term vision does not hinder the current government’s activity, given the delicate stage the country is going through.
Stefano Freyr Castiglione is an Arab media analyst at Integrity UK
Undermined from inside and outside his movement, keeping out of politics is proving a difficult and dangerous game for the influential Shia cleric
As the final days of the holy month of Ramadan approached, Muqtada al-Sadr busied himself with preparations for his annual itikaf, a period of reflection to be spent in the great mosque of Kufa.
To those around him, it seemed clear he was trying to divert his attention away from events in the world outside the walls of his home in central Najaf’s Hanana.
It has been almost a year since the influential Shia cleric announced his withdrawal from politics. Over the past few months, as a new Iraqi government was formed without his participation, he resolutely refused to enter into any political dialogue or receive visitors trying to speak to him about developments or issues the country was facing.
Sadr’s entourage could see how difficult it was for Sadr to remain calm as he made his arrangements for the three-day Kufa mosque retreat. It was plainly difficult for him to stay away from the daily drama of Iraqi politics.
Sadr had just a few days before he was due to head to Kufa. He asked who would join him in itikaf, and what food they would be given for their days of reflection, one of Sadr’s close aides told Middle East Eye.
Everyone told him everything was as he wanted it and that there was nothing to worry about. But that wasn’t quite true.
The masked man said that the Kufa mosque would witness the launch of a “big campaign” to declare allegiance to Sadr during his stay there.
“We will pledge allegiance to him and announce that he is the awaited imam, and we will be under his banner and support him,” the man said.
“Do not let down the imam of your time. Give your allegiance to him and support him.”
Hours later, dozens of Sadr’s supporters, who call themselves “owners of the cause”, gathered in Hanana in front of his house to declare their allegiance.
To their surprise, Sadr’s guards did not greet them, instead assaulting the rapturous Sadrists and handing them over to the police, local sources told MEE.
Sadr already knew that there were some among the most devoted in the Sadrist movement who believe he is the Mahdi, and footage like the video of the masked man was not particularly unusual. But for some reason, the developments “provoked him a lot, and raised his fears”, Sadr’s aide said.
Rather than being a show of support, the video was seen as an attempt to destabilise Sadr.
“That was an explicit threat to Sadr’s life and a threat of chaos,” the aide told MEE.
According to the aide, whoever was behind the video wanted to provoke Sadrists into massing at the Kufa mosque and then confronting Shia clergy in Najaf, who would not accept the claim Sadr is their long-awaited saviour.
“These people are very dangerous and can carry out crimes in the name of Sadr,” he said.
A devotee reads the Quran during Ramadan at the Grand Mosque of Kufa, 14 April (AFP)
If this analysis is correct, Sadr’s response showed he understood well what was at play and decided to distance himself from it as soon as possible.
He cancelled his itikaf, ordered most of his offices closed, and suspended his movement’s religious and social work for at least a year.
At least three prominent Shia leaders told MEE that “a malicious plan was behind that movement”, and that Sadr was indeed a target.
“It was an ideological game aimed at manipulating Sadr and inflating his ego. If he remained silent or responded to the game positively, then killing him became legitimate,” one of the leaders said.
“Whoever was behind this scheme, he was seeking to implicate Sadr and to force him in one way or another to take a stand.”
Since that day, Sadr has only been dealt further painful blows, both by his political opponents and people closer to home. It seems more than one player is trying to drag him out of his seclusion.
The fatwa loophole
In Shia jurisprudence, adult Muslims must choose a senior cleric to be their religious reference – or marjaa – and follow his fatwas and instructions in all matters of life.
Traditionally, that marjaa must be alive and known for his religious scholarship. But the two founders of the Sadrist movement, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr and Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, stressed that a marjaa should be the most knowledgeable cleric available – alive or dead.
Grand Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri, who was a student of the first Sadr and guardian of the second, did not deviate from this line. In fact, he issued a fatwa allowing people to follow a dead marjaa, as long as they have the permission of a living one, like himself.
When Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr was assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s agents in 1999, the Sadrists began to follow Haeri spiritually and the slain Sadr’s son, Muqtada, politically.
Haeri also gave Muqtada al-Sadr permission to manage his father’s office and religious schools, as well as the funds raised through khums (obligatory religious charity) and donations.
This arrangement benefitted Sadr considerably and helped keep the Sadrist movement together under his leadership, particularly keeping the loyalty of youth born following his father’s death.
Fear, a fatwa, and bloodshed: Inside the battle for Iraq’s Green Zone
In his announcement, Haeri rescinded his permission for Sadr to manage the movement’s funds and activities.
“Sayyid Haeri’s sudden retirement confused Sadr and greatly embarrassed him,” Khalid al-Hamdani, professor at Najaf’s scientific seminary, told MEE.
“Retirement is not customary among Najaf clergymen… so everyone was surprised by it, including the offices of Sadr and Haeri himself. That retirement has impacted all the arrangements between Sadr’s and Hairi’s offices dating back to 2003.”
Haeri’s retirement prompted Sadr to suspend the work of the Sadrist religious schools and institutions, and he stopped receiving the khums.
Not only did he lose access to the hundreds of millions of dollars they brought in, he haemorrhaged followers as well.
Only adding to the “shocking” and “strange” nature of Haeri’s announcement, as a number of Shia scholars in Najaf described it, was the order for the marjaa’s followers to “obey” Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei instead.
“Herein lies the danger,” said a prominent Sadrist leader. Previously, Sadrists would be embarrassed following Khamenei spiritually, and therefore working with the Iraqi armed factions associated with the Iranian supreme leader.
But not only had Haeri embarrassed Sadr by associating him with Khamenei, whom he had long kept a distance from, he had opened the door for Sadrists to consider other clerics as their marjaa rather than Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr.
“Can you imagine what happened? The semi-closed circle, which Sadr was keen to keep the Sadrists inside, has broken, and this is what Sadr never expected to happen,” Sadr’s aide said.
Today, Sadr’s status is a hot topic of discussion, with Haeri’s announcement opening the door for the cleric’s Shia rivals to question his legitimacy at every opportunity.
‘Frankly, the issue is far from jurisprudence, religion and faith. It is a struggle over the Sadrist grassroots’
– Former Sadr aide
Dozens of Telegram channels, WhatsApp groups and Facebook pages, some of them linked to Shia armed factions and others of unknown affiliation, have been heavily promoting the debate for weeks.
In response, Sadr has tried to shore up his support.
On 29 April, he asked his followers to submit a written pledge signed in blood where they promised not to follow any religious scholar who has not been a longstanding Sadrist. They also had to vow not to join any “suspicious groups that want to undermine Iraq, the sect and the Sadrist movement”.
Sadr was keen to stress to his followers that his enemies had “malicious plans” aimed at dispersing the Sadrist movement and encouraging them to question their marjaa or leader – Sadr himself.
“Frankly, the issue is far from jurisprudence, religion and faith. It is a struggle over the Sadrist grassroots,” said a former Sadr aide, who a few years ago defected to an Iranian-backed armed faction.
“Questioning Sadr’s religious and ideological authority, and raising questions about the nature of the relationship between him and his followers, is one of the weapons used in the battle and we all know this.”
The former aide acknowledged the cleric relies heavily on the movement’s youngest generation but also said these youth remain committed to him spiritually and politically.
“Fortifying these people and keeping them under control, away from the influence of opponents, is Sadr’s chief goal right now,” he said.
Fraternal competition
Sadr’s fiercest opponents are his former companions: followers of his father and uncle, people he has gone into battle with.
Most prominent are Shia armed factions Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah, who have ideological, demographic and territorial overlap with the Sadrist movement.
The three factions emerged from the same school of jurisprudence that was founded by the first Sadr leader, Muhammad Baqir, Sadr’s uncle and father-in-law.
This demographic and ideological crossover complicates the competition between the factions, making their fight even more cruel.
And the fraternal nature of their competition means the Sadrists, Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataeb Hezbollah know exactly how to undermine each other and tempt their fighters away.
Iraqi documents say Hashd al-Shaabi fighters have doubled in two years
This dynamic dramatically and publicly revealed itself earlier this month.
On 6 May, Sadr instructed his supporters to mark the annual anniversary of the assassination of his father later in the month.
Only those who had signed the pledges in blood were allowed to participate in the Najaf ceremony, provided they walk on foot from the outskirts of the holy city to the place where Sadr senior was killed.
Sadr’s stipulations and planned march were a message to his opponents, one of the cleric’s aides told MEE. He was showing his rivals that only he could move such vast crowds of devotees.
“The plan was for everyone to see the number of those willing to die for Sadr. We do not deny that the goal was to display our strength and our men,” the aide said.
Just days before the parade was due to take place, it was cancelled.
Sadr’s office distributed an audio recording of the cleric, in which he ordered everyone to stop preparations and close Sadr’s shrine in Najaf throughout the last week of May, when the anniversary was due to fall.
This was “the best punishment for this hypocritical group and those who support them among the corrupt and shameless militias”, Sadr is heard saying, using a common nickname he has for Asaib Ahl al-Haq.
No other reason was given. But developments in the southern governorates of Basra and Nasiriyah in recent weeks offer some clues.
Internal Sadrist correspondence seen by Middle East Eye shows in late April the central security branch of Saraya al-Salam, the Sadrists’ armed wing, ordered the expulsion of 18 fighters from the 304th Basra Brigade, without mentioning why.
A senior Saraya al-Salam commander in Basra told MEE that the fighters were believed to be defecting to Asaib.
Saraya al-Salam fighters take part in a parade along a street in Najaf in 2016 (Reuters)
Two weeks later, the same branch ordered the expulsion of Abu Hassan al-Daradji, a senior commander in Basra, on charges of “treason”, the correspondence shows.
Twenty-four hours later, websites linked to Asaib published pictures of Darraji accompanied by a number of the armed faction’s leaders, announcing his defection.
“Our information says that they paid him at least 2bn dinars [$1.5m] to defect from us, along with his unit,” the Saraya al-Salam commander told MEE.
It is not clear what material damage Darraji’s defection caused Sadr’s Basra units, but by the reactions of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, we can see it was a blow to morale.
Local Sadrist leaders in Basra told MEE that Daradji had been made commander of Asaib’s special missions team.
“They wanted to tell us that this was his reward,” the Saraya al-Salam commander told MEE.
Wanting Sadr back
The Sadrist retreat began in June last year, when, frustrated by his inability to form a government, Sadr ordered his MPs to resign from parliament.
That allowed Sadr’s Shia rivals in the Coordination Framework alliance to form the government of their choice. It seemed like an incredible coup for them. Months later, it appears more like a trap.
Iraq has witnessed a period of relative calm in recent months. Leaders of the Coordination Framework, which includes most Iranian-backed political forces and armed factions, have gone about their business without obvious concerns.
Yet Shia political leaders told MEE that fears are beginning to surface.
Some of the biggest concerns expressed by Framework leaders is that some of their partners in the Shia alliance are “encroaching” on their territory and have control over key institutions.
Essentially, the organs of state are a lucrative business for whoever controls them.
While Sadrists had powerful positions in government, anyone pursuing illegal and corrupt activities could accuse them of being responsible instead, giving them plausible deniability.
With that no longer possible, Sadr’s friends and enemies alike find they miss him and wish for his return to political life, “to relieve them of embarrassment and to provide them with the required cover for their illegal business”, as a Framework leader put it.
“Many international and local parties believe that Sadr’s presence outside the political process is more costly than his presence inside it, and it is time for him to return,” the Framework leader said.
According to the leader, Asaib Ahl al-Haq has begun taking more shares of the spoils of government than its partners are happy with.
“If it stays like this, this faction will turn on the rest and swallow them up,” he said.
“Others have become exposed and cannot proceed with their illegal activities without the presence of someone that they can use as a cover to throw the charge at.”
Sadr, the Framework leader said, is a “tool of deterrence” and provides a kind of protection for several parties.
“It cannot be said that only one player is behind everything that is happening with Sadr now, but it is certain that several international and local parties are seeking to bring him back to the scene,” he said.
“How and when will he return? This mainly depends on his ability to hold on.”
He’s not a general and he’s not a politician, at least in the conventional sense. But with a single speech he can spark a protest that ends up in with hundreds of Iraqi Shiites storming their parliament. He’s commanded a militia of thousands, some who fought and killed U.S. and Iraqi soldiers. And he’s been on TIME Magazine’s annual list of the 100 most influential people on the planet.
This is how he’s managed to gain such prominence — and retain it.
The Sadr family
Sadr was born in 1973 in the Shiite holy city of Najaf to a prominent family.
The city, which is about 100 miles south of Baghdad, is home to the Imam Ali shrine, where the eponymous cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad is buried. Shiites believe that Ali was the rightful successor to Muhammad.
Sadr’s father, Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, was an important Shiite figure in Iraq who openly spoke out against Saddam Hussein and his ruling Baath party.
The elder Sadr and two of his sons were assassinated in 1999 in Najaf, and many believe that he was killed either by the dictator’s forces or Sunnis loyal to him.
Despite the cult of personality Muqtada al-Sadr has developed in recent years, he is still a relatively private man. He does not appear in public often and his exact age was not known until recently.
Protesters in Kadhimiya, Iraq, hold up pictures of Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father.
The Mehdi Army
Sadr is best known to Western audiences for his role leading the Mehdi Army, which he formed in 2003 during the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The militia is considered the armed wing of the Sadrist movement, which followed the teachings of Sadr’s father. Its power base was in Najaf and the massive Sadr City in eastern Baghdad, which is home to more than 2 million Shias.
Sadr himself opposed the presence of outside forces in Iraq — be they al Qaeda’s Sunni fighters or U.S. forces — and hoped to establish Islamic rule within the country, clashing with the Iraqi Army, U.S. forces and fellow Shias.
By 2004, forces loyal to Sadr battled the U.S. for control of Najaf. President George W. Bush labeled him an enemy and ordered the U.S. military to take him out.
“We can’t allow one man to change the course of the country,” he said, according to Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez.
Within a week, Bush changed course and decided not to go after him.
“That reversal was the turning point in al-Sadr’s rise to power,” Sanchez, who commanded U.S. forces in Iraq from 2003 to 2004, said. “It gave him legitimacy and enhanced his stature within the broader Iraqi community.”
Later that year, Sadr made peace with the most powerful Shia religious figure in Iraq, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who brokered a truce between U.S. forces and the Mehdi Army. The deal brought together the unquestioned spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shia population and the man who could mobilize the Shia “street.”
The Mehdi Army in Najaf in 2007.
As part of the agreement, the Iraqi government agreed not to press charges after a judge issued an arrest warrant for Sadr in connection with the killing of another prominent Shia leader, Ayatollah Abdul Majid al-Khoei.
But the Mehdi Army became even more deadly as the war dragged on.
The militia was linked to much of the sectarian violence that reached fever pitch in Iraq in 2006 and 2007. It was accused of running death squads, killing Sunni Arabs and fighting with rival Shiite factions, though Sadr would denounce the violence from time to time.
After more than 200 people were killed in an attack on Sadr City in 2006 — one of the deadliest periods in the Iraq war — Shiite militants responded by burning people to death and attacking Sunni mosques.
By the end of the year, Pentagon leaders assessed that the Mehdi army had replaced al Qaeda as “the most dangerous accelerant” of sectarian violence in Iraq.
But the Mehdi Army also clashed with other Shiite militias. The group often clashed with Badr Brigades for control of parts of Iraq’s Shiite-dominate south. At one point the Badr Brigades partnered with Iraqi security forces to fight the Mehdi Army.
However, the Mehdi Army’s power and influence began to subside by the end of 2007, in part due to the U.S. troop surge.
Kingmaker
Sadr’s capacity to reinvent his role in Iraqi politics, and to tap into a strong vein of Shia protest, has helped him survive and outmaneuver many rivals over the past 13 years. His latest initiative reinforces his place as one of the most influential figures in Iraq.
He and the Iraqi government signed a ceasefire in 2008, and later that year he formally disbanded the Mehdi Army.
The organization is now called Saraya al-Salam, which means the Peace Brigades.
His plan was to transition it into a socio-political populist movement to help Iraq’s poor Shiites through a combination of political and grassroots activities — following a similar model to the structure of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Sadr would move to Iran later that year for religious study. Some believed that he hoped to achieve a higher religious standing, like Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, in order to strengthen his leadership position.
Muqtada al-Sadr delivers a speech in Najaf in 2011.
He returned to Iraq permanently in 2011 — more than three years later — without a new title, but with ambitions to become an Iraqi nationalist leader who could make a difference by growing his movement and pushing his followers to the ballot box.
“We have not forgotten the occupier. We remain a resistance,” he said in one of his first speeches back. Sadr did strike a conciliatory tone with fellow Iraqis: “Whatever struggle happened between brothers, let us forget about it and turn the page forever and live united,” he said. “We do not kill an Iraqi.”
Though Sadr rarely makes public appearances, his plan seems to have worked so far.
During Iraq’s 2010 elections, his supporters were key to helping then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki secure a second term; today they make up the second-largest bloc in Iraq’s Parliament.
Muqtada al-Sadr and former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in 2006.
But Sadr and Maliki have since had a nasty falling out, and now are considered rivals in Baghdad.
After the 2010 election, Sadr referred to Maliki as a “dictator.”
He often called for the government to better include moderate Sunni elements, a faction that most say was marginalized by the Maliki government, which led to his ouster (and in part contributed to the rise of ISIS).
His support for Iraq’s current Prime Minster, Haider al-Abadi, is lukewarm at best.
Sadr is now focusing his efforts on reshaping Iraq’s government — he wants more technocrats appointed and to go after corrupt politicians.
Sadr’s supporters held massive protests earlier this year to push Abadi to form a new government and enact reforms. The demonstrations were called off after Abadi trimmed the size of his Cabinet and submitted a new list of nonpolitical ministers for approval by parliament.
And it was Sadr’s impassioned speech late April that spurred protesters to occupy the Iraqi Parliament and Baghdad’s Green Zone, a normally off-limits area housing government buildings and foreign embassies.
CNN’s Tim Lister, Hamdi Alkhshali, Mohammed Tawfeeq and Elise Labott contributed to this report
Sulaiman LkaderiPublished date: 21 October 2021 17:38 UTC| Last update: 10 hours 40 mins ago 111Shares
Muqtada al-Sadr emerged as the frontrunner in Iraq’s 2021 elections. The Shia cleric, militia leader and political kingmaker has played a crucial role in shaping Iraq since the US invasion in 2003. Here’s what you need to know about him.
Influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, makes a speech from his house in Najaf, Iraq, August 30, 2022. Photo: Anmar Khalil/AP
ERBIL, Kurdistan Region – Iraq’s Influential Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on Sunday canceled all ceremonies scheduled to honor the memory of his father, Muhamed Sadiq al-Sadr, on the anniversary of his assassination, saying he was punishing the followers that have claimed him to be a long-foretold messianic figure.
In April, a group of Sadrist followers known by the name “People of the Cause” were spreading a theory that Imam al-Mahdi would appear at the Kufa Mosque, coinciding with Sadr’s decision to attend a religious retreat at the mosque. They claimed that Sadr would be the promised one.
Protesting their claims, Sadr announced he was freezing the activities of his Sadrist Movement for a year and deactivating his Twitter account indefinitely.
The Shiite cleric said that “the best punishment” for these groups of outliers and those who support them was “prohibiting everyone” from conducting ceremonies to mark the anniversary of Sadr’s father’s death.
Thousands of Shiite followers annually attend a ceremony in Najaf marking the anniversary of the assassination in accordance to the Islamic Hijri calendar.
Sadr added that he remains “loyal and a servant” to his followers, but claimed that he was making the decision out of concern for them and in hopes that God would spare them from “the evil of that day.”
Islamic theology says that a messianic figure, known as Imam al-Mahdi among Shiites and Muhammad al-Mahdi among Sunnis, will emerge at the end of times to redeem Islam and rid the world of evil. Naming the figure is condemned by both sects, as it falls into the category of al-Ghaib (the concealed), which is information known only by God.
Sadr’s father, an outspoken critic of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, was shot in his car alongside two of his sons, Muamal and Mustafa, by unidentified assailants on February 19, 1999, corresponding to the fourth of Dhu al-Qidah month on the Hijri calendar.
Unlike his two sons, the late Shiite cleric did not immediately meet his fate after the shooting, rather he was taken to a hospital for treatment where he was shot once more, leading to his death. Sadr was 24 when his father was killed.
Sadr commands a large popular following and his movement has religious and charitable institutions. He was also involved in politics until he announced his “definitive retirement” last August after violent altercations broke out between his supporters and those of pro-Iran parties inside Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone.
While he opposed the Baathist regime, his rise to prominence came with his resistance to the Anglo-American occupation after 2003, founding a militia known as the Mahdi Army, which was involved in the post-invasion insurgency, and accused of sectarian violence. Being able to count on both large popular support and a powerful military force, he soon became one of Iraq’s leading political and religious figures.
Sadr’s stance with regards to Iraqi politics has been rather ambiguous, leading some to describe him as “a hybrid of anti-establishment positions while being part of the establishment himself.” His involvement in the country’s public life has seen him make moves and take positions which are sometimes in contrast with the Shia ruling majority’s orientations. He is a steadfast opponent of sectarian politics, although some members of his bloc, the Sadrist Movement, have held, and continue to hold, positions in governments based on quota-sharing.
A common thread since 2003 has been the opposition to foreign interference in Iraq, regardless whether it comes from the West (US, UK) or the East (Iran). His disenchantment as to the possibility of pursuing an alternative to sectarian politics was one of the reasons that led him to suddenly announce his withdrawal from political life in 2014, as one of his movement’s officials stated. Since then, things have evolved in Iraq. The rise of Islamic State (Isis) in which sectarian politics undoubtedly played a role has posed a serious threat to the stability of the country, exacerbated by the political tensions of Maliki’s government at the time. Despite enormous difficulties (the constant threat of extremism, the recent fall of oil prices), his successor Haidar al-Abadi has managed to keep the country afloat as the Hashd al-Shaabi (PMU) and the Security Forces have regained territory from Daesh.
Abadi has been able to ease tensions with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to take some anti-corruption measures, and to purge the army of inefficient officials. Some issues which have taken root in Iraq have not yet been entirely solved, such as poor public services, corruption, lack of transparency, and sectarianism.
These are the plagues that Sadr has vowed to fight against, on the base of a populist vision of national unity in which religiosity and patriotism are often conflated, as the slogan “Love for one’s country is part of the faith” suggests. The Shia leader supported Abadi’s pledge to carry out a government reshuffle, aimed at installing a technocratic cabinet, as well as to fight corruption, restore services, and implement public accountability.
People in Iraq are getting more and more frustrated at Abadi-led government’s inability to move forward in the reform process — which some elements in the ruling majority actually oppose, seeing it as a threat to their interests. As talks between political factions have not led to concrete results so far, Sadr has seen an opportunity to mobilise the Iraqi masses and push for more audacious measures. After having a member of his own political bloc, Baha al-A’raji (PM deputy), arrested on corruption and embezzlement charges, he disavowed the corrupt officers in his movement and is currently going to investigate how they have caused corruption.
Looking at the causes that may have led Sadr to such a steadfast return to public life, it has been suggested that he hopes to prevent other Shia groups from asserting their influence in the country, on both a political and a military level. After a government reshuffle was proposed, factions have been in disagreement over how this is to be done: while one side prefers the ministries to be chosen by political parties, another side, led by Sadr, asserts that parties should not interfere. Sadr has also threatened the current government with a vote of no-confidence if no agreement is reached within 45 days. It is also worth noting that Sadr does not oppose Abadi, but he thinks he should take the chance to promote reforms before it’s too late.
How is Sadr’s comeback to be evaluated? This week, the third demonstration led by the Shia leaexpected to be held, which threatens to storm the Green Zone in the Iraqi capital. There are mixed feelings in the Iraqi street regarding Sadr’s role. Some support his push for change, frustrated at Abadi government’s poor performance in terms of reforms.
Others, however, are afraid that if a breach in security occurs during the protests, it will undermine the rule of law and set a precedent that Sadr is taking the law into his own hands. This is why some of the Green Zone residents have allegedly left the area lest the situation gets out of control. Despite being characterised by some clearly populist motifs, Sadr’s pledge to fight against corruption and for the sake of the most vulnerable classes of Iraqi society can function as an incentive for the large-scale reforms proposed by Abadi. At the same time, though, Sadr’s uncompromising stances may lead to political stalemate in a country that still needs to recapture the remaining areas under Daesh control.
His call for a more transparent and efficient administration, then, can be beneficial as long as his long-term vision does not hinder the current government’s activity, given the delicate stage the country is going through.
Stefano Freyr Castiglione is an Arab media analyst at Integrity UK
Influential Iraqi Shiite cleric and political leader al-Sadr announced Friday, April 14, 2023, that he would suspend his movement for one year, citing “corruption” among some of his followers. (AP Photo/Anmar Khalil, File)
BAGHDAD (AP) — Influential Iraqi Shiite cleric and political leader Muqtada al-Sadr announced on Friday that he would suspend the movement he leads for one year, citing “corruption” among some of his followers.
A group within his Sadrist movement, which has dubbed itself the “Owners of the Cause,” believes that al-Sadr is Imam Mahdi, a Shiite religious leader said to have vanished more than 1,000 years ago and who is expected to return leading an army of the faithful to defeat evil in the world.
On Friday, Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council announced that an investigative court had ordered the arrest of 65 alleged members of the “Owners of the Cause,” which it described as a disruptive “gang.”
Al-Sadr resigned from politics last August, following a nearly yearlong deadlock in the formation of a new Cabinet. His party won the largest share of seats in the October 2021 parliamentary elections, but not enough to secure a majority government.
Al-Sadr’s refusal to negotiate with his Iran-backed Shiite rivals and his subsequent exit from the talks catapulted the country into political uncertainty and volatility amid intensifying intra-Shiite wrangling.
After al-Sadr announced his resignation from politics, hundreds of his angry followers stormed the government palace and clashed with security forces. At least 15 protesters were killed.
In an indication of his extreme anger and his estrangement with them, the leader of the “Sadr movement” Muqtada al-Sadr decided not to allow politicians from outside his movement to attend the commemoration ceremony for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the killing of his father, the religious authority Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who accused Saddam’s regime of masterminding his assassination on February 9, 1999. , which falls on the fourth of the next month of Dhu al-Qi`dah of the Hijri year, and is dedicated to commemorating the anniversary.
This is the first time that al-Sadr has taken a decision of this kind, which means that a wide spectrum of politicians of armed parties and factions who were students and imitators of al-Sadr are unable this year to visit the shrine of the late religious authority, which is included in the commemoration ceremonies, and according to a source from the movement. Al-Sadr, “two politicians and personalities affiliated with the (Virtue) party, (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) and the (Nujaba) movement … and others will not be able to visit the shrine this year.”
And the source added in an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat that “Al-Sadr intended, through the set of points he issued regarding the commemoration, to send a message to the movements and parties that invest politically in the legacy of the late reference, and sought to stop that personal and interest-based investment that has been going on for years at the expense of the Al-Sadr family. ».
And he continues: «There is another matter that al-Sadr wanted to stop through the instructions he issued, which is to prevent the exploitation of the occasion even by some interest-based tendencies affiliated with the movement, through his insistence on holding the commemoration in Najaf governorate only and limiting it to three days instead of continuing it to seven days as is the case. It used to happen in previous years.Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr during a protest in Sadr City, Baghdad, last month (AP)
Yesterday, Salih Muhammad al-Iraqi, known as “Minister of al-Sadr,” issued a list of the steps ordered by al-Sadr that must be taken during the commemoration ceremony for the twenty-fifth anniversary, and they included “spreading blackness this year by lovers and on their homes, shops, and places of work, and walking from the designated walking places.” It is the outskirts of the most honorable Najaf, or whatever is appointed by the Central Committee as much as possible.
The regulation prohibited entry to the shrine of the reference, “anyone who refrained from signing the blood covenant document,” referring to the document that al-Sadr issued a few days ago, and he asked his followers to sign it. his political career.
The regulation also prohibited “the presence of politicians in commemoration ceremonies, and it is restricted to Sadrist politicians exclusively only.”
Since Al-Sadr’s decision to withdraw his bloc in the Federal Parliament (73 seats) in early August 2022, speculation about the step that Al-Sadr might take has been deliberating inside Iraq, but Al-Sadr has not taken any step so far that would mix the cards and disturb Months of political calm enjoyed by the government of Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani.
However, al-Sadr’s failure to take escalatory steps against the government of his opponents in the Shiite “coordinating framework” forces does not mean that he has surrendered to the status quo according to most local observers, and a wide spectrum of them believes that “Al-Sadr deliberately misleads his opponents and may surprise them at any moment and turn the tables on them while he enjoys a strong base.” A very popular masses of obedience and adherence to his orders.
On the other hand, others believe that al-Sadr’s delay in responding to his political opponents, who prevented him from forming a government despite his numerical majority in Parliament, may cost him a heavy political price in the coming years, and lead to the disintegration of his current and the departure of many of his followers, especially if the prime minister’s government succeeds. Minister Muhammad Shayaa Al-Sudani achieved relative successes related to the service side, infrastructure and combating corruption.
Who is Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr?
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