The Pakistani Horn’s Nukes Are Not Safe and Secure: Revelation 8

nuclear weapons in pakistan — Representative photo

Chaos in Pakistan: Are the nuclear weapons safe and secure?

June 3, 2023

Prevailing Unstable Environment in Pakistan: If events were not so tragic, the fast moving violent, dynamic, unpredictable politico-social drama being enacted in Pakistan would appear to be ‘comic-action film’ on TV. Nevertheless, being a transactional, impersonal world, people are watching with great interest and unfortunately great amusement. But, a nuclear crisis is certainly no laughing matter, and powers that be will do well to plan and be ready for all contingencies.

The situation is exacerbated by the rivalry and obvious power games between the military, judiciary and executive, with Imran Khan as the ‘invincible, highly popular action hero’. Lost in the turmoil and violence, is the constant fear about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ecosystem – the warheads, the missiles, delivery vehicles (land, air, sea, undersea), the readymade, high grade, unused fissile material, communication systems and aspects like security of the launch codes. I am quite sure that the heads of governments of specifically USA, China and India and their national security advisors (NSAs), and intelligence agencies must be having sleepless nights. The contingency plans to be put into operation for securing the nuclear assets must be getting finetuned. Why specially these three; USA the superpower still fighting global war on terrorism (GWOT) and wants to keep the nuclear club exclusive with no additions, China with her Xinjiang and fundamentalist elements despite Pakistan being her client state (like North Korea), and India, Pakistan’s arch rival for eternity. At the outset it is important to highlight that the two most relevant but worrying aspects are, whether effective state control would be asserted at all times, and whether there are conditions where weapons could be used without due authorisation?; secondly, how to prevent subversion and theft both of physical nuclear assets and technical and communication details, including launch codes, by the very people who are guarding/protecting it. Pakistan’s capability and capacity to protect their nuclear assets along with a historical perspective, followed by contingencies in case the international powers need to intervene has been analysed. This article has used credible open source material [i].

Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal:Pakistan currently has 170 nuclear warheads, and claims a triad status which indicates the capacity to launch from land, air and sea. Details of her assets are listed below:

Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Notes:

Experts believe that Pakistan could well be the world’s fourth-largest nuclear weapon state; with a stockpile of some 350 warheads in a decade (2030).
Air: Apart from Mirage III and V, Pakistan can also deploy F-16s (24) and Chinese J 17s (186 in pipeline) for nuclear delivery.
Sea: abur III, range 470 kms; deployed on the air-independent-diesel-electric Agosta class submarines (ordered 8; deployed 4?); some Babur IIIs are pre-mated for second strike capability.
Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW):NASR/HATF 9 has a range of 60 k.m. only, most probably pre-mated, some deployed with forward troops, and possibly under command and control of HQs at operational level (Corps HQ); raising the probability and its vulnerability of misuse/rogue use/panic use, and finding its way in wrong hands including terrorist organisations; and starting a nuclear Armageddon. In 2016 Obama said, “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you’re taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure”.
Pak does not possess enough launchers compared to the warheads it holds; and

all launchers are dual capable!

Nuclear Policy: Pakistan boasts of ‘full spectrum deterrence capability’. Policy similar to NATOs ‘flexible response strategy’, with threat of use when her red lines/threshold will be crossed without explicitly spelling it out. Pakistan claims that she has a formal policy which is classified, and believes that ambiguity adds to the value of deterrence.

Source: Taylor and Francis Online (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178069)

Command and Control of Nuclear Assets: The apex body which exercises command and control is the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) headed by the PM, with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) under a three-star army general, which is responsible for the protection of its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, and the strategic assets. Special Response Force (SRF) is the special forces unitof SPD Force with the strength of 25 to 28000 personnel which secures the assets. The selection standards in terms of intelligence and physical standards for the force are even higher than army due to very sensitive nature of their duty. After initial training in army training establishments, they are now trained in Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), located in Chakri near Rawalpindi. Training is modelled on US National Nuclear Security academy.

Regarding Pakistan, it will be fair and reasonable to assume, that the military (COAS) would have the final and decisive vote for exercising the nuclear option.

International Opinion and Observations on Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) Pakistan : Ashley J. Tellis in his book (Striking Assymetries: Nuc Transitions in Southern Asia) says Pakistan is building “the largest, most diversified, and most capable nuclear arsenal possible”, which is endorsed by Peter Lavoy, a US intelligence officer. The Trump administration’s South Asia strategy in 2017 urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists”. President Biden in Oct 2022 said ““Pakistan “may be one of the most dangerous” countries in the world having “nuclear weapons without any cohesion”.

Deployment/Location of Nuclear Assets:

Note: Areas shown as Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas are an integral part of India (map not to scale)

Even when nations proclaim transparency, as exists(ed) between USA and Russia, regarding holdings and deployment of nuclear assets, in terms of agreements (SALT II, which now stands abrogated/suspended), there is always uncertainty and ambiguity regarding accuracy of details, especially when most delivery mechanisms are dual-capable (can fire both conventional and nuclear warheads) and also co-located which is a new dangerous trend followed specially by China and Pakistan. US aggressive anti-nuclear stance against North Korea is mainly because she can never be 100% sure of deployment of nuclear assets, thus not confident of knocking them out in a ‘first strike’ if ever the need arises. However, Pakistan nuclear assets locations are known to a fair degree of certainty, both due to diligence and ISR by the big powers, specially USA, as also with an existing agreement between India and Pakistan[ii] to notify each other. Details of known locations are placed below:

Fissile Mtrl Production Complex – Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding at Kahuta, enrichment plant at Gadwal North of Islamabad. Four heavy water plutonium reactors in Khushab and thermal power plant (helps in estimation of production of fissile material). A new Reprocessing plant at Nilore, E of Islamabad, and second at Chatham in NW Punjab processing spent fuel and extracts plutonium.
Fissile Mtrl – In 2020, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,900 kilograms of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 410 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This material is theoretically enough to produce between 285 and 342 warheads.Pakistan uses tritium to boost fission process and reduce size of warhead. Possesses 690 gms, enough to boost over 100 weapons. Most short range missiles like NASR, Abdali, Babur, Ra-‘ad will need small, lightweight tritium boosted fission warhead.
Production of Msl and Mob Lrs – National Defence Complex at Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range West of Islamabad with two sections;
West – development, production, test launching of missiles and rocket engines;
- East – production and assembly of road mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs)
- Some launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.
Warhead Production- Pak Ord Factories near Wah, NW of Islamabad.

Safety and Security of Nuclear Assets

Pakistan has put in place all safeguards expected from an NWS and as per international norms of IAEA’s Nuclear Security Strategy (NSS)[iii]. During late 2000 a US report stated “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise”. The SPD is the institutional link between civilian and military facilities. Pakistani sites have three “rings” of security. The first is within each facility itself with SPD personnel responsible for physical searches, Nuclear Media Acess Control (NMAC)[iv] protocols; while the second ring is formed of physical means (limited Access Areas, physical barriers). Outside of each site, the third ring of security is provided by a wider counter intelligence effort. Being aware of the dangers of subversion, NCA has put in place a very rigid system of vetting regularly; different for scientists, civilian staff and military personnel. Screening involves four of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Some important measures incorporated are:

The National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has become an IAEA collaborating centre for Nuclear Security Education, Training and Technical Support in Oct 2022.

Working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas. The GICNT is an international partnership intended to improve international capacity for prevention, detection, and response to nuclear terrorism, particularly the acquisition, transport, or use of nuclear and radiological materials.
Advanced-level training in American National Laboratories and applied it to improve the overall security practices in the country.

Additional measures in terms of equipment enhancement are:

Specially trained – as per IAEA and Nuclear Security Series.
Permissive Action Links[v] (PAL) –electronic codes.
Special theft and tamper-proof vehicles and containers are also used.
SPD and PNRA operate radiational detection portal monitors at nuclear sites.
Contingency planning.
All round and fool proof communications.
Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NuSECC) in Islamabad.
Mobile Radiological Monitoring Laboratory (MRML) established.

Historical Statistics and Vulnerabilities:But impressions, reputation and opinions has gone steadily downhill in the last decade, more due to the socio-politico-unstable internal security situation, rise of political Islam and fundamentalism, Pakistan’s unrelenting dalliance with terrorist organisations, which has come back to bite them like the proverbial snake. There are credible intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, IS, TTP have shown renewed interest in acquiring both warhead, fissile material and technology. The two main constant and real worries are theft (material and intellectual) as also ‘insider operations.

The latest mob violence on Imran Khans arrest, has ignited violence and instability, and specter of even civil war. There are worrying reports of dissension within the Army ranks, both within the highest (rift between COAS, CJSC, Corps Commanders), middle and lower echelons; reports of mutinies in old established army units; soldiers abandoning their posts and duties, increasing insubordination which should cause grave apprehension regarding the safety and security of nuclear assets. If the most disciplined force can be beset with insubordination and desertion, the paramilitary, intelligence agencies and most importantly the personnel manning the security protocol of nuclear assets are equally susceptible. The vulnerability is not only physical theft of warheads and fissile material, but technical data and electronic codes which can operationalize the weapons and missile systems. In the current unrest and fragile security environment ‘when it is time to implement the harshest security measures, is ironically the time when it is at its most vulnerable to subversion and theft. Some historical lapses concerning security of nuclear assets are listed below: –

In November 2007, suicide attack killed seven PAF staff travelling between Mushaf Mir Airbase and the Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha. Both sites have been associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
A double bombing in August 2008 killed 64 people in Wah Cantt. One explosion took place outside the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), which is believed to house the Gadwal Enrichment Plant.
In July 2009, a bus carrying KRL workers was attacked by a suicide bomber at Chor Chowk, Peshawar Road.
In October 2009, the Minhas air force base in Kamra was attacked. The site is widely assessed to host Pakistani nuclear weapons, although the attacker is reported to have detonated a bomb at “a checkpoint on a road leading to the complex,” rather than the base itself.
The biggest of them all; AQ Khan both stealing sensitive information from the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, a subcontractor to the URENCO enrichment consortium, and then going on to sell indigenised versions of that technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
Subversion at the highest level revealed when Lieutenant General (retired) Javed Iqbal and Brigadier (retired) Raja Rizwan who received 14 years’ imprisonment and the death penalty, respectively for nuclear espionage.
Note: – If staff can be identified for attack, they may also be coerced into becoming “insiders. Insiders have been a real concern to Pakistani authorities.

Scenario Building and Recommendations.

Pakistan will obviously remain the first responder for most contingencies, and is expected to act immediately and decisively in case of theft of warhead or fissile material, or loss of critical technological information; assuming the command and control of nuclear assets is still intact and not broken (contingencies like civilian and/or military control, or break up of both is a realistic probability). They are expected to act responsibly and alert the international community immediately specially the ‘Three’ (USA, China and India the immediate neighbour), and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
In case, the UN and world body led by USA and China feel that there exists conditions where the nuclear assets are NOT under the command and control of any responsible body, be it the civil or military, and safety and security of the assets are compromised, and real and present threat to them exists (terrorists, breakaway military leader/group(s) and rogue elements); there is a need for physical intervention to secure them, with or without the sanction/permission of Pakistan authorities. The current scenario does warrant planning and coordinating for such a contingency specially by the ‘Three’.
In the eventuality of the above, and if the unstable situation of a civil war like situation persists, there is a case of following a variation of the Ukraine model* with Pakistan. Pakistan naturally will be loath to give up her nuclear assets. The process will take time, but the world cannot afford to have the spectre of a Nuclear Armageddon hanging over its head all the time.

*Note: When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, there were thousands of former Soviet nuclear warheads, as well as hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers, left on Ukraine’s territory (some in Belarus and Kazakhstan too), which they decided to transfer to Russia. Ukraine never had an independent nuclear weapons arsenal, or control over these weapons, but agreed to remove former Soviet weapons stationed on its territory. In 1992, Ukraine with the other two, signed the Lisbon Protocol[vi] and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1994. The transfer of all nuclear material took some time, but by 2001, all nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia to be dismantled and all launch silos decommissioned. Interestingly, the Protocol in itself does not talk of any security guantantees by either USA or Russian Federation. However, The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories. The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. China and France too gave somewhat individual assurances in separate documents.

The memoranda, prohibited the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, “except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. The memorandum did accelerate the handing over of nuclear weapons.

Conclusion: Pakistan has always led a rather unstable existence ever since its independence. Its nuclear weapon status provides the proverbial edge, which does keep world powers and India on their toes. Pakistan has institutionalised systems in place to secure the nuclear assets. However, given the unstable internal security situation, which can deteriorate in an accelerated manner, and possibly weaken the command and control chain, and security of nuclear assets, it makes eminent sense to plan and put procedures in place to secure the nuclear assets by external agencies led by the ‘Three’. India must make it her business to ensure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear business.

(This article was earlier published in bharatshakti.in)

[i] Current geo-polical-social situation in Pakistan is being widely covered in the internet and other media sources. Nuclear aspects have been covered by sourcing the following articles online: –

‘Nuclear Notebook: How many nuclear weapons does Pakistan have in 2021?’, by Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, September 7, 2021, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, available at https://thebulletin.org/premium/2021-09/nuclear-notebook-how-many-nuclear-weapons-does-pakistan-have-in-2021/.
‘Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018’, Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris & Julia Diamond, 31 Aug 2018, Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2018.1507796.
‘Pakistan says it has provided list of nuclear facilities to India under annual practice’, by Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, Reuters, January 01, 2023, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-says-it-has-provided-list-nuclear-facilities-india-under-annual-2023-01-01/.
‘Pakistan’s Evolving Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure’, by Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 16 Nov 2016 onwards to 2022, available at https://fas.org/publication/pakistan-nuclear-infrastructure/.
‘Pakistan’, ResearchStockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)>Research>Armament and disarmament>weapons of mass destruction>world nuclear forces, available at https://www.sipri.org/research/armaments-and-disarmament/nuclear-weapons/world-nuclear-forces/pakistan.

[ii] ‘Non-Nuclear Attack Agreement’, signed between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi on 21 December 1988 in Islamabad (ratified 1991), according to which, both countries have to inform each other of the nuclear facilities. Accessed on 12 May 2023.

[iii] ‘Assessing the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme’, by Tahir Moahmood Azad, and Karl Dewey, 27 Feb 2023, Taylor & Francis Online>Defence and Security Analysis, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178069. Accessed on 13 May 2023.

[iv] ‘Media Access Control Protocol’, ScienceDirect, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/media-access-control-protocol#:~:text=The%20proposed%20MAC%20protocol%20considers,for%20sensing%20and%20data%20transmission. Accessed on 15 May 2023.

[v] Permissive Action Links (PALs) – ensures that even if an unauthorized person gets hold of a weapon, he cannot activate it unless he also has access to electronic codes.

[vi] ‘Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, signed on May 23, 1992, between representatives of USA, Russian Federation, Republics of Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan; available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf. Accessed on 17 May 2023.

The Pakistani Horn is Burning: Are the Nukes Safe and Secure? Daniel 8

Pakistan Burning: Are the Nukes Safe and Secure?

May 30, 2023; By: Lt Gen PR Kumar (Retd)

Editor’s Note

The prevailing unstable environment in Pakistan could be used by multiple sections within that country to orchestrate a situation that might lead to nuclear weapons and associated technical mechanisms to fall in the hands of those driven by fundamentalism. It’s a scenario that threatens the world at large, comparable to the USSR breaking down. India, the US and China would be most affected and share the responsibilities of ensuring such an eventuality doesn’t come to a pass.

…………………………………………………….

If events were not so tragic, the fast moving violent, dynamic, unpredictable politico-social drama being enacted in Pakistan would appear to be a ‘comic-action film’ on TV. Nevertheless, being a transactional, impersonal world, people are watching it with great interest, and unfortunately, great amusement. However, a nuclear crisis is certainly no laughing matter, and powers that be will do well to plan and be ready for all contingencies.

Why especially these three: USA the superpower, still fighting the GWOT (Global War on Terror) also wants to keep the nuclear club exclusive with no further additions. For China, though Pakistan is her her client state (like North Korea), and an arch rival of India, it has its own worries about Xinjiang and fundamentalist elements.

At the outset it’s important to highlight that the two most relevant but worrying aspects are, whether effective state control would be asserted at all times, and whether there are conditions where weapons could be used without due authorisation? Secondly, how to prevent subversion and theft both of physical nuclear assets and technical and communication details, including launch codes, by the very people who are guarding/protecting it. Pakistan’s capability and capacity to protect its nuclear assets along with a historical perspective, contingencies in case the international powers need to intervene need to be analysed. The article has used credible open-source material to examine the relevant issues.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal. Pakistan currently has 170 nuclear warheads, and claims a triad status which indicates the capacity to launch from land, air and sea. Details of assets are listed below:

Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

Notes:

Experts believe that Pakistan could well be the world’s fourth-largest nuclear weapon state, with a stockpile of some 350 warheads in a decade (2030).
Air. Apart from Mirage III and V, Pakistan can also deploy F-16s (24) and Chinese J 17s (186 in pipeline) for nuclear delivery.
Sea. Babur III, range 470 km; deployed aboard the air-independent-diesel-electric Agosta class submarines (ordered 8; deployed 4?); some Babur IIIs are pre-mated for second strike capability.
Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW). NASR/ HATF 9 has a range of 60 km only, most probably pre-mated, and some deployed with forward troops, and possibly under command and control of HQs at operational level (Corps HQ); raising the probability and its vulnerability of misuse/rogue use/panic use, and finding its way in wrong hands including terrorist organisations; a recipe for a nuclear Armageddon. In 2016 Obama said, “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you’re taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure,”
Pakistan does not possess enough launchers compared to the warheads it holds; and the launchers are dual capable (can fire both conventional and nuclear warheads)!

Nuclear Policy. Pakistan boasts of ‘full spectrum deterrence capability’. Their policy is similar to NATOs ‘flexible response strategy’, with threat of use when her red lines/threshold are crossed, without explicitly spelling it out. Pakistan claims that she has a formal policy which is classified, and believes that ambiguity adds to the value of deterrence.

Source: Taylor and Francis Online (https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178069)

Command and Control of Nuclear Assets. The apex body which exercises command and control is the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) headed by the PM, with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) under a three-star army general, which is responsible for the protection of its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, and the strategic assets. Special Response Force (SRF) is the special forces unit of SPD Force with a strength of 25000 to 28000 personnel which secures the assets. The selection standards in terms of intelligence and physical standards for the force are even higher than army due to very sensitive nature of their duty. After initial training in army training establishments, they are now trained in Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), located in Chakri near Rawalpindi. Training is modelled on US National Nuclear Security academy.

Regarding Pakistan, it will be fair and reasonable to assume, that the military (COAS) would have the final and decisive vote for exercising the nuclear option.

International Opinion and Observations on Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) Pakistan. Ashley J. Tellis in his book (Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia) says Pakistan is building “the largest, most diversified, and most capable nuclear arsenal possible”, which is endorsed by Peter Lavoy, a US intelligence officer. The Trump administration’s South Asia strategy in 2017 urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists”. President Biden in Oct 2022 said ““Pakistan “may be one of the most dangerous” countries in the world having “nuclear weapons without any cohesion”.

Deployment/Location of Nuclear Assets.

Note: – Areas shown as Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas are an integral part of India

Even when nations proclaim transparency, as exists(ed) between USA and Russia, regarding holdings and deployment of nuclear assets, in terms of agreements (SALT II, which now stands abrogated/suspended), there is always uncertainty and ambiguity regarding accuracy of details, especially when most delivery mechanisms are dual-capable and also co-located which is a new dangerous trend followed specially by China and Pakistan. US aggressive anti-nuclear stance against North Korea is mainly because she can never be 100% sure of deployment of nuclear assets, thus not confident of knocking them out in a ‘first strike’ if ever the need arises. However, Pakistan nuclear assets’ locations are known to a fair degree of certainty, both due to diligence and ISR by the big powers, especially USA, as also with an existing agreement between India and Pakistan to notify each other. Details of known locations are placed below: –

Fissile Material Production Complex – Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding at Kahuta, enrichment plant at Gadwal North of Islamabad. Four heavy water plutonium reactors in Khushab and thermal power plant (helps in estimation of production of fissile material). A new Reprocessing plant at Nilore, E of Islamabad, and second at Chatham in NW Punjab processing spent fuel and extracts plutonium.
Fissile Material – In 2020, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,900 kilograms of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 410 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This material is theoretically enough to produce between 285 and 342 warheads. Pakistan uses Tritium to boost fission process and reduce size of warhead. Possesses 690 gm, enough to boost over 100 weapons. Most short range missiles like NASR, Abdali, Babur, Ra-‘ad will need small, lightweight tritium boosted fission warhead.
Production of Missile and Mobile Launchers. National Defence Complex at Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range West of Islamabad with two sections;
West – development, production, test launching of missiles and rocket engines;
East – production and assembly of road mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs)
Some launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.
Warhead Production. Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, NW of Islamabad.

Safety and Security of Nuclear Assets.

Pakistan has put in place all safeguards expected from a Nuclear Weapon State and as per international norms of IAEA’s Nuclear Security Strategy (NSS). During late 2000s a US report stated “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise.” The SPD is the institutional link between civilian and military facilities. Pakistani sites have three “rings” of security. The first is within each facility itself with SPD personnel responsible for physical searches, Nuclear Media Access Control (NMAC) protocols; while the second ring is formed of physical means (limited access areas, physical barriers). Outside of each site, the third ring of security is provided by a wider counter intelligence effort. Being aware of the dangers of subversion, NCA has put in place a very rigid system of vetting regularly; different for scientists, civilian staff and military personnel. Screening involves four of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Some important measures incorporated are:

The National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has become an IAEA collaborating centre for Nuclear Security Education, Training and Technical Support in October 2022.
Working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas. The GICNT is an international partnership intended to improve international capacity for prevention, detection, and response to nuclear terrorism, particularly the acquisition, transport, or use of nuclear and radiological materials.
Advanced-level training in American National Laboratories and applying it to improve the overall security practices in the country.

Additional measures in terms of equipment enhancement are:

Specially trained – as per IAEA and Nuclear Security Series.
Permissive Action Links (PAL) –electronic codes.
Special theft and tamper-proof vehicles and containers are also used.
SPD and PNRA operate radiational detection portal monitors at nuclear sites.
Contingency planning.
All round and fool proof communications.
Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NuSECC) in Islamabad.
Mobile Radiological Monitoring Laboratory (MRML) established.

Historical Statistics and Vulnerabilities. But impressions, reputation and opinions have gone steadily downhill in the last decade, more due to the socio-political instable internal security situation, rise of political Islam and fundamentalism, Further, Pakistan’s unrelenting dalliance with terrorist organisations, has run the full circle to pose a serious threat at home. There are credible intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, IS, TTP have shown renewed interest in acquiring both warhead, fissile material and technology. The two main constant and real worries are theft (material and intellectual) as also insider operations.

The latest mob violence on Imran Khans arrest, has led to greater instability, and even the specter of a civil war. There are worrying reports of dissension within the Army ranks, both at the highest levels (rift between COAS, CJSC, Corps Commanders), middle and lower echelons. There are reports of mutinies in old established army units; soldiers abandoning their posts and duties, increasing insubordination which should cause grave apprehension regarding the safety and security of nuclear assets. If Pakistan’s most disciplined force can be beset with insubordination and desertion, the paramilitary, intelligence agencies and most importantly the personnel manning the security protocol of nuclear assets could also be equally susceptible.

The vulnerability is not only physical theft of warheads and fissile material, but technical data and electronic codes which can operationalize the weapons and missile systems. In the current unrest and fragile security environment, when it’s time to implement the harshest security measures, ironically, it the entire system at its most vulnerable levels from subversion and theft. Some historical lapses concerning security of nuclear assets are listed below:

In November 2007, a suicide attack killed seven PAF staff travelling between Mushaf Mir Airbase and the Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha. Both sites have been associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
A double bombing in August 2008 killed 64 people in Wah Cantt. One explosion took place outside the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), which is believed to house the Gadwal Enrichment Plant.
In July 2009, a bus carrying KRL workers was attacked by a suicide bomber at Chor Chowk, Peshawar Road.
In October 2009, the Minhas air force base in Kamra was attacked. The site is widely assessed to host Pakistani nuclear weapons, although the attacker is reported to have detonated a bomb at “a checkpoint on a road leading to the complex,” rather than the base itself.
The biggest of them all, AQ Khan stole both sensitive information from the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, a subcontractor to the URENCO enrichment consortium, and then going on to sell indigenised versions of that technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

Subversion at the highest level was revealed when Lieutenant General (Retired) Javed Iqbal and Brigadier (Retired) Raja Rizwan who received 14 years imprisonment and the death penalty, respectively for nuclear espionage. Insiders have been a real concern for Pakistani authorities.

Possible Scenarios and Recommendations.

Pakistan will obviously remain the first responder for most contingencies, and is expected to act immediately and decisively in case of theft of warhead or fissile material, or loss of critical technological information; assuming the command and control of nuclear assets is still intact and not broken (contingencies like civilian and/or military control, or break up of both is a realistic probability). They are expected to act responsibly and alert the international community immediately specially the ‘Three’ (USA, China and India the immediate neighbour), and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
In case, the UN and world body led by USA and China feel that there exist conditions where the nuclear assets are NOT under the command and control of any responsible body, be it the civil or military, and safety and security of the assets are compromised, and real threat to them exists (terrorists, breakaway military leader/group(s) and rogue elements); there is a need for physical intervention to secure them, with or without the sanction/permission of Pakistani authorities. The current scenario does warrant planning and coordinating for such a contingency, especially by the ‘Three’.
In the eventuality of the above, and if the unstable situation of a civil war like situation persists, there is a case of following a variation of the Ukraine model* with Pakistan. Pakistan naturally will be loath to give up her nuclear assets. The process will take time, but the world cannot afford to have the spectre of a Nuclear Armageddon hanging on its head, all the time.

*Note: When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, there were thousands of former Soviet nuclear warheads, as well as hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers, left on Ukraine’s territory (some in Belarus and Kazakhstan, too), which they decided to transfer to Russia. Ukraine never had an independent nuclear weapons arsenal, or control over these weapons, but agreed to remove former Soviet weapons stationed on its territory. In 1992, Ukraine with the other two, signed the Lisbon Protocol and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1994. The transfer of all nuclear material took some time, but by 2001, all nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia to be dismantled and all launch silos decommissioned. Interestingly, the Protocol in itself does not talk of any security guarantees by either USA or Russian Federation. However, The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) conference in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories. The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. China and France too gave somewhat individual assurances in separate documents.

Conclusion. Pakistan has always led a rather unstable existence ever since its independence. Its nuclear weapon status provides the proverbial edge, which does keep world powers and India on their toes. Pakistan has institutionalised systems in place to secure the nuclear assets. However, given the unstable internal security situation, which can deteriorate in an accelerated manner, and possibly weaken the command-and-control chain, and security of nuclear assets, it makes eminent sense to plan and put procedures in place to secure the nuclear assets by external agencies led by the ‘Three’. India must make it her business to ensure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear business.

The Pakistani Nuclear Horn: Daniel 8

Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons

Hira Bashir

May 29, 2023

Regarding maintaining calm and order in South Asia, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development is essential. Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons has drastically transformed the dynamics of the security environment in a region defined by historical tensions and wars between India and Pakistan. The nuclear arsenal of Pakistan helps to keep tranquility in South Asia. Pakistan has no belligerent intentions against any other country; hence, they help maintain placidity in the area.

Pakistan has nuclear weapons primarily to obviate any possible assault from India. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent aims to avert its larger and conventionally superior neighbor from launching a military attack against Pakistan. India is deterred from taking moves that may lead to a full-scale confrontation due to the threat of devastating nuclear retaliation. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal balances out India’s conventional military dominance, creating a more even playing field and reducing the probability of aggressive military action by India. The security situation is more stable since neither party can gain an overwhelming military advantage without triggering catastrophic repercussions.

Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons coerces India to exercise prudence in South Asia. India has a compelling interest in avoiding a nuclear exchange because of the devastation it would cause to civilians and the environment. The risk of any escalation quickly spiraling out of control and leading to an unthinkable catastrophe incentivizes India to pursue diplomatic solutions and avoid reckless military adventurism.

Nuclear weapons provide a level of stability between India and Pakistan during heightened tensions or crises. Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence forces both nations to exercise strategic restraint and logical decision-making. It compels leaders to consider the consequences of their actions, making them less likely to make rash choices that could worsen the situation.

The world closely monitors the issue of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Increased international efforts have been made to foster conversation, mediation, and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan as the dangers of a nuclear confrontation in the region have been more widely recognized. The international community should make an effort to resolve long-standing issues between Pakistan and India, such as the Kashmir issue. By taking a stand and actively working towards a resolution, both countries would have fewer reasons to engage in conflict. With the support of the international community and other powerful nations, there is an increased incentive for the two countries to settle their differences amicably.

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has engendered strategic stability, making the region more predictable. Decision-makers are aware of the potential implications and are compelled to explore diplomatic and non-aggressive solutions to crises, knowing that a significant military attack could trigger a nuclear retaliation. This stability reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic war breaking out due to a mistake or unintentional deployment of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons help maintain peace and security in South Asia, which is why Pakistan possesses them. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program has deterred major conflicts and promoted a more peaceful environment in the region by providing a credible deterrent against potential aggression, maintaining a balance of power, controlling escalation, fostering crisis stability, attracting international mediation, and establishing nuclear stability. However, India and Pakistan must continue to engage in dialogue, implement confidence-building measures, and make diplomatic efforts to resolve their differences.

The First Nuclear War Cannot Be Held Back: Revelation 8

As nuclear weapons states outside the framework of the NPT, Pakistan and India have certain legal and normative responsibilities | AFP

CAN PAK-INDIA NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HOLD?

The nuclearisation of South Asia can be analysed from different angles.

Ejaz Haider Published May 28, 2023 Updated about 13 hours ago

Exactly 25 years ago, on May 28, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests (a sixth was done on May 30). The tests were a response to India’s five nuclear tests, conducted on May 11 and 13. Both governments, after the tests, declared a moratorium on further testing. A quarter century since May 1998, they have stuck to the moratorium, though neither has signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

The nuclearisation of South Asia can be analysed from different angles. For our present purpose, however, the main question is simple: while there’s general consensus among security experts and nuclear establishments within India and Pakistan that nuclear weapons are a deterrent, should we consider that proposition a truism for now and the time to come?

Having analysed these issues for a long time and advocated the deterrence framework, I have come to believe that such unerring faith in deterrence might increasingly be misplaced for a host of reasons. This is also true for other nuclear weapons states (NWSs). We should be less sanguine about deterrence holding in all situations. Indeed, there’s now growing literature about the world being “on the cusp of a Third Nuclear Age” where a number of factors are likely to make the old belief in deterrence increasingly problematic if not entirely untenable.

This article primarily deals with India and Pakistan, a nuclear dyad in conflict. But some of the observations here are also applicable to other NWSs, including those whose possession of nuclear weapons have been “legitimised” by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).Pause

Today marks 25 years since Pakistan became a declared nuclear weapons state. Although conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan’s nuclear parity with India has served to deter a serious conflict between the two countries, with our peculiar history and geography and the emergence of new technologies, is this faith misplaced?

What follows below is not an exhaustive discussion or analysis of the new factors but seeks to draw the attention of the informed generalist to them. After listing those factors, I intend to focus the discussion on India and Pakistan.

WHAT IS THE THIRD NUCLEAR AGE?

In a 2021 article for European Journal of International Security, titled Strategic non-nuclear weapons and the onset of a Third Nuclear Age, Andrew Future and Benjamin Zala describe the Third Nuclear Age as the combination of Second Nuclear Age thinking — i.e., deployment of Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons (SNNWs) — “with the return of the kind of major power competition associated with the First Nuclear Age.” This combo, as experts have begun to note, is highly dangerous.

So, what are SNNWs? Broadly, they are weapons with the “ability to engage targets at the strategic level of warfare, where the adversary’s sources of national power are located.” They can be kinetic and non-kinetic.

The kinetic category includes the increasingly more sophisticated conventional precision-strike capabilities: cruise and ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). This category also includes anti-satellite weapons and missile defences. Missile defences, by denying the adversary strategic strikes, can offset the deterrent balance and force adversaries into using overwhelming preemptive force. The ongoing Russo-Ukraine War has seen the employment of these SNNWs.

The second, non-kinetic category, includes cyber attacks (which can be mounted with strategic effect) and electronic-warfare capabilities (dominating the electromagnetic spectrum can not only degrade or deny the environment for the adversary but achieve strategic results for the side dominating the spectrum). Another aspect is information warfare and influence operations.

Again, we are witnessing the use of info war by both Ukraine/NATO and Russia. Misinformation and disinformation campaigns, as is now widely known, serve to undermine trust in public institutions and governments. They are also essential tools in influencing perceptions.

INTEGRATION, AI AND THE KILL CHAIN

Nawaz Sharif at Pakistan’s nuclear test site in 1998 | White Star

While the SNNW technologies are disrupting the battlefield by getting increasingly more accurate and sophisticated, there’s the additional problem of cross-tech/cross-platform integration that is concentrating and increasing firepower devastatingly.

Developments in artificial intelligence (AI) are also likely, by most accounts, to take the human out of the decision-making loop. This is not hypothetical, since multiple such systems are being tested and prototypes developed. Another problem is the presence of SNNWs in a nuclear environment, such as between a nuclear dyad.

Since they “constitute an employable and credible weapon system that can engage the sources of enemy power directly, skipping the tactical and operational levels of warfare”, nuclear adversaries can use them thinking that they could keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold. Also, in the case of NWSs there’s no way of knowing whether these weapons carry conventional warheads.

Cross-platform integration and the introduction of AI — what we can call the Internet of Military Things — is changing the concept of the decision-making speed and what the militaries call the kill chain (it also throws up many ethical issues). Up until now, the kill chain was a series of processes, executed sequentially. With AI, we are now looking at overlapping some of those phases and completing them in parallel, to reduce the execution time of the chain.

In other words, the weapon is fired first, the find and fix processes overlap the flight time, and the final target designation is sent to the weapon in flight, through a SATCOM channel. Now bring AI into this and combine it with hypersonic missiles and you get an idea of how much time will be reduced on the kill chain.

In August 2020, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the United States conducted a simulated experiment. It pitted a Heron-developed AI pilot against a top F-16 human pilot. The AI pilot beat the human pilot in a 5-0 sweep in dogfight and manoeuvres.

According to DARPA, the trials were designed as a risk-reduction effort for its Air Combat Evolution (ACE) programme to flesh out how human and machine pilots can share operational control of a fighter jet to maximise its chances of mission success. The overarching ACE concept is aimed at allowing the pilot to shift “from single platform operator to mission commander”, in charge not just of flying their own aircraft but managing teams of drones slaved to their fighter jet.

THE NEW RISKS

While some of these technologies are expensive, others are not. The cost of many will steadily come down further as they proliferate (drones are a case in point, as is cyber and digital expertise). At this point, there are almost no regulatory frameworks for a number of emerging technologies.

Integration and the digital environment has also brought other risks. In a January 2018 report, the Royal Institute of International Affairs warned that US, British and other nuclear weapons systems are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks. This is far from an abstract threat.

In 2010, the US Air Force lost contact with a field of 50 Minuteman III Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming for an hour, raising the terrifying prospect that an enemy actor might have taken control of the missiles and was feeding incorrect information into the nuclear command-and-control networks.

Earlier, in 2016, Andrew Futter wrote a paper for the Royal United Services Institute, titled ‘Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons: New Questions for Command and Control, Security and Strategy.’

Futter says: “There are two significant implications of this for nuclear weapons management and nuclear strategy: first, increasing complexity, particularly through computerisation and digitisation, raises the risk of normal accidents within the nuclear enterprise; and second, complex systems used to manage nuclear forces contain inherent vulnerabilities, weaknesses and bugs that might be exploited or manipulated in a variety of different ways by hackers.”

This is not all. In a January 2023 edited volume, The Fragile Balance of Terror: Deterrence in the New Nuclear Age, professors Vipin Narang and Scott D Sagan point to what they call the “declining confidence in deterrence.”

Gathered in the book are some of the top world experts trying to analyse the presence of nuclear weapons in a new age: growing prevalence of personalist dictatorships; incomplete or incorrect information; states facing multiple nuclear adversaries (regional subsystems) and operating in a novel information environment where misinformation can be maliciously planted or otherwise spread rampantly; states possessing small nuclear arsenals which they fear may not be reliable or survivable or over which they may not retain firm command and control.

As they put it: “Each of these factors alone, and especially in combination, generate risks that our standard strategies of nuclear deterrence are simply unequipped to manage or address.”

This is just a bird’s-eye view of a much larger and complex body of literature, a corpus that is increasing in volume, not as an exercise in alarmism but in analysing the emerging, uncertain trends.

INDIA-PAKISTAN, A CONFLICT DYAD

Some might say that it will be a while before some of these advanced technologies will get to these shores. They are wrong.

UAVs are already here, as are missile defences and precision, long-range artillery. India is already seeking to bolster its anti-ballistic and cruise missile defences, developing MIRVs (multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles), hypersonic glide vehicles (reducing the already very short missile flight times) and fielding SSBNs (ship submersible ballistic nuclear), essentially, nuclear-powered submarines which can carry ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads.

These systems can both be non-nuclear and nuclear — i.e., they can carry tactical and strategic warheads. Coupled with non-kinetic strategic options (cyber, electronic and information warfare), they extend the same set of problems to India and Pakistan. In fact, given the contiguity of this nuclear-armed conflict dyad, the chances of accidents, miscalculations and bluster are even higher.

There are a number of additional risk factors as far as India and Pakistan are concerned: they are locked in a conflictual model; they have had multiple armed confrontations; both are nuclear-armed with growing arsenals and capabilities; since 2014, but more so since 2016, there is no dialogue framework between the two (covert channels notwithstanding); multiple military and non-military confidence-building measures (hotlines etc) are hardly used to offset a crisis, though they are used after a crisis begins to unfold; and the two sides’ respective positions on outstanding disputes are almost mutually exclusive.

This environment is known. But it also feeds into another set of problems that increases the likelihood of a conflict:

a: India’s stated doctrine of limited conflict;

b: India’s movement away from the declaratory no-first use policy, as contained in its 2003 doctrine, to what can now only be described as a non-stated first-use policy; and

c: India’s poor record of handling weapon systems and platforms, which increases the risk of accidental conflict.

COLD START AND LIMITED WAR

The remains of a missile fired from India which landed near Mian Channu on March 9, 2022 | Reuters

India’s doctrine of limited war has a high probability of a spiral. That story goes back to India’s full-scale mobilisation in 2001-02. The Indian political and military leadership drew two lessons from that mobilisation: the requirement for a forward-leaning posture, and developing strategies to punish Pakistan in limited engagements that do not escalate — i.e., assuming there is a band in which India can act militarily and punitively.

If India were to play within that band, goes the theory, it would be very difficult for Pakistan to use nuclear-level deterrence, because such escalation would be considered highly disproportionate and would draw international opprobrium.

This was the start of India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine. Cold Start is a limited-war strategy designed to seize Pakistani territory swiftly without, in theory, risking a nuclear conflict.

As an explainer in The Economist put it, the strategy envisaged “having nimbler, integrated units stationed closer to the border [that] would allow India to inflict significant harm before international powers demanded a ceasefire. By pursuing narrow aims, it would also deny Pakistan a justification for triggering a nuclear strike.”

This thinking is flawed and rests on the assumption that, in any first or possibly second round, India will gain an upper hand, forcing Pakistan to either escalate or blink. If Pakistan does escalate, India believes the international opinion will be on India’s side and Pakistan will have to climb down.

But events may not follow India’s script, as was evident in February 2019. Pakistan’s aerial retaliation and complete domination of that point of conflict forced India to threaten missile strikes, a big no between a nuclear dyad. International pressure, Pakistan’s promised response and Islamabad’s decision to return the downed Indian pilot served to de-escalate the situation.

But things could have got worse: what if India hadn’t missed the target in Balakot and killed seminary children; what if, under pressure, Pakistan had actually engaged and destroyed the Indian targets that were selected for engagement? What if India had followed through on its missile strikes threat, forcing Pakistan to retaliate with greater numbers?

At every point along that trajectory, many things could have gone wrong. That they didn’t could possibly be traced back to the chance factor that the Indian strike package missed its target.

At the politico-strategic levels, relations remain tense, with little to no dialogue between the two sides since August 5, 2019, when India unilaterally and illegally revoked the autonomous status of Jammu and Kashmir, in violation of UN Resolutions. Past experience suggests that deteriorating relations result in a higher probability of conflict between the two sides.

INDIA’S NO-FIRST USE IS A SHAM

India’s 2003 Nuclear Doctrine declares that India is wedded to no-first use (NFU) — i.e., India will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, unless it is attacked with nuclear weapons. The NFU declarations, as experts have widely argued, are political, not operational statements.

In a 2019 article for International Security, Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang argued that “Indian officials are [increasingly] advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India’s long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.” There is also other evidence that India has come a long way since the 2003 doctrine and is no longer tied down by NFU operationally.

Additionally, as is evident from debates on NFU, it is very difficult to verify a state’s NFU declaration. For instance, Li Bin, a professor at China’s Tsinghua University and an expert in nuclear strategy, argues that, without knowledge of a state’s size of nuclear force, its force composition, the accuracy of its weapons (for counterforce targeting) and conventional force strength, it is not possible to verify such a declaration.

The operational insignificance of NFU is also evident from what Nato officials found in the classified documents on Warsaw Pact war plans after the fall of the Berlin Wall. French diplomat and strategic expert Therese Delpech, wrote that “…military records of the Warsaw Pact that fell into German hands demonstrated beyond doubt that Russian operational plans called for the use of nuclear and chemical weapons in Germany at the onset of hostilities, even if Nato forces were using only conventional weapons.”

In view of the evolving Indian military thinking, Pakistan has no option but to consider India’s 2003 NFU as merely a declaratory policy without military significance.

ACCIDENTS, MORE ACCIDENTS

On March 9, 2022, at 6:43pm, the Air Defence Operations Centre of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) picked up and began tracking a high-speed flying object which, after flying for some time inside Indian airspace, sharply changed course and manoeuvred towards Pakistani territory. It violated Pakistan’s air space and ultimately fell near Mian Channu in Pakistani Punjab’s Khanewal district.

The next day, the Director-General Inter-Services Public Relations (DG-ISPR) briefed the media on the incident. The DG-ISPR noted that “It is important to highlight that the flight path of this object endangered many international and domestic passenger flights…as well as human life and property on ground. Whatever caused this incident to happen… it, nevertheless…reflects very poorly on their [India’s] technological prowess and procedural efficiency.”

The Indian government kept silent for two days after the incident before publicly confirming that one of its missiles had been accidentally launched while undergoing “routine maintenance” and that it had crossed into Pakistan.

On March 15, six days after the incident, speaking in the Indian parliament, Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh admitted to an “inadvertent release of a missile… during routine maintenance and inspection.”

He stated that: “It was later known that the missile fell in Pakistan’s territory. The incident is regrettable. But it’s a relief that no losses happened. I’d like to inform the House that the Government has taken this matter very seriously and [an] official order for a high-level probe has been given.”

Singh’s statement raised a number of technical and strategic questions, justifying Pakistan’s demand that any inquiry into the launch must involve a team of technical experts from Pakistan.

Pakistan’s statement also listed seven fundamental questions: the exact type of the missile/projectile that was accidentally launched; what was the missile’s programmed flight path; how and why it had veered from its flight path, stressing, as an Indian analyst termed “justifiably”, that “such an incident had the possibility of precipitating a prospective crisis if Islamabad had opted to react, as it was completely unaware that the missile was unarmed”; was the missile fitted with a self-destruct mechanism (if not, why not and if it were, why and how the device had malfunctioned); and what technical measures and procedures, if any, does India have in place to prevent accidental missile launches during “routine maintenance.”

QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS

In addition to the technical questions — answers to which are vital for a number of reasons, including strategic stability, safety and security — the important question is whether India informed Pakistan that a missile had been accidentally launched.

From Singh’s statement that India “later learnt” that the missile landed in Pakistani territory, it is obvious that, while the missile was in flight and even after it had gone off course, India did not inform Pakistan, either because it failed to monitor the missile’s flight or deliberately withheld the information.

No matter which way one cuts it, whether the operators were incompetent or complicit, the incident is indicative not just of India’s inability to handle sensitive technology, but also of the deeply worrying communication gaps between India and Pakistan, a contiguous nuclear dyad locked in a conflictual paradigm.

Serious questions have been raised by analysts within and outside India about multiple incidents and accidents that have happened over the years during equipment and systems handling.

As noted by one Indian analyst, “the Indian military services over the last several years have witnessed many high profile tragedies and mishaps.” During PAF’s Operation Swift Retort on February 27, 2019, while there was a dogfight going on over the skies along the Line of Control, Indian ground air defence shot down one of its own Russian Mi-17V5 ‘Hip’ medium-lift helicopters, killing six service officials and one civilian.

In two other incidents, “India’s indigenous Arihant [nuclear] submarine [was left] out of commission for many months in 2018; and a fire and explosion on board an Indian Kilo-class submarine in 2013…killed 18 crew members.”

ELUSIVE COMMON GROUND

As nuclear weapons states outside the framework of the NPT, Pakistan and India have certain legal and normative responsibilities. Their civilian nuclear programmes are under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

India, which has a 123 Agreement with the United States, has been trying to become a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and is already a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Pakistan, for its part, has constantly argued against discriminatory approaches to non-proliferation and disarmament. While supporting efforts on the CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Pakistan continues to argue for a standardised approach to these multilateral arrangements at the Conference on Disarmament.

It has also flagged the requirement of regulating the emergence of new technologies, including hypersonic missiles, lethal autonomous weapons, cyber security, military uses of artificial intelligence and quantum computing.

There are two sets of problems in finding common ground. One is, of course, the nature of relations between India and Pakistan and the disputes that underpin it. The other is India’s perception of itself as a regional power that must find a place at the high table.

A good example of that, among others, is India’s bid for a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This desire, coupled with India’s tense relations with China, means that India is unwilling to accept a broader bilateral arrangement with Pakistan that it might consider as hampering the development of its conventional and nuclear military capabilities in relation to China.

The second problem is the desire by the United States to partner India and look at New Delhi as a net security provider in this region. This strategic approach is not just about India’s market and economic potential but also the US’ competition with China. These problems, going forward, will only exacerbate further.

CONCLUSION

Emerging technologies are increasing the risks in nuclear environments. For India and Pakistan the risks are much higher for the reasons cited above. There are a number of military confidence building measures in place between India and Pakistan but they have, at best, been partially respected.

As the situation stands, India does not seem to have much appetite to engage with Pakistan. Pakistan, on its part, has shown the desire to resume the normalisation process but has preconditioned it with India’s reversal of its August 5, 2019 decision that revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir.

In the foreseeable future, there does not seem to be much space for a serious dialogue on nuclear risk reduction measures even as risks continue to grow.

The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. He tweets @ejazhaider

Published in Dawn, EOS, May 28th, 2023

Cyber threats to the Pakistani nuclear horn: Daniel 8

Cyber threats to nuclear weapons | By Rimsha Malik

May 25, 2023

CYBER THREATS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

EACH aspect of society is at risk from cyber-based dangers, including the financial sector, the entertainment industry, departmental stores and insurance organizations. When it comes to cyberattacks on their most important systems, governments face an even more serious threat. A successful cyberattack on a nuclear weapon or related system, such as a nuclear weapon, a delivery system, or the accompanying Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3) systems, might have existential repercussions. Attacks on key infrastructure could have extreme implications. Cyberattacks could result in false attack warnings, disrupt access to information or vital communications, undermine nuclear delivery or planning systems, or even let an enemy gain control of a nuclear weapon. The resilience of nuclear systems may be negatively impacted by the increased use of digital technology. In historically resilient systems, like submarines or mobile missile launchers, new technology can improve performance and dependability but it can also create new vulnerability.

Although there haven’t been any known public cyberattacks on nuclear weapons systems, past occurrences give us some idea of what can happen. For instance, in 1980, missiles were detected to be heading for the United States by warning systems. The warning turned out to be a false alarm brought on by a defective computer chip in the minutes before the President would have had to issue an order for retaliation. More recently, in 2010, a computer system malfunction caused 50 nuclear-armed missiles to go down for about an hour. These missiles were based in Wyoming. These are the kinds of occurrences that, particularly in times of crisis or conflict, could push leaders to the point of deciding to launch a nuclear attack based on incomplete intelligence and weaken their trust in military systems, which is necessary to prevent a serious error.

The human factor is also a significant concern in terms of cyber threats to nuclear weapons. In 2016, a security researcher discovered that the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile system used an unsecured communications protocol that made it vulnerable to hacking. This vulnerability was caused by an insider who deliberately inserted the insecure protocol into the system. Another potential cyber threat to nuclear weapons is through supply chain attacks, where attackers compromise the security of a third-party vendor or supplier that provides critical components or software to the nuclear weapons system. In 2017, malware known as “NotPetya” was able to spread globally through supply chain attacks, affecting several companies and causing billions of dollars in damage. North Korean hackers have been linked to several cyber-attacks on nuclear-related targets. In 2014, a South Korean nuclear power plant operator was hacked, resulting in the leak of blueprints and other sensitive information. In 2017, a cyber-attack on a South Korean defence contractor resulted in the theft of sensitive military information, including plans for joint military exercises with the United States. These incidents demonstrate the potential for cyber threats to physically damage critical infrastructure and the need to maintain robust cybersecurity measures and regularly assess and address potential vulnerabilities in nuclear weapons management systems.

In 2013, a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) highlighted the vulnerability in Pakistan’s nuclear program to cyber-attacks. The report stated that Pakistan had invested relatively little in cybersecurity and relied on outdated technology, making its nuclear facilities vulnerable to cyber-attacks. In 2014, a group of hackers claiming to be from India breached the computer systems of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and leaked sensitive information. The attack was believed to be part of a larger cyber espionage campaign targeting Indian and Pakistani government agencies. In 2015, the FBI arrested a Pakistani national in the United States who was attempting to sell sensitive information about Pakistan’s nuclear program to an undercover FBI agent. The individual had previously worked as a contractor at Pakistan’s Chashma nuclear power plant.

These incidents suggest that Pakistan’s nuclear program is vulnerable to cyber threats and underscore the need for robust cybersecurity measures. However, it is important to note that Pakistan has a policy of maintaining a low profile on its nuclear weapons program and does not publicly disclose details about its nuclear arsenal or its security measures. Therefore, the extent of cyber threats to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program remains largely unknown. The consequences of a successful cyber-attack could be catastrophic, resulting in physical damage, loss of life and potentially even nuclear war. A concerted global effort will be needed to address the cyber danger of nuclear weapons. Everyone has an interest in averting a cyberattack that either triggers a nuclear launch or explosion or that precedes, exacerbates and intensifies a nuclear catastrophe. Therefore, the most urgent need is to bring nuclear-armed states together and seek consensus on preventing the most hazardous dynamics offered by the new cyber threat.

—The writer is Researcher at Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Working on Cyber Warfare and National Security.

The US Taking Control Of Pakistan’s Nukes??? Daniel 8

The US Must Take Control Of Pakistan’s Nukes

India must engage with the West, especially the US and find ways of getting it to secure the nukes of Pakistan. It can’t leave 165 nukes of a completely rogue and destabilised regime unsecured. If Pakistan could build its nuke arsenal covertly, it can very well sell a limited stockpile the same way

Shashwat Gupta Ray

22 May 2023

Pakistan is going through an unprecedented internal political turmoil which has gone beyond all past incidents. On 9 May 2023, former Pakistani Prime Minister and politician Imran Khan was arrested from inside the High Court in Islamabad by National Accountability Bureau (NAB) on the charges of corruption in connection with the Al-Qadir Trust, which he owns alongside his wife, Bushra Bibi.

During Khan’s court appearance in Islamabad High Court, while he was in the process of submitting his biometric data, paramilitary forces of Pakistan Rangers forcibly entered by breaking a window to apprehend him.

Video footage depicted numerous security officers of Pakistan Rangers grabbing Khan out of the courtroom and subsequently placing him inside a black Toyota Hilux Vigo Following Khan’s arrest, his party called for demonstrations.

This led to dissenters going berserk, to the extent of attacking and torching army Corps Commander’s house in an army cantonment! Armed men wearing army uniforms attacked the Pakistani army’s headquarters in the garrison city of Rawalpindi close to the capital, Islamabad.

In a nation where the army is believed to be supreme, seemed totally clueless of what was happening in the country. It is believed that the army has been divided in pro and anti-Imran Khan. It is a very dangerous situation for any country if there is any reality in this information. Pakistan’s economy is also in a huge mess right now.

In all this chaos, what has missed the attention is the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Nuclear bombs in a nation heading towards a civil war, is a recipe for disaster. In Pakistan, the Army chief has the nuclear button.

Pakistan is a unique nuclear weapons state. It’s been the recipient of proliferation technology transfers, by theft (from the Netherlands) and from others (China), and it’s been a supplier as well (North Korea, Iran, Libya). Pakistan has been a state sponsor of proliferation and tolerated private-sector proliferation as well. As a weapons state it has engaged in highly provocative behaviour against India.

Pakistan’s nuclear use policy is unlike its nuclear armed neighbours India and China. Pakistan has not committed to a “No-First Use” policy, unlike India. US President Joe Biden has gone on record to say that Pakistan is “one of the most dangerous nations in the world” as it has “nuclear weapons without cohesion”.

The West has expressed concern over the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Many in the West are worried that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists or jihadi elements.

Ever since May 1998, when Pakistan first began testing nuclear weapons, claiming its national security demanded it, American presidents have been haunted by the fear that Pakistan’s stockpile of nukes would fall into the wrong hands.

“There are three threats,” says Graham Allison, an expert on nuclear weapons who directs the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. The first is “a terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon, which they take to Mumbai or New York for a nuclear 9/11. The second is a transfer of a nuclear weapon to a state like Iran. The third is a takeover of nuclear weapons by a militant group during a period of instability or splintering of the state.”

The militant group Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan or TTP, which is wreaking havoc on Pakistan army on the latter’s western front, is an umbrella organization of various Islamist armed militant groups operating along the Afghan–Pakistani border formed in 2007 with an aim is to overthrow the government of Pakistan by waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistan armed forces and the state and to establish an emirate based on its interpretation of Islamic law.

A socially, politically, economically and militarily destabilised nuclear weapons State, which happens to be India’s most hostile neighbour, should be a matter of concern for the authorities here. Pakistan is a rogue nation, to say the least.

Pakistan is crushed under a mountain of debt. Pakistan’s debt jumped from Rs 42.39 trillion in January 2022 to reach close to PKR 55 trillion in January 2023, as per State Bank of Pakistan data. One won’t be surprised if Pakistan decides to covertly sell its nuclear weapons to its friendly nations like China, North Korea or Turkey in a desperate bid to raise funds to repay its debt and avoid bankruptcy. Indian and world media outlets have been speculating about such a possibility.

In these circumstances, India must engage with the West, especially the US and find ways of securing the nukes of Pakistan because if the nukes fall in the hands of rogue elements, then even the US won’t be safe. It can’t leave 165 nukes of a completely rogue and destabilised regime unsecured.

If Pakistan could build its nuke arsenal covertly, it can very well sell a limited stockpile the same way. Desperation can compel individuals and regimes to take disastrous steps. Thus, it is in US’ interests also that it secures Pakistan’s nuclear assets sooner than later.

Preparing for the First Nuclear War: Revelation 8

Full Text: ‘We’ve to Be on Guard So That Spillover From Pakistan’s Developments Don’t Impact India’

‘We’ve to be constantly on our guard, but the fact that there is so much civil strife and civil-military dissonance [in Pakistan], it is an additional factor for us to take into account as we evaluate our own internal and external security threats,’ says former diplomat T.C.A. Raghavan in an interview with Karan Thapar.

SECURITYSOUTH ASIA

As Pakistan undergoes a crisis, with the military going full throttle against former prime minister Imran Khan, what should India watch out for in such a scenario? On May 22, Karan Thapar spoke to former High Commissioner to Islamabad T.C.A. Raghavan to discuss how concerned India should be when our neighbour, a nuclear power, is going through constitutional, political and economic crises.

With Pakistan locked in an ever-increasing, widening and deepening web of crises – constitutional, political and economic – we ask how concerned should we in India be.

To answer that key question, we have one of our foremost experts in Pakistan – former High Commissioner to Islamabad and former Director General of the Indian Council of World Affairs, T.C.A. Raghavan.

Let me repeat that essential question.

With Pakistan caught in a deepening and worsening web of crisis – constitutional, political, and economic – and additionally, with terrorism becoming an increasing problem, how concerned should we be in India?

Thank you for inviting me to your show. Evidently, because of the long adversarial nature of our relationship with Pakistan, we have to be very concerned about whatever is happening over there, and certainly, it goes without saying we have to be on our guard so that spillover developments from that internal churn do not impact us adversely. So yes, I would say we need to be certainly on top of all the developments in Afghanistan and very very watchful about the possible impact on us.

Let me quote to you what Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center in Washington D.C. has told the BBC just a couple of days ago. He says and I’m quoting him, “When your rightful neighbour, a nation that volatile even at the best of times, is experiencing severe political stress, bouts of large-scale unrest, and especially concerns about the cohesiveness of the army leadership, then you should be worried.” Would you go as strong as that we need to be worried in India, and not just concerned?

I would agree. I think that given the state, or the intensity, of the situation in Pakistan, there is every reason for us to be worried and that worry can have different dimensions because contrary to the view of some who think that chronic instability in Pakistan is something which serves our interest, I am in agreement with those [who believe] that such chronic instability is not good in terms of our national interests.

So certainly, given the fact that we know more this time, or we have heard more this time about the possible rifts in the army, about the extent of political polarisation, about the severe civil-military differences which have cropped up, there is every cause for us to not just be concerned but also worry.

Let’s discuss a couple of scenarios that could develop [in such a scenario]. Firstly, with the Pakistan Army distracted by its enormous troubles at home, is it likely that it could take its eyes off terrorist groups like the LeT [Lashkar-e-Taiba] and the Jaish [Jaish-e-Mohammed], who in turn, sensing the opportunity, could step up the anti-Indian activity. Is that a credible fear at the moment?

To be realistic that fear has always existed with Pakistan because whatever might be one’s opinion of the Pakistan military, the fact is they are not effective in controlling the structures which they create, and that applies both to the politicians who grow rogue and also to terrorist outfits. So that threat of terrorist attack either with or without the complicity of the Pakistan military has always been there, and will certainly continue to be there. Given the chaos in Pakistan, does that [the threat] go up by a few notches? Possibly, it does.

When you say ‘go up by a few notches’ and ‘possibly’, does that mean it’s gone up fairly considerably or just marginally?

It’s very difficult to make that evaluation. I don’t think we can be in a position where we can relax a bit because Pakistan is fully stable, or there is a harmonious situation prevailing within it. We need to be more concerned because of [Pakistan’s] internal turmoil.

We have to be constantly on our guard, but the fact that there is so much civil strife and civil-military dissonance [in Pakistan], it is an additional factor for us to take into account as we evaluate our own internal and external security threats.

At this point, let me ask you a specific question in connection with the issue that we are discussing. Are you worried about the G20 meeting in Srinagar, which begins today (May 22) and will continue till May 24. Could that G20 meeting in Srinagar provide a tempting target for terrorists, who, as you know, have already stepped up their activity, fairly worryingly in the recent weeks, in the Poonch-Rajouri area. I know Srinagar is not quite there, but it [the G20 meeting] is a tempting target. Should it be concerned?

Certainly, high-profile events in Jammu and Kashmir, or for that matter elsewhere in India, do create a window of opportunity for terrorists, who want publicity, in terms of attacks, [who] time those certain times for maximum impact. So yes, I would say the G20 meeting adds to the overall security threats that we confront.

Was it wise to hold the meeting or was this something that we have to do and bite the bullet and get on with it?

I would say that it is a call which the government has to take. Certainly, we cannot be deterred by the possible threats of terrorist attacks from embarking on something which we want to do. I think to do so would be a cop-out and would not be in the traditions of Indian governance.

This question, for instance, came up in the past, once, at the inauguration of the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad Bus, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had gone there to inaugurate the bus. And [back then, too] there were major terrorist attacks. And, there was the view that this was in a way providing a target. But the fact is, you wanted to do it because you felt that was the direction to take. So you cannot let terrorist attacks or the fear of terrorist attacks deter you from embarking on a course of action you have decided.

Let me put a second scenario that could develop as a result of the critical confusion in Pakistan. As Pakistan Army’s image and standing within the country gets steadily weaker, do you think there’s a possibility it might seek to assert control by signalling strengths on the Kashmir front, leading to either an increase in cross-border activity, or even a breakdown of the ceasefire on the LoC [Line of Control], which has held fairly remarkably well over the last two years?

But that factor is always there at a time of civil-military strife. Or when the image of the Pakistan Army is dented, that is a general consideration. It is always there. But that’s not to say that the general consideration is always valid. We don’t have to embark on the root of the self-fulfilling prophecy that this is something inevitably which is going to happen because logically it appears so. I do think that while there may be greater dissonance in the Pakistan military today than there has been in the past, but there will also be a larger awareness in the higher command of the military as to is it in their overall interest to create a situation with India by stepping away from the ceasefire or by any other steps. I think, possibly, there will be enough people within the Pakistan military who feel that would not be in their overall interests.

So, you are not as concerned about the second scenario as you were [concerned] about the first. Have I understood that correctly?

I’m generally concerned. Because you cannot rule out any particular scenario. I’m just cautious about going down, as I said, the root of a self-fulfilling prophecy, and imagining or thinking that the worst is about to happen, or has happened. It’s good to be prepared for different situations but not necessarily act as if the worst case scenarios are upon you.

Let me at this stage slightly widen our discussion. We are talking about an increasing, widening, and a deepening web of crises in Pakistan, but I define them, initially, as constitutional, political, and economic. I want to now raise a possibility of a developing crisis, but I am not sure if it’s a full-fledged crisis, within the Pakistan army. Doubts are emerging that General Munir, the Army Chief, may not be fully in control. Why people have these doubts is because after Lieutenant General [Salman Fayyaz] Ghani was sacked as Corps Commander on May 9 and 10, websites in Pakistan, not foreign websites, showed two different generals as his successor.

Lieutenant General Fayyaz Hussian Shah was being shown as the first successor, but over the last three to four days, Lieutenant General Syed Aamer Raza was being shown as the successor. This means that in course of 13 to 14 days, the Lahore Corps Commander has changed three times.

Does this indicate that there is tension within the higher ranks of the army and that General Munir, the army chief, has no control over it? [Does this mean] he perhaps doesn’t have the full loyalty of his generals. Secondly, if those doubts are credible, how worrying are they, how much more do they add to this mix of crises in the country?

These rumours about the Lahore Corps Commander have been there for the past week or so. I don’t think anyone really knows what is happening. As you pointed out that most of this information is coming from Pakistani journalists themselves, to some extent events playing out in Pakistan have greater transparency today than they have ever had before, but we still certainly don’t know what is the situation regarding the Lahore Corps Commander.

It’s also a fact that the current chief, who has been in this position only since November-end, has not had the time to stamp his authority on the higher command. Usually, that happens in Pakistan when he has been able to reshuffle the senior generals and get a team of his choice in place. That has not happened so far and it was expected that would happen by September-October, but the crisis developed and matured before that.

So yes, there is this question, whether the Pakistan Army Chief is fully in control. What does that mean? Are there serious rifts in the higher command? At the same time, my own feeling is that the Pakistan army remains a disciplined formation.

The army chief is certainly conscious of the fact that he has to put the full weight of his authority behind what he is doing, which is why he has been touring, quiet feverishly, different core headquarters over the past three or four days. So far, apart from the sacking of the Lahore Core Commander, there is uncertainty about who has been appointed in his place.

There is no other significant sign which suggests deep rifts or further rifts. My sense is that the higher command will rally around him, and certainly, the torching of the Core Commander’s house in Lahore has acted to consolidate the opinion within the military behind the chief to some extent at least. I think that the kind of noises that were emerging from ex-servicemen and former retired officers, those have gone down by quite a few steps. So overall, I think we see a situation where the command is going to hold together, but these are uncertain times for Pakistan and nobody is entirely sure.

Two quick questions, am I right in saying that this is the first time after literally decades that the authority of the Army Chief of the Pakistan army seems to be in question? And that hasn’t happened for a very long time. Secondly, do you believe that there are fissures between jawans and lower rank officers and the top generals over the issue of Imran [Khan] and is that is another weakening element for the army?

You are right. These kinds of fissures have erupted after some time, primarily, because the transition from one chief to another was in itself quite a messy affair, but it’s not as if these fissures are totally unknown, or we have to go deep into Pakistan’s history to look up for them. They have happened before, especially, during the times of civil-military imbalance or civil-military dissonance.

Musharraf, for instance, was sacked when he was returning to Pakistan, and someone else was appointed as Army Chief. Then there was a coup. There have been cases like this. General Munir was removed as DG ISI after only a few months in the post.

The present situation is unsual, but it’s not unprecedented.

On the question of fissures going down to the jawan level and to the junior officer level, to my knowledge, we have heard less about that. The real signs of dissonance have come from retired officers, colonels, brigadiers, a few general officers, and particularly, the signs of dissonance have come from the families of serving senior officers. Imran Khan has a wide appeal; he has almost a cult-like status. But it’s also an appeal which is spearheaded by the middle class which is dissatisfied with the old style of politics and they want change quickly and they think that Imran Khan can deliver that change.

We hear less about peasants’ commitment to his movement. That is the constituency from which the rank and file are recruited.

So we hear less about that. I don’t see that as a major factor. Certainly, there is some dissonance from retired officers, serving officers, families – the upper crust of Pakistan’s society.

Do we ought to be concerned about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons? Could they fall into the wrong hands because of the turmoil in the country, and perhaps the tensions within the top brass of the army? Or is that an exaggerated fear?

At this stage, it is an exaggerated fear, because those fears have always been there. We’ve had views in the past about Zia’s generals, who are deeply committed Islamic extremists, taking control of nuclear weapons, or terrorist outfits seeking control of nuclear weapons.

I think that the key question is, is the higher command in the Pakistani army intact? If it is not intact, [then] we go into a totally uncharted domain. Right now there are signs which we should be monitoring. But I don’t think there is a serious possibility of the military command structure breaking into a number of factions.

Let me widen the ambit of our discussion. There is another aspect of the crisis in Pakistan: social unrest caused by both the treatment of Imran Khan, but perhaps, more importantly, social unrest caused by the economic crisis with inflation soaring above 36%, and a shortage of essential food items. How concerning is this social unrest for India?

The social unrest will have less of a direct impact on us. There are exaggerated fears about the economy totally imploding, and refugees coming into India. Those fears are exaggerated.

The chronology of the current crisis began with Imran Khan’s removal in a vote of confidence, followed by a major climatic crisis, in the form of floods, and some of the flooded areas were quite close to the Indian borders, especially from the Sindh, Rajasthan, sector.

Then there’s deep economic crisis. Pakistan’s currency has depreciated by 50% in about 11 months, but there are no signs that this has propelled the people to think of abandoning their homes and moving towards India.

There are some exaggerated noises to that effect in some circles in India. But certainly, social unrest in Pakistan is increasing. It’s possibly going to continue to increase. But the social unrest in Pakistan is not directly impacting us. So far, there is no sign that the state structures in Pakistan are imploding. I don’t see that happening.

There are some people in India who talk about Pakistan imploding, not just [in terms of] the economy but the politics of the country, and its integrity, its social cohesion. Is that a possibility? Or can it be better explained by saying this is an exaggerated schadenfreude on the part of the people in India, who don’t like Pakistan?

It’s an exaggerated fear, an exaggerated schadenfreude. If one looks at the past quarter century, Pakistan has had recurrent crises. This time, Pakistan was hit by three or four times with different kinds of crises. So therefore, the dramatic intensity has increased, and the magnitude has increased, but it’s not a new situation for Pakistan to be battling crises.

The schadenfreude is inevitable in India given the serial nature of our relationship, and the fact that so many terrorist attacks have been carried out against civilians. So it is inevitable, but I would say we will have to abandon schadenfreude, if there is a realistic threat of Pakistan cracking up, or extremists gaining the upper hand in the running of the country. Because this is a country with nuclear weapons. [This is a country] with whom you have a deeply adversarial history. So, the stability of that country is also a part of your national interest.

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Let me ask you two more questions. Given everything we have discussed, as someone who understands Pakistan’s past better than most people, and I shall point out to the audience that you have had several tenures there. In addition to being the High Commissioner, you were also deputy High Commissioner, a few years before that, and you were also in charge of Pakistan in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a very long time.

Altogether, your knowledge of that country is probably unsurpassed. This leads to two questions. What should be the Indian government’s response to the problems across the border, given the possibility that they could deteriorate? So far, we have waited and watched. Is that the wisest course of action?

I would think so. Whenever Pakistan has gone through a domestic churn, our traditional postures have been to try to insulate ourselves from what is happening there. Don’t become a factor in that mess. By and large that appears to be the position now. I think it’s a wise position. It’s an entirely domestic situation.

There is very little way that any external power can do to control it. So even apart from India, none of Pakistan’s other external powers are in a position to control the current situation. It is something which Pakistan has to resolve for itself. So we should stay out of that domestic churn, insulate ourselves from it. And, wait and watch to see what happens.

My last question is, is there a case for offering economic assistance? For instance, [India offering] wheat or vegetables. Would that not enhance our standing in the South Asia region where we are very keen to be recognised as the leaders? And, secondly, our problem, surely, is with the government of Pakistan, and not with the people suffering there. Offering them economic assistance could build some body of support in that country that is more willing to be realistic towards India.

So is there a case for offering economic assistance to a neighbour whose countrymen were our countrymen 75 years ago?

Any such offers from India will not be seen as benign. Most Pakistanis would see it as Indians relishing the difficulties which Pakistanis are facing. So we should resist any such temptation. Whatever we could do is in any case going to be limited. And, given the intensity of events in Pakistan, we should refrain from any optical gestures, as I said, our policy in the past always was to try to insulate yourself from a domestic churn, don’t become a factor in it and its a wise policy and we should stick with it.

War Against the Pakistani Nuclear Horn: Daniel 8

War Against Pakistan

Malik Muhammad Ashraf

MAY 22, 2023

A special meeting of the corps commander was convened to deliberate on the horrendous events of May 9 when workers and leaders of PTI, reacting to the arrest of Imran Khan in a criminal case, attacked GHQ, Corp Commander House Lahore and other military installations. Not only did they condemn the attacks in the harshest possible terms but also decided to make an example out of those responsible for executing, planning and conceiving those acts of terrorism and trying all those responsible for this dastardly acts under the Army Act. The National Security Committee, in its meeting on 16th May, has also endorsed the deliberations of the Corp Commanders huddle besides deciding to observe May 9 as black day. It also emphasised the need to regulate the social media and showing zero tolerance to violence. The cabinet has also endorsed the foregoing decisions. Nobody in his right mind and imbued with love for the motherland can take an issue with these decisions.

Pakistan Army is the pride of the nation and a protector of the ideological and physical frontiers of the country. The nation is greatly indebted to the Armed forces for their sacrifices in ensuring existence of Pakistan as a sovereign entity and warding off the existential threats to its security both internal as well as external. In fact Pakistan Army is the actual red line for the nation.

Pakistan Army is the pride of the nation and a protector of the ideological and physical frontiers.

The attacks on military installations were attacks on the writ and integrity of the state. The pre-dominant public view is that it was war against Pakistan. Only the traitors and enemies of the country could indulge in such acts. The way these attacks were executed proved beyond any iota of doubt that that they were pre-planned and not a spontaneous reaction to arrest of Imran Khan. The audio leaks of PTI leaders have confirmed the authenticity of these claims. One is however amazed at the audacity of Imran who first expressed ignorance about the attacks before the court and after his release on bail has come up with the allegations that these attacks were carried by the agencies to find an excuse to ban PTI and convict him. That tells how devious the man is. What happened at Zaman Park when the police went to arrest him on the basis of an arrest warrant was a premonition for the things to follow. Imran Khan persistently fomented anti-Army rhetoric. The PTI social media mangers worked on it round the clock.There were already intelligence reports regarding presence of some terrorists at Zaman Park. The arrests made in the backdrop of these attacks indicate that more than nine hundred of them were foreign nationals having connection with a terrorist entity.

These incidents have not only made Pakistan a laughing stock for its enemies and ill-wishers but has also sent a very wrong message to the global community in regards to its ability to safeguard its nuclear assets. It is pertinent to point out that some countries have been persistently propagating that there was a danger of Pakistani nuclear assets falling in the hands of terrorists. Army has a key role in the Command and Control structure for the safety of our nuclear assets. If the Army headquarters and military installations are attacked it goes to strengthen that nefarious propaganda against Pakistan. What happened on May 9 is fraught with serious consequences.

Politics must be done and practiced in line with limits set by the constitution and laws of the land in this regard. Expressing dissent with the government policies and protesting against it is a democratic and constitutional right of the opposition and must be exercised within the permissible legal limits and in line with the internationally recognized norms of democracy. Violence has no place in politics. The politicians and leaders of the political parties need to understand that whatever they do or say has profound implications both good as well as bad depending on the nature of their messages and acts. The nation has witnessed several agitations and political movements during its 75 years history when the mob turned unruly and destroyed some public as well as private properties but neither any leader incited sentiments against Pakistan Army nor their followers ever thought of hitting the military targets in spite of the fact that the military dictators deposed elected governments four times.

The defence forces of Pakistan are viewed as saviours of the nation. Because the people know fully well that the Army was their first and last line of defence and to live as a sovereign nation it needed to be respected as an institution as well as strengthened to thwart designs of the enemies.

It is really regrettable to note that since the emergence of Imran Khan on the political landscape of Pakistan an element of violence has crept into politics. The ugliest manifestation was witnessed when during 126 days sit-in at Islamabad the supporters of Imran Khan and Tahir ul Qadri attached the parliament, TV station and the Prime Minister House while the two brothers standing on the container made victory signs. Imran used abusive language against senior police officers, threatened them of dire consequences. The SSP Islamabad was badly beaten with sticks. He incited people to civil disobedience and even asked them to refuse paying their taxes; surely anti-state fulminations.

During his three and half year power stint he pummeled all democratic norms, refused to develop working relationship with the opposition. His resorted to unprecedented political vendetta by implicating the opposition leaders in cases which were never proven in the courts of law and the High Courts and SC repeatedly observed that the government was using NAB for political engineering. He insulted the opposition leaders incessantly by hurling derogatory epithets on them. Those who brought him in power after witnessing his incompetence to rule and inability to deal with economic challenges withdrew their unqualified support for his government and decided to become apolitical. The opposition parties got their chance to depose him through a no-confidence motion, a constitutional way of regime change.

He was so incensed and confused after his removal that he started blaming USA, establishment and the PDM for the alleged conspiracy against him. Down the line he also blamed a number of other people. He kept shifting the targets. However in the end he started a tirade against General Bajwa holding him solely responsible for the regime change. Actually he was angry why the General did not help him in torpedoing the no-confidence motion. What he and his party has done to Pakistan is inexcusable.

The writer is a former diplomat and freelance columnist.

Pakistani nuclear horn in focus after Baloch diaspora launches protests

Pakistani nuclear tests in focus after Baloch diaspora launches protests

New Delhi: On May 28, Pakistan will celebrate the ‘Youm-e-Takbir’, the ‘Day of Greatness’ to give itself a pat on its back, for the nuclear tests in 1998, under the shadow of an unprecedented revolt against the powerful army. Around the same time, the Baloch diaspora will protest against the Pakistani nuclear tests in Balochistan as Aasrokh – day of mourning.

Pakistan had conducted the tests in utter secrecy in the Chagai district of Balochistan, not even revealing about the tests to the Baloch chief minister and his cabinet who came to know about the tests only through the media.

In a press statement, the Free Balochistan Movement (FBM) said that it would hold simultaneous demonstrations in the UK, the Netherlands and Germany to highlight the negative effects of the radiation on the Baloch community. The FBM statement said that after Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests in Chagai, “drought and skin cancer and other radiation-induced diseases have become common among people. It has destroyed the ecosystems of the areas which has damaged the agriculture and livestock of our poor people”.

The Baloch diaspora plans to hold the protests to lobby with the European nations against the nuclear tests which, it says were conducted against the will of the local community. The tests were carried out by Pakistan in the Ras koh mountain range and Chaagi district of Balochistan on May 28, 1998. The Baloch activists also plan to run a social media campaign with the hashtag #NoToPakistaniNukes on May 28.

Pakistan had conducted a total of six nuclear tests between May 28 and May 30, 1998. The country had begun its quest for a nuclear device after India, under then prime minister Indira Gandhi, had tested one in 1974. In response, the then Pakistani prime minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was later hanged to death, said famously: “We will eat grass… but we will make a bomb”.

The Baloch have been struggling for an independent Baloch nation soon after the Pakistani Army invaded the independent land in March 1948 and annexed it. At that very moment as the Pakistani Army was marching into Balochistan, its Parliament was debating on how to tackle an imminent Pakistani threat in case of an invasion. Since then, the Baloch tribes, people and various armed groups have been running a lethal struggle against the Pakistani Army and the government for a free nation.

The FBM, which advocates for an independent Balochistan, says that it wants an independent investigation by the UN on the impact of these tests on the people and environment of Balochistan. It also wants areas contaminated by radioactivity to be cleaned of toxicity as well as compensation to be paid to the local Baloch community that has suffered from diseases and deformities.

Turbulence in the Pakistani Nuclear Horn: Daniel 8

Turbulence in Pakistan

Colonel Balwan Singh Nagial

The Chairman of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) and former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan, was arrested on 09 May 2023 in an alleged land transfer case involving realtor Malik Riaz. He was accused of corrupt practices and was handed over to National Accountability Bureau (NAB). The Pakistan Rangers, who work under the Interior Ministry officers usually posted from the military establishment on secondment, broke open the glass of the window pan and arrested Imran Khan, who was undergoing a biometric process at the court. It is alleged that they beat the security staff and lawyers of Imran Khan. After this incident, massive protests broke out in numerous areas of Pakistan. For the first time, the protestors smashed the main gate of Pakistan Army headquarters at Rawalpindi, raising voices against the establishment. The caretaker government ordered the Pakistan Rangers to control Pakistan’s law and order situation, and section 144 has been invoked. Imran Khan’s arrest came after he alleged an Inter-Service Intelligence(ISI) officer. The Pakistan Army rejected these allegations terming them as highly irresponsible and baseless. It is pertinent to mention that Imran Khan has been facing various allegations of corrupt practices since he was ousted from power in April 2023, when he lost the vote of confidence.