The Prophecy is much more than seeing into the future. For the Prophecy sees without the element of time. For the Prophecy sees what is, what was, and what always shall be. 11:11 LLC
This photo taken on September 11, 2022 shows a security person standing in front of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant amid the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. STRINGER/AFP via Getty Images
The U.N. nuclear chief stressed Tuesday that the world is fortunate a nuclear accident hasn’t happened in Ukraine and asked Moscow and Kyiv to commit to preventing any attack on Europe’s largest nuclear power plant and make other pledges “to avoid the danger of a catastrophic incident.”
Rafael Mariano Grossi reiterated to the U.N. Security Council what he told the International Atomic Energy Agency’s board of governors in March: “We are rolling a dice and if this continues then one day our luck will run out.”
Grossi “respectfully and solemnly” asked Ukraine and Russia to observe the principles, saying IAEA experts at Zaporizhzhia will start monitoring and he will publicly report on any violations:
Ban attacks from or against the plant, especially targeting reactors and spent fuel storage areas.
Ban the storage of heavy weapons or presence of military personnel that could be used for an attack.
Ensure the security of an uninterrupted off-site power supply to the plant.
Protect “all structures, systems and components” essential to the plant’s operation from attacks or acts of sabotage.
Take no action to undermine these principles.
Grossi asked the 15 Security Council members to support the five principles, stressing that they are “to no one’s detriment and to everyone’s benefit.”
The Kremlin’s forces took over the plant after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy opposes any proposal that would legitimize Russia’s control.
Neither the Russian nor Ukrainian ambassador gave a commitment to support the principles.
Ukraine’s U.N. Ambassador Sergiy Kyslytsya accused Russia of continuing “to actively use the nuclear plant for military purposes.” He said Russia has mined its perimeter and is responsible for shelling that has inflicted “serious damage” on parts of the plant, undermining its safety. He claimed 500 Russian military personnel are at the plant along with heavy weapons, munitions and explosives.
“The threat of dangerous accident as a result of these irresponsible and criminal actions hangs over us,” he said.
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Linda Thomas-Greenfield said recent news reports indicate that Moscow has disconnected Zaporizhzhya’s vital radiation monitoring sensors, which means the plant’s data is now being sent to the Russian nuclear regulator.
“This is a clear escalation of Russia’s efforts to undermine Ukrainian sovereignty and authority over the Zaporizhzhya plant. And this undermines our ability to have confidence in the level of nuclear safety at the plant,” she said. “Let me be clear: the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant belongs to Ukraine. And its data must go to Ukraine, not to Russia.”
In response to a question by CBS News correspondent Pamela Falk after the meeting, Grossi addressed that issue: “This flow of information has been interrupted by the Russian management in control,” he said.
“We have addressed this, in this aspect, with the Russian management at the plant, and we are going to be getting the information and transmitting it to the Ukrainian regulator for their information — which is a mitigation, is not an ideal situation,” Grossi said, adding that the solution to the data question indicates the usefulness of the presence of the IAEA to bridge these gaps.
U.K. Ambassador to the U.N. Barbara Woodward was skeptical about how Russia will comply with the principles.
“New imagery shows Russian forces have established sandbag fighting positions on the rooves of several of the six reactor buildings. This indicates that they will have integrated the actual reactor buildings of Europe’s largest nuclear power plant into tactical defense planning,” Woodward said.
Russia’s U.N. Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia denied that Russia has ever attacked the Zaporizhzhia plant, placed heavy weapons there or stationed military personnel at the plant to carry out an attack from its territory.
Grossi was guardedly optimistic about the views at the Security Council, although he said he was “not naïve” about the challenges ahead.
“We have gotten pretty close to consensus even though everybody wants a little more. … I think this is very encouraging,” he told told Falk in an exclusive sit-down for CBS News after the meeting.
“You know, we have tried to have a practical approach here. We haven’t been seeking Resolutions or things that are cast in stone or set in paper,” he said.
Asked about the interest expressed by both Ukraine’s Ambassador Kyslytsya and the U.S. to have an explicit reference in any agreement to include a recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, Grossi told CBS News: “It will be difficult to get universal consensus on that — this is obvious.”
But he went on to say, “The IAEA is very clear, this being part of the U.N. system, that the U.N. Charter should never be violated and national borders are not to be changed by force.”
Grossi said he has an “operational mandate” to do more to prevent a nuclear accident.
There is intensive debate in South Korea over North Korea’s nuclear threat and whether, in response, Seoul should take more significant measures. Should it nuclearize? Do the US and neighboring powers really want denuclearization and peace on the Korean Peninsula? Can the South Korea-US alliance and the US nuclear deterrent be trusted…
A recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has revealed a significant increase in the Iranian regime’s stockpile of enriched uranium, intensifying concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
The report, prepared just before the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, highlights the agency’s assessment of the regime’s enriched uranium stockpile, which now exceeds 23 times the amount agreed upon in the 2015 agreement between Tehran and world powers.
This revelation comes as the nuclear negotiations with the Iranian regime—which have been in a state of limbo for months—and the appeasement policy pursued by Western governments continue to spark intense debate and scrutiny.
The primary objective of these negotiations was to address concerns about the regime’s nuclear program and prevent the development of nuclear weapons. However, questions have been raised regarding the effectiveness of these negotiations and the approach taken by Western governments, a point further driven by the IAEA’s latest report.
Critics argue that Western governments, particularly the United States, have been overly lenient in their diplomatic efforts, culminating in agreements like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. They contend that this approach has failed to adequately address Iran’s ambitions and its non-compliance with international obligations.
According to the IAEA report, as of May 13, 2023, the Iranian regime’s total enriched uranium reserves have reached 4,744.5 kilograms. This marks a substantial rise from the previous estimate in February, where the regime possessed around 3,760 kilograms of uranium, with 87.5 kilograms enriched to 60%.
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action permits the regime to possess up to 202.8 kilograms. The IAEA Director General has warned that the regime now has enough uranium to potentially produce multiple nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the report reveals that the regime continues to enrich uranium beyond the 3.67% limit specified in the JCPOA.
Despite these alarming activities, which clearly indicate the regime’s intention to acquire enriched uranium for nuclear weapons, Western countries persist with a contradictory and weak policy in confronting the regime.
The policy of appeasement, characterized by a willingness to make concessions and seek diplomatic solutions, has drawn criticism for potentially enabling the regime’s nuclear ambitions rather than effectively curbing them. Critics argue that Tehran has used negotiations as a means to buy time and continue its nuclear activities covertly.
Amidst ongoing negotiations and discussions, striking the right balance between diplomatic engagement and preventing nuclear proliferation remains a pressing challenge for Western governments and the international community.
In another development, the IAEA has decided to close the case related to traces of uranium found at one of the regime’s undisclosed nuclear facilities. This issue had strained relations between Iran and the agency in recent years, as reported by AFP.
Additionally, Axios news agency reported, citing American, Israeli, and European officials, that Brett McGurk, the US National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, discussed the possibility of diplomatic contact with the regime regarding nuclear talks during his visit to Oman in early May, approximately four weeks prior.
Robert Malley, the US Special Envoy for Iran, reiterated that the US government is keeping all options on the table to prevent the regime from acquiring nuclear weapons. In an interview with NPR, Malley stated that if the regime’s actions indicate the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the United States will employ all necessary means to deter such efforts. He emphasized that the Biden administration is committed to taking requisite measures while favoring diplomacy to prevent the Iranian regime from obtaining nuclear weapons.
Direct nuclear talks between Western countries and the regime have been stagnant since July 2022, with no visible signs of progress. However, there is speculation among some observers that undisclosed negotiations are taking place between Western countries, including the United States.
In recent weeks, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq of Oman has taken on a more active role, suggesting increased involvement in facilitating discussions between the regime and Western nations. Additionally, officials from the regime have been making alternating visits to Oman, hinting at potential diplomatic engagements.
Prevailing Unstable Environment in Pakistan: If events were not so tragic, the fast moving violent, dynamic, unpredictable politico-social drama being enacted in Pakistan would appear to be ‘comic-action film’ on TV. Nevertheless, being a transactional, impersonal world, people are watching with great interest and unfortunately great amusement. But, a nuclear crisis is certainly no laughing matter, and powers that be will do well to plan and be ready for all contingencies.
The situation is exacerbated by the rivalry and obvious power games between the military, judiciary and executive, with Imran Khan as the ‘invincible, highly popular action hero’. Lost in the turmoil and violence, is the constant fear about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ecosystem – the warheads, the missiles, delivery vehicles (land, air, sea, undersea), the readymade, high grade, unused fissile material, communication systems and aspects like security of the launch codes. I am quite sure that the heads of governments of specifically USA, China and India and their national security advisors (NSAs), and intelligence agencies must be having sleepless nights. The contingency plans to be put into operation for securing the nuclear assets must be getting finetuned. Why specially these three; USA the superpower still fighting global war on terrorism (GWOT) and wants to keep the nuclear club exclusive with no additions, China with her Xinjiang and fundamentalist elements despite Pakistan being her client state (like North Korea), and India, Pakistan’s arch rival for eternity. At the outset it is important to highlight that the two most relevant but worrying aspects are, whether effective state control would be asserted at all times, and whether there are conditions where weapons could be used without due authorisation?; secondly, how to prevent subversion and theft both of physical nuclear assets and technical and communication details, including launch codes, by the very people who are guarding/protecting it. Pakistan’s capability and capacity to protect their nuclear assets along with a historical perspective, followed by contingencies in case the international powers need to intervene has been analysed. This article has used credible open source material [i].
Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal:Pakistan currently has 170 nuclear warheads, and claims a triad status which indicates the capacity to launch from land, air and sea. Details of her assets are listed below:
Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists
Notes:
Experts believe that Pakistan could well be the world’s fourth-largest nuclear weapon state; with a stockpile of some 350 warheads in a decade (2030).
Air: Apart from Mirage III and V, Pakistan can also deploy F-16s (24) and Chinese J 17s (186 in pipeline) for nuclear delivery.
Sea: abur III, range 470 kms; deployed on the air-independent-diesel-electric Agosta class submarines (ordered 8; deployed 4?); some Babur IIIs are pre-mated for second strike capability.
Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW):NASR/HATF 9 has a range of 60 k.m. only, most probably pre-mated, some deployed with forward troops, and possibly under command and control of HQs at operational level (Corps HQ); raising the probability and its vulnerability of misuse/rogue use/panic use, and finding its way in wrong hands including terrorist organisations; and starting a nuclear Armageddon. In 2016 Obama said, “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you’re taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure”.
Pak does not possess enough launchers compared to the warheads it holds; and
all launchers are dual capable!
Nuclear Policy: Pakistan boasts of ‘full spectrum deterrence capability’. Policy similar to NATOs ‘flexible response strategy’, with threat of use when her red lines/threshold will be crossed without explicitly spelling it out. Pakistan claims that she has a formal policy which is classified, and believes that ambiguity adds to the value of deterrence.
Command and Control of Nuclear Assets: The apex body which exercises command and control is the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) headed by the PM, with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) under a three-star army general, which is responsible for the protection of its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, and the strategic assets. Special Response Force (SRF) is the special forces unitof SPD Force with the strength of 25 to 28000 personnel which secures the assets. The selection standards in terms of intelligence and physical standards for the force are even higher than army due to very sensitive nature of their duty. After initial training in army training establishments, they are now trained in Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), located in Chakri near Rawalpindi. Training is modelled on US National Nuclear Security academy.
Regarding Pakistan, it will be fair and reasonable to assume, that the military (COAS) would have the final and decisive vote for exercising the nuclear option.
International Opinion and Observations on Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) Pakistan : Ashley J. Tellis in his book (Striking Assymetries: Nuc Transitions in Southern Asia) says Pakistan is building “the largest, most diversified, and most capable nuclear arsenal possible”, which is endorsed by Peter Lavoy, a US intelligence officer. The Trump administration’s South Asia strategy in 2017 urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists”. President Biden in Oct 2022 said ““Pakistan “may be one of the most dangerous” countries in the world having “nuclear weapons without any cohesion”.
Deployment/Location of Nuclear Assets:
Note: Areas shown as Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas are an integral part of India (map not to scale)
Even when nations proclaim transparency, as exists(ed) between USA and Russia, regarding holdings and deployment of nuclear assets, in terms of agreements (SALT II, which now stands abrogated/suspended), there is always uncertainty and ambiguity regarding accuracy of details, especially when most delivery mechanisms are dual-capable (can fire both conventional and nuclear warheads) and also co-located which is a new dangerous trend followed specially by China and Pakistan. US aggressive anti-nuclear stance against North Korea is mainly because she can never be 100% sure of deployment of nuclear assets, thus not confident of knocking them out in a ‘first strike’ if ever the need arises. However, Pakistan nuclear assets locations are known to a fair degree of certainty, both due to diligence and ISR by the big powers, specially USA, as also with an existing agreement between India and Pakistan[ii] to notify each other. Details of known locations are placed below:
Fissile Mtrl Production Complex – Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding at Kahuta, enrichment plant at Gadwal North of Islamabad. Four heavy water plutonium reactors in Khushab and thermal power plant (helps in estimation of production of fissile material). A new Reprocessing plant at Nilore, E of Islamabad, and second at Chatham in NW Punjab processing spent fuel and extracts plutonium.
Fissile Mtrl – In 2020, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,900 kilograms of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 410 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This material is theoretically enough to produce between 285 and 342 warheads.Pakistan uses tritium to boost fission process and reduce size of warhead. Possesses 690 gms, enough to boost over 100 weapons. Most short range missiles like NASR, Abdali, Babur, Ra-‘ad will need small, lightweight tritium boosted fission warhead.
Production of Msl and Mob Lrs –National Defence Complex at Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range West of Islamabad with two sections;
West – development, production, test launching of missiles and rocket engines;
East – production and assembly of road mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs)
Some launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.
Warhead Production-Pak Ord Factories near Wah, NW of Islamabad.
Safety and Security of Nuclear Assets
Pakistan has put in place all safeguards expected from an NWS and as per international norms of IAEA’s Nuclear Security Strategy (NSS)[iii]. During late 2000 a US report stated “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise”. The SPD is the institutional link between civilian and military facilities. Pakistani sites have three “rings” of security. The first is within each facility itself with SPD personnel responsible for physical searches, Nuclear Media Acess Control (NMAC)[iv] protocols; while the second ring is formed of physical means (limited Access Areas, physical barriers). Outside of each site, the third ring of security is provided by a wider counter intelligence effort. Being aware of the dangers of subversion, NCA has put in place a very rigid system of vetting regularly; different for scientists, civilian staff and military personnel. Screening involves four of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Some important measures incorporated are:
The National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has become an IAEA collaborating centre for Nuclear Security Education, Training and Technical Support in Oct 2022.
Working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas. The GICNT is an international partnership intended to improve international capacity for prevention, detection, and response to nuclear terrorism, particularly the acquisition, transport, or use of nuclear and radiological materials.
Advanced-level training in American National Laboratories and applied it to improve the overall security practices in the country.
Additional measures in terms of equipment enhancement are:
Specially trained – as per IAEA and Nuclear Security Series.
Special theft and tamper-proof vehicles and containers are also used.
SPD and PNRA operate radiational detection portal monitors at nuclear sites.
Contingency planning.
All round and fool proof communications.
Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NuSECC) in Islamabad.
Mobile Radiological Monitoring Laboratory (MRML) established.
Historical Statistics and Vulnerabilities:But impressions, reputation and opinions has gone steadily downhill in the last decade, more due to the socio-politico-unstable internal security situation, rise of political Islam and fundamentalism, Pakistan’s unrelenting dalliance with terrorist organisations, which has come back to bite them like the proverbial snake. There are credible intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, IS, TTP have shown renewed interest in acquiring both warhead, fissile material and technology. The two main constant and real worries are theft (material and intellectual) as also ‘insider operations.
The latest mob violence on Imran Khans arrest, has ignited violence and instability, and specter of even civil war. There are worrying reports of dissension within the Army ranks, both within the highest (rift between COAS, CJSC, Corps Commanders), middle and lower echelons; reports of mutinies in old established army units; soldiers abandoning their posts and duties, increasing insubordination which should cause grave apprehension regarding the safety and security of nuclear assets. If the most disciplined force can be beset with insubordination and desertion, the paramilitary, intelligence agencies and most importantly the personnel manning the security protocol of nuclear assets are equally susceptible. The vulnerability is not only physical theft of warheads and fissile material, but technical data and electronic codes which can operationalize the weapons and missile systems. In the current unrest and fragile security environment ‘when it is time to implement the harshest security measures, is ironically the time when it is at its most vulnerable to subversion and theft. Some historical lapses concerning security of nuclear assets are listed below: –
In November 2007, suicide attack killed seven PAF staff travelling between Mushaf Mir Airbase and the Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha. Both sites have been associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
A double bombing in August 2008 killed 64 people in Wah Cantt. One explosion took place outside the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), which is believed to house the Gadwal Enrichment Plant.
In July 2009, a bus carrying KRL workers was attacked by a suicide bomber at Chor Chowk, Peshawar Road.
In October 2009, the Minhas air force base in Kamra was attacked. The site is widely assessed to host Pakistani nuclear weapons, although the attacker is reported to have detonated a bomb at “a checkpoint on a road leading to the complex,” rather than the base itself.
The biggest of them all; AQ Khan both stealing sensitive information from the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, a subcontractor to the URENCO enrichment consortium, and then going on to sell indigenised versions of that technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
Subversion at the highest level revealed when Lieutenant General (retired) Javed Iqbal and Brigadier (retired) Raja Rizwan who received 14 years’ imprisonment and the death penalty, respectively for nuclear espionage.
Note: – If staff can be identified for attack, they may also be coerced into becoming “insiders. Insiders have been a real concern to Pakistani authorities.
Scenario Building and Recommendations.
Pakistan will obviously remain the first responder for most contingencies, and is expected to act immediately and decisively in case of theft of warhead or fissile material, or loss of critical technological information; assuming the command and control of nuclear assets is still intact and not broken (contingencies like civilian and/or military control, or break up of both is a realistic probability). They are expected to act responsibly and alert the international community immediately specially the ‘Three’ (USA, China and India the immediate neighbour), and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
In case, the UN and world body led by USA and China feel that there exists conditions where the nuclear assets are NOT under the command and control of any responsible body, be it the civil or military, and safety and security of the assets are compromised, and real and present threat to them exists (terrorists, breakaway military leader/group(s) and rogue elements); there is a need for physical intervention to secure them, with or without the sanction/permission of Pakistan authorities. The current scenario does warrant planning and coordinating for such a contingency specially by the ‘Three’.
In the eventuality of the above, and if the unstable situation of a civil war like situation persists, there is a case of following a variation of the Ukraine model* with Pakistan. Pakistan naturally will be loath to give up her nuclear assets. The process will take time, but the world cannot afford to have the spectre of a Nuclear Armageddon hanging over its head all the time.
*Note: When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, there were thousands of former Soviet nuclear warheads, as well as hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers, left on Ukraine’s territory (some in Belarus and Kazakhstan too), which they decided to transfer to Russia. Ukraine never had an independent nuclear weapons arsenal, or control over these weapons, but agreed to remove former Soviet weapons stationed on its territory. In 1992, Ukraine with the other two, signed the Lisbon Protocol[vi] and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1994. The transfer of all nuclear material took some time, but by 2001, all nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia to be dismantled and all launch silos decommissioned. Interestingly, the Protocol in itself does not talk of any security guantantees by either USA or Russian Federation. However, The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories. The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. China and France too gave somewhat individual assurances in separate documents.
The memoranda, prohibited the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, “except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. The memorandum did accelerate the handing over of nuclear weapons.
Conclusion: Pakistan has always led a rather unstable existence ever since its independence. Its nuclear weapon status provides the proverbial edge, which does keep world powers and India on their toes. Pakistan has institutionalised systems in place to secure the nuclear assets. However, given the unstable internal security situation, which can deteriorate in an accelerated manner, and possibly weaken the command and control chain, and security of nuclear assets, it makes eminent sense to plan and put procedures in place to secure the nuclear assets by external agencies led by the ‘Three’. India must make it her business to ensure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear business.
(This article was earlier published in bharatshakti.in)
[i] Current geo-polical-social situation in Pakistan is being widely covered in the internet and other media sources. Nuclear aspects have been covered by sourcing the following articles online: –
[ii]‘Non-Nuclear Attack Agreement’, signed between Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Prime minister Rajiv Gandhi on 21 December 1988 in Islamabad (ratified 1991), according to which, both countries have to inform each other of the nuclear facilities. Accessed on 12 May 2023.
[iii] ‘Assessing the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme’, by Tahir Moahmood Azad, and Karl Dewey, 27 Feb 2023, Taylor & Francis Online>Defence and Security Analysis, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14751798.2023.2178069. Accessed on 13 May 2023.
[v]Permissive Action Links (PALs) – ensures that even if an unauthorized person gets hold of a weapon, he cannot activate it unless he also has access to electronic codes.
[vi] ‘Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation Of Strategic Offensive Arms’, signed on May 23, 1992, between representatives of USA, Russian Federation, Republics of Ukraine, Byelarus and Kazakhstan; available at https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf. Accessed on 17 May 2023.
Iranian flag in Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant. on November 10, 2019, [Photo by ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images]June 2, 2023 at 2:33 pm
A former head of Israel’s military intelligence, on Thursday, claimed that Iran possesses a quantity of uranium capable of making three to five nuclear bombs, Anadolu Agency reports.
Speaking to the Israeli public broadcaster, KAN, Amos Yadlin said that the recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not reveal anything new, adding that it is known to Israel that Iran is capable of making nuclear bombs.
On 24 May, Israel’s army Chief of Staff also said Iran has made unprecedented progress in its uranium enrichment program.
“Iran has made more progress in the field of uranium enrichment than ever before. We are closely examining additional domains that lead to nuclear capability,” said Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi at the Herzliya Conference.
Israel has repeatedly accused Iran of seeking to build a nuclear bomb, a claim denied by Tehran, which says its program is designed for peaceful purposes.
Former US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew Washington from the landmark agreement in 2018 and re-imposed sanctions on Iran, prompting Tehran to retaliate by taking steps away from its nuclear-related commitments. It has since gone on to surpass limits on the amount of uranium it is allowed to possess, as well as the levels to which it is allowed to enrich the nuclear material.
Iran has been escalating its program for years since the US unilaterally withdrew from its nuclear deal with world powers in 2018. (Reuters: Shamil Zhumatov)none
Iran has significantly increased its stockpile of enriched uranium in recent months, continuing its nuclear escalation, a confidential report by the UN nuclear watchdog said.
Key points:
Iran has enough uranium enriched to up to 60 per cent for two bombs
The IAEA estimates Iran’s stockpile is now 23 times the 202.8-kg limit imposed by the 2015 deal
The reports said Iran had given a satisfactory answer explaining the presence of uranium particles at one site
The two confidential reports come days before the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is due to meet to review progress in addressing the watchdog’s remaining concerns.
The nuclear watchdog said in its quarterly report that Iran’s estimated stockpile of enriched uranium had reached more than 23 times the limit set out in the landmark 2015 accord between Tehran and world powers.
As of May 13, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was estimated at 4,744.5kg.Iran’s former president Hassan Rouhani visits nuclear facilities in April 10, 2021.(Reuters: Iranian Presidency Office)none
The limit in the 2015 deal was 202.8kg.
The report also said that Iran is continuing its enrichment of uranium to levels higher than the 3.67 per cent limit in the deal.
Efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal — which was left in tatters by the unilateral withdrawal of the United States in 2018 — have stalled since last summer.
The stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20 per cent is now believed to be 470.9kg — up 36.2kg since the last report in February — while the amount enriched up to 60 per cent stands at 114.1kg, an increase of 26.6kg and enough to make two bombs.
Meanwhile, the IAEA has been able to reinstall some monitoring equipment set up under the 2015 nuclear deal — but which was later removed by Iran — the reports said.
“Iran has allowed the agency to install monitoring equipment at two declared enrichment facilities,” it said.
Some additional surveillance cameras were also installed at workshops in Esfahan where “centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows are manufactured”.
However, the agency said it awaits Iran’s engagement to address “the completion of the installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment, access to data recordings and the gaps in the recordings.”
On the detection of uranium particles enriched to near bomb-grade at the Fordo plant, the IAEA said it has “no further questions on the matter” for now.
“The Agency assessed that the information provided (by Iran) was not inconsistent with Iran’s explanation for the origin of these particles,” the report said.
The watchdog “has no additional questions… and the matter is no longer outstanding at this stage”, the report said of the site at Marivan in Abedeh county.
The IAEA had reported the discovery of traces of radioactive material at three sites not declared by Iran, in a blow to efforts to restore the 2015 deal.
The Marivan site in the southern province of Fars is the first to be addressed under a work plan agreed by Iran and the IAEA in March.
The other two sites are Varamin and Turquzabad.
Iran has always denied any ambition to develop a nuclear weapons capability, insisting its activities are entirely peaceful.
By Josh Robin – Chief National Political Reporter New York City PUBLISHED 9:58 AM ET Jun. 01, 2023 PUBLISHED 9:58 AM EDT Jun. 01, 2023
Seventy-three years after Hiroshima, Japan, was leveled in an atomic explosion, the city recently hosted world leaders at the G-7 summit. Survivors of the bombing implored the leaders to ensure the devastation is never repeated.
But a leading nuclear war watchdog has determined the risks of nuclear war are the highest since it began counting, two years after the United States dropped bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists points to the perils of war between the nuclear-armed Russia, and Ukraine, which the nuclear-armed NATO is supporting.
“We are kind of in this danger zone,” said Sharon Squassoni, a professor at the Elliott School of Public Affairs at The George Washington University who helped make that determination.
In January, the “Doomsday Clock” was set at 90 seconds to midnight — midnight defined vaguely, if disturbingly, as “an atmosphere where civilization is no longer possible or where great swaths of it’s going to be a world in which you are not going to want to live,” in Squassoni’s definition.
The number had never been higher, not even in the depths of the Cold War.
The Ukraine war, and Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling, was seen as the main driver of the added vigilance. Earlier this month, Russia and its neighbor Belarus formalized a deal to deploy Moscow’s tactical nuclear weapons there. Putin says the move followed the U.S. basing nuclear weapons in such countries as Turkey, Italy, Belgium and Germany.
Organizers of the Doomsday Clock also cite climate change for the increased movement toward midnight.
But others wonder whether armageddon is really all that near.
Steven Pinker, an author whose new book argues progress is on the rise, says of the Doomsday Clock, “the underlying attitude seems to be let’s just whip people into a lather of fear and dread.”
Pinker, a psychology professor at Harvard University, calls the clock’s accuracy “defective,” disputing the metrics used to determine its time to “midnight.”
“There always has to be some guesswork,” he said in an interview. “But right now, it has no relation at all to the degree of risk. I think a panel of experts whose goal was not ‘let’s terrify people,’ but whose goal was ‘let’s accurately quantify the risk,’ could do a better job.”
Despite the assessment that the world has been heading towards the apocalypse, lifespans have also generally improved over the decades. And the number of nuclear weapons has declined over time, but are still seen as more than sufficient to annihilate humanity.
The joint statement also justifies weapons that “serve defensive purposes, deter aggression and prevent war and coercion.”
Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy attended the meeting, with leaders reiterating support for Kyiv. Squassoni says people should not conclude the Doomsday Clock’s warnings about nuclear war should take away from it the belief that fear of nuclear war should cause the U.S. to pull back from its support of Ukraine.
“It is absolutely not in anybody’s interest that Russia simply subvert all of the rules of the so-called international order established after World War II,” she said. “What we are suggesting is that all of the channels for dialogue need to be heavily used.”
Squassoni also pushed back against the charge that the Doomsday Clock whips people into a “lather,” leading them to inaction because of the seeming futility of it all. She calls the Doomsday Clock a “meme,” a visual tool created by a panel that includes Nobel laureates meant to spur more research and advocacy.
“Nobody wants to be painted as a Cassandra, ‘we’re running around saying the sky is falling’” she said. “It is not just to scare people, but to alert them that there’s a broad range of risks out there that we really need to pay attention to and put some effort against.
Still, she noted with a laugh, “I scare my family.”
The agency, however, noted progress in its cooperation with Iran in a separate report saying it has decided to close the file on nuclear material at an undeclared site, an issue which has long exacerbated relations between the two parties.
The two confidential reports come days before the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is due to meet to review progress in addressing the watchdog’s remaining concerns.
The nuclear watchdog said in its quarterly report that Iran’s estimated stockpile of enriched uranium had reached more than 23 times the limit set out in the landmark 2015 accord between Tehran and world powers.
As of 13 May, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was estimated at 4,744.5 kilograms (10,459 pounds).
The limit in the 2015 deal was 202.8 kilograms.
The report also said that Iran is continuing its enrichment of uranium to levels higher than the 3.67 percent limit in the deal.
Efforts to revive the Iran nuclear deal — which was left in tatters by the unilateral withdrawal of the United States in 2018 — have stalled since last summer.
The stockpile of uranium enriched up to 20 percent is now believed to be 470.9 kilograms — up 36.2 kg since the last report in February — while the amount enriched up to 60 percent stands at 114.1 kilograms, an increase of 26.6 kg.
Enrichment levels of around 90 percent are required for use in a nuclear weapon.
Meanwhile, the IAEA has been able to reinstall some monitoring equipment set up under the 2015 nuclear deal — but which was later removed by Iran — the reports said.
“Iran has allowed the agency to install monitoring equipment at two declared enrichment facilities,” it said.
Some additional surveillance cameras were also installed at workshops in Esfahan where “centrifuge rotor tubes and bellows are manufactured”.
However, the agency said it awaits Iran’s engagement to address “the completion of the installation of surveillance and monitoring equipment, access to data recordings and the gaps in the recordings.”
On the detection of uranium particles enriched to near bomb-grade at the Fordo plant, the IAEA said it has “no further questions on the matter” for now.
“The Agency assessed that the information provided (by Iran) was not inconsistent with Iran’s explanation for the origin of these particles,” the report said.
In a second confidential report, the IAEA said it has decided to close the file relating to the presence of nuclear material at one undeclared site after receiving a “possible explanation” from Iran.
The watchdog “has no additional questions… and the matter is no longer outstanding at this stage”, the report said of the site at Marivan in Abedeh county.
The IAEA had reported the discovery of traces of radioactive material at three sites not declared by Iran, in a blow to efforts to restore the 2015 deal.
The Marivan site in the southern province of Fars is the first to be addressed under a work plan agreed by Iran and the IAEA in March.
The other two sites are Varamin and Turquzabad.
Iran has always denied any ambition to develop a nuclear weapons capability, insisting its activities are entirely peaceful.
Just when you thought it couldn’t get any worse, it does. The Biden administration is working on a plan that would make the world a far more dangerous place.
March 19, 2022 10:09pm
It’s a plot with three steps, all terrible and each arguably worse than the previous one.
Step One is the determination to make a new sweetheart nuclear deal with Iran. There is no good reason, only the fetish to undo everything Donald Trump did.
Step Two in the budding disaster is that the White House is letting the butcher of Ukraine, Vladimir Putin, broker the talks between America and Iran. As I noted last week, on one hand, Putin is a war criminal raining death and destruction on millions of civilians, and on the other hand, we trust him to make an ironclad deal that blocks the mad mullahs from getting the ultimate weapons of mass destruction.
Oh, and in consideration of Putin’s efforts for world peace, any construction work Russia does in Iran related to the nuke deal would be exempt from sanctions imposed over Ukraine. As Biden would say, no joke.
If this sounds absolutely insane, get a load of Step Three. The Biden bots are actively considering, as a bonus to the mullahs, removing the terrorist designation of their main military group, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Recall that Trump droned the longtime commander of the Guards’ elite Quds Force, Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who was responsible for killing and maiming thousands of American soldiers in Iraq. Soleimani had spread terror in the region for decades, yet Biden said during the 2020 campaign he would not have ordered the hit.
Under the Iran deal, the dangerous Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps force will no longer be designated as terrorists.
His objection is probably relevant to the fact that Iran added the demand about removing the terror label. They figured they were pushing on an open door with the appeaser in chief.
Reports say all the group must do is pledge to make nice and stop killing Iran’s enemies across the Middle East and a separate agreement will lift the sanctions blocking its financing, travel, etc., as if it’s the Chamber of Commerce.
The whole notion is so far off the charts that the Jewish News Syndicate reports that Israeli leaders, already unhappy about the prospect of any deal with Iran, initially refused to believe the White House would even consider giving a free pass to the Revolutionary Guards.
Iranians still honor Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani and Iraqi Cmdr. Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis two years after former President Donald Trump ordered their assassinations.
Convinced the proposal is real, Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and Foreign Minister Yair Lapid issued a furious statement denouncing the group as “responsible for attacks on American civilians and American forces throughout the Middle East” and said it was “behind plans to assassinate senior American government officials.”
Bennett and Lapid continued: “The IRGC were involved in the murder of hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians; they destroyed Lebanon and they are brutally oppressing Iranian civilians. They kill Jews because they are Jews, Christians because they are Christians, and Muslims because they refuse to surrender to them.”
Former American diplomats who have advised both Democrats and Republicans in the region agreed the idea stinks.
Dennis Ross tweeted that the concept “makes us look naive” and, citing the group’s recent rocket attacks in Iraq that nearly struck an American consulate, added: “For the IRGC, which admitted this week to firing rockets into Erbil, to promise to de-escalate regionally is about as credible as Putin saying Russia would not invade Ukraine.”
Iran claimed responsibility for firing ballistic missiles near the US consulate in Erbil, Iraq, in response to an Israeli strike on the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syria.
Ambassador Martin Indyk tweeted that removing the Guards from the terror list would be seen as a “betrayal” by many US allies who suffered from their brutal terrorism.
Nonetheless, it looks as if Biden wants to give the terrorists a pass in exchange for a vague promise. The White House has said no decision has been reached, which probably means it has but officials won’t defend it publicly until the agreement is signed.
There is one potential roadblock to all the madness, and that is the Senate. Because the entire package is new, Senate approval is required.
Many people believe it should be considered a formal treaty, which would require two-thirds support. Instead, Democrats are likely to try to use an end run similar to the one they used in 2015 to get the first deal through.
After a GOP-led filibuster effort failed, 58 to 42, the pact was deemed approved through what one critic called “brilliant political subterfuge.” That critic, Eric R. Mandel, director of the Middle East Political Information Network, writes in The Hill: “So, let’s recap: Forty-two senators were able to bind America to an agreement that should have required the votes of 66 senators for a treaty.”
If the Senate lets anything like that happen again, it will prove that Biden’s love of extremely bad ideas is contagious.
The prevailing unstable environment in Pakistan could be used by multiple sections within that country to orchestrate a situation that might lead to nuclear weapons and associated technical mechanisms to fall in the hands of those driven by fundamentalism. It’s a scenario that threatens the world at large, comparable to the USSR breaking down. India, the US and China would be most affected and share the responsibilities of ensuring such an eventuality doesn’t come to a pass.
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If events were not so tragic, the fast moving violent, dynamic, unpredictable politico-social drama being enacted in Pakistan would appear to be a ‘comic-action film’ on TV. Nevertheless, being a transactional, impersonal world, people are watching it with great interest, and unfortunately, great amusement. However, a nuclear crisis is certainly no laughing matter, and powers that be will do well to plan and be ready for all contingencies.
The situation is exacerbated by the rivalry and obvious power games between the military, judiciary and executive, with Imran Khan as the ‘invincible, highly popular action hero’. Lost in the turmoil and violence, is the constant fear about the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons ecosystem – the warheads, the missiles, delivery vehicles (land, air, sea, undersea), the readymade, high grade, unused fissile material, communication systems and aspects like security of the launch codes. Surely, the heads of governments of specifically USA, China and India and their national security advisors (NSAs), and intelligence agencies must be having sleepless nights. The contingency plans to be put into operation for securing the nuclear assets must be getting finetuned, too.
Why especially these three: USA the superpower, still fighting the GWOT (Global War on Terror) also wants to keep the nuclear club exclusive with no further additions. For China, though Pakistan is her her client state (like North Korea), and an arch rival of India, it has its own worries about Xinjiang and fundamentalist elements.
Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal. Pakistan currently has 170 nuclear warheads, and claims a triad status which indicates the capacity to launch from land, air and sea. Details of assets are listed below:
Air. Apart from Mirage III and V, Pakistan can also deploy F-16s (24) and Chinese J 17s (186 in pipeline) for nuclear delivery.
Sea. Babur III, range 470 km; deployed aboard the air-independent-diesel-electric Agosta class submarines (ordered 8; deployed 4?); some Babur IIIs are pre-mated for second strike capability.
Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW).NASR/ HATF 9 has a range of 60 km only, most probably pre-mated, and some deployed with forward troops, and possibly under command and control of HQs at operational level (Corps HQ); raising the probability and its vulnerability of misuse/rogue use/panic use, and finding its way in wrong hands including terrorist organisations; a recipe for a nuclear Armageddon. In 2016 Obama said, “Battlefield nuclear weapons, by their very nature, pose [a] security threat because you’re taking battlefield nuclear weapons to the field where, as you know, as a necessity, they cannot be made as secure,”
Pakistan does not possess enough launchers compared to the warheads it holds; and the launchers are dual capable (can fire both conventional and nuclear warheads)!
Nuclear Policy. Pakistan boasts of ‘full spectrum deterrence capability’. Their policy is similar to NATOs ‘flexible response strategy’, with threat of use when her red lines/threshold are crossed, without explicitly spelling it out. Pakistan claims that she has a formal policy which is classified, and believes that ambiguity adds to the value of deterrence.
Command and Control of Nuclear Assets. The apex body which exercises command and control is the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) headed by the PM, with the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) under a three-star army general, which is responsible for the protection of its tactical and strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, and the strategic assets. Special Response Force (SRF) is the special forces unit of SPD Force with a strength of 25000 to 28000 personnel which secures the assets. The selection standards in terms of intelligence and physical standards for the force are even higher than army due to very sensitive nature of their duty. After initial training in army training establishments, they are now trained in Pakistan’s Centre of Excellence for Nuclear Security (PCENS), located in Chakri near Rawalpindi. Training is modelled on US National Nuclear Security academy.
Regarding Pakistan, it will be fair and reasonable to assume, that the military (COAS) would have the final and decisive vote for exercising the nuclear option.
International Opinion and Observations on Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) Pakistan. Ashley J. Tellis in his book (Striking Asymmetries: Nuclear Transitions in Southern Asia) says Pakistan is building “the largest, most diversified, and most capable nuclear arsenal possible”, which is endorsed by Peter Lavoy, a US intelligence officer. The Trump administration’s South Asia strategy in 2017 urged Pakistan to stop sheltering terrorist organizations, and noted the need to “prevent nuclear weapons and materials from coming into the hands of terrorists”. President Biden in Oct 2022 said ““Pakistan “may be one of the most dangerous” countries in the world having “nuclear weapons without any cohesion”.
Deployment/Location of Nuclear Assets.
Note: – Areas shown as Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas are an integral part of India
Even when nations proclaim transparency, as exists(ed) between USA and Russia, regarding holdings and deployment of nuclear assets, in terms of agreements (SALT II, which now stands abrogated/suspended), there is always uncertainty and ambiguity regarding accuracy of details, especially when most delivery mechanisms are dual-capable and also co-located which is a new dangerous trend followed specially by China and Pakistan. US aggressive anti-nuclear stance against North Korea is mainly because she can never be 100% sure of deployment of nuclear assets, thus not confident of knocking them out in a ‘first strike’ if ever the need arises. However, Pakistan nuclear assets’ locations are known to a fair degree of certainty, both due to diligence and ISR by the big powers, especially USA, as also with an existing agreement between India and Pakistan to notify each other. Details of known locations are placed below: –
Fissile Material Production Complex – Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding at Kahuta, enrichment plant at Gadwal North of Islamabad. Four heavy water plutonium reactors in Khushab and thermal power plant (helps in estimation of production of fissile material). A new Reprocessing plant at Nilore, E of Islamabad, and second at Chatham in NW Punjab processing spent fuel and extracts plutonium.
Fissile Material – In 2020, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 3,900 kilograms of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 410 kg of weapon-grade plutonium. This material is theoretically enough to produce between 285 and 342 warheads. Pakistan uses Tritium to boost fission process and reduce size of warhead. Possesses 690 gm, enough to boost over 100 weapons. Most short range missiles like NASR, Abdali, Babur, Ra-‘ad will need small, lightweight tritium boosted fission warhead.
Production of Missile and Mobile Launchers. National Defence Complex at Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range West of Islamabad with two sections;
West – development, production, test launching of missiles and rocket engines;
East – production and assembly of road mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs)
Some launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.
Warhead Production. Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, NW of Islamabad.
Safety and Security of Nuclear Assets.
Pakistan has put in place all safeguards expected from a Nuclear Weapon State and as per international norms of IAEA’s Nuclear Security Strategy (NSS). During late 2000s a US report stated “we’re, I think, fairly confident that they have the proper structures and safeguards in place to maintain the integrity of their nuclear forces and not to allow any compromise.” The SPD is the institutional link between civilian and military facilities. Pakistani sites have three “rings” of security. The first is within each facility itself with SPD personnel responsible for physical searches, Nuclear Media Access Control (NMAC) protocols; while the second ring is formed of physical means (limited access areas, physical barriers). Outside of each site, the third ring of security is provided by a wider counter intelligence effort. Being aware of the dangers of subversion, NCA has put in place a very rigid system of vetting regularly; different for scientists, civilian staff and military personnel. Screening involves four of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies. Some important measures incorporated are:
The National Institute of Safety and Security (NISAS) of the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) has become an IAEA collaborating centre for Nuclear Security Education, Training and Technical Support in October 2022.
Working with the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) in different areas. The GICNT is an international partnership intended to improve international capacity for prevention, detection, and response to nuclear terrorism, particularly the acquisition, transport, or use of nuclear and radiological materials.
Advanced-level training in American National Laboratories and applying it to improve the overall security practices in the country.
Additional measures in terms of equipment enhancement are:
Specially trained – as per IAEA and Nuclear Security Series.
Permissive Action Links (PAL) –electronic codes.
Special theft and tamper-proof vehicles and containers are also used.
SPD and PNRA operate radiational detection portal monitors at nuclear sites.
Contingency planning.
All round and fool proof communications.
Nuclear Security Emergency Coordination Centre (NuSECC) in Islamabad.
Mobile Radiological Monitoring Laboratory (MRML) established.
Historical Statistics and Vulnerabilities. But impressions, reputation and opinions have gone steadily downhill in the last decade, more due to the socio-political instable internal security situation, rise of political Islam and fundamentalism, Further, Pakistan’s unrelenting dalliance with terrorist organisations, has run the full circle to pose a serious threat at home. There are credible intelligence reports that Al Qaeda, IS, TTP have shown renewed interest in acquiring both warhead, fissile material and technology. The two main constant and real worries are theft (material and intellectual) as also insider operations.
The latest mob violence on Imran Khans arrest, has led to greater instability, and even the specter of a civil war. There are worrying reports of dissension within the Army ranks, both at the highest levels (rift between COAS, CJSC, Corps Commanders), middle and lower echelons. There are reports of mutinies in old established army units; soldiers abandoning their posts and duties, increasing insubordination which should cause grave apprehension regarding the safety and security of nuclear assets. If Pakistan’s most disciplined force can be beset with insubordination and desertion, the paramilitary, intelligence agencies and most importantly the personnel manning the security protocol of nuclear assets could also be equally susceptible.
The vulnerability is not only physical theft of warheads and fissile material, but technical data and electronic codes which can operationalize the weapons and missile systems. In the current unrest and fragile security environment, when it’s time to implement the harshest security measures, ironically, it the entire system at its most vulnerable levels from subversion and theft. Some historical lapses concerning security of nuclear assets are listed below:
In November 2007, a suicide attack killed seven PAF staff travelling between Mushaf Mir Airbase and the Central Ammunition Depot, Sargodha. Both sites have been associated with Pakistan’s nuclear programme.
A double bombing in August 2008 killed 64 people in Wah Cantt. One explosion took place outside the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), which is believed to house the Gadwal Enrichment Plant.
In July 2009, a bus carrying KRL workers was attacked by a suicide bomber at Chor Chowk, Peshawar Road.
In October 2009, the Minhas air force base in Kamra was attacked. The site is widely assessed to host Pakistani nuclear weapons, although the attacker is reported to have detonated a bomb at “a checkpoint on a road leading to the complex,” rather than the base itself.
The biggest of them all, AQ Khan stole both sensitive information from the Physical Dynamics Research Laboratory, a subcontractor to the URENCO enrichment consortium, and then going on to sell indigenised versions of that technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.
Subversion at the highest level was revealed when Lieutenant General (Retired) Javed Iqbal and Brigadier (Retired) Raja Rizwan who received 14 years imprisonment and the death penalty, respectively for nuclear espionage. Insiders have been a real concern for Pakistani authorities.
Possible Scenarios and Recommendations.
Pakistan will obviously remain the first responder for most contingencies, and is expected to act immediately and decisively in case of theft of warhead or fissile material, or loss of critical technological information; assuming the command and control of nuclear assets is still intact and not broken (contingencies like civilian and/or military control, or break up of both is a realistic probability). They are expected to act responsibly and alert the international community immediately specially the ‘Three’ (USA, China and India the immediate neighbour), and United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
In case, the UN and world body led by USA and China feel that there exist conditions where the nuclear assets are NOT under the command and control of any responsible body, be it the civil or military, and safety and security of the assets are compromised, and real threat to them exists (terrorists, breakaway military leader/group(s) and rogue elements); there is a need for physical intervention to secure them, with or without the sanction/permission of Pakistani authorities. The current scenario does warrant planning and coordinating for such a contingency, especially by the ‘Three’.
In the eventuality of the above, and if the unstable situation of a civil war like situation persists, there is a case of following a variation of the Ukraine model* with Pakistan. Pakistan naturally will be loath to give up her nuclear assets. The process will take time, but the world cannot afford to have the spectre of a Nuclear Armageddon hanging on its head, all the time.
*Note: When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, there were thousands of former Soviet nuclear warheads, as well as hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles and bombers, left on Ukraine’s territory (some in Belarus and Kazakhstan, too), which they decided to transfer to Russia. Ukraine never had an independent nuclear weapons arsenal, or control over these weapons, but agreed to remove former Soviet weapons stationed on its territory. In 1992, Ukraine with the other two, signed the Lisbon Protocol and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1994. The transfer of all nuclear material took some time, but by 2001, all nuclear weapons had been transferred to Russia to be dismantled and all launch silos decommissioned. Interestingly, the Protocol in itself does not talk of any security guarantees by either USA or Russian Federation. However, The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) conference in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories. The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the UK and the USA. China and France too gave somewhat individual assurances in separate documents.
The memoranda, prohibited the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, “except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. The memorandum did accelerate the handing over of nuclear weapons.
Conclusion. Pakistan has always led a rather unstable existence ever since its independence. Its nuclear weapon status provides the proverbial edge, which does keep world powers and India on their toes. Pakistan has institutionalised systems in place to secure the nuclear assets. However, given the unstable internal security situation, which can deteriorate in an accelerated manner, and possibly weaken the command-and-control chain, and security of nuclear assets, it makes eminent sense to plan and put procedures in place to secure the nuclear assets by external agencies led by the ‘Three’. India must make it her business to ensure the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear business.
![Iranian flag in Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant. on November 10, 2019, [Photo by ATTA KENARE/AFP via Getty Images]](https://i0.wp.com/www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/GettyImages-1181344604.jpg?resize=1200%2C800&quality=85&strip=all&zoom=1&ssl=1)
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