Who Is The Antichrist? (Revelation 13:11)


Baghdad protests

Who is Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr? The Iraqi Shia cleric making a comeback in Baghdad

By Stefano Freyr Castiglione
March 11, 2016 09:51 GMT 

Supporters of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr burn a US flag during a protest demanding the government prevent the entry of U.S. troops into Iraq at Al-Tahrir Square in Baghdad, September 20, 2014.REUTERS/Ahmed Saad

Images from last Friday’s demonstrations in Baghdad, where thousands of people gathered outside the so-called Green Zone, may have reminded some observers of the protests that took place in a number of Arab countries in 2011. But during the Arab Spring people were not guided by political leadership, whereas recent demonstrations in Iraq have been promoted and led by one man in particular; Iraqi Shia leader Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr.

Al-Sadr was born in 1973 to a family of high-ranking Shia clerics. Both his father, Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and his father-in-law, Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, were important religious authorities who enjoyed large support among their co-religionists, a key factor in why there were tensions between them and the Baathist regime.

The latter was arrested and executed in 1980, while the former was assassinated in 1999 at the hands of regime agents. Muqtada al-Sadr, a junior and unknown cleric at the time, inherited his father’s legacy and popular support (primarily among working class Shia families in the South and the now ubiquitous Sadr City in Baghdad).

While he opposed the Baathist regime, his rise to prominence came with his resistance to the Anglo-American occupation after 2003, founding a militia known as the Mahdi Army, which was involved in the post-invasion insurgency, and accused of sectarian violence. Being able to count on both large popular support and a powerful military force, he soon became one of Iraq’s leading political and religious figures.

Sadr’s stance with regards to Iraqi politics has been rather ambiguous, leading some to describe him as “a hybrid of anti-establishment positions while being part of the establishment himself.” His involvement in the country’s public life has seen him make moves and take positions which are sometimes in contrast with the Shia ruling majority’s orientations. He is a steadfast opponent of sectarian politics, although some members of his bloc, the Sadrist Movement, have held, and continue to hold, positions in governments based on quota-sharing.

Sadr’s uncompromising stances may lead to political stalemate in a country that still needs to recapture the remaining areas under Daesh control.

A common thread since 2003 has been the opposition to foreign interference in Iraq, regardless whether it comes from the West (US, UK) or the East (Iran). His disenchantment as to the possibility of pursuing an alternative to sectarian politics was one of the reasons that led him to suddenly announce his withdrawal from political life in 2014, as one of his movement’s officials stated.
Since then, things have evolved in Iraq. The rise of Islamic State (Isis) in which sectarian politics undoubtedly played a role has posed a serious threat to the stability of the country, exacerbated by the political tensions of Maliki’s government at the time. Despite enormous difficulties (the constant threat of extremism, the recent fall of oil prices), his successor Haidar al-Abadi has managed to keep the country afloat as the Hashd al-Shaabi (PMU) and the Security Forces have regained territory from Daesh.

Abadi has been able to ease tensions with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), to take some anti-corruption measures, and to purge the army of inefficient officials. Some issues which have taken root in Iraq have not yet been entirely solved, such as poor public services, corruption, lack of transparency, and sectarianism.

These are the plagues that Sadr has vowed to fight against, on the base of a populist vision of national unity in which religiosity and patriotism are often conflated, as the slogan “Love for one’s country is part of the faith” suggests. The Shia leader supported Abadi’s pledge to carry out a government reshuffle, aimed at installing a technocratic cabinet, as well as to fight corruption, restore services, and implement public accountability.

People in Iraq are getting more and more frustrated at Abadi-led government’s inability to move forward in the reform process — which some elements in the ruling majority actually oppose, seeing it as a threat to their interests. As talks between political factions have not led to concrete results so far, Sadr has seen an opportunity to mobilise the Iraqi masses and push for more audacious measures.
After having a member of his own political bloc, Baha al-A’raji (PM deputy), arrested on corruption and embezzlement charges, he disavowed the corrupt officers in his movement and is currently going to investigate how they have caused corruption.

Sadr urges Iraqis to oppose U.S., but peacefully
Iraqi Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr Reuters

Given Sadr’s huge influence both as a political and military leader — his military wing known as the Peace Brigades has participated in the liberation of the Leine area west of Samarra — his moves could turn out to be a destabilising factor, which is not the first time Sadrist intervention has disrupted the political process.

Looking at the causes that may have led Sadr to such a steadfast return to public life, it has been suggested that he hopes to prevent other Shia groups from asserting their influence in the country, on both a political and a military level. After a government reshuffle was proposed, factions have been in disagreement over how this is to be done: while one side prefers the ministries to be chosen by political parties, another side, led by Sadr, asserts that parties should not interfere.
Sadr has also threatened the current government with a vote of no-confidence if no agreement is reached within 45 days. It is also worth noting that Sadr does not oppose Abadi, but he thinks he should take the chance to promote reforms before it’s too late.

How is Sadr’s comeback to be evaluated? This week, the third demonstration led by the Shia leaexpected to be held, which threatens to storm the Green Zone in the Iraqi capital. There are mixed feelings in the Iraqi street regarding Sadr’s role. Some support his push for change, frustrated at Abadi government’s poor performance in terms of reforms.

Others, however, are afraid that if a breach in security occurs during the protests, it will undermine the rule of law and set a precedent that Sadr is taking the law into his own hands. This is why some of the Green Zone residents have allegedly left the area lest the situation gets out of control.
Despite being characterised by some clearly populist motifs, Sadr’s pledge to fight against corruption and for the sake of the most vulnerable classes of Iraqi society can function as an incentive for the large-scale reforms proposed by Abadi. At the same time, though, Sadr’s uncompromising stances may lead to political stalemate in a country that still needs to recapture the remaining areas under Daesh control.

His call for a more transparent and efficient administration, then, can be beneficial as long as his long-term vision does not hinder the current government’s activity, given the delicate stage the country is going through.

Stefano Freyr Castiglione is an Arab media analyst at Integrity UK

Antichrist’s bloc wins Iraq election

Cleric Moqtada al-Sadr’s bloc wins Iraq election

BAGHDAD, May 19 (Reuters) – A political bloc led by populist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, a long-time adversary of the United States who also opposes Iranian influence in Iraq, has won the country’s parliamentary election, the electoral commission said on Saturday.

Sadr himself cannot become prime minister as he did not run in the election, though his bloc’s victory puts him in a position to have a strong say in negotiations. His bloc captured 54 parliamentary seats.

The bloc led by Hadi al-Amiri, who has close ties with Iran and heads an umbrella group of paramilitaries who played a key role in defeating Islamic State, came in second with 47 seats.

The Victory Alliance, headed by incumbent Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, took third place with 42.

Sadr’s victory was a surprising change of fortunes. The cleric, who made his name leading two violent uprisings against U.S. occupation troops, was sidelined for years by Iranian-backed rivals. (Reporting by Michael Georgy and Raya Jalabi Editing by Leslie Adler)

Maliki Ready to Reach Understanding with the Antichrist over Iraq Elections

The Coordination Framework holds a meeting attended by PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. (INA file photo)

Maliki Ready to Reach Understanding with Sadr over Iraq Elections

The Coordination Framework holds a meeting attended by PM Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. (INA file photo)

06:46-13 March 2024 AD ـ 03 Ramadan 1445 AH

Iraqi former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki has sent “secret messages” to head of the Sadrist movement influential cleric Moqtada al-Sadr about the possibility of him returning to political life through the next parliamentary elections, five Shiite sources told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The messages, which were delivered by mediators, also did not rule out the possibility of holding early elections if necessary.

The sources said Maliki met over the past two weeks figures close to Sadr to explain his position on the elections and the amendments he is seeking over the electoral law.

Asharq Al-Awsat had reported on Saturday that Maliki was drafting a new law with amendments that would lower the chances of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani of winning a sizable number of seats at the legislature.

The sources added that the amendments would “set the balances within the Coordination Framework” alliance in advance to prevent one single Shiite ally from reaping the largest number of seats.

Early elections?

The five sources said Maliki was not the only Shiite figure trying to contact Sadr. Rather, figures such as Ammar al-Hakim and Hadi al-Ameri had asked Maliki to inquire about the cleric’s plans to return to political life.

At the moment, mediators are delivering the messages between the Framework and Sadrist movement about the proposed amendments.

They were surprised to learn that Maliki and Sadr’s positions on the amendments “may be almost aligned,” stated the sources.

Maliki had in recent days been mulling the benefits or not of holding early elections, saying he was open to discussing the issue with the Sadrists.

A source from the Sadrist movement said: “Maliki is certain Sadr will take part in the next elections. He implied to the mediators that he was prepared to reach an understanding with the Sadrists over the best version of the electoral law that would pave the way for Sadr’s strong return to the political scene.”

Three sources said Maliki has yet to receive a “frank and direct response from Sadr”, but the mediators said the proposed amendments “may be acceptable.”

Sadr has yet to comment on any of the information about the Framework’s preparations for the elections.

His associates refused to comment to Asharq Al-Awsat on whether messages were indeed exchanged between him and the Framework.

One associate said: “Sadr is busy these days with collecting aid to the Palestinians in Gaza.”

The cleric had on Monday launched a donation campaign to help the people of Gaza.

Political activist in the Sadrist movement Issam Hussein ruled out the possibility of a potential mediation with Sadr.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Framework was trying to drag the movement into a heated rivalry with its own competing parties.

The Framework is a coalition of Shiite groups that are aligned with Iran. Their alliance helped secure Sudani’s appointment as prime minister.

Hussein added that the Framework is expecting Sudani to win several seats in the next elections, which could mark the beginning of the end of the coalition in its current form.

The Framework is expecting the PM to secure around 200,000 votes in Baghdad, which according to the current law, will win him 15 seats. The proposed amendments, however, would see those votes reduced to one seat. This is at the heart of the dispute within the Framework.

Asharq Al-Awsat had previously reported that the Framework believes that Sudani may win 60 seats at the new parliament even though he didn’t run in local elections.

Another source told Asharq Al-Awsat that Maliki was preparing for the worst-case scenario after he realized that even with the absence of his fiercest rival – Sadr – from the political scene, he was still unable to secure his goals.

It is too soon to say whether Maliki’s time with the Framework is coming to an end, it added.

‘Deepest concern’

The Framework has for weeks been speculating whether a new coalition would be formed. It would bring together Sudani and powerful conservative Shiite figures that are backed by the Asaib Ahl al-Haq movement headed by Qais Khazali.

Maliki believes that an alliance between Sudani and Khazali would mean the end of the Framework, which would have dire consequences, said two sources.

Coordination between Sudani and Khazali would mean the PM would emerge as the most powerful figure after the elections, said another source.

Confronted with these possibilities, Maliki is encouraging the Sadrists to return to politics and prevent the formation of powerful Shiite alliance that “could slip out of his control,” it went on to say.

An alliance between Sudani and Khazali “worries Maliki deeply, which is why he is seeking to counterbalance it by teaming up with Sadr.”

Another source explained that Maliki likely shares the Iranian view that keeping Sadr isolated only deepens the divisions between the Shiites that could spiral into unrest

Sisi: Rafah Operation Threatens More than 1.5 Million Displaced People



Arab World

US Imposes Sanctions on Israeli Settler West Bank Outposts

FILE - A man looks at graffiti that reads, in Hebrew, "revenge, death to Arabs," allegedly sprayed by Jewish West Bank settlers in the Palestinian West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, Feb. 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Nasser Nasser, File)

FILE – A man looks at graffiti that reads, in Hebrew, “revenge, death to Arabs,” allegedly sprayed by Jewish West Bank settlers in the Palestinian West Bank village of Turmus Ayya, Feb. 18, 2024. (AP Photo/Nasser Nasser, File

The US imposed sanctions on two Israeli outposts in the occupied West Bank on Thursday, the latest move against settlement activity it says is an obstacle to peace between Israelis and Palestinians.
The US Treasury Department added two entities, Moshes Farm and Zvis Farm, as well as three Israeli nationals, to its list of sanctioned entities, according to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s website.
Axios reported late on Wednesday, citing three US officials, that the outposts would be targeted with sanctions because they were used as a base for attacks on Palestinians by settlers deemed to be extremist.

The administration in February imposed sanctions on four Israeli men it accused of being involved in settler violence in the West Bank, signaling growing US displeasure with the policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The administration said at the time that Israel’s expansion of settlements in the West Bank was inconsistent with international law.
Israel has stepped up raids in the West Bank since the Gaza war began in October. United Nations’ records show at least 358 people in the Palestinian territory have been killed since Oct. 7, a quarter of them children.

State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said in a statement Thursday that “there is no justification for extremist violence against civilians or forcing families from their homes, whatever their national origin, ethnicity, race, or religion.”

Currently, nine people and their properties have been sanctioned under the new executive order targeting West Bank settlers according to Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control database.


The Incest Between Iraq and Babylon the Great: Daniel

‘The Achilles Trap’ offers a new look at Saddam Hussein’s relationship with the U.S.

Mar 10, 2024 5:35 PM EDT

Nick Schifrin

Dan Sagalyn

The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq was based on the allegation that the country’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, had weapons of mass destruction. In his new book, author Steve Coll pored over hundreds of audio tapes and transcripts, many previously unreleased, of internal meetings to uncover Hussein’s view on his tumultuous relationship with the United States. Nick Schifrin speaks with Coll to learn more.

Read the Full Transcript

Notice: Transcripts are machine and human generated and lightly edited for accuracy. They may contain errors.

  • Laura Barron-Lopez:In 2003, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was based on the allegation that the country’s longtime dictator Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction. The failure to find these weapons prompted intense scrutiny of the decision to go to war over two decades ago.In his new book author Steve Coll pored over hundreds of audio tapes and transcripts, many previously unreleased of Saddam Hussein’s internal meetings. To uncover his view on the tumultuous relationship with the United States, Nick Schifrin, recently sat down with Coll.
  • Nick Schifrin:The U.S. relationship with Saddam Hussein evolved dramatically across the decades from the 1980s, when the U.S. aided his regime to the 90s when the U.S. sought to contain him, and dismantle his program of weapons of mass destruction. And of course, after 9/11 the U.S. invasion and his death in 2006.Using previously unreleased materials, the Achilles Trap, Saddam Hussein, the CIA and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq, tells the story of how Saddam Hussein and four successive U.S. administrations repeatedly misinterpreted each other.The author is Steve Coll. Steve Coll, thank you very much. You write this book, in part is about the U.S. failure to comprehend Saddam Hussein and you write the U.S. thinking was often wrong, distorted and incomplete. How sell?Steve Coll, Author, “The Achilles Trap”: Well, Saddam’s motives confounded us, they also confounded many of his own generals and his neighbors, but he took actions that just didn’t fit into western logic and analysis. And so the U.S. particularly after the war, to expel him from Kuwait, just assume the worst. And in fact, he was making very complicated decisions on the basis of a calculation that we didn’t really understand.
  • Nick Schifrin:And that was mutual you right, how Saddam Hussein misinterpreted and had misaligned perceptions about what the CIA was doing. How so?
  • Steve Coll:Well, he saw the CIA is omniscient, and he had long experience with their involvement in changes of government in Iraq. And he saw them around every corner and thought, for example, that they knew that he didn’t have weapons of mass destruction.And so he interpreted the accusation that he did, as just a game and his comments to his comrades when he was talking to them in private was, there’s no reason for us to play this game. We are not going to be rewarded by being honest or cooperative. So let’s maintain our pride and defy them.
  • Nick Schifrin:You document how the Reagan administration decided to help him writing at one point that by 1983, it had lashed itself to an ambitious dictator. How did that effort go? And how did Saddam Hussein’s own perception of US assistance evolve?
  • Steve Coll:Well, our objective was to help him avoid losing the war, he had started with Iran. And we feared that he might and that Ayatollah Khomeini would expand the Iranian Revolution into Baghdad. So we started providing him with secret intelligence to give him a military advantage.He always regarded this help with suspicion, and he thought we were playing a double game. And we assured him for several years that he was wrong. And then in 1980 —
  • Nick Schifrin:He wasn’t wrong.
  • Steve Coll:He wasn’t wrong. And the Iran Contra scandal demonstrated that at least for a short time, the Reagan administration had played both sides. And there are these wonderful tapes after the scandal is revealed where he says to his comrades, I told you so.And what’s important about it is that this conviction that there was a conspiracy between the United States Israel and Iran against him, persisted well into the 90s. And so later, as he’s talking to his colleagues about whether to cooperate he refers back to Iran Contra and says, just remember, what was revealed then remains the case now and so we should be careful.
  • Nick Schifrin:How did Saddam Hussein undergo what you describe as the quote stunning transformation from tenuous American ally to mortal enemy?
  • Steve Coll:By invading and occupying Kuwait innocent neighbor with no defenses that a country he decided essentially, in the aftermath of his very expensive war with Iran that he needed Kuwait’s wealth to reconstruct Iraq.And he ended up in a dispute with the Kuwaiti royal family and then decided basically to sack the country. Of course, George H.W. Bush organized an international military coalition to successfully expel him from Kuwait. But he survived in power. And that became the unfinished business of the 1990s that George W. Bush inherited on 911.
  • Nick Schifrin:What did you discover about why Saddam Hussein essentially destroyed his weapons of mass destruction program after the Gulf War, but then was reluctant to allow you and weapons inspectors to be able to confirm that fact.
  • Steve Coll:In the summer of 1991, he more or less secretly destroyed his chemical and biological stocks and the infrastructure of his nuclear weapons program. But then he failed to keep any records. He failed to tell the truth about what he had done. He lied about the history of the program. And he didn’t really come clean for four or five years creating the impression that he was hiding a secret weapons program. And that uncertainty persisted right through to the end. Why?Partly, I think he didn’t want to appear weak in front of his enemies. He didn’t want to appear weak in front of his own generals, because he feared a coup attempt. He didn’t want to be humiliated. And he also concluded that honestly wouldn’t pay. And about this, he might be right, because as Madeleine Albright announced in 1997, the real underlying policy of the sanctions he was trying to escape was not justice, disarmament, but his replacement.
  • Nick Schifrin:The third era that you write about, of course, is after 911. And you point out in the days after 9/11, he made no attempt to separate himself from Osama bin Laden and said publicly, the U.S. quote is reaping the thorns, its leaders have planted explain that.
  • Steve Coll:He was oblivious to his own vulnerability after 911. And like a lot of people in the Arab world, he thought that the United States deserved a little bit of taste of the kind of rebound of its foreign policy. And so he became this kind of pundit in his meetings with his own cabinet and with visitors continually talking about America’s failures in the world and the consequences of 911.At the same time, he really was slow to pick up on the possibility that he would be targeted in retaliation from 9/11. And he would say, of course, it had nothing to do with Osama bin Laden. I’m against Islamists of that type. But he didn’t recognize that he was already in the crosshairs.
  • Nick Schifrin:And finally, this is not about Ukraine about the Middle East is a different topic than you’ve written out before. Why this topic? Why this book?
  • Steve Coll:Well, I hope that enough, time has passed that this momentous event in American post-cold war life, the Iraq War, probably the biggest pivot point that we experienced as a nation after the fall of the Berlin Wall, that we could think in a different and larger way about its origins because Saddam’s contribution to the origins The war has been missing from our own reckoning.And for once we have the opportunity with these new materials to really expand our sense of where this tragedy came from.
  • Nick Schifrin:The book is called “The Achilles Trap, Saddam Hussein, the CIA and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq.” Steve Coll, thank you very much.
  • Steve Coll:Nick, great to be with you.

Nick Schifrin

Nick Schifrin is PBS NewsHour’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Correspondent. He leads NewsHour’s daily foreign coverage, including multiple trips to Ukraine since the full-scale invasion, and has created weeklong series for the NewsHour from nearly a dozen countries.
The PBS NewsHour series “Inside Putin’s Russia” won a 2017 Peabody Award and the National Press Club’s Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Correspondence. In 2020 Schifrin received the American Academy of Diplomacy’s Arthur Ross Media Award for Distinguished Reporting and Analysis of Foreign Affairs. He was a member of the NewsHour teams awarded a 2021 Peabody for coverage of COVID-19, and a 2023 duPont Columbia Award for coverage of Afghanistan and Ukraine.
Prior to PBS NewsHour, Schifrin was Al Jazeera America’s Middle East correspondent. He led the channel’s coverage of the 2014 war in Gaza; reported on the Syrian war from Syria’s Turkish, Lebanese and Jordanian borders; and covered the annexation of Crimea. He won an Overseas Press Club award for his Gaza coverage and a National Headliners Award for his Ukraine coverage.
From 2008-2012, Schifrin served as the ABC News correspondent in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2011 he was one of the first journalists to arrive in Abbottabad, Pakistan, after Osama bin Laden’s death and delivered one of the year’s biggest exclusives: the first video from inside bin Laden’s compound. His reporting helped ABC News win an Edward R. Murrow award for its bin Laden coverage.
Schifrin is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a board member of the Overseas Press Club Foundation. He has a Bachelor’s degree from Columbia University and a Master of International Public Policy degree from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Antichrist Exits Politics Sparking Clashes in Baghdad: Revelation 13

Moqtada al-Sadr Exits Politics Sparking Clashes in Baghdad: Two Dead Amidst Political Deadlock
Moqtada al-Sadr Exits Politics Sparking Clashes in Baghdad: Two Dead Amidst Political Deadlock

Moqtada al-Sadr Exits Politics Sparking Clashes in Baghdad: Two Dead Amidst Political Deadlock

Following Moqtada al-Sadr’s retirement from politics, Baghdad witnesses deadly clashes amid a deep political crisis. The event marks a pivotal moment in Iraq’s ongoing struggle for stability and governance.

06 Mar 2024 21:55 EST

In a dramatic turn of events, Moqtada al-Sadr, a powerful Shi’ite Muslim cleric, announced his retirement from politics on Twitter, leading to violent clashes in Baghdad that resulted in two fatalities and dozens injured. This announcement came amidst a prolonged political stalemate in Iraq, preventing the formation of a new government and igniting tensions between Sadr’s supporters and rival Shi’ite factions.

Roots of Unrest

The immediate aftermath of al-Sadr’s announcement saw his followers, who had been part of a prolonged sit-in at the parliament, storming the government headquarters in the Green Zone. This escalation highlights the deep-rooted political divisions in Iraq, further complicated by external influences and a history of sectarian conflict. Sadr’s decision was reportedly influenced by a statement from Kazem Haeri, another Shi’ite cleric, urging followers to support Iran’s Supreme Leader, which Sadr suggested was made under pressure.

Political Implications

Al-Sadr’s withdrawal marks a significant moment in Iraq’s tumultuous political landscape. His movement, known for opposing both U.S. and Iranian influences, has been a major force in Iraqi politics. Al-Sadr’s call for early elections and the dissolution of parliament reflects the deep dissatisfaction with the current political elite. This move throws into question the future of Iraq’s governance, with the potential to either deepen the deadlock or catalyze a path towards resolution.

The Path Forward

The consequences of Moqtada al-Sadr’s exit from politics and the subsequent violence underscore the fragility of Iraq’s post-conflict recovery efforts. As the nation grapples with this latest upheaval, the focus turns to how the political vacuum will be filled and whether this could lead to meaningful reform or further instability. With Sadr’s history of re-entering politics after similar announcements, the situation remains fluid, and the long-term impact on Iraq’s political trajectory is yet to be determined.

China Supports the Pakistani Nuclear Horn: Daniel 7

China pulls back on CPEC, but continues covert support for Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions

China is helping Pakistan build expensive nuclear weapons and missiles, posing a significant threat to regional stability

The news from Pakistan is interesting. Not Shehbaz Sharif’s return as prime minister. That’s just another contrived leaf in the country’s electoral history with a rather more than usual dose of blatant interference. What is news is that Indian authorities seized a consignment of dual-use items abroad a Malta-flagged vehicle originating from China and destined for Pakistan. It seems the ‘iron brother’ remains steadfast in the area of nuclear assistance, even while its interest flags in commercial enterprises.

Indian intel makes a grab

The  report is rather limited. All that Customs authorities in Mumbai are willing to say is that two advanced Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines manufactured by GKD, Italy and bound for the port of Karachi were seized by Indian customs at Mumbai Port. The consignment was shipped on 9 January on a merchant vessel CMA CGM Attila, a Malta-flagged vessel from Shekou Port in China, and was heading to Karachi Port with Cosmos Engineering being the consignee. Not that this was stated in the original bill of lading. That mentioned the consigner as “Shanghai JXE Global Logistics Co Ltd” and the consignee as “Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd” of Sialkot turned out to be false. The real consignee was Cosmos Engineering which is involved in manufacturing a range of items but describes itself as a sourcing and procurement agency also. It has been in the eye of interest in the past, when it tried to acquire  ‘thermo-electric instruments’ from an Italian firm, and which was also seized.

There are many more such instances, nearly all involving China. Most recently, this was apparent in October 2023 when the US announced sanctionson three Chinese companies for missile proliferation to Pakistan. What is interesting is the areas that are seeing Chinese assistance. These include razing materials, which are used to join components in ballistic missile rocket engines and in the production of combustion chambers. Beijing Luo Luo Technology Development Co Ltd supplied mandrels and other machinery for use in solid‐propellant rocket motors. Another Chinese company supplied D‐glass glass fibre, quartz fabric, and high silica cloth, all of which have applications in missile systems. In other words, core and dual-use equipment for Pakistan’s missile effort, all of which has been going on at least since the 1990’s. It’s interesting that the US sanction list doesn’t mention Pakistani entities at all. This information would have been known, certainly to Indian intel, at least in part. How many other shipments have passed without detection is unknown, given that such stray seizures are likely to be the tip of the iceberg. The question arises why the US doesn’t call out Pakistani entities involved in such transactions.

The US and its allies have long been partnering against nuclear and missile proliferation, with the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) launched in 2003, and with some 111 countries ‘endorsing’ the move which is a non-treaty based voluntary effort to interdict and share information on any proliferation activities. Sri Lanka is a participant. India is not. Delhi stayed away from the PSI given the years of efforts to stop India’s own independent efforts at building a minimum nuclear deterrent. In 2016 however, India joined the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which also allows it access to sensitive technologies and makes it part of the non-proliferation effort.

India is also part of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which is a node for curbing industrial technology for proliferation, which is chaired last year. China is not a member of either, but claims to adhere to its guidelines. Clearly, it does not. US Congressionalpublications detail Chinese proliferation activities to Pakistan and others, including Beijing’s supply of civil nuclear reactors in Chashma, which is disallowed under the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to which China is a signatory. Beijing argues this is covered under an original treaty which predates its entry into NSG. Members however explicitly did not agree with this interpretation. Yet, no one objected to the signing last year for the construction of Chashma 5 by China and Pakistan.

In the past, so-called legitimate imports for its civilian nuclear reactors, often concealed parts for its nuclear weapons program. Despite all this, the position now is that the parts are being supplied not by the Chinese government, but by ‘entities’ in China. That would be reasonably understandable in a democracy. Under Beijing’s ever-increasing control, any such transhipment is impossible. Yet Beijing enjoys access to technologies of all kinds, and it is only recently that some controls have been instituted.  Pakistan in effect, therefore has access to all tech available to China.

Those missile tests are expensive

Now consider another set of issues. Pakistan tested the Ababeel Medium Range ballistic missile (MRBM) in October 2023, which is assessed as aspiring to launch MIRV’s (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles) an elite technology club that was so far limited to five countries including China, and perhaps India.

In October 2023 it tested the Ghauri MRBM for its readiness. In December it tested the Fatah -2 which is alleged to be a 400 km missile. And in March it inducted some 12 JF-17’s for its airborne nuclear-capable fleet.  All that takes a lot of money. Estimates for North Korea is broadly $3 million for a short-range missile to $10 million for a long-range missile. While North Korea has been castigated forstarving its people to fund its nuclear programme. Pakistan to do it justice, may not have the same indifference, but its debt and liabilities spiralled  27.2 per cent to reach Rs 81.194 trillion end of December 2023, over the same period of the previous fiscal year.

That means either that already scarce funds are being diverted to this area, or that it is receiving help from some outside source. That source has so far been only China (and to a lesser extent North Korea).  It seems at the minimum, that while Beijing is now drawing back from further funding the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, it has no qualms about sustaining a hugely expensive nuclear and missile programme.

In sum, the recent seizures underline how much China uses Pakistan for its own ends, mostly to the latter’s detriment, which includes the huge debt that Islamabad is reeling under. More dangerous however is the nuclear and missile link which Pakistan wrongly sees as ‘Iron brother’s’ generosity. It is not. When it comes to the push, China will demand that Pakistan use its nuclear and missile inventory to at the very least present a two-front threat. That would be extremely unwise, given not just the muscular approach to such threats by the present government, but that it doesn’t serve its own core interests.

India-China skirmishes will continue. But both will steer clear of outright war. The US and others will use the situation for their own ends, as they have so far. In simple words, the bigger countries will continue on their usual well-trodden path. Pakistan on the other hand will teeter again on the edge. Islamabad has so far wisely refrained from such adventurism. It may not have that luxury in future.

The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. She tweets @kartha_tara. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost_’s views_.

The Influence of the Antichrist

Sanchez writes about al-Sadr in Time tribute

Time magazine has published its list of the world;s 100 most influential people, with retired Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez writing the piece on Iraq Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

The 2008 list, which appeared on the magazines Web site Thursday morning and on newsstands Friday, also includes presidential contenders Barack Obama, John McCain and Hillary Clinton, and President Bush.

Sanchez writes, in part:

During 2003, U.S.-led coalition forces considered Muqtada al-Sadr a renegade Shiite leader whose legitimacy was based mostly on the anti-Saddam Hussein legacies of his father and uncle. Although his Mahdi Army was small and loosely organized, he was able to quickly mobilize tens of thousands of Shi;ites

In April 2004, al-Sadr’s militia attacked coalition forces and took control of most provincial capitals in southern Iraq. In response, President Bush officially declared al-Sadr the enemy and ordered the military to capture or kill him;We can;t allow one man to change the course of the country; stated Bush in a video teleconference. ‘He must be wiped out.; However, within a week, the White House reversed direction and ordered coalition forces to walk away from the mission. Negative media coverage was endangering the planned July 1, 2004, transfer of sovereignty to Iraq, which was heavily tied to Bush’s re-election campaign.

That reversal was the turning point in al-Sad;s rise to power. It gave him legitimacy and enhanced his stature within the broader Iraqi community.;By turning up the level of violence at will, he is able to control the coalition war-fighting environment, disrupt Iraq’s political progress and affect American public opinion. Today, as Iraq moves toward provincial elections, he is in a position to alter world events. He will inevitably continue as a major political power broker on the Iraq scene. But the die was cast in April 2004.”

The Associated Press contributed to this report.

The Iraqi Horn Attacks Israel: Daniel 8

Iraqi resistance launches drone strike at Israeli chemical storage sites in Haifa port

Sunday, 03 March 2024 6:45 PM  [ Last Update: Sunday, 03 March 2024 6:53 PM ]

A general view shows the Port of Haifa in the Israeli-occupied territories on July 24, 2022. (Photo by Reuters)

Iraqi resistance forces have carried out a drone strike against the largest and busiest port in the Palestinian territories controlled by Israel since 1948 in a new show of solidarity with the Palestinians under Israeli attack in Gaza.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella group of anti-terror fighters, in a statement published on its Telegram channel on Sunday, claimed responsibility for an aerial attack targeting chemical storage facilities inside the port of Haifa that had taken place two days earlier.

The statement noted that the attack had taken place “in rejection of US military presence in Iraq and elsewhere in the region, in support of our people in Gaza and in response to the massacre of Palestinian civilians, including children, women, and elderly people, by the usurping entity.”

The Iraqi resistance underscored that it will continue to target the occupying regime until the complete “destruction of enemy strongholds.”

Last month, Iraqi resistance forces said they had carried out a drone attack on the port of Haifa in the Israeli-occupied territories.

“In continuation of our approach to resisting the occupation and supporting our people in Gaza, our (fighters), using drones, attacked the port of Haifa in the occupied territories in Palestine,” the IRI said in a statement on the first of February.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq has also claimed responsibility for attacks targeting US-occupied military bases in the region, including one in late January on Jordan’s border with Syria that left three US soldiers dead.

The Israeli regime waged the war on Gaza on October 7 after Hamas carried out the surprise Operation Al-Aqsa Storm against the occupying entity in response to the Israeli regime’s atrocities against the Palestinians.

Since the start of the aggression, Israel has killed at least 30,410 Palestinians, mostly women and children, according to the latest count by the Gaza Health Ministry.

The US, Israel’s traditional ally, has backed Tel Aviv’s attacks on the Palestinian territory and provided the regime with extensive military support since the onset of the war.

Washington has also used its veto power to block the United Nations Security Council’s resolutions demanding an immediate ceasefire in Gaza.


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The enigma of the Antichrist: Revelation 13

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Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr gives a speech in Najaf, 30 August 2022Qassem al-Kaabi · AFP · Getty

The enigma of Muqtada al-Sadr

by Akram Belkaïd 

What is Muqtada al-Sadr’s objective? A prominent religious and political figure, he has a considerable ability to surprise with his changes of direction. He leads one of the most powerful militias in the country, Saraya as-Salam (Peace Brigades), but also heads a nationalist political movement that became the leading force in parliament after elections in 2018 and 2021.

He’s the son of the revered cleric Mohammad Sadek al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein’s regime in Najaf in 1999. He rejects both Iranian and US influence, but happily formed an alliance with Iraqi communists. In August 2022, when apparently at the height of his power, he caused widespread surprise by ordering his 73 members of parliament to resign and announcing his own withdrawal from politics.

This decision triggered clashes between his supporters and the regular army in Baghdad, leaving dozens dead and hundreds injured. On 14 April he announced the suspension of most of his movement’s activities ‘for at least a year’. Is this a genuine withdrawal or political manoeuvring?

Each of Sadr’s announcements has shown that the absence of his movement creates a vacuum and leads to chaos, which forces the government and his rivals in the Shia camp into concessions, ultimately strengthening his influence on Iraqi politics.

It’s no coincidence that it was Sadr supporters who set fire to the Swedish embassy in Baghdad on 20 July in protest against the Quran-burning in Stockholm. Although the Iraqi authorities condemned the attack, they soon ordered the Swedish ambassador’s expulsion, preventing Sadr from claiming to be the sole defender of Islam.

Who is the Antichrist? The Iraqi warlord who claims to fight corruption

Who is Moqtada Al Sadr? The Iraqi warlord who claims to fight corruption

The cleric rose to prominence organising resistance to US and British forces but has since become a powerful political force

Radical cleric Moqtada Al Sadr is once again upending Iraqi politics by asking his legion of supporters to occupy the national Parliament for the second time since 2016, this time blocking rival MPs, many aligned to Iran-backed political parties in a coalition called the Co-Ordination Framework, from convening to form government.

On Monday, the sit-in spurred a counter-protest, largely led by Asaib Ahl Al Haq, a splinter group from the Sadrist movement backed by Iran with a political party aligned to former prime minister Nouri Al Maliki — Mr Al Sadr’s arch rival.

Supporters of Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr during a sit-in at a parliament building in Baghdad, Iraq. Reuters

Supporters of Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr during a sit-in at a parliament building in Baghdad, Iraq. Reuters 

The group is widely accused of kidnapping, torturing and killing civilians during Iraq’s civil war and later killing hundreds of protesters in 2019.

They fought street battles with the Mr Al Sadr’s militia in Baghdad between 2012 and 2014.

Since then, rivalry has involved assassinations of members from both groups.

The recent standoff has led to fears of a new civil war — this time Shiite against Shiite.

Who is Moqtada Al Sadr?

The cleric has long claimed to fight corruption and oppression, whether that of the Saddam Hussein regime or after 2003, the US.

Through numerous protests between 2016 and 2020, he aligned his movement with Iraqi Communists and youth protest groups, calling for “a revolution of the oppressed” that could put an end to Iraq’s system of sectarian apportionment in government and usher in public service based on quality rather than identity.

His father-in-law, revered cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Al Sadr, was murdered along with his wife by Iraq’s Baathists and his father, Muhammad Sadiq Al Sadr was shot dead by Baathist agents in 1999, sparking a second Shiite uprising against Saddam.

This heritage of suffering and religious piety gave him folk hero status among Iraq’s Shiite poor and he inherited a southern network of Sadrists stretching into the slums of Baghdad’s crowded, suburban Saddam City (now Sadr City).

But is the cleric really an outsider fighting corruption?

“In the background, Sadrist loyalists have embedded themselves in the bureaucracy. There has been some good reporting on this, on the ‘deep state’ and Sadrist penetration thereof,” says Nicholas Krohley, author of The Death of the Mehdi Army: The Rise, Fall, and Revival of Iraq’s Most Powerful Militia.

Mr Krohley refers to revelations over the years that Mr Al Sadr controls sections of Iraq’s Ministry of Electricity, abusing contracts to raise funds, and controls much of the Ministry of Health, a legacy of when his militia, the Jaish Al Mahdi, took control of it between 2005 and 2007.

The group was widely accused of committing sectarian murders in hospital wards, selling medicine on the black market and driving away many of Iraq’s talented health workers.

But Mr Al Sadr has tried to distance himself from this period, disbanding the Jaish Al Mahdi, withdrawing ministers and MPs from government on many occasions as an act of protest against what he deems mainstream political groups — mainly his rivals in Mr Al Maliki’s Dawa party and their Iran-backed allies in the Badr Organisation.

With the latter group, Mr Al Sadr’s supporters fought a series of bloody gun battles in Karbala in 2007 that left 50 dead.

But analysts say his outsider image is a mirage.

In reality, the cleric has always maintained a strong network of supporters in senior government positions.

When Baghdad’s Ibn Al Khatib hospital caught fire — killing nearly 90 people in a tragedy widely blamed on negligence — Mr Al Sadr’s nominated health minister Hassan Al Tamimi was removed from his post. A health official told The National that the hospital, along with most health facilities in Rusafa, where Sadr City is located, was run by the movement.

When a similar blaze occurred in July last year, killing 92 people in Nasiriyah, tribal leaders blamed local Sadrists in the health authority, giving them three days to leave the province.

The cleric has also tried to distance himself from militia crimes during Iraq’s sectarian strife between 2003 and 2008.

Sensitive to the fact that he reformed his old militia, renamed Saraya Al Salam during the war on ISIS, Mr Al Sadr said he would disband the group in 2017, but they remain active. Their commander Abu Mustafa Al Hamidawi ordered members to be “prepared for any emergency” in Baghdad on July 24.

Some analysts say Mr Al Sadr only has loose control over this armed group and at least three splinter factions have emerged.

Hakim Al Zamili, former deputy parliament speaker and deputy minister of health — arrested by the US for running sectarian death squads when working in the Health Ministry, last year said the kidnap and murder strategy his militia used had helped to “defeat terrorism”. Mr Al Zamili recently joined protesters in Iraq’s Parliament.

Al Sadr again sorry Iran

To some, the unpredictable Shiite cleric is a useful bulwark against increasingly powerful Iranian-backed political parties.

Their power soared after 2014 when Mr Al Maliki formalised Iran-backed militias as part of the security services, wrapping them into an umbrella organisation, the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF).

But it meant that two rival sets of militias — US-listed terrorist organisations such as Kataib Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl Al Haq, as well as a host of smaller groups — were now in the same formation as Saraya Al Salam.

Bitter disputes over salaries between the groups ensued, at one point leading to the assassination of a government-appointed PMF auditor.

Now the prize, after 10 months of stalled government formation, is control over Iraqi state resources — Shiite parties lead the competition for everything from PMF salaries and pensions to controlling entire state-owned companies.

Will there be a new civil war?

“None of what’s happening is usual, this has been uncharted territory since Sadr pulled his followers [MPs] out of Parliament,” says Omar Al Nidawi, programme director at US NGO Enabling Peace in Iraq Center.

“Both Sadr and the Co-ordination Framework are taking shots in the dark to see what works. The difference is the Framework seems to be finding it more difficult to agree on a united course of action. This may explain the brief protest on Monday and decision to pull back after ‘delivering the message’.”

But Mr Al Nidawi is sceptical of the prospect of full-scale war.

“We’re unlikely to see Co-ordination Framework factions decide they want to take on the Sadrists in an armed conflict.” he says.

Joel Wing, an analyst who has tracked violence in Iraq since 2008, agrees that Iraq’s intra-Shiite competition now extends beyond Iran’s reach.

“The driving force in all this escalation is Maliki not Iran. Everyone knows Maliki is an autocrat full of conspiracies who will turn on anyone and use the power of the state,” he says, referring to Mr Al Maliki’s considerable influence behind the scenes in Iraq’s politics.

But Mr Wing says there will be no winners.

“Sadr could be just as big a threat to everyone as Maliki was, if he’s in the driver’s seat,” he warns.

In the long run, “time is on Moqtada’s side”, Mr Krohley says. He notes Iraq’s rapidly growing population which swells the ranks of unemployed with each year of government failure.

This will always boost the appeal of Mr Al Sadr’s populist brand, he says.

“It’s demographics. The Sadrist base keeps growing in Iraq, in absolute and relative terms. No other political faction has had any luck in peeling away meaningful numbers of Sadrist followers. The ‘resistance’ IRGC-linked PMF types have utterly failed. So, Moqtada still sits at the head of what is, and seems very likely to remain, the dominant political force in Iraq.”

Updated: August 02, 2022, 10:18 AM