The German Horn Prepares to Nuke Up: Daniel 7

Michael Rühle, German Musings About a European Nuclear Deterrent, No. 571, January 3, 2024

“Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his mind wonderfully.” Samuel Johnson’s well-known observation may be over two centuries old, yet it sums up nicely the current mood in parts of the European, notably German, strategic community. Faced with an aggressive Russia to its East and with a United States possibly heading toward a second Trump presidency, some Europeans fear for the worst: the old continent deprived of the US “nuclear umbrella,” left defenceless against Russian nuclear blackmail. Hence, they try to concentrate their minds on what they believe is the only way out of this dilemma: an independent European nuclear deterrent.

In an interview with the German weekly Die Zeit in December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer argued in favour of European nuclear deterrent.[1] This came as a surprise, since it was Fischer who, upon coming into office in 1998, had started a (short-lived) campaign for a NATO “no-first-use policy,” and who, in 2020, had signed a letter asking NATO’s non-nuclear allies to join the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.[2] A few days before Fischer’s about-face on nuclear deterrence, Herfried Münkler, a retired politics professor and well-known author, imagined “a suitcase with a red button” that would rotate among the major EU countries.[3]

The most elaborate case for a European nuclear deterrent appeared in the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, a paper that over the past years had repeatedly published authors who would make the case for a European or even a German nuclear arsenal. In an article entitled “What will Europe do if Trump wins?,” three of the paper’s best-known journalists painted a dire picture: the US would finally fold its nuclear umbrella for Europe, leaving the continent with no alternative but to build its own nuclear deterrent. However, while presenting their case in detail, the authors revealed their analytical confusion. For example, they claimed that deterrence today depends on the ability to preemptively destroy an opponent’s entire nuclear arsenal. They argued that while the U.S. is capable of exercising such an option, the small British and French arsenals are not. After inconclusive musings about France’s eventual willingness to spread its own nuclear umbrella across Europe, the article concluded with a reference to the US-UK special relationship, which could still ensure a certain US nuclear presence in Europe.[4] One week later, the “Welt am Sonntag” published an article that also predicted the imminent demise of the US “nuclear umbrella,” and argued that, based on a core group of France, Germany and Poland, Europe had to become a true defense union that would encompass the nuclear domain.[5]

This is not the first time German observers indulge in speculation about alternative paths to nuclear protection. Ever since the 2016 US election campaign, when candidate Trump made numerous statements about the United States being taken advantage of by free-riding allies, the German strategic community in particular has been worrying about the future of the transatlantic security relationship. In contrast to the earlier debate, however, when a few German commentators called for German nuclear weapons, the new debate appears to center around a European nuclear option.[6] This European focus thus removes the highly controversial scenario of an independent German bomb. It also makes more sense politically, given that a truly integrated European Union (EU), akin to the United States of America, would probably need to have a nuclear deterrent of its own. Indeed, when ratifying West Germany’s accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975, the German Government stated its understanding that this Treaty would not preclude an eventual nuclear deterrent in the framework of the EU.[7]

Yet even this moving away from a focus on the “German bomb” towards a more palatable European nuclear arrangement does not change the fact that this goal remains unattainable for the foreseeable future. The EU is suffering from economic woes, the rise of populism, and from major disagreements ranging from immigration policy to support for Ukraine. Hence, a European nuclear arsenal—the most challenging of all projects the EU could ever undertake—is not in the cards in the absence of some enormous shock to the system. Even the genuine nervousness about a more erratic United States will not create sufficient momentum to overcome the five formidable hurdles that such a project would face.

First, there is no nuclear consensus within the EU about the legitimacy of nuclear deterrence, but rather a massive disagreement. Although Sweden has now given up its anti-nuclear dalliance and is striving to join NATO, the neutral states of Ireland and Austria are still trying to discredit nuclear deterrence at every opportunity. This means that the EU as a whole cannot be the “owner” of a nuclear arsenal. Only a smaller group of countries, and probably only the larger ones, would appear to be plausible owners of a joint nuclear deterrent. Since the United Kingdom’s “Brexit,” the British nuclear arsenal is no longer available to the EU. And regardless of the argument that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine constituted a turning point for the defense of Europe, any discussion about a European nuclear force would trigger fierce political controversy in many European countries. With such divisiveness on display, Europe would likely emerge from this debate weaker rather than stronger.

Second, German ideas about an eventual Europeanization of French nuclear weapons remain a classic case of wishful thinking. The very fact that France is the only member of NATO that does not belong to its Nuclear Planning Group says as much about the French willingness to extend its national nuclear deterrent to Germany or even Europe. French nuclear weapons are meant to protect, first and foremost, France. However, many German politicians consistently misinterpret French invitations for a “nuclear dialog” with Paris as an offer to extend the French nuclear umbrella to Germany. Some have argued that if Germany would signal its readiness to somehow co-finance the French arsenal, Paris might be more willing to extend its nuclear umbrella over its neighbour.[8] Moreover, some observers argue that France’s geographical proximity to a potential European theatre of conflict would make nuclear use by Paris more credible than Washington’s. All these views ignore Paris’ deep-seated scepticism regarding Germany’s position on all things nuclear. Not only does France continue to rely on civilian nuclear energy, while Germany—largely for ideological reasons—has opted out, Paris also vividly remembers the anti-nuclear stance of various German political leaders, including German Foreign Minister Westerwelle. His call in 2010 for withdrawing all nuclear weapons from Europe fundamentally challenged France’s status as a nuclear power, causing massive irritations in the Franco-German relationship. In short, while seeking to calm Germany’s nuclear anxieties, France does not plan to extend its deterrence.

Third, credible nuclear deterrence also requires conventional strength. Nuclear deterrence is only effective when existential interests are at stake, but offers no reliable protection against attacks by an adversary who is pursuing only limited goals. If it were otherwise, Egypt and Syria would not have attacked purportedly nuclear-armed Israel in 1973, and Argentina would not have challenged nuclear-armed Britain by occupying the Falkland Islands in 1982. These conflicts remained below the “nuclear threshold” because the national existence of the defender was not at stake. These wars were thus decided at the conventional level. This underlines the close connection of conventional and nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Hence, a European investment in nuclear weapons without also strengthening conventional capabilities would place demands on nuclear deterrence that it is unlikely capable of bearing—the result would hardly be a substantial net security gain. However, European defence budgets reveal that a major conventional rearmament of Europe remains unlikely. Although the overall trends are pointing upward, currently not even a dozen EU states meet the guideline of spending just two percent of their gross national product on defense.[9] If one adds to this the enormous costs of a European nuclear program, it becomes clear that this project is next to impossible to finance. As permanent members of the UN Security Council, France and the UK are prepared to bear the costs of their respective national deterrents. However, other European countries are not likely to invest a large part of their future defense budgets in a common nuclear effort if decisions over the eventual employment of this arsenal would have to be made by consensus or by the government of the country that happened to hold the nuclear chairmanship at the key point in time.

Fourth, due to the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons, any decision with regard to their use will rest with the political leadership of the nuclear weapons state itself. Figuratively speaking, for effective deterrence, it is difficult to conceive realistically of how there can be more than one national finger on the trigger, i.e., a multilateral nuclear deterrent. Even 70 years of nuclear cooperation and planning in NATO have not changed this. If the EU were to become a genuine nation state, a European arsenal would be conceivable, as there would be one European government, i.e., one single “button.” A consortium of EU states, on the other hand, in which such an employment decision would have to be agreed by multiple, diverse national governments, would be a bureaucratic nightmare. The idea of a rotating launch authority—the aforementioned “travelling suitcase” analogy employed by Herfried Münkler—would seem even more absurd, as it would amount to having an EU with alternating nuclear decision makers. Such models would almost ensure that no decision would ever be taken, thereby seriously limiting the credibility of a European nuclear deterrent. The ill-fated so-called “Multilateral Force” (MLF) of the 1960s, in which nuclear-armed ships with multinational crews were intended to suggest something like a jointly managed deterrent, should be a healthy reminder of the lack of realism in such schemes: due to a host of political, military and financial problems, the concept was never implemented.[10] A single “red button” will only emerge if and when the EU has evolved from a mere confederation of states into a true federal state.

Finally, even in a prospective second Trump term, Washington will remain a global power. That is why President Trump, despite employing damaging rhetoric, did not touch the nuclear deterrent for Europe. Indeed, his administration’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review contained a clear commitment to “extended deterrence” for allies in Europe and Asia and advanced two new “supplemental” nuclear capabilities dedicated to credible extended deterrence. Moreover, only the United States maintains a global system of alliances and strong conventional armed forces that signal to an opponent that aggression below the nuclear threshold will not succeed. This does not rule out that a second President Trump could challenge extended deterrence for Europe, but it would suggest that the concerned Europeans would achieve more for their security by intensifying their dialog with Washington and increasing their engagement in NATO’s nuclear arrangements, than by defiant and unrealistic musings about nuclear independence. Indeed, if Europe were to pursue nuclear autonomy, it would provide the logical rationale—in particular for a second-term President Trump—to no longer invest in “extended deterrence” for the Old Continent. For a U.S. President who may become even more sceptical about the value of alliances, any initiative to develop a European nuclear arsenal would be the perfect excuse to reduce the U.S. commitment to Europe.

Taken together, these arguments should explain why the current debate—like similar debates before—is unrealistic and will be short-lived. As much as calls for an independent European nuclear deterrent may appear timely to some, they quickly lose their appeal once the challenges of implementing such an ambitious project become clear. Hence, it is probably no coincidence that almost all proposals for a European nuclear arsenal provide no detailed discussion of how to achieve it. Another reason for scepticism is that Germany, where some of these ideas periodically surface, is simply not a plausible leader on the path towards an independent European deterrent. A country that, due to partisan politics, for many years remained unable even to take the mundane decision to equip the Bundeswehr with armed drones, and the defense budget of which still remains below the NATO guideline of two percent, is not going to generate much enthusiasm for independent nuclear capabilities.

Conclusion

Simply dismissing proposals for a European nuclear force as ill-conceived and unrealistic misses the mark. Far more important than the quality of those proposals is the rationale behind them. Rather than reflecting a European desire for self-aggrandizement, they reflect the fear that the United States might fold its nuclear deterrence umbrella and go home. Although the transatlantic security relationship survived the first Trump presidency, the President’s open disdain for the European allies, his ambiguous rhetoric with respect to committing the United States to European security, and his seeming admiration for President Putin have left many Europeans worried that a second term might result in even more difficult times.[11] The counter argument–that the Trump Administration’s actual policy regarding European security remained firmly in line with that of its predecessors, and even advanced new capabilities for extended deterrence—has little traction in Europe. Trump’s style and sharp rhetoric obfuscated the pragmatism that prevailed in many policy areas, including extended deterrence.

For a new U.S. administration, the lessons from the current erratic debate about a European nuclear deterrent thus should be rather straightforward: on the one hand, the United States should keep reminding the allies of their responsibility to re-balance the transatlantic defence burden by spending more—an objective that President Trump (and President Putin) certainly helped to achieve. On the other hand, Washington should also emphasise by word and deed its continuing commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. If the next U.S. President does not do so because such a commitment could make allies again too complacent and he would prefer to hold their feet to the fire, other administration officials would be wise to advise a more reasonable tactic. Unlike other defense challenges, which are often difficult and expensive to meet, reassuring the Europeans, and notably the Germans, that the proverbial U.S. “nuclear umbrella” will remain in place, is relatively cheap and cost-effective: when adjusting rhetoric provides at least a partial solution, it constitutes low-hanging fruit with considerable political payoff.

This article appeared originally at National Institute for Public Policy.

Notes:

[1] Interview with Joschka Fischer in “Zeit online,” December 3, 2023.

[2] Open Letter in Support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, September 21, 2020 (https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-11/features/open-letter-support-treaty-prohibition-nuclear-weapons).

[3] Interview in “Stern,” November 30, 2023, p. 73.

[4] “Was macht Europa, wenn Trump gewinnt?,“ Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, December 3, 2023, p. 3.

[5] Jaqcues Schuster, “Der Verlust des amerikanischen Schutzschirms,“ Welt am Sonntag, December 9, 2023, p. 9. A year earlier, an influential individual in the conservative party had argued in favor of a European Security Council, see Thorsten Frei, “Das Undenkbare denken,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 24, 2022, available at https://thorsten-frei.de/aktuelles/artikel/sicherheitspolitischer-gastbeitrag-das-undenkbare-denken-2072/.

[6] On the earlier discussion see Hans Rühle and Michael Rühle, “German Nukes: The Phantom Menace,” National Institute for Public Policy, Information Series, No. 419 (March 22, 2017), available at https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/IS-419.pdf.

[7] Statement of the Federal Government in the context of the deposit of the ratification instruments, May 2, 1975, reprinted in Matthias Küntzel, Bonn und die Bombe: Deutsche Atomwaffenpolitik von Adenauer bis Brandt (Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag, 1992), p. 329.

[8] For a refutation of such arguments, as well as for some more modest proposals, see Bruno Tertrais, “The European Dimension of Nuclear Deterrence: French and British Policies and Future Scenarios,” Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper, 106 (November 2018), available at https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/wp106_tertrais_european_nuclear_deterrence.pdf.

[9] See the table in Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries 2014-2023, July 7, 2023, available at https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2023/7/pdf/230707-def-exp-2023-en.pdf.

[10] See Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2019), chapter 5.

[11] The London-based “Economist” went so far as to describe Donald Trump as “the biggest danger to the world in 2024,” see “Next Year’s great danger,” The Economist (U.S. Edition), November 18, 2023, p. 11.

The National Institute for Public Policy’s Information Series is a periodic publication focusing on contemporary strategic issues affecting U.S. foreign and defense policy. It is a forum for promoting critical thinking on the evolving international security environment and how the dynamic geostrategic landscape affects U.S. national security. Contributors are recognized experts in the field of national security. National Institute for Public Policy would like to thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for the generous support that made this Information Series possible.

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Russia Warns the German nuclear horn: Daniel 7

Russia warns it will treat uranium shells in German Leopard 2 tanks as ‘dirty bombs’

By Jack Newman For Mailonline 09:46 EST 26 Jan 2023 , updated 09:46 EST 26 Jan 2023

A Kremlin official has warned that will consider the use of any depleted uranium weapons in their new tanks as nuclear ‘dirty bombs’.

The West finally agreed to arm with dozens of state-of-the art tanks yesterday, modernising the attritional warfare seen on the battlefield in the past 11 months.

Konstantin Gavrilov, head of Russia’s delegation on the OSCE forum on security cooperation, claimed that Ukraine could arm their German-supplied Leopard 2 tanks with ‘uranium core armour-piercing’ shells.

The ammunition known as the ‘Silver Bullet’, which was used by the US in the Gulf War and during Allied bombing in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, uses dense depleted uranium or spent uranium fuel to penetrate the thick steel of enemy tanks.

A Leopard 2 main battle tank fires during exercises in Germany. Russia claims the tanks could be armed with uranium-core shells

Depleted uranium is less radioactive than the isotopes used in nuclear bombs, but months after the end of Operation Allied Force in Yugoslavia, Italian soldiers were diagnosed with leukaemia linked to the Silver Bullet.

On hitting a tank or bunker, they disintegrate, with up to 40 per cent of the uranium, which is still radioactive, turning into fine powder.

The weaponry is largely discontinued and there is no evidence the Leopard 2 tanks are armed with the dangerous shells.

But that has not stopped Russia alleging the West is planning to deploy them on the battlefield against Putin’s troops.

Gavrilov said: ‘We warn Western sponsors of the Kyiv military machine from encouraging nuclear provocations and blackmail.

‘We know that the Leopard 2 tank, as well as the Bradley and Marder infantry fighting vehicles, are armed with uranium-core armor-piercing projectiles, the use of which leads to contamination of the area, as happened in Yugoslavia and Iraq.

‘If Kyiv is supplied with such shells for NATO heavy military equipment, we will consider this as the use of dirty nuclear bombs against Russia with all the ensuing consequences.’

Vladimir Putin meets with Chief Rabbi of Russia Berel Lazar and President of the Federation of Jewish Communities Alexander Boroda at the Kremlin today

A crater of an explosion is seen next to a destroyed house after a Russian rocket attack in Hlevakha today

Russia has throughout the war accused the West and Ukraine of colluding to use nuclear weapons against Kremlin forces, without evidence.

They claimed last year that Ukraine was preparing a ‘dirty bomb’ which disperses radioactive material upon explosion.

The comments are the latest in Russia’s sabre-rattling threats following the ‘game-changer’ decision to supply Ukraine with the tanks.

Gavrilov said Germany was ‘simply forced’ by the US and NATO to give its tanks under the threat of international isolation after chancellor Olaf Scholz finally relented.

The Kremlin claims the West is now ‘directly involved’ in the Ukraine war and Russia has already hit back with a barrage of missile strikes in Ukraine.

The and send 31 M1 Abrams tanks, 14 Leopard 2 tanks, and give allies permission to send their own supply.

Today, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said: ‘European capitals and Washington constantly give statements that sending various types of weapons, including tanks, in no way means their involvement in hostilities. We strongly disagree with this. In Moscow, this is perceived as direct involvement in the conflict and we see that this is growing.’

Putin is also furiously retaliating by raining missiles down on Ukraine as an air raid was issued over the whole country in the early hours of this morning.

Defending forces said they shot down all 24 drones fired from Moscow including 15 around Kyiv, with no reports of any damage so far, as civilians sheltered in subway stations amid the blitz.

Missiles seen over Kyiv amid Russian fury at German tank deal

A missile flies over Kyiv this morning as Vladimir Putin retaliated against the West for its tanks deal

‘The first Russian missiles have been shot down,’ Andriy Yermak, head of Zelensky’s office said.

Russia has targeted critical infrastructure with missile and drone strikes since October, causing sweeping blackouts and other outages during the bitter winter.

Despite the generous Western package, there are fears that Ukraine won’t be able to actually use the tanks on the front line for months, potentially after Russia’s anticipated spring offensive.

The promised M1 Abrams tanks from the US are not even in supply at the moment and will take months to arrive before training can even commence, senior officials have said.

Moment Russian missile is seen soaring over Ukraine

An air raid alert was issued over the whole of Ukraine early this morning as defence units shot down a stream of incoming missiles

Defending forces said they shot down all 24 drones fired from Moscow including 15 around Kyiv, with no reports of any damage so far

People gather in a subway station being used as a bomb shelter during a rocket attack in Kyiv today

Ukrainian civilians wait in subway stations underground while Russia pounded Kyiv with missiles

Putin has wasted no time in punishing Ukraine by blasting missiles overnight, after a period of relative calm

Fighting has re-intensified in Bakhmut after the tank deal ramped up the war following a period of relative calm

The modern tanks need to be procured, then the US will begin a ‘comprehensive training programme’ for Ukrainian soldiers, which will also need spare parts and will require significant maintenance once deployed.

Germany and European Leopard 2 tanks will likely arrive sooner but will still require training as Kyiv forces have become accustomed to their Soviet-era tanks used so far in the war.

Germany’s tanks would probably be ready in three or four months, Defence Minister Boris Pistorius said.

The fact that Leopard 2, M1 Abrams and Challenger tanks will all be arriving in the coming months, each needing separate parts and training, will complicate matters for Ukraine.

Brad Martin, director of the RAND Institute for Supply Chain Security, told BBC Radio 4’s Today Programme: ‘Unfortunately, it does mean that each of these capabilities is going to need their own supply chains because they are different, their parts are different, the maintenance requirements are different.

‘I don’t know that it’s such a large challenge that it can’t be met but all things being equal it would be better to have common systems but they’re working with what they have.

‘The United States has a number of Abrams tanks and some of them would have to be refurbished in order to be exported… it’s certainly true that they’re not sitting there ready to go, work will have to be done to get any of them ready to be deployed.

Germany will initially send 14 Leopard 2s to Ukraine, and aims to provide 80 tanks overall

The US is sending dozens of M1A2 Abrams tanks to Ukraine in the coming weeks to help with their war-effort

How the day unfolded as US and Germany send tanks to aid Ukraine

A Ukrainian soldier is seen on his way to frontlines with their armoured military vehicles as strikes continue

Germany's 55-ton Leopard 2 tank combines aspects of firepower, protection, speed and maneuverability - making it adaptable to many types of combat situations — Germany’s 55-ton Leopard 2 tank combines aspects of firepower, protection, speed and maneuverability – making it adaptable to many types of combat situations

‘A lot of this is rather complicated sophisticated stuff and it takes time to learn how to deal with this, training is going to be a very big issue.

‘Supply chains and the acquiring of spare parts take time, and those two things together will be a challenge.’

Western countries have made ‘no clear indication’ of how many tanks will be given to Ukraine, an advisor to the country’s defence minister has said.

Yuriy Sak told the BBC Radio 4 Today programme: ‘We need 300 to 400 tanks for this to be a game changer.

‘This tank coalition consisting of different countries, we have no clear indication of how many tanks each country will provide. We have communicated to our partners that this is the number that we need.

‘If you want missile terror to stop you need to receive the weapons that will allow us to defeat the enemy on the battlefield.

‘The sooner we defeat Russia on the battlefield using Western weapons the sooner we will be able to stop this missile terror and restore peace.’

Zelensky has praised the US and German commitments to send tanks and urged allies to provide large quantities of tanks quickly.

‘The key now is speed and volumes. Speed in training our forces, speed in supplying tanks to Ukraine. The numbers in tank support,’ he said in a nightly video address on Wednesday. ‘We have to form such a “tank fist”, such a “fist of freedom”.’

Ukraine has been seeking hundreds of modern tanks to give its troops the firepower to break Russian defensive lines and reclaim occupied territory in the south and east. Ukraine and Russia have been relying primarily on Soviet-era T-72 tanks.

The promise of tanks comes as both Ukraine and Russia are expected to launch new offensives in the war.

Maintaining Kyiv’s drumbeat of requests for more aid, Zelensky said he spoke to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and called for long-range missiles and aircraft.

Ukraine’s allies have already provided billions in military support including sophisticated U.S. missile systems.

The United States has been wary of deploying the difficult-to-maintain Abrams but had to change tack to persuade Germany to send to Ukraine its more easily operated Leopards.

Biden said the tanks pose ‘no offensive threat’ to Russia and that they were needed to help the Ukrainians ‘improve their ability to manoeuvre in open terrain’.

Germany will send an initial company of 14 tanks from its stocks and approve shipments by allied European states.

The Abrams can be tricky, but the Leopard was designed as a system that any NATO member could service and crews and repair specialists could be trained together on a single model, Ukrainian military expert Viktor Kevlyuk told Espreso TV.

‘If we have been brought into this club by providing us with these vehicles, I would say our prospects look good.’

Russia reacted with fury to Germany’s decision to approve the delivery of the Leopards.

‘This extremely dangerous decision takes the conflict to a new level of confrontation,’ said Sergei Nechayev, Russia’s ambassador to Germany.

Pledges to Ukraine from other countries that field Leopards have multiplied with announcements from Poland, Finland and Norway. Spain and the Netherlands said they were considering it.

A view shows a Puma infantry fighting vehicle during firing practice, at armoured infantry training area Altengrabow, Germany, today

German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius is seen a day after finally agreeing to supply tanks to Ukraine

How human wave attacks and slaughter ‘won’ Battle of Soledar

Britain has offered 14 of its comparable Challenger tanks and France is considering sending its Leclercs.

The Kyiv government acknowledged on Wednesday its forces had withdrawn from Soledar, a small salt-mining town close to Bakhmut in the east, that Russia said it captured more than a week ago, its biggest gain for more than six months.

The area around Bakhmut, with a pre-war population of 70,000, has seen some of the most brutal fighting of the war.

Ukraine’s military said that Russian forces were attacking in the direction of Bakhmut ‘with the aim of capturing the entire Donetsk region and regardless of its own casualties’.

The Russian-installed governor of Donetsk said earlier that units of Russia’s Wagner contract militia were moving forward inside Bakhmut, with fighting on the outskirts and in neighbourhoods recently held by Ukraine.

Analyst Kevlyuk said losing Bakhmut would not change much in terms of the tactical scheme of things but that he was more concerned by Russian efforts to regroup and concentrate resources in the Luhansk region.

Donetsk and Luhansk make up the Donbas region. Russian forces control nearly all of Luhansk, while Russians and their proxies say they control about half of Donetsk.

Reuters could not verify battlefield reports.

The 11-month war has killed thousands of people, driven millions from their homes and reduced cities to rubble.

US Aggravates Nuclear War: Revelation 16

US prolongs Russia-Ukraine conflict for three aims, aggravates nuclear war risk: experts at GT annual forum

Photo: Global TimesA prolonged and expanded Russia-Ukraine conflict will have a far-reaching impact and damage the future of the globe, and increase the risk of a runaway control and nuclear crisis, Chinese foreign affairs experts and scholars warned at the 2023 Global Times Annual Conference on Saturday.

“The conflict between Russia and Ukraine is a typical ‘proxy war.’ The prolonged conflict in Ukraine is inevitable, and its troubles and shocks will further spill over to other parts of the world,” Zhu Feng, a professor of international relations at Nanjing University, said, addressing the 2023 Global Times Annual Conference, held both online and off-line.

The US and the EU have not made substantial efforts to ease Russia-Ukraine conflict, and have even moved in the opposite direction by providing weapons and ammunition. The key to solving the crisis lies in the hands of the US and EU, Zhou Li, former vice minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, noted at the conference.

There are three major uncertainties in the future development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict – direct military confrontation between Russia and NATO members, nuclear contamination in Ukraine, and Russia being forced to use nuclear weapons, Zhu said.

“It is fair to say that the prolonged conflict between Russia and Ukraine is the most important strategic challenge and the most serious uncertainty facing the world today,” Zhu stressed.

Both sides of the Ukraine conflict are locked in a stalemated battle of attrition, which could set the stage for a new round of escalation, the Associated Press reported recently.

Scholars have analyzed the future direction of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and underlined that currently the willingness of the parties to negotiate is far from sufficient.

For Ukraine, it is still in a military stage of counter offensive; for Russia, it hopes to adjust and regain its battlefield advantage; as for the US, it continues military support to Ukraine through advanced military equipment, so all parties are more willing to continue their military moves, according to Wu Xinbo, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University.

Wu Dahui, deputy dean of the Russian Institute of Tsinghua University, also believes that there is no overlap between the negotiating goals of Russia and Ukraine.

The US has three goals in the Ukraine conflict: to comprehensively weaken Russia, to stabilize the regime in Ukraine, and to push Europe to follow US policies, Wu Xinbo said.

He believes that it will be hard to find a clear solution to the Russia-Ukraine conflict any time soon. But 2024 could be a critical timing for resolving the conflict, given that both US and Russia will have presidential elections in 2024.

Having been drawn into the protracted and intense Russia-Ukraine conflict, and having to deal with inflation and skyrocketing energy costs, more people in the EU have realized how they have been caught in a US trap. Top European officials are furious with the Biden administration and have accused the US of profiting from the Ukraine crisis by selling gas at high prices and selling arms, Politico reported in early December.

In the modern world, countries depend on each other as part of growing globalization, such as oil and gas, which have increasingly become the new frontlines in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. As the conflict deepens, the world could enter a post-post-Cold War era, Zhu said.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, great power relations have eased and the world has entered an era of globalization. However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict is returning the world to a time of great power confrontation, and the real rivalry behind the conflict is between Russia and the US, the expert said.

It is clear that Russia-Ukraine conflict is a continuation of the Cold War conflict. Especially, the Western camp led by the US suppressed other countries with the Cold War mentality and hegemonism, expanded with so-called “democracy versus freedom” narrative, and maintained its geopolitical strategy, so as to maintain the economic and international order under the US’ system, said Zhang Shuhua, director of the institute of political sciences at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

The West wants the dividends of the post-Cold War era, which dictates that it must weaken Russia, must mire Russia in war; for the four major groups in the US – the military-conglomerates group, the energy group, the financial group, and the digital oligarchy – they have not been satisfied with the exploited profits and war dividends from the Ukraine conflict, said Wang Yiwei, director of the Institute of International Affairs at the Renmin University of China.

In addition, globalization is a relatively long-term process. These above-mentioned factors, taken together, determine the final course of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the way to end it, Wang concluded.

The imperialist horns prepare for World War III: Revelation 16

Two US Air Force B-1B bombers, top center, South Korean Air Force F-35 fighter jets and US Air Force F-16 fighter jets, bottom left, fly over South Korea Peninsula during a joint air drill in South Korea, Saturday, Nov. 19, 2022. [AP Photo/South Korean Defense Ministry via AP]

The imperialist powers prepare for World War III: US, Japan, Germany plan record military spending

Over the past week, the United States, Germany and Japan, three of the principal combatants in the last world war, moved to approve their largest military budgets since World War II, each marking a major escalation in their preparations for military conflict with Russia and China.

On Thursday, the US Senate voted overwhelmingly to approve an $858 billion National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) that is $45 billion larger than that requested by the White House, which was in turn larger than the request by the Pentagon.

The budget marks an eight percent increase over last year and a 30 percent increase in military spending over the 2016 Pentagon budget. The massive surge in military spending comes as the typical US household saw its real income fall by three percent in the past 12 months.

The overwhelming majority of the American population was not informed that the measure was being debated or voted on. Neither the passage of the record-setting budget through the House of Representatives or the Senate was reported on the evening network news.

The bill increases funding for every single military department and weapons program. The US Navy will get $32 billion for new warships, including three Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and two Virginia-class submarines. And the Pentagon is authorized to purchase a further 36 F-35 aircraft, each costing approximately $89 million.

Members of Congress did not even bother hiding the fact that the central purpose of the bill was to prepare for what they called “a future conflict with China” and the ongoing US-led proxy war against Russia.

“This year’s NDAA takes concrete steps towards preparing for a future conflict with China by investing in American hard power, strengthening American posture in the Indo-Pacific, and supporting our allies,” Wisconsin Republican Representative Mike Gallagher said.

The NDAA will upend Washington’s decades-old One China policy by providing $10 billion in direct military funding to Taiwan for the first time. The bill will also institute no-bid contracting, typically used only in wartime, allowing defense contractors to charge the US government whatever they want.

The bill transforms Taiwan into a frontline proxy for conflict with China, in a manner similar to the way Ukraine is serving as a US proxy for war with Russia. In a press statement, Gallagher praised the fact that the bill “provides similar drawdown authority to arm Taiwan as we have Ukraine.”

On Friday, just one day later, the Japanese government unveiled a new national defense strategy that will double the country’s military budget and transform its military into an offensive fighting force. For the first time, Japan will procure long-range missiles capable of hitting China in an offensive strike.

The strategy openly defies Japan’s constitution, which declares that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be sustained.”

The Japanese population is overwhelmingly opposed to military rearmament, stemming from popular horror at both the crimes committed by Japanese imperialism throughout Asia and the devastating toll the war with the United States took on the Japanese population.

The Japanese imperial government oversaw the murder of millions of people through massacres, starvation and forced labor. In China alone, which was invaded by Japan, it is estimated that between 10 and 25 million civilians died in the war. During its war in the Pacific, the United States and its allies killed over one million Japanese civilians, including in the fire-bombing of Tokyo and the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

On Wednesday, the budget committee of the German parliament voted to approve the purchase of nuclear-capable F35 aircraft from the United States. While Germany does not have nuclear weapons of its own, as a member of NATO it participates in nuclear weapons sharing with the United States, and US nuclear weapons are stationed in Germany.

The purchase of the F-35 fighters is part of a $100 billion spending package passed through the German parliament earlier this year, which more than doubles previous German military spending.

As in Japan, there is broad popular opposition in Germany to military rearmament as a result of the horrendous crimes of German imperialism in the Second World War. The Nazis murdered six million European Jews in the Holocaust and millions of other European civilians, laying waste to large portions of the continent. German imperialism is also responsible for the murder of as many as 19 million civilians in the Soviet Union against which it conducted a brutal “war of annihilation.”

Both the First and Second World Wars were preceded by years of military spending increases in a massive global arms race. During the Nuremberg tribunal, a key pillar of the case against the leaders of Nazi Germany was that they facilitated a years-long military build-up in preparation for waging aggressive war.

Now, too, both Germany and Japan are making preparations for wars that risk consequences for their populations as devastating as those of the Second World War.

In June, NATO published a strategy document declaring that the alliance, which includes Germany, must prepare for “high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors” including Russia and China.

The United States, Germany, Japan and other imperialist powers are preparing for a new imperialist world war. Their targets are Russia and China: two countries that, for many decades, were excluded from direct exploitation by imperialism as a result of the Russian and Chinese revolutions. They remained outside the direct control of imperialism even after the Stalinist restoration of capitalism. But while the primary targets of the imperialist war drive are now Russia and China, the logic of inter-imperialist rivalries will inevitably lead to the reemergence of open and bitter conflicts among the temporary allies of today.

The war in Ukraine, instigated, provoked and prolonged by the United States, has become the catalyst for this new global redivision of the world. That war is only intensifying, with US officials now openly discussing Ukraine’s stated goal of retaking Crimea – a move that threatens nuclear retaliation by Russia.

In an interview this week with the Economist, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky doubled down on his declaration that Ukraine’s aim is to retake Crimea, which was annexed by Russia in 2014. Asked what “price would be too high” for Ukraine to advance “to the 1991 borders,” Zelensky made clear that his aim was to fully retake the peninsula, no matter the cost.

Over 100,000 Ukrainians have already been killed or injured in the war with Russia. When asked, “But how many lives are you going to lose” to retake the peninsula, Zelensky refused to reply.

Indeed, none of the imperialist governments are able to honestly answer this question. Are the governments in Tokyo and Berlin willing to risk a repeat of the horrors of the Second World War? They never say so in public, but the answer is yes.

Stopping the war plans of the imperialist powers requires the political intervention of the working class and youth, organized on the basis of a socialist program. This was the perspective put forward at the December 10 online rally, “For a Mass Movement of Students and Youth to Stop the War in Ukraine!”

We urge our readers to study the speeches delivered at the rally, and to make the decision to contact and join the Socialist Equality parties and International Youth and Students for Social Equality.

The World Socialist Web Site is the voice of the working class and the leadership of the international socialist movement. We rely entirely on the support of our readers. Please donate today!

The German Nuclear Horn: Daniel 7

In March 2022, the German government decided to purchase 35 US F-35 aircraft at a price of $8.4 billion to replace Germany’s aging “dual-capable” aircraft. Here, an F-35A aircraft carries a test article of the upgraded B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb at the Nellis US Air Force Base, Nevada in September 2021. Germany will use this combination to maintain its nuclear capability using US-owned bombs. (Photo: US Air Force/Zachary Rufus)

Germany’s nuclear weapons policy and the war: Money for nukes, words for disarmament

By Moritz Kütt | October 27, 2022

With its nuclear weapons policy, Germany has tried to kill probably too many birds with one stone. The result has been a mix of partially disconnected, sometimes even contradictory individual policies and governmental actions. This was the case under the previous Merkel governments, remains the case since 2021 under the new Scholz cabinet, and has not changed significantly since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

However, there is one thing the war has laid bare: For policies that rely on nuclear weapons, Germany’s material and financial support is strong. In contrast, support for disarmament is often limited to rhetoric.

Germany is a strong supporter of NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy. The North Atlantic alliance has kept its nuclear strategy flexible, meaning that the alliance could theoretically be the first party to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. Moreover, in addition to whatever coverage Germany gets from NATO, the United States has promised that it would come to the rescue of Germany with all its might, including nuclear weapons. Germany still hosts 15 US tactical nuclear weapons on its soil and provides dual-capable aircraft to deliver these weapons under the control of German pilots to potential targets.

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At the same time, Germany sees itself as a leading actor in efforts at global nuclear disarmament. It is active in the Stockholm initiative, a group of 16 non-nuclear weapon countries that try to renew disarmament debates within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), focusing on a “pragmatic and result-oriented nuclear disarmament agenda.” And the country has recently been an observer to the first meeting of states that party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, also known as the “ban treaty”).

A turning point. In 2021, Germans ended a 16-year-long streak of conservative governments under Angela Merkel. A broad coalition of three parties from the left and the right formed a new government, consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens—technically known as “Alliance 90/The Greens.” Because of the involvement of the Greens, many observers had hoped that disarmament would become a more prominent topic within the new government, because the party has roots in the 1980s peace movement. The last time it came to power, in 1998, the Greens’ party platform argued strongly to replace NATO with a European peace order. Significantly more moderate in that regard today, subsequent Green party platforms still propose a Germany free of nuclear weapons, and in 2021 proposed accession to the TPNW.

Then came 2022. Only a few weeks after taking government, the new coalition had to face the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Then followed a succession of governmental decisions and changes—partly as a direct reaction to the war but also because of a broader trend toward policies that strengthen Germany’s existing nuclear posture. This happened despite a conflicting trend toward government actions that promote a world free of nuclear weapons. It is not wonder that there has been much public debate in Germany on the issue of nuclear sharing and nuclear deterrence.

Government support for extended nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing. Only three days after the start of the war, Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD) announced a “Zeitenwende” (turning point) in German defense policies. In a speech to the German parliament, he announced a special military investment budget of 100 billion euros (98 billion US dollars), and a stronger commitment of Germany to achieve NATO member states’ goal of spending at least two percent of a country’s gross domestic product for defense purposes.

In March 2022, after the war in Ukraine started, the government decided to purchase 35 US F-35 aircraft at a price of $8.4 billion to replace Germany’s aging “dual-capable” aircraft. (“Dual-capable” means that these aircraft can transport US nuclear weapons.) This decision marked the end of a debate that lasted more than a decade, which, taken remarkably swiftly, suggests there was already an underlying leadership support for the sharing of nuclear weaponry across the political spectrum, despite surface impressions to the opposite.

Funding for these aircraft comes from the new special military investment budget. The request for purchase was confirmed by the US government in July.

Another step that demonstrates the German government support for nuclear sharing will be the first-ever national security strategy. The drafting process for the strategy was announced by the foreign minister in March 2022 and is still ongoing. As part of the strategy, the foreign minister plans to retain a credible nuclear deterrence through Germany’s NATO membership. The strategy is expected to be made public early next year.

But while it funds new nuclear sharing capability, the German government also continues to assert—in words, if not in deeds—that it wants to eliminate nuclear weaponry.

Government efforts toward a world free of nuclear weapons. Germany, along with NATO allies, repeatedly criticized the ban treaty in previous years. But this changed too in 2022. In June, German diplomats observed the first meeting of states parties of the TPNW in Vienna, despite the initial criticism from other NATO members. But Germany nevertheless participated in the meeting—and was joined eventually by five other NATO—or soon-to-be NATO—members: Belgium, Norway, the Netherlands, Finland, and Sweden.

At the meeting, Germany announced its intention to provide support for victims of nuclear testing and environmental remediation of damages caused by nuclear testing explosions. The signatories of the ban treaty are required to take such actions by its members under so-called “positive obligations.” Germany, even though it is not a TPNW member, repeated this pledge again at the review conference of the NPT in August. As the government has not taken concrete steps in that regard yet, it is unclear if that was just rhetoric or if serious action will follow.

Like previous initiatives by Sweden, Canada, and Mexico, the new German government announced a new focus on a feminist foreign policy, which it defines as foreign policy “based on the conviction that gender equity and equal participation are preconditions for long-term peace and security.” It is the government’s goal, the policy says, to work for equal rights, equal representation, reduced injustice in resource distribution, and include a view on diversity in foreign policy. This marks an important shift even though it is too early to know if the new approach will have immediate as well as long-term implications for nuclear policy—if any.

A shifting public debate on Germany’s nuclear policy. The war in Ukraine led to rapid, visible changes in debates about Germany’s own security. As soon as the 100-billion-euro defense fund was announced, the discussion started on what should be funded with that money. In this debate, some voices say the Russian invasion of Ukraine results from a weak stance toward Russia. In this view, Germany’s future security can only be maintained if the country commits to higher investments in military equipment and personnel. Often, however, there is no reflection on whether such investments might end up being counterproductive by fueling an international arms race. Voices of the opposing view—those critical of war and armaments in general—remained mostly quiet. There has been, so far, no indication of a large-scale response by a new German peace movement.

There has been, however, frequent calls for a “Euro-deterrent,” provided by the French strategic forces—most prominently voiced by Friedrich Merz, the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the main right-wing opposition party in Germany. His party colleague and head of the conservative European People’s Party in the European parliament, Manfred Weber, went further and even proposed that Germany fund the French force de frappe.

Such moves, if implemented, will come under fierce criticism from other members of the NPT. Whether or not it is legal also remains subject to debate. But the NPT Review Conference this summer has already shown that an increasing number of countries see nuclear sharing as problematic—with Germany finding itself on the defensive side. Similar attempts to change Germany’s nuclear policy in the past have been seen as expert debates much disconnected from the public debate. But this might change this time. For instance, in a June 2022 poll, a majority of the interviewees expressed a supportive stance toward hosting US nuclear weapons in Germany. This is in stark contrast to previous years where a large majority of Germans in polls were in favor of removing these weapons from the country.

Follow the money. The words of the current foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, a Green Party leader and a key player in the current coalition, capture well http://andrewtheprophet.comthe current state of nuclear policy in Germany: “disarmament and arms control as being complementary to deterrence and defense.” Complementarity, however, does not necessarily mean that these two priorities are equal. Judging from the special military investment allocation—and if one tracks the money—there seems to be a clear preference toward nuclear deterrence over concerns for nuclear disarmament. Moreover, additional defense spending since the war started is significant, also reflecting its increased prominence in policy.

In contrast, there is no indication whether new financial support will come for issues related to nuclear disarmament. The public debate in Germany also shows that as the international security environment deteriorates, military options and new nuclear armaments are becoming more attractive among political leaders.

There’s no question that disarmament supporters in Germany should applaud the government for showing some support for the ban treaty—both as observers and as proponents of victim assistance. But this happened in the shadows of real-world armaments, including the purchase of new dual-capable aircraft for nuclear sharing. By its recent actions, the German government has de facto increased the relative role of nuclear weapons and fueled an ongoing arms race.

Germany needs to do more if it wants to help achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. Positive steps can be taken even in times of ongoing conflict, but they need to be more than mere catchphrases.

As part of the new German government’s coalition agreement, the three governing parties promised a “disarmament offensive.” But given the recent government decisions, a lot remains to be done to make this promise a reality. Actions will speak louder than words

US, Russia & France Are ‘Pushing’ Germany Towards Becoming a Nuclear Horn: Daniel 7

US, Russia & France Are ‘Pushing’ Germany Towards Nukes; Berlin Drafting Its 1st Ever National Security Strategy

ByEurAsian Times Desk

November 21, 2022

Among its other fallouts, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has energized the Atlantic Alliance (Europe on one side of the Ocean and the US on the other) like never before in the post–Cold War era. Some pundits say that the alliance under the United States’ leadership may have reached its peak.

But at the same time, the two foremost powers of Europe – France and Germany – seem very particular about the importance of “strategic autonomy” and lessening Europe’s dependence on the US for its security by building the prowess of their militaries.

And here, the significant trend is the growing recognition of the need to develop and strengthen “European Nuclear Weapons.”

The capture of the US House of Representatives by the Republicans and the announcement of former President Donald Trump for the Presidency in 2024 have further strengthened this trend of ‘autonomy’ in both Germany and France.

They are mindful of the Trump Presidency’s repeated admonishment to European countries for not sharing enough for their security at the cost of American taxpayers.

As Jeremy Shapiro, research director at the European Council on Foreign Relations, apprehends, the Republicans will again ask why Americans should pay more than Ukraine’s neighbors.

All told, while the US has already spent billions of dollars and is committed to more than $40 billion in military aid for Ukraine, Europe has pledged only half that.

French President Macron’s Stance For The Nation’s Future

Against this backdrop, one may see the timing of French President Emmanuel Macron’s unveiling on November 9 of France’s “national strategic review,” meant to define how the country’s defense will look in 2030.

Macron said France wants to be an “independent, respected, agile power at the heart of European strategic autonomy” with strong links to the Atlantic alliance.

He added that France wanted to focus on boosting the European Union’s defense capacity building, lessening the dependence of the bloc of 27 nations’ security dependence on the US and NATO.

Of course, Macron has consistently argued the above theme of Europe building its strength. After interviewing him, the Economist magazine wrote, “Europe has become dependent on others for too much—from its ability to innovate to military heft and even food.

In a world led by unreliable folk like Donald Trump, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin, that set his nerves jangling. Europe, in Mr. Macron’s jargon, needs strategic autonomy. That pitch for greater sovereignty encompasses everything from more defense spending to Europe coming up with its tech giants and much else besides.”

Importantly, in his “national strategic review,” the French President has insisted that a “credible, modern” nuclear deterrence is the key. After BREXIT, France became the only EU country with nuclear weapons. “Our nuclear forces contribute through their existence to the security of France and Europe,” he said.

But, and it is exceptionally significant, Macron also made it clear that “a potential nuclear ballistic attack from Russia in the region would not bring any nuclear response from Paris.” He said that France’s doctrine “is based on what we call the fundamental interests of the nation. They would not at all be at stake” in such a situation.

In other words, Macron says that the French nuclear weapons are for France only. And this, in turn, seems to have revived a debate in Germany about developing a nuclear deterrent of its own.

This is an issue that few in Germany wanted to discuss until recently, given its history and aversion to all things nuclear. All the more so after the 2021 general elections that ended a 16-year-long streak of conservative governments under Angela Merkel.

The country today has a government of a broad coalition of three parties from the left and the right – the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Greens. Both the SPD and the Left Greens, particularly the latter, are big-time votaries of nuclear disarmament and the closure of even civilian nuclear plants.

The last time it was in the government (1988), the Greens party had argued strongly to replace NATO with a European peace order. Even during election campaigns last year, the Greens had proposed a Germany free of nuclear weapons.

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed all that. The German government, led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz (SPD), has not only pledged to spend at least two percent of a country’s gross domestic product for defense purposes but also supported the sharing of NATO’s nuclear weaponry on German soil.

Germany Leans Toward Nuclear Weapons

Reportedly, the German government is now drafting a first-ever national security strategy, which is expected to be made public early next year, and will talk of retaining a credible nuclear deterrence through Germany’s NATO membership.

The public debate at present in Germany also shows that as the international security environment deteriorates, military options and new nuclear armaments are becoming more attractive among political leaders.

Even otherwise, in a June 2022 poll, most interviewees supported hosting US nuclear weapons in Germany. This starkly contrasted with previous years when many Germans in polls favored removing these weapons from the country.

Of course, under the previous German government of Angela Merkel of the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU), there were calls for a “Euro-deterrent” (independent of US nuclear weapons through NATO).

The leading defense expert of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag, Roderich Kiesewetter, made this case. And Roderich Kiesewetter, a lawmaker and foreign policy spokesman with then Germany’s ruling party, had elaborated this line of thinking.

This “Euro deterrent” by its advocates did not necessarily mean that Germany would make nuclear weapons in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT). It meant supporting and financing those European countries that already had nuclear weapons – France and the United Kingdom.

“My idea is to build on the existing weapons in Great Britain and France,” Kiesewetter argued while acknowledging that Britain’s decision to leave the European Union could preclude its participation.

Kiesewetter’s thesis had four ingredients: “a French pledge to commit its weapons to a common European defense, German financing to demonstrate the program’s collective nature, a joint command, and a plan to place French warheads in other European countries.”

This thesis of a “Euro-deterrent,” provided by the French strategic forces, is being reasserted today by Friedrich Merz, the leader of the CDU. His party colleague and head of the conservative European People’s Party in the European Parliament, Manfred Weber, has even proposed that Germany fund the French “force de frappe.”

However, the problem with the German idea of a “Euro-deterrent” has met a significant setback, and that is the irony, with the latest French national strategic review and President Macron’s announcement that the French deterrent is there to protect and defend French territory, and does not extend to its European partners.

And this, in turn, may lead to the revival of the public demand that the country should have its nuclear weapons. Germany had a discussion in the late 1960s about whether it should have a nuclear force, something that then Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss had strongly advocated.

As Stephen F Szabo, Adjunct Professor at the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, and author of “Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-economics,” writes, “A nuclear North Korea, a nuclear-curious Iran, and the prospect of Japan and South Korea becoming nuclear powers begs the question: Why should Germany stay behind given its power and centrality to European security?”

A pertinent question, indeed!

Author and veteran journalist Prakash Nanda has been commenting on politics, foreign policy on strategic affairs for nearly three decades. A former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship, he is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.

The German Horn Will Be the Next Nuclear Weapons State: Daniel 7

Will Germany Be the Next Nuclear Weapons State?

One major consequence of Germany’s strategic reorientation, or Zeitenwende, will be a reinvigorated debate about the development of a nuclear deterrent. This is an issue that no one in Germany wants to discuss given its history and aversion to all things nuclear. However, this will become an unavoidable question facing German policymakers in the medium term. Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s reckless war in Ukraineand his threat to use nuclear weapons have made it clear that the issue of nuclear deterrence is now very much front and center in European security policy.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine marks the end of the post-Cold War security arrangement reached with German unification in 1990. All of the assumptions and policies shaped around that settlement are now dead, including Germany’s commitment to not produce or possess weapons of mass destruction. A recent speech by German president Frank-Walter Steinmeier, who was a proponent of close relations with Moscow for many years, makes it clear that Berlin now views Russia as a threat for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, this reopens Berlin’s commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its reliance on the U.S. nuclear deterrent as the bedrock of its security policy.

The major factors inhibiting the development of a German nuclear force are now much weaker. These include arms control agreements, the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, Germany’s retreat from its civilian nuclear power program, domestic resistance to a nuclear force, and the fear that a nuclear-armed Germany would revive the “German question” with its European partners.

On the strategic level, there has been a clear role reversal from the Cold War when NATO was concerned about the conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. Today, it is abundantly clear that the main threat to German and European security does not come from Russian conventional forces but from nuclear blackmail and hybrid war. The Russian military’s failure in the conventional area has pushed Moscow to rely on nuclear blackmail in Ukraine. However, this is not a new development. Russia announced a first-use policy years ago on the rationale that nuclear weapons would prevent the escalation of a conventional conflict. The rationale for the U.S. deployment of intermediate nuclear forces on German soil in the 1980s was seen as a way of preventing Russia from using nuclear blackmail.

The implications of these developments are already being drawn out in Washington and Paris. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review allows for the possibility of nuclear first use in American doctrine and President Emmanuel Macronrecently made it clear that the French deterrent is there to protect and defend French territory, and does not extend to its European partners. Additionally, Germany cannot rely anymore on the United States to be a stable partner given the dysfunction of American democracy and increasingly isolationist trends within the Republican Party, as well as the strategic shift in U.S. policy towards China.

Germany had a discussion in the late 1960s about whether it should have a nuclear force, something that Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss advocated for. This was averted by the proposal of a so-called multilateral force (MLF) which was proposed by NATO as an alternative to an independent German nuclear force. MLF never saw the light of day and Germany was given a role in the nuclear planning group of NATO as compensation. It agreed to sign the NPT and renounced the production of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons.

During the presidency of Donald Trump, this discussion was revived given the loss of confidence in U.S. policy. In 2018, the distinguished political scientist Christian Hackepublished an op-ed in Welt am Sonntag arguing that “Germany’s new role as enemy number one of the American President forces Germany to a radical rethinking of its security policy.” He explained that “Germany is for the first time since 1949 without the nuclear umbrella of the United States. Germany is defenseless in case of an extreme crisis.” Hacke was not alone in raising this point. The leading defense expert of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag, Roderich Kiesewetter, made this case as well. Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, the vice chair of the Free Democrats and its leading foreign policy expert, agreed that German policymakers must openly discuss this issue. “The end of the Cold War did in no way end the era of atomic weapons—one can lament this but that is the reality.”

Another key factor limiting Germany’s nuclear options relates to the shutdown of its civilian nuclear power facilities, which was first announced by Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2011 and is scheduled to be completed this year. As Ulrich Kuehne, Tristan Volpe, and Bert Thompson have contended, the planned phase-out of nuclear power makes it more difficult and costly to start a military nuclear program. While Japan and Iran could go nuclear quite quickly, this would not be the case for Germany. However, Berlin’s decision to shut down its nuclear power plants has been delayed by Putin’s war in Ukraine and the resulting energy cut-off. Therefore, Germany will soon have the ability to utilize its civilian nuclear expertise for military purposes on short notice.

Of course, this would be a very difficult policy to sell at home. Not only is there an empowered Green Party which has been anti-nuclear since its founding but also a strong pacifist strain on the Left, particularly in the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens. But Germany is being forced to reconsider its nuclear stance given the geostrategic environment. Already the Greens and the SPD have been forced to modify their views on military and climate policy. A further deterioration of the European geostrategic environment will lead to more changes in future governing coalitions.

Finally, there is the concern that a nuclear force would reopen the German question and incentivize the organization of countervailing European coalitions. Yet, the Ukraine crisis has made it clear that Europe is more concerned about a lack of German leadership in defense and not with strengthening its deterrence. As Steinmeier observed, Germany is now faced with some very difficult choices. A nuclear North Korea, a nuclear curious Iran, and the prospect of Japan and South Korea becoming nuclear powers begs the question: Why should Germany stay behind given its power and centrality to European security? The Russian military is so degraded that there is no reason why Europe and Germany can’t provide an alternative conventional and nuclear deterrent. Putin may have been surprised by the reactions in Finland and Sweden to his invasion but he may be even more surprised by the long-term reaction in Germany to his brutal policies.

Stephen F. Szabo is an Adjunct Professor at the BMW Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, and author of Germany, Russia and the Rise of Geo-economics.

Image: Reuters.

The German Horn Slams the Iranian Nuclear Horn: Daniel 8

German chancellor slams Iran’s ramped up uranium enrichment

BERLIN

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Friday condemned Iran’s plans to boost its uranium enrichment, saying greater efforts were needed to stop Tehran from acquiring the nuclear bomb.

“As far as Iran’s enrichment policy is concerned, it underscores once again how important it is to do everything possible to ensure that Iran does not get a nuclear bomb or missile systems with which to transport it,” Scholz said at a joint news conference with French Prime Minister Elisabeth Borne.

He added preventing Iran from getting a nuclear bomb was one of the “central goals” of Germany as well as France and other Western allies, notably the US and UK.

On Tuesday, Britain, France and Germany also condemned Iran’s plans to expand its nuclear program after the UN nuclear watchdog said Iran was enriching uranium with plans to further expand enrichment at two plants.

“Iran’s step is a challenge to the global non-proliferation system,” the three nations said in a joint statement provided by the British government.

“This step, which carries significant proliferation-related risks, has no credible civilian justification.

“We will continue to consult, alongside international partners, on how best to address Iran’s continued nuclear escalation,” the statement further said.

Last week, the 35-nation governing board of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution drafted by the US and European allies censuring Iran over an alleged lack of cooperation over uranium traces found by agency inspectors at sites not declared as nuclear-related.

Lightning-Speed Deal to Nuke Up Germany:Daniel 7

Lightning-Speed Deal. Germany to Purchase F-35 for Nuclear Sharing

In July 2022, the Department of State and the U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) approved the sale of F-35A Lightning II multirole combat aircraft to Germany. This came as a climax of quite a protracted and a rather tragicomic story of Germany’s Luftwaffepurchasing a new carrier of nuclear weapons to carry out “NATO nuclear sharing.”

The Legacy

Today’s NATO nuclear sharing is a legacy of the Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR, which has effectively evolved into a policy relic over the 30 years that followed. RIAC has already described the history of the program in detail. The first carriers of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) in Germany were deployed in October 1953 when the U.S. forces stationed in Germany received first specialized M65 cannons designed to fire nuclear devices. Over a few years, the U.S. Air Force acquired surface-to-surface guided missiles, such as MGR-1 Honest John and MGM-5 Corporal, air bombs, and MGM-1 Matador, the first operational surface-to-surface cruise missile.

Curiously, back then, the U.S. government had no official permission from the German government (and never requested it), such as a ratified international treaty. However, striving to maintain friendly ties and acting out of “intra-alliance politeness,” Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was notified of these steps and of the U.S. army’s readiness to use the TNW in military hostilities waged in Germany in case of war with the USSR, even though the Chancellor was to understand that the U.S., as an occupying power, did not need his consent. However, published documents show that the U.S. was concerned with this matter in view of the future, in case special rights to deploy troops were to be abolished.[1] It should be noted that some interpretations posit the German authorities still may not dispute the U.S. right to deploy its troops.[2] Practically speaking, though, these are legal conflicts: U.S. troops, including nuclear weapons, are deployed in Germany with consent of local authorities, and it can hardly be imagined that they would not be withdrawn should the local authorities firmly demand it. On the contrary, when President Donald Trump announced a redeployment of some U.S. troops to other European states, German and pro-Democrat U.S. media presented it as a tragedy that could undermine U.S.–Germany allied relations and NATO’s solidarity, while the Pentagon was sabotaging this decision until Joe Biden abolished it altogether, something the media painted as a great blessing.

Adenauer’s laid-back attitude to nuclear weapons is easy to explain. In the 1950s, today’s concept of non-proliferation was not yet conceived, and West Germany’s leaders envisaged their country to become a nuclear power in a medium-term outlook[3]—as did, for instance, the leaders of Sweden or Italy. For the time being, allied weapons were enough, especially since the U.S. began steering a course for arming its NATO allies with nuclear weapons in the late 1950s, at least by training them and by providing carriers. In the future, the U.S. seemed intent on establishing “NATO’s united nuclear forces” that were sometimes visualized in rather exotic forms, whether a joint force operating intermediate-range missiles stationed in silos under a glacier in Greenland or joint fleets disguised as transport vessels carrying ballistic missiles or rail-based missile complexes cruising around Europe.

However, more practical work was underway in the late 1950s. In 1958, when NATO Atomic Stockpile program was launched with a view to increasing military capabilities of the allied armies under NATO’s new MC 70 directive, [4]the new Luftwaffe was already receiving U.S. F-84F Thunderstreak bombers, which were largely designed as nuclear bomb carriers. The Department of State’s European Bureau noted in a memorandum of November 1958 that West Germany had ordered “dual purpose” systems—such as MIM-14 Nike Hercules SAM systems, MGR-1 Honest John rockets, and Matador cruise missiles—to be delivered shortly.[5]

With discussions and debates on the issue transpiring in the U.S. itself, the militaries were still engaged in fairly close cooperation, exchanged experience while steering clear of any political discussions and the nascent movement for nuclear non-proliferation. For instance, when inspecting the status of American nuclear weapons in Germany in September 1962, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his colleagues visited a Luftwaffeairbase to discover that “warheads were … stored aboard those aircraft on alert status. The assumption that the German pilots do not know how to arm these warheads turns out to be fictional; on request, one of the pilots showed the U.S. visitors how this was done.”[6] Later, West Germany received several nuclear weapons carriers, including Pershing 1a ballistic missiles with a range of about 740 km, which could strike targets not only in East Germany but also in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary. Later, the Luftwaffe used the U.S.-purchased F-104G Starfighter for nuclear aviation bomb carriers (using a high-altitude interceptor as a low-level strike aircraft largely resulted in its notoriously many crashes) and Panavia Tornado strike fighters, a joint product of Italy, Britain and Germany. Officially, the U.S. military remained in control of all the payloads—in practice, though, both the Bundeswehr and the Luftwaffe would operate in a combat situation as full-fledged nuclear forces within NATO’s allied forces.

A nuclear white elephant

Once the Cold War ended, the presence of U.S. troops in Europe, the armies of its local allies, and local American tactical nuclear weapons were being rapidly reduced. Consequently, America’s European nuclear arsenal was reduced by an order of magnitude. All the TNWs were eliminated, except for B61 free-fall air bombs for army air forces. The U.S. withdrew nuclear weapons from the UK, South Korea, and Japan, and nuclear weapons in other states were significantly reduced. Unofficial estimates claim that there are now about a hundred B61-3 and B61-4 bombs deployed in five states (Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Germany) at six air bases equipped with special WS3 hangar storage systems.[7]

In Germany, bombs—likely totaling no more than 20 units—are deployed at the Büchel airbase in Rhineland-Palatinate in the country’s southwest. Nörvenich and Ramstein air bases are no longer used for the purpose, even though the latter had 55 WS3 systems, the largest number built in Europe (Büchel only has 11), enough to house up to 220 bombs.[8]

Only the 33rd tactical Luftwaffe wing (Taktisches Luftwaffengeschwader 33, TaktLwG 33) stationed in Büchel is trained in the use of nuclear weapons on Tornado IDS strike aircraft. This unit is among the oldest in the “new” iteration of the Luftwaffe, the first air wing to fly jet fighter bombers (in 1958, they flew the above-mentioned F-84F Thunderstreak); originally, this unit was led by Walter Krupinski, one of the Nazi Luftwaffe’s highest-scoring pilots in World War II. [9] The 702nd Munitions Support Squadron of the 52nd MUNSS services the bombs and trains technicians and pilots. In addition to regular personnel, air base security is provided by a special Luftwaffe ground force unit, “security squadron S” (Luftwaffensicherungsstaffel „S“).

Despite the general public’s predominantly negative attitude and despite populist statements coming from politicians representing several parties (statements these politicians usually “forget” once they come to power, as happened, for instance, with Annalena Baerbock, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the anti-nuclear Greens), Germany’s military political leadership clearly did not want U.S. nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from the country even before NATO’s current exacerbation in relations with Russia. Otherwise, Germany’s leaders would have achieved it back during the quiet 1990s–2000s, as, for instance, the British leadership did under public pressure. If we look past the perfunctory statements of allied solidarity, Germany’s leadership apparently sees American nuclear bombs as a tool for upgrading Germany’s status within NATO to the “semi-nuclear inner circle,” as well as a means of making its voice louder in the Alliance’s nuclear planning group.

Besides, American and NATO politicians exploit German establishment’s fear of Poland getting excessively strong should Germany “slacken.” For instance, in late 2021, when Germany was discussing American nuclear bombs once again, NATO’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Q&A session after his speech at the German Atlantic Association Conference, threatened that should Berlin demand a withdrawal of nuclear weapons they will appear “east of Germany” as part of the U.S. bilateral treaty with some other state (that is, utterly outside NATO’s control). [10] Naturally, in connection with the current public sentiments in NATO states, the launch of Russia’s military operation in Ukraine puts to rest the matter of possible reductions in NATO’s nuclear sharing for the foreseeable future.

Punch line for a long-running joke

For Germany, its continued participation in nuclear sharing was tied to the long-running problem of carrier aircraft. Since the 1980s, the principal (and soon only) carriers of American B61 bombs in European air forces were the F-16 Fighting Falcon multi-role fighters purchased in the U.S. or the Europe-designed Tornado aircraft. Today, the former are used in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Turkey, while the latter are deployed in Germany and Italy. Both aircraft were produced in the 1980s–early 1990s, and they are outdated and old, which suggests they should soon be put out of service.

Four out of five states have already decided to purchase F-35A Lightning II, a fifth-generation multirole stealth aircraft that Washington labels as the principal carrier of B61-12, a thermonuclear bomb that comes as a guided and high-precision update of B61. The “Turkish question” still remains: following Turkey’s purchase of Russia’s S-400 air defense missile system and because of a generally sharply exacerbated relations, Ankara was excluded from the program, and the fighters Turkey had already paid for were “arrested” in the U.S. This question, however, may be resolved in the future, and a purchase of a shipment of newly-made F-16 fighters is now discussed. In any case, there are reports of Turkish pilots having had no training in using nuclear weapons for a long time, while the bombs in Incirlik are the Middle Eastern cutting-edge arsenal for the U.S. air force itself.

It is easy to see that Germany alone was not on this list. Around 2016–2017, Germany was close to buying F-35, but then its relations with Washington cooled off as the United States under Donald Trump sharply criticized Berlin for insufficient defense spending (far below the 2% of the GDP recommended by NATO) and, therefore, for “mooching off” the U.S. in Germany’s security. In such a situation, Germany’s authorities decided—as a matter of principle—to purchase more European-made Eurofighter Typhoon multipurpose fighters.

The story of Luftwaffe Inspector Karl Müllner is utterly tragicomic: the General did not promptly toe the “party line” and continued to insist that F-35 needed to be bought as nuclear bomb carriers and even openly argued with Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen. As a result, he was forced to resign amid a scandal in the spring of 2018.

For a while, certifying Eurofighter Typhoon as a nuclear weapons carrier became the master plan for continued participation in nuclear sharing. Airbus was confident it could be done by 2025. Having to be involved in reconfiguring the fighter and willing to have the final say on whether the aircraft was ready, the U.S. began hinting that the process would take longer than Tornadoes would remain in service (and the time need to certify Tornado would “turn out” to be longer than any Tornado’s in-service time named by Germany).

Ultimately, the German government drove itself into a corner and decided in March 2020 to buy Boeing F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter bombers. The purchase of a small number (30) of originally carrier-based aircraft which did not enjoy much popularity on the global market, which were not aligned with Luftwaffe aircraft and with those of its NATO allies, which did not have better combat capabilities than Eurofighter Typhoon (for instance, F-35 is stealth aircraft and would open up new opportunities) looked like a hugely awkward decision Angela Merkel’s government made in a tortured manner for political reasons. It would have looked very silly had it decided to purchase F-35 once again, when it had harshly refused to purchase them two years prior. A small bonus consisted solely in purchasing, together with Super Hornets, 15 EA-18G Growler, EW aircraft (jamming, surveillance, air defense suppression) also designed by the Hornet. Currently, these tasks are carried out by old Tornado ECR aircraft that need to be replaced.

Another comic element in this story is that the Super Hornet has not been designed to carry B61 bombs and is not certified to carry nuclear weapons, [11] but the U.S. hinted that it would deal with that problem much faster. For some reason, arguments that “first, we would need to spend several years reconfiguring it carry F-35” cited against Eurofighter Typhoon have not been brought forward concerning the Super Hornet.

Everyone could easily see how impractical that decision was, and when new leaders came to power in Germany in the fall of 2021, Germans began taking careful steps towards “re-appraising” the possibility of purchasing F-35. The process, however, would have certainly been drawn out over several years since the subject was highly “toxic” both due to the issue of U.S. nuclear bombs as such and on account of the stupid predicament the former government had driven Germany into.

When Russia launched its military operation in Ukraine, Berlin reacted with a truly lightning speed: the decision to buy F-35A Lightning II without a bidding process came as early as March 14. Essentially, it was the first practical step taken to buy additional equipment for the German armed forces. To support German manufacturers, the country decided to buy additional 15 Eurofighter Typhoon in its EW aircraft modification (that is, to finance its development since at the moment this modification is just a concept).

In late July, the U.S. Administration officially approved the deal; legislature is likely to promptly follow suit. In its Congressional notification, the DSCA estimated 35 F-35A fighters with equipment, spare and repair parts, weapons (including long-range cruise missiles AGM-158B JASSM-ER) and personnel training to cost USD 8.4 bn. [12]. Lockheed Martin, the fighter’s manufacturer, suggested that should the contract be signed in the near future, it could deliver first fighters to the Luftwaffealready in 2026; Tornado aircraft should last that long.

The German government managed to resolve its predicament by promptly using the changed geopolitical situation. Thanks to the F-35 purchase, they did everything they could to preserve the desired status quo of American nuclear weapons. The Luftwaffe will receive a fifth-generation stealth aircraft used by many of Germany’s NATO allies. Flying F-35 could prove useful for the program of developing forward-looking European FCAS fighter. On the other hand, purchasing F-35 reduces the need for a FCAS and additionally sours relations with France, a partner in the FCAS program, as France insists that Europe rely more on its own forces. Additionally, operating a small number of fighters that are not aligned with the rest of the Luftwaffe’s aircraft fleet will be a very expensive undertaking (unless, of course, Berlin decides, further down the road, to make F-35 one of the Luftwaffe’s main fighters).

However, Germany’s leadership is apparently ready and willing to pay for Germany’s semi-nuclear status. Most likely, America’s vestigial nuclear presence will remain in Europe for a long time, until some kind of an exchange deal with Russia, for instance, in the matter of the latter’s TNW (nuclear weapons were likely kept in Europe just for that purpose, as the military value of relatively few free-fall nuclear bombs is small). When the U.S. decides to get rid of these weapons, it will not consult its “privileged allies,” just like it did not consult them in the mid-1950s when deploying nuclear weapons in their country.

[1]For instance, “Gerard C. Smith, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Atomic Energy Matters, ‘Memorandum of Negotiations Looking to Obtain Storage and Use Rights for Atomic Weapons in Western Germany,’” Draft, 12 August 1954

[2]Under the Bonn-Paris Conventions of 1952/54, the US, the UK, and France gave the Federal Republic of Germany much of its sovereignty back, with Germany, however, agreeing to a series of restrictions, including giving up the right to demand a withdrawal of foreign troops. These conventions are to remain in force until the Allies and Germany sign the final peace treaty, yet this treaty has never been and apparently will not be concluded. Under the 1990 Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany that largely replaces such a peace treaty, the USSR alone gave up its right to deploy troops in Germany, and NATO undertook not to deploy its troops or nuclear weapons only in the former German Democratic Republic

America Preps the German Nuclear Horn: Daniel 7

Fears of war have been raised as a US nuclear detachment arrives in Germany with new hypersonic weapons.

Helena SutanNovember 15, 2021

Fears of war have been raised as a US nuclear detachment arrives in Germany with new hypersonic weapons.

As tensions rise on Europe’s Eastern front, an American nuclear artillery battalion has been redeployed to Germany, raising concerns of war.

The unit, which is equipped with long-range hypersonic missile technology, is the first of its sort since the conclusion of the Cold War. The Dark Eagle weapon will be controlled by the 56th Artillery Command in Mainz-Kastel, which, when completely built and deployed, will be capable of accelerating to more than five times the speed of sound, or almost 4,000mph.

The reactivation reflects rising Pentagon concerns that Russia has outgunned the US and NATO in Europe with longer-range artillery rockets and its own hypersonic weapons development.

As Russian military are deployed to the Ukraine border, tensions between Russia-backed Belarus and Poland are rising over waves of migrants trying to enter Europe.

Rising powers are striving to overturn the status quo in the current global world order, which is dominated by the hegemonic power of the United States.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Iron Curtain, nuclear arsenals have been maintained reasonably secure.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the command was disbanded, and its main weapon, the Pershing II ballistic missile, was banned by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The Trump administration, on the other hand, withdrew the INF in 2019 after accusing Russia of breaking the rules.

The 56th Artillery Command will also get a ground-launched version of the US Navy’s Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile, in addition to Dark Eagle.

The reactivation “will give the US Army Europe and Africa with considerable capabilities in multi-domain operations,” according to Commander Stephen Maranian, commanding general of the artillery unit.

America’s Europe and Africa commands are based in Germany.

General Maranian mentioned intentions to deploy “future long-range surface-to-surface” missiles, alluding to hypersonic weapons’ impending arrival in Europe.

Despite the fact that no hypersonic weapons are ready for deployment, the first launcher systems placed on trailers were delivered to an army camp in Washington State in September, allowing personnel to begin training programs.

Three tests of “hypersonic technologies, capabilities, and prototype systems” tied to Dark Eagle were completed satisfactorily, according to the Pentagon.

However, a hypersonic missile test in Alaska failed last month.

“Brinkwire Summary News” from China and Russia.