The Caliphate Under the Antichrist (Revelation 13) the Mahdi state to the Caliphate state!
Al Arabiya
The peoples of the East generally believe in inherited legends which, over time, turn into an unreliable part of faith. The idea of the Caliphate state which was promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood is a set of inherited mythical fantasies that claim that the Prophet (PBUH) promised the Muslims a Caliphate state which will unite the Muslim world under the same flag.
Naturally, this Hadith is challenged by many and is not proven by the authorities and scholars. In fact, the caliphate state is an idea which emerged after the death of the Prophet, and it is improbable that he had recommended it. However, the mixing of some of the Hadiths with fixed historical facts has created a kind of sanctity in the contemporary Islamic mindset.
The caliphate state, which they say will materialize at the end of time, is the basis of most of the Muslim political movements. At the forefront of these movements is the Muslim Brotherhood.
Sowing destruction
Among those who adopted this mythical idea is also ISIS, which shed the blood of many people, sowed destruction in countries and displaced people for the sake of the Caliphate state. In the end, all its efforts failed. They based their entire war and propaganda on a Hadith attributed to the Prophet which promised the emergence of this state at the end of time. In fact, it is believed that this state will conquer (Rome) in Europe, as is repeatedly vowed by its advocates.
By the way, when Juhayman occupied the Grand Mosque, and pledged allegiance to the person who claimed to be the Mahdi under the Kaaba, he also believed in the heritage of another newly inherited prophesy that predicts that when the Mahdi emerges at the end of time, all the Muslims in the Haram will pledge allegiance to him. Consequently, an army will come from the north to fight his supporters.
The defeat of ISIS and the idea of the state of the Caliphate, which some claim will emerge as strong as the Caliphate state in the beginning of Islamic history, requires us to purify our heritage from these myths that are not based on logical context as much as on the logic of miracles.
The story describes how the soil would crack and swallow the army and that the Mahdi and his supporters would conquer all. Yet, the truth was something else, something that is far away from myths and legends.
The question that we should urgently ask within this context is whether the fall of the so-called Caliphate State, along with the horrendous fall of ISIS, would fortify the Islamic mind and keep it from accepting these inherited heritage legends, which invade the law of logical causality under the pretext of the sanctity of the Prophet and make the miraculous supernatural somehow believable.
The defeat of ISIS and the idea of the state of the Caliphate, which some claim will emerge as strong as the Caliphate state in the beginning of Islamic history, requires us to purify our heritage from these myths that are not based on logical context as much as on the logic of miracles.
Just like the Juhayman incident and the myth of the Mahdi cost us human and psychological losses at the beginning of the current Hajri century, history is repeating itself. The same idea of the mythical state of the Caliphate cost the whole world human and material losses, which can be seen on the ground. In the end, it turns out that states are not based on desires or metaphysical reasons, but on rational reasons justified by reality, not by the cosmic law and miracles.
Hence, young people must realize that they were taken for fools. Indeed, some of the inherited heritage texts are only a form of rational abuse and myths.
This article is also available in Arabic.
Mohammed Al Shaikh is a Saudi writer with al-Jazirah newspaper. He tweets @alshaikhmhmd
Last Update: Sunday, 6 August 2017 KSA 16:06 – GMT 13:06
Disclaimer: Views expressed by writers in this section are their own and do not reflect Al Arabiya English’s point-of-view.

Antichrist’s Men Martyred By ISIS (Rev 13:18)

Shia families told ‘don’t weep for our martyrs’ as fathers and sons die in holy war against Isis

Thousands rushed to fight jihadis in Mosul, but their friends and families are expected not to mourn
By  in Karbala
December 29, 2016 13:25 GMT

Iraqis mourn over a coffin
25 August 2016: Iraqis mourn over a coffin during the Najaf funeral of members of the Iraqi government forces and Shia fighters who were killed in the Khalidiyah area of Iraq’s Anbar provinceHaidar Hamdani/AFP
Just 15 minutes drive from the upscale homes and modern shopping centres of southern Iraqi city Karbala, Saif Saad’s streets are lined with houses built with breeze blocks and corrugated iron. One of the poorest neighbourhoods in Karbala, mounds of litter lie in heaps on the side of dusty dirt roads, some smouldering with acrid black smoke. Trucks and lorries, abandoned and rusting, dot the landscape.
Thirteen-year-old Obeida rides around Saif Saad on a sky-blue bicycle. On the bike, just a little too big for him, he passes a poultry shop and a tyre yard, where workers sit on seats salvaged from scrapped cars, as he returns home.
The house Obeida shares with his mother Raqwa and his four siblings stands apart from other nearby structures, and would be unremarkable were it not for the sign which dominates its front entrance.
It shows a serious-looking man holding a mounted automatic rifle. Above him flies the Iraqi national flag and below is depicted the Shia shrine of Imam Hussein and blossoming flowers. ‘The martyred hero Waleed Mohammed Hamed’, a red Arabic script reads next to the picture.
Obeida is the martyr’s son.
Raqwa remembers the night Waleed was killed with a sense of detachment, staring off into the middle distance as she retells the events. “At 1am they called me and they said he was wounded. They didn’t tell me that he was martyred then,” she says. “Then they called me again and asked to speak to his brother, and they told him about his martyrdom.”
Waleed suffered catastrophic injuries when, during the battle of Bayji in May 2015, he walked into a house rigged with an Islamic State (Isis) IED. He later died in hospital. He was a volunteer in the Shia Imam Ali Brigade and received no payment other than a one-off sum of 400,000 ID ($330).

Saif Saad
Obeida (centre), 13, stands with his younger brother and sister in their home in Saif SaadIBTimes UK

That is all that is to be said of Waleed Hamed’s death, as far as Raqwa is concerned, other than that he, like the hundreds of other Shia paramilitary fighters killed fighting Isis, died a hero in the eyes of his family and the community.
This is the first response of most from Iraq’s southern Shia heartlands when asked about paramilitary fighters killed by Isis.
Obeida remembers how his father, a labourer, would give him money to go to school. Otherwise, he says little more about him, apart from than that he is proud he died fighting Isis and defending Iraq. However, snippets of the hardship the family has endured since Hamed was killed is occasionally revealed.
“First we asked him to leave the Hashid Shabi [PMF] because he was a volunteer and we were unable to make ends meet on their own. I was forced to send my sons to sell gum on the road,” Raqwa says. “But he always said no.”
By the accounts of his family, Waleed was a deeply devout man, and apart from work his principal interest was in participating religious events regarding Karbala’s holy shrine to Imam Hussein, the Shia faith’s third Imam. He considered a pivotal fatwa called for by Iraq’s Shia religious leader Ayatollah Sistani in June 2014 to fight the Isis principal of faith. “He would say we should protect our families, we should liberate our cities and respond to the fatwa,” Raqwa says.
On the rough concrete wall of the family’s house adorned with decoration, Waleed’s photo hangs next to images of Shia devotion: pictures of Ayatollah Sistani, the religion’s highly revered imams and its holy places. Raqwa has to survive in the leaky house on her own, relying on religious charity to keep going.

Shia fighters sit in a
Shia fighters sit in a vehicle driving through a sandstorm near the village of Al-Boutha al-Sharqiyah, west of Mosul, on 2 December 2016, during the offensive to retake the city from Islamic StateAhmad al-Rubaye/AFP

“Many families have sent money to the brigade to support us,” she says. “The children go to schools related to the shrine. They get money from the Shia organisations and rely on their charity,” Raqwa adds.
On the walls of a room set aside in the Karbala headquarters of the Shia PMF, the Ali Akbar Brigade, pictures of martyrs stare down at visitors. The scores of killed, looking straight down the lens of the camera, died across Saladin province, Anbar and Nineveh. The battles and their names are written in white lettering on the black plastic posters.
The brigade’s base is in the former Ministry of Transport building and the fighting group’s flags fly alongside a fleet of government buses. Inside, base co-ordinator Naif Ahmed explains that in their most recent battles at Tal Afar, where the brigade was fighting to cut Isis supply lines, four men were killed by Isis. He says that Isis has inflicted most casualties through IEDs and suicide attacks, adding that these are the tactics of a fighting force in retreat.
Ahmed says martyrs are only to be celebrated, not mourned. If he is killed fighting – he expects to rejoin the battle against Isis in Mosul as he did in Saladin province (he has already arranged to have his son come and replace him) – he would consider it a blessing. An officer in the Iraqi army for two decades, his decision to join the PMU is a deeply religious one.
“I could have joined the Iraqi army and earned $2000 per month … but I decided to join the PMU because of its affiliation with my faith. [My faith] is much more important than my family because it is what keeps my family protected and secure,” he adds.

Members of Iraqi security forces
Members of Iraqi security forces and Shia militia fighters make their way in vehicles from Samarra to the outskirts of Tikrit on 28 February 2015Reuters

The Ali Akbar Brigade was formed immediately after the fatwa by Ayatollah Sistani and the first aspect of its fighters’ training is doctrinal. It is directly linked to the shrine in Karbala and it places the city’s religious authority above that of PMF command in Baghdad. Ahmed explains that, if called, to he would go to protect Shia shrines in Syria. Although all of Ali Akbar Brigade’s fighters remain in Iraq, Iraqi fighters have travelled to defend the shrine of Sayyidah Zaynab. Ahmed says he revers Zaynab as he does Hussein. “The only difference is Hussein is here close to us; she is far,” he explains.
The call to arms, for Ahmed, is far more important than the effect the war has had on his family, his absence and his reduced wages. “Right now I have two children in school and they are not doing very well because I am not teaching them,” he explains. “This is the priority. Even though they are not doing well in school, this is my priority. This much more important than my children’s education,” he says.
Outside the great mosque in Kufa, 80km south of Karbala, the tension between the loss of those killed fighting Isis and the political necessity of their heroism plays out once more. In one of the mosque’s central courtyards two young men are weeping over the coffin of their fallen friend, killed in the Mosul operation.
The wooden box is plastered with military adornments. The plastic coverings flash in the sun, yellow with the emblem of the PMF, red, white, green and black for the Iraqi flag and green and black for the Saraya al-Salam Brigade, Muqtada al-Sadr’s paramilitary organisation, the latest iteration of the Mahdi Army which fought the US invasion.
Approaching the two crying friends, their heads pressed on the coffin, an older man chastises them in front of a slowly forming group. “Why are you upset?” he asks. “You’ve had good news. Your friend is a martyr, he fought for this country.”

Kufa Mosque
Mourners gather around the coffin of a fighter killed in the Mosul offensive outside the Great Mosque of KufaIBTimes UK

How the Antichrist’s men are disrupting national unity

BAGHDAD — Iraq’s parliament is divided over a proposal designed to unite the country.
Iraq’s passage of a law establishing the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) as an official security force threw a wrench into efforts to adopt a national settlement proposal — basically a grand plan to abolish sectarian and ethnic quotas in parliament and “put an end to the monopoly of power by the Shiite parties, as opposed to the marginalization of the Sunni sect.” The proposal says it will involve “all segments of Iraqi society and ethnic and religious communities, including women, youth and civil society organizations.”
The parliament’s Sunni blocs don’t think empowering the PMU, an umbrella organization of dozens of predominately Shiite groups, is a good example for ending that monopoly. Since the PMU was formed in 2014, it has been seen by many as a band of outlaw militias accused of human rights violations against Sunni civilians in the areas where it has been fighting the Islamic State (IS).
When the PMU law passed Nov. 26, the Sunni blocs walked out of the parliamentary session as a show of opposition. Now the Sunni blocs have walked away from the national settlement proposal. Saleh al-Mutlaq, the head of the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, called the PMU law the final destruction of the settlement.
Sheikh Khamis al-Khanjar, an influential Sunni leader, also rejected the national settlement proposal after meeting Dec. 6 with Jan Kubis, the head of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq. Kubis had tried to convince him to participate in the settlement.
The Sunni blocs now have three options. According to Ahmad al-Sulmani, a member of the Sunni Union of Nationalist Forces, the first option is to challenge the PMU law in federal court; the second option is to negotiate amendments. Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Shiite national Sadrist movement, has presented proposed amendments to the PMU law to Iraqi President Fuad Masum and parliament Speaker Salim al-Jabouri.
If both of those options fail, the Sunni blocs would have to resort to completely boycotting the national settlement project, which has been embraced by the largely Shiite Iraqi National Alliance, headed by Ammar al-Hakim.
Sulmani told Al-Monitor, “The Sunni blocs in the Iraqi parliament were hoping to find a solution to the PMU and integrate it within the army and police force. However, after the National Alliance insisted on turning the PMU into an institution, we agreed so long as it would be accepted by all parties and passed by consensus.”
The most important amendments that the Union of Nationalist Forces wants to make to the PMU law include preventing individuals accused of violating the rights of civilians from being integrated within the PMU institution, leaving the task of controlling areas liberated from IS to the army, not the PMU, and raising the percentage of Sunni fighters in PMU ranks to 40%. PMU spokesman Ahmed al-Asadi said in November that there were some 9,000 Sunni fighters — only 8% of the PMU total force of about 110,000.
“Sunni parties refused to receive the draft … from the National Alliance and agreed among themselves not to be part of this settlement as long as [the Shiite parties] do not show good intentions, particularly in amending the PMU law,” Sulmani added.
The National Alliance said it aims to involve all parties in the Iraqi national settlement project, to resolve outstanding issues and disagreements and eliminate all political issues for the post-IS phase.
However, not only did passing the PMU law by majority — without the consent of all political parties in parliament — make Sunni parties doubt the seriousness of the “settlement,” it also raised the ire of Sadrists, who object to the law in its current form.
He noted in a statement that he has urged the three presidencies to “integrate the PMU within the official security forces.” He added, “To avoid all sectarian, political and security issues, I believe it would be best to take into consideration all proposals, especially after the parliament agreed on this integration.”
In addition, Sadr stressed in his recommendation “the need to keep all those who wish to stir sectarian strife at an arm’s length, along with those who sold out two-thirds of Iraq.” He was referring to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, under whose management two-thirds of the country was lost to IS.
This Sadrist-Sunni rapprochement will keep the debate over the PMU institution going for quite a while if changes aren’t drafted by the president or the federal court. That would mean that Saraya al-Salam (Peace Brigades), the Sadrist movement’s military wing under the PMU umbrella, would not remain with the PMU. A Sunni division would emerge between parties that do wish to join the PMU and political parties objecting to the PMU’s current form. This tense situation also threatens the settlement project.
For his part, Salim Shawki, a member of the Al-Mouwaten bloc, headed by Hakim, told Al-Monitor, “The real problem facing the national settlement project does not lie in the PMU law at all; it is rather represented by the large number of parties wishing to be part of this project.”
He added, “Many parties claim to be representing Sunnis, which is turning into the biggest obstacle for the settlement. … Most parties agreed on the PMU law, and those that objected only want to amend a few of its provisions.”
Despite the long discussions conducted before the PMU law was passed, critics said its provisions were too general and lacked details. For instance, the law does not specify the number of fighters who would officially join the PMU, although Asadi had noted there will be 142,000 fighters, including 30,000-40,000 Sunnis.
It would be a first for an Iraqi security institution to be divided according to sects. This is why the law avoided mentioning ratios. However, all concerned parties noted that Sunnis and Shiites will control the liberated areas according to certain percentages, under the command of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.
In this context, Abadi noted in a statement approving the PMU law: “Under the law, the PMU has come under the direct leadership of the general commander of the armed forces. This law will represent all Iraqi people and defend Iraqis wherever they are. This will not please those seeking chaos who tried to impede the law for a long time.”
For the first time ever, Shiite factions will officially be under government administration, and perhaps the state will be able to adjust their activities and follow up on their actions, allowing it to pursue and hold accountable the factions and armed groups that are not affiliated with the PMU.
However, one cannot tell how the prime minister will deal with Saraya al-Salam if they decide not to join the PMU under the law, as well as other Sunni factions such as the National Mobilization, headed by Atheel al-Nujaifi, the former governor of Ninevah province. It remains uncertain how the law would be able to integrate all PMU factions and isolate them from their previous leaderships.
Most importantly, many observers wonder what position the government would take if the PMU decides — either officially or unofficially — to participate in the battles in Syria, especially since Maliki had announced that the PMU would be heading to Syria after liberating Mosul.

Trying to Keep the Antichrist’s Men Under Control

The military capability and reach of Islamic State has deteriorated so much over the past year that the Iraqi government will now need to think long and hard about the day after. Iraq’s Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and his ministers in Baghdad have focused most of their resources and attention on the immediate priorities of pushing Islamic State out of Mosul, consolidating the gains made by the Iraqi security forces, and preparing the international community with the immense financial burden that will be required to reconstruct the country once the war is over.
The Iraqi Council of Representatives took a major step forward on the “day after” question last month when it passed a law that Sunni lawmakers are vehemently citing as further proof that the Shia-dominated parliament is intent on dragging Iraq towards a sectarian future. Thanks to the power of numbers, the Shia blocs were able to ram a law through the parliament that would incorporate [3] the roughly 140,000 fighters of the Popular Mobilization Units into the regular Iraqi armed forces. Prime Minister Abadi is fully supportive of the plan, calling it a much-deserved recognition of the PMUs’ instrumental success on behalf of the Iraqi state against ISIS. Sunnis who have been in the militias’ line of fire are naturally taking a much different position, a testament to the group’s often indiscriminate tactics on the battlefield and its habit of sweeping through liberated areas like a destructive freight train.
Human rights organizations inside and outside of Iraq have documented numerous times when PMU militias—the vast majority of which were formed after Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a call to young men to help the army take the country back—abused their authority and practiced vindictive harassment on Sunni civilians. Human Rights Watch has released several reports detailing the PMUs’ retributive behavior, primarily directed against Sunni towns and cities that once boasted an ISIS presence. Tikrit was the most illustrative example of how out of control these units can be; according to HRW [4], “militia forces looted, torched, and blew up hundreds of civilian houses and buildings in Tikrit and the neighboring towns of al-Dur, al-Bu ‘Ajil and al-Alam along the Tigris River, in violation of the laws of war.” Hundreds of residents were also detained, based on nothing more than their Sunni sectarian identity and the unfortunate fact that they happened to live under ISIS’s dominion.
In virtually every operation that the PMUs have participated in, chaos and war crimes have not only been conducted, but left unpunished. In Fallujah, up to seven hundred men and boys [5] streaming out of the city were detained by the militias, questioned, and presumably imprisoned or perhaps even executed. Months after these people were taken into custody, relatives and friends were still at a loss as to where they were being held or whether they were still alive. It’s the kind of track record that convinced Prime Minister Abadi that the PMUs should be left outside of Mosul’s city limits, and why the U.S. Air Force has refused to provide air support to militias outside of Baghdad’s command.
Yet as vicious as the PMUs have proven to be in the past, it would be foolish not to admit that they haven’t been detrimental to ISIS’s strength. When multiple divisions of the Iraqi Army and police force collapsed in 2014, it was the irregular militias that served as the crack force to stop ISIS’s ascent to Baghdad. Indeed, if it weren’t for the presence of these militias, it’s doubtful that the newly rebuilt and retrained Iraqi Army would have been able to drive ISIS away from Baghdad’s suburbs without high casualties. In fact, ISIS may have even been able to control the cities of Tikrit and Fallujah for a much longer period.
Like it or not, the PMUs provide the Iraqi government with critical manpower, just as the regular armed forces are hard at work attempting to finish ISIS off in Mosul.
There is therefore a certain logic to Prime Minister Abadi’s endorsement of reintegrating the PMUs into the Iraqi chain of command. The question, though, is whether this can be done without alienating the very Sunni community in Iraq that Baghdad will need if it genuinely wants to heal the sectarian fissures that have torn the country apart for the past thirteen years.
Before the militias are brought into the armed forces, Abadi should call on the parliament to clarify that any reintegration will only take effect if certain conditions are met.
First, before any PMU is formalized into Iraq’s security structure, these units must sever any and all contact with alternative lines of authority, particularly partnerships with Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah—two actors that have aided the more troublesome militias in the past. Financing for the PMUs should be controlled by the Iraqi government and not by a neighboring state with their own interests in mind.
Secondly, Abadi should appoint a technocratic commission supervised by his office that is responsible for overseeing the legalization of the PMUs. The duties of the commission should include a review of the units’ performance in the field, and whether those units are cooperating constructively with the Iraqi high command and following orders; the creation of a set of guidelines that will hold PMU commanders and fighters accountable if they misappropriate government funds; and the launching of investigations to ensure that any abuses against civilians are prevented and severely punished through prosecution, disbandment, or the withholding of state financing.
Thirdly, Prime Minister Abadi must make it clear that any unauthorized operations conducted by PMU units will result in censure. The Iraqi government cannot afford sectarian militias running amok and annexing specific parts of the country for their own parochial purposes. Iraq, in other words, need not return to 2004–08, when clerics like Muqtada al-Sadr were administering entire cities.
Finally, the Iraqi parliament should reopen the prospect of Sunni-majority provinces taking more ownership of their own security, perhaps through the establishment of tribal or provincial national guards (these national guards could also be legalized as an official branch of the Iraqi security forces). If this idea is too politically traumatizing for Shia MPs to consider, then they should at least amend the current PMU law in order to stipulate that Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians and Yazidis have just as much of a right to be incorporated into the Iraqi security forces as the Shia.
Filling out the details will be the difference between rewarding militias that have engaged in violations of the Geneva Conventions (making reconciliation with Sunni populations in Iraq even more difficult in the process) and granting the PMUs the opportunity to become a responsible segment of Iraq’s security architecture.
This story was originally published by The National Interest
Daniel R. DePetris is an analyst at Wikistrat, Inc., a geostrategic consulting firm, and a freelance researcher. He has also written for, Small Wars Journal and The Diplomat.

Antichrist’s Men Integrate Into Iraq Politics

02 December 2016
Key Points
The passage of law making the Hashd al-Shaabi part of Iraq’s armed forces will not increase government oversight or influence over Shia militias.
However, the legislation will safeguard militias against pressure to demobilize following the conclusion of military operations against the Islamic State and facilitate such groups’ future participation in elections.
Sunni opposition to the law threatens to derail the project for national reconciliation.
As with the army, Hashd al-Shaabi fighters, which comprise approximately 110,000 soldiers will receive salaries and pensions. This will probably be in addition to ongoing funding from Iran received by many of the Iran-aligned component groups. The Hashd al-Shaabi comprises groups of varied political affiliations and loyalties; its leading components – the Badr Organisation, Kata’eb Hizbullah and Asai’ib Ahl al-Haq – are closely aligned with Iran and their operations on the ground are co-ordinated by the head of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, Qassem Soleimani. Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Peace Brigades are another component, had until recently maintained an openly antagonistic stance towards these groups and distanced himself from association with the Hashd al-Shaabi as an entity and its Iranian backers. The final component comprises those groups that answer directly to the Shia religious establishment in Iraq’s holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, including the Ali Al Akhbar Brigade and the Abbas Division; these receive donations from Iran, but do not receive training from, and are not otherwise close to, the IRGC. Although the Hashd al-Shaabi will be funded from the Ministry of Defence budget, the law did not specify under whose operational command it would fall; and this may be, on paper, the Iraqi chiefs of staff/minister of defence, it is likely that in reality it will be answerable directly to the prime minister, with Iran exercising a controlling influence.
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The Antichrist’s Men (Revelation 13:28)

 MIDEAST > US concerned over Shiite militia joining Iraqi army
US concerned over Shiite militia joining Iraqi army
The Iraqi government’s effort to integrate a Shiite militia, the al-Hashd al-Shaabi, into the country’s security forces is concerning as it might increase Iran’s influence with Baghdad, a U.S. general said on Nov. 30.
“It will increase obviously Shia – potentially Iranian – influence over the government of Iraq and we have to be concerned about it,” the head of Central Command, Gen. Joseph Votel, said during a panel discussion at the Foreign Policy Initiative, a neoconservative Washington-based think tank, state-run Anadolu Agency reported.
The Iraqi Parliament passed a law last weekend that formally recognized the controversial Iran-backed al-Hashd al-Shaabi as an “independent military entity” operating within the Iraqi army.
Votel said he believes that the nuclear deal inked between world powers and Iran last year did not prompt change in “Tehran’s sponsoring of terror groups and fueling of sectarian conflicts.”
“[The nuclear deal] is implemented appropriately but it addresses only one of our concerns,” he said of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, adding that since the deal Iran has sponsored more than 100,000 Shiite militias in conflicts, including in Yemen and Iraq.
“I would probably say there is a little bit of uptick,” he said.
Meanwhile, Iraqi special forces fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) militants on the eastern side of Mosul have retaken 19 neighborhoods from the extremist group since the battle for the city began last month, Brig. Gen. Haider Fadhil of the special forces told The Associated Press on Nov. 30.
Fadhil said his men were now about four kilometers (2.5 miles) from the Tigris river, which slices the city in half. He said the 19 neighborhoods constituted less than 30 percent of the part of the city east of the Tigris.

The Antichrist represents the Shiite paramilitary force

“Maliki does not represent Hashd al-Shaabi and has nothing to do with this foundation,” said Ibrahim Jabri, media officer to Sadr. He said the force was established under a religious decree by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq’s top Shiite cleric.
“Maliki is far from the Hashd al-Shaabi. Go ask him how many members of his family have been martyred alongside the Hashd al-Shaabi,” he asked.
The Hashd al-Shaabi was formed by the Iraqi Interior Ministry when Maliki was in power to fight ISIS after the group’s takeover of a third of Iraq in mid-2014. The group was since then reportedly taking orders from Maliki.
On many occasions Maliki has supported the Shiite paramilitaries as being an active force in the fight against ISIS.
The parliamentary decree also stipulates that members of all of Iraq’s ethnic and religious groups will have the right to the join the Hashd, which will be reorganized by the military following the ongoing Mosul operation against ISIS.
“Hashd al-Shaabi represents all Iraqi groups. Politicians should not impose their hegemony on it. And we are for changing the name to Hashd al-Watani,” which means nationalist force in Arabic, Jabri said.

Antichrist Seeks Reforms For His Men (Revelation 13:18)

Al Arabiya
In step 24 hours after Iraqi Parliament passed a bill recognizing Popular Mobilization militias as a government entity, Muqtada al Sadr, head of al Sadrist movement, proposed reforms to regulate and organize the Shiite militia fighters.
A delegation from al Sadrist movement handed over the reform manuscript to Iraqi president, Fuad Masum and the Speaker of the Parliament, Salem al Jabouri, on Sunday.
On the other hand, Al Jabouri emphasized the magnitude of unification of all Iraqi parties in order to accomplish a comprehensive national reconciliation that will contribute to the stabilization of their country.
On Saturday, the Iraqi parliament has passed the bill recognizing the Popular Mobilization Forces as a government body operation alongside the military, amid the opposition of some Sunni lawmakers, who said the law would intensify the division and the rift within the Iraqi society particularly following the violations attributed to these militias in some areas of Iraq.
*This article can also be viewed in Arabic on
Last Update: Monday, 28 November 2016 KSA 14:16 – GMT 11:16

The Sunni’s Concern About The Antichrist’s Men (Revelation 13:18)

Legalizing Iraq’s Shiite mobilization forces

The Popular Mobilization – and without any exaggerations or intimidation – is a structure that’s deeply into Khomeini ideals, sectarianism and financial corruption. It wants to follow the example of its counterpart, the Revolutionary Guard, or the guards of Khomeini revolution in Iran. Iran’s revolutionary guards are in control of the state as they’re in control of arms, money, media outlets, hawza programs, ayatollahs, banks, ports, oil, gas, foreign policy and everything else.
Iraq is not like Iran despite attempts by former Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his comrades among the leaders of Iraqi Shiite parties to transform it. There is the independent Kurdish bloc, the Peshmerga, with its government, region and army. There are also Arab Sunni powers and although they’re dispersed now, this will not last forever as it’s only due to current circumstances and this will end once the circumstances change. Finally, there is a big percentage of Iraqi civil nationalists who reject the governance of fundamental groups, whether Sunnis or Shiites, and they are the spirit of the awaited Iraq.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi would have gained glory and won the Iraqis’ support and love if he had rejected this law legalizing the Popular Mobilization Units.
Unfortunately, he did not reject it but only minded it a little bit requesting them to be patient before approving it and transfering the law to the cabinet. However Shiite parties did not listen to him and the law was passed amid Sunni MPs and other MPs’ boycotted the session. The law passed support from the MPs of Maliki’s, Ammar al-Hakim’s, Muqtada al-Sadr’s and other Shiite leaders’ blocs, and Abadi therefore giving their blessing for the move.
Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi would have gained glory and won the Iraqis’ support and love if he had rejected this law legalizing the Popular Mobilization Units
Mshari Al Thaydi
All proposals to postpone passing the law were rejected and all suggestions to amend it were prohibited. Some Sunni MPs’ suggestions proposed allotting 40 percent of the units’ fighters to Sunni tribes.
Relentless attempts
Saleh al-Mutlaq, former deputy prime minister and leader of Al-Arabiya Coalition, said passing the law “ends the dream of the civil state which the Iraqis dream of.” The law is dangerous and it seriously tampers with the structure of the Iraqi state and paves way for continuous strife that may conclude with dividing Iraq or sustaining tensions and civil war as it creates a perfect atmosphere for sectarianism and transform Iraq into a Shiite state where others, mainly Sunni Arabs live under mercy and tutelage of others – that is if they live at all.
There are relentless attempts to fortify the criminal sectarian mobilization forces from being legally pursued after its involvement in bloodshed and violent practices which resemble ISIS’ has been proven. The approved law’s fourth article allows the Popular Mobilization to militarily act to confront any armed practices and to protect the government and the regime.
Shiite Al-Fadila bloc MP Hassan al-Shammari had requested providing legal immunity to the Popular Mobilization forces if they fight against ISIS and liberate areas occupied by the latter.
This law “destroys national partnership” like Sunni powers and other powers in Iraq said. By the way, I do not know how “brother” Salim al-Jabouri, the Brotherhood Islamist figure who is the speaker of parliament, explains passing this poisonous law.
Peace be upon Iraq.
This article was first published in Asharq al-Awsat on November 28, 2016.
Saudi journalist Mshari Al Thaydi presents Al Arabiya News Channel’s “views on the news” daily show “Maraya.” He has previously held the position of a managing senior editor for Saudi Arabia & Gulf region at pan-Arab newspaper Asharq al-Awsat. Al Thaydi has published several papers on political Islam and social history of Saudi Arabia. He appears as a guest on several radio and television programs to discuss the ideologies of extremist groups and terrorists.
Last Update: Saturday, 19 November 2016 KSA 13:14 – GMT 10:14

The Antichrist and the Hashd al-Shaabi (Revelation 13:18)

Move comes 2 days after parliament votes to incorporate Hashd al-Shaabi into Iraqi armed forces
By Ali Shekhu
According to al-Jabouri’s office, al-Sadr’s raft of recommendations included suggestions for streamlining the Hashd al-Shaabi’s operations, financially and administratively.
Al-Sadr had also emphasized that group members “should not be affiliated with any political faction”, al-Jabouri’s office said in the statement.
The State Department said Monday that the decision was an “internal Iraqi matter” but expressed concerns and wanted things to be settled in a way that “doesn’t further inflame sectarian tensions”.
The Hashd al-Shaabi has stirred controversy, however, with some of its members having been accused of committing abuses against Sunni civilians in areas they had “liberated” from Daesh.
Iraq’s security situation has deteriorated markedly since mid-2014, when Daesh captured the city of Mosul — now the target of a wide-ranging military campaign — and overran vast swathes of territory in northern and western Iraq.
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