The History Of New York Earthquakes: Before The Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

Historic Earthquakes
Near New York City, New York
1884 08 10 19:07 UTC
Magnitude 5.5The History Of New York Earthquakes: Before The Sixth Seal (Rev 6:12)
Intensity VII
This severe earthquake affected an area roughly extending along the Atlantic Coast from southern Maine to central Virginia and westward to Cleveland, Ohio. Chimneys were knocked down and walls were cracked in several States, including Connecticut, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Many towns from Hartford, Connecticut, to West Chester,Pennsylvania.
Property damage was severe at Amityville and Jamaica, New York, where several chimneys were “overturned” and large cracks formed in walls. Two chimneys were thrown down and bricks were shaken from other chimneys at Stratford (Fairfield County), Conn.; water in the Housatonic River was agitated violently. At Bloomfield, N.J., and Chester, Pa., several chimneys were downed and crockery was broken. Chimneys also were damaged at Mount Vernon, N.Y., and Allentown, Easton, and Philadelphia, Pa. Three shocks occurred, the second of which was most violent. This earthquake also was reported felt in Vermont, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. Several slight aftershocks were reported on August 11.
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Hamas calls on Palestinians to confront Israelis outside the Temple Walls: Revelation 11

Hamas calls on Palestinians to confront Israel victory parade in Jerusalem

Israelis wave national flags in front of Damascus Gate outside Jerusalem’s Old City to mark Jerusalem Day, an Israeli holiday celebrating the capture of the Old City during the 1967 Mideast war, Sunday, May 29, 2022

RESISTANCE fighters from Hamas today called on Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip to confront a flag-waving parade planned by Jewish nationalists through the main Palestinian thoroughfare in Jerusalem’s Old City.

The comments by Hamas added to the already heightened tensions ahead of Thursday’s march and threatened to reignite fighting between Israel and Palestinian militants in Gaza, just days after a ceasefire took hold.

Two years ago, an 11-day war between Israel and Hamas erupted during the annual march.

While Hamas stayed out of the latest round of fighting, officials with the group urged Palestinians to oppose Thursday’s parade.

“We ask the people of Jerusalem to mobilise the masses to confront the march of the flags in Jerusalem tomorrow,” said Mushir al-Masri, a Hamas official in Gaza.

Hamas also urged Palestinians in the occupied West Bank and inside Israel to “clash with the occupation” and said it would hold a demonstration with Palestinian flags along Gaza’s heavily fortified frontier with Israel.

The parade is meant to mark so-called Jerusalem Day, Israel’s annual celebration of its capture of East Jerusalem in the 1967 six-day war.

Each year, thousands of Israeli nationalists participate in the march through the Muslim Quarter and towards the Jewish Quarter and the Western Wall, the holiest site where Jews can pray.

Why the Russian horn will nuke Ukarine

v day parade 23

Why Putin Will Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine

May 17, 2023

Kevin Ryan

Recent developments in Ukraine suggest Russian military commanders have exhausted their ability to effectively respond to a Ukrainian escalation in fighting, which is expected any day. An influx of 300,000 new soldiers over the winter has done little to improve the fighting of Russian units, and the reported appearance of 1950s Russian tanks near the battlefield confirms Russian materiel is running out. President Vladimir Putin’s bombing campaigns have not broken Ukraine. It is becoming clear, in my view, that the only way he can meet escalation with escalation is by introducing nuclear weapons.

Moreover, during the past 12 months, Putin has laid the groundwork for using a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine. He has removed domestic and operational barriers to doing so and has created justifications, fabricated and real, so that his people support him. In speeches and interviews, he has made the case that Russia is under existential attack — a situation, under Russian policy, that warrants the use of nuclear weapons. He has reshuffled his military leadership accordingly, assigning the three generals responsible for employment of tactical nuclear weapons to command his “special military operation” in Ukraine. He already has tactical reasons to explode a nuclear weapon: saving Russian soldiers’ lives, shortening the war, destroying Ukrainian forces. He also has strategic reasons: rejuvenating the deterrent value of his nuclear arsenal and proving that he is not a bluffer.

Putin’s threats have included both strategic nuclear weapons, which can reach the United States, and tactical nuclear weapons, which are generally smaller in explosive power and could be launched from shorter distances to strike Ukraine. His threats include preemptive strikes against those who threaten the survival of Russia. Unlike Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO have their own nuclear weapons to deter a Russian strike. But they have made it clear they will not use their nuclear weapons to defend Ukraine. This leaves Ukraine especially vulnerable to nuclear attack.  

Many Western experts say they take the threat of a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine seriously but make the mistake of asserting that the odds are low. The result is that many officials view the problem of tactical nuclear weapons as serious but not urgent. Earlier this month, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told a Senate hearing that Putin’s weakened conventional force would make him more reliant on “asymmetric options,” including nuclear capabilities, for deterrence, but that it was “very unlikely” that Moscow would use nuclear weapons in its war against Ukraine. Speaking at the same hearing, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, also assessed the chances as “unlikely.” 

In fact, the evidence is strong that the problem is urgent and I argue that Putin will use a tactical nuclear weapon in his war in Ukraine. Western leaders need not wonder about Putin’s nuclear-use red lines and how to avoid crossing them while supporting Ukraine, in my view. Putin is not waiting for a misstep by the West. He has been building the conditions for nuclear use in Ukraine since early in the war and is ready to use a nuclear weapon whenever he decides, most likely in response to his faltering military’s inability to escalate as much as he wishes by conventional means. This article will not consider exhaustively what may prompt Putin’s decision, but we should not fool ourselves by thinking we can prevent it. Instead, we should prepare responses for a new world in which the nuclear genie is out of the bottle.

Russia’s Increased Reliance on Nuclear Weapons

For much of the past 80 years, Russia’s security has rested on two pillars whose relative strength has waxed and waned — its conventional ground forces and its nuclear weapons. The conventional forces have been used to influence, bully and force Russia’s neighbors and adversaries to bend to its will. The nuclear forces were intended to deter the United States and the West from interfering militarily in Russia and its perceived zone of influence. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia’s conventional forces have at times struggled with their share of the task. To compensate, Russian leaders have had to rely on their nuclear forces to do both: strategic nuclear weapons to deter the West and tactical nuclear weapons to threaten neighbors.

In today’s situation, a single nuclear strike in Ukraine could thwart a Ukrainian counterattack with little loss of Russian lives. For Moscow, this consideration is as much practical as it is moral or image-related: Last year’s large-scale mobilization and increase in military units showed that Putin’s army was too small for its task. Nevertheless, Russia has managed to create only a few new battalions because most new personnel and equipment went to replace losses in existing units. Putin and his military leaders are running out of the people and materiel needed to achieve his goals.

Russian military and security experts have been encouraging this greater reliance on nuclear weapons for years. In 2000, responding to the U.S. bombing of former Yugoslavia, Russian international affairs expert and former lawmaker Alexey Arbatov advised that Moscow should “enhance its nuclear forces to deter not just nuclear, but also, large–scale conventional attacks of the type demonstrated in the Balkans.”He predicted a plan some say Putin has embraced: “a suicidal threat of nuclear escalation [that] could present a credible deterrent against a full-scale, theater-wide conventional aggression — including major ground warfare.”

Putin Prepares for a Nuclear Strike

In the first three months of 2023, Putin took several public steps to demonstrate that he is not bluffing about the use of nuclear weapons.

In February, he signed a law “suspending” Russia’s participation in the strategic nuclear arms treaty New START. This step officially ended joint inspections of American and Russian nuclear weapons sites and released Russia from limiting its number of strategic nuclear weapons, Russian promises to remain limited notwithstanding.

In March, Putin announced that he would station tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus this year, building a storage facility to house them, to be completed as early as July. Since Russia has already deployed nuclear-capable Iskander ground-launched missile systems and thousands of troops to Belarus, this would put nuclear delivery systems and warheads in close proximity to one another, greatly reducing the warning time of their use. Putin noted that Russian trainers would also train Belarussian forces to use the weapons. Analyst Dmitri Trenin, former director of the now-defunct Carnegie Moscow Center and a retired Soviet military officer, observed that the Belarus deployment “demonstrates that the conflict between Russia and the West is developing into an armed clash between Russia and NATO, and is a signal to Washington that further American/Western involvement in the military conflict in Ukraine could lead to the use of nuclear weapons.”

Putin has taken these increasingly threatening steps in the belief that NATO and the West — in particular, the United States — are not listening to him as he proclaims Russia’s demands on the international stage. In 2018, when Putin unveiled a bevy of new nuclear weapons, he warned: “You will listen to us now!” Four years later, his invasion of Ukraine was a wakeup call for those in the West who were still not listening.

Even after the invasion though, some in Russia undoubtedly fear that the threat of a nuclear strike has begun to ring hollow. For Putin, whose regime is at risk, in my view, continuing to threaten a tactical nuclear attack in Ukraine without doing it carries perhaps as much risk as doing it. To remind the West of the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, Putin and his generals may decide it is necessary to explode such a weapon. This would enable Russia to escalate the war to its tactical advantage and let Putin prove he is no bluffer.

Besides warning the West many times that he might use a nuclear weapon, Putin and his leadership have, step by step, prepared the Russian people with reasons why he should use nuclear weapons.

Among these justifications, Putin has repeatedly invoked “whataboutist” comparisons to the United States. When announcing plans for deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus on Russian state television, he said: “The United States has been doing this for decades. They have long … deployed their tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of their allied countries, NATO countries, in Europe, in six states. … We are going to do the same thing.” Putin has also several times referenced American nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and equated American goals then — to save soldiers’ lives and shorten the war — with Russian goals today.

Putin has also made clear to the Russian people that Moscow’s red lines for the use of nuclear weapons, spelled out in its official documents, have all been crossed in the conflict in Ukraine. These include “aggression with conventional weapons against the Russian Federation, when the very existence of the state is threatened.” Putin has repeatedly claimed that the very survival of Russia is at stake in the current struggle. At this month’s Victory Day parade, he claimed that the West’s “goal is to achieve the collapse and destruction of our country.” He asserts that Crimea and other Ukrainian lands are Russian territory, meaning that, from Putin’s perspective, battles that were occurring on Ukrainian land one day are suddenly happening on Russian land. Another of Russia’s officially designated red lines for nuclear use is “attacks … against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces’ response actions.” Russia has claimed that Ukrainian drones have struck Russian strategic nuclear bombers inside Russia, and that Ukraine and the U.S. are responsible for drones launched to assassinate Putin. All these claims, real and fabricated, are used to establish the pretext for Putin to use nuclear weapons when he decides.

Some Western observers of the Russian military claim that because we have not yet seen any movement of nuclear weapons, we have no tangible signs of intent to use them. I disagree.

First of all, last fall, Kyiv officials reported that Russia was firing “Kh-55 nuclear cruise missiles” with dummy warheads. Observers suggested these missiles — which are designed to carry only a nuclear weapon — were launched to erode Ukrainian air defenses by “decoying” them into destroying the Kh-55s rather than missiles with conventional explosives. This claim makes little sense: Missiles, even unarmed, would be too valuable to shorthanded Russia to use as decoys. But launching the Cold War-era missiles with dummy warheads to test their reliability and readiness for use in a real nuclear strike would be a good reason for what we saw.

Another sign of Russia’s increasing readiness to use nuclear weapons is the most recent change in the leadership of the war, which both underscores Putin’s message that Russia is fighting for its survival and puts at the helm the very men who are in charge of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons. In January, Putin appointed his chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, to head the military operation in Ukraine. (Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said the change was connected to a coming “expansion in the scope of [the war’s] tasks.”) Not since the second world war has the chief of the general staff been in command of a military operation for Russia. Putin also appointed two generals to be Gerasimov’s main deputies in the war, Gen. Oleg Salyukov, head of Russia’s ground forces, and Gen. Sergei Surovikin, head of Russia’s aerospace forces. This is even more worrisome since, under Russian doctrine, the chief of the general staff and the heads of the ground and aerospace forces are the three officers who control all tactical nuclear weapons use in ground operations. Putin has now placed in direct control of the war the three senior-most officers who have the authority to employ tactical nuclear weapons when he gives the order.

When these developments are coupled with the impending deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, nearer Ukraine, we can no longer pretend there are no tangible signs of intent.

Trigger for Nuclear Use

With the groundwork laid to justify a tactical nuclear strike in Ukraine, what will trigger Putin’s decision to launch? Most likely it will be the inability of the Russian military to escalate the war by conventional means when Putin demands. For example, if a Ukrainian offensive threatens the loss of Crimea or the provinces that form the land bridge to it, Putin would demand an escalation of the fighting to prevent that loss. If the conventional forces could not successfully respond, however, a nuclear strike against the Ukrainian forces would be the only way to escalate. On the night Putin illegally added four Ukrainian provinces to Russia, he declared, “If the territorial unity of our country is threatened, in order to protect Russia and our nation, we will unquestionably use all the weapons we have. This is no bluff.”

Putin is also under pressure to escalate the war from Russian nationalists. These groups have supported Putin in his rise to power, but now are vocal in their dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war. Some, like former FSB officer Igor Girkin, openly criticize the senior military leadership and even Putin. That criticism may be morphing into opposition, forcing Putin to consider escalating his war before his conventional forces are ready.

Claims that Putin would be dissuaded from using nuclear weapons by important partners like China or India are belied by experience thus far in the war. Although Putin values the support of others, he has not shied from putting that support at risk to get what he wants.

None of this is to say that we in the West should pressure Ukraine to forgo its goal to liberate all seized territory. But it does mean that we should anticipate a nuclear weapon will be used and develop our possible responses accordingly.

Normalizing Nuclear Weapons

As soon as Russia uses a nuclear weapon in Ukraine, the “fallout” will begin and spread. Tens of thousands of Ukrainians will be dead, suffering or dealing with the effects of the nuclear explosion. Hundreds of millions of Europeans will be bracing for war. But 7 billion others around the globe will go about their business, alarmed to be sure, but physically unaffected by a nuclear explosion in Ukraine. This last outcome of a Russian tactical nuclear strike may ultimately be the most dangerous to the international order. The image that many people have of nuclear arms as civilization-ending weapons will be erased. In its place, people will see these weapons as normal and, although tragic, acceptable in war. Just a “bigger bullet.” It is in this dramatically changed context that the United States will have to decide how to respond.


Kevin Ryan

Retired Brigadier General Kevin Ryan is a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He served as U.S. defense attaché to Moscow and deputy director for strategy, plans and policy on the Army Staff.

China Horn prepares its people for nuclear war

Democracy in China, Joe Biden, Democracy Contest Month, China, US, Democracy Summit, People’s democracy, deliberative democracy,

China prepares its people for war

15 May 2023

As nations in Asia rebalance against Chinese aggression and expansionism, China begins mobilisation of its citizens, citing danger to the nation

The Communist Party of China’s (CPC) assessment of its security situation shows a heightened threat perception. During the “two sessions”—China’s annual parliamentary sittings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference that serve as a barometer to decipher the nation’s policy direction—China’s elite voiced their concerns publicly. President Xi Jinping spoke about the severe challenges it had faced due to the Western allianceled by the United States (US), seeking to encircle and suppress China. His Foreign Minister Qin Gangagain put the onus on America, cautioning that if the US does not desist from its current path, then it could lead to greater confrontation and conflict. In the face of these “risks” to China, Xi’s mantra to the Party has been: to be determined, consolidate through stability, strive for achievement, and importantly, have the courage for conflict.

Xi’s speech at the 20th Party Congress highlights an urgency to modernise the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) by 2027 and transform it into a world-class military by 2027. As PLA’s modernisation in recent years gathered steam, its aggression along the India-China boundary, in the East China and South China seas has also heightened. It carried out repeated exercises in the Taiwan Straits, seeking to send a message to the government on the island and deter it from seeking independence. While the US has responded to the China challenge by reinvigorating its alliances in East Asia, China sees the situation differently and through the prism of its nationalism and the ‘Century of Humiliation’ narrative—referring to the period stretching from the mid-18th century to the 19th century that saw several Western nations and Japan militarily intervene in China.

Force mobilisation 

An article in the military’s newspaper,PLA Daily,sees an American hand behind the rapprochement between South Korea and Japan after a hiatus of more than a decade, citing Japanese PM Fumio Kishida’s and South Korean President Yoon Suk yeol’s recent visits this year. Additionally, Yoon also visited the US. President Joe Biden. Academics Zhang Yuanyong and Chen Yue say the PLA should be “extremely vigilant”, cautioning that frequent military exercises and drills between the US, Japan and South Korea pose a threat to regional security. The researchers foresee that military cooperationbetween the US, Japan, and South Korea in Asia is a precursor to the ‘Five-Eyes’ intelligence-sharing arrangement between the US, Australia, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand. Thus, Chinese strategists believe that the US will cement a NATO-like trilateral military bloc and intelligence-pooling arrangement in Asia just like the one in the Anglosphere.

Experts prophesies a “perilous” nuclear arms race in China’s backyard, pointing to the recent agreement whereby the US can deploy US N-submarines in South Korean waters.

The paper also prophesies a “perilous” nuclear arms race in China’s backyard, pointing to the recent agreement whereby the US can deploy US N-submarines in South Korean waters. In the Xi era, China’s domestic political discourse has sought to hype historical wrongs, particularly Japan’s wartime role in China. Given this background, the CPC perceives that Japan had harboured militaristic ambitions that were restrained by its postwar “pacifist Constitution”, it now sees greater threat from Japan purportedly developing its nuclear weapons. It may be recalled that China’s exercises in the Taiwan Straits in response to the then US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to Taiwan in 2022 spilt over to Japan after missiles landed in the latter’s exclusive economic zone. The notion that Japan could be threatened in the eventuality of China’s invasion of Taiwan has led to greater US-Japanese security cooperation. However, the People’s Republic seeks to portray this rebalancing by nations in its neighbourhood to its people as one that imperils the nation.

People at the centre of defence strategy

In conjunction with this, we must also see how the civilian element is being bolstered in China’s concept of civil-military fusion. A recent order by China’s Ministry of Defence states that the concept of ‘national defence education’ is of strategic importance to the Party. It also emphasises that steps to strengthen national defence education have been taken in the Xi era through public commemorations such as Martyrs’ Day and National Public Sacrifice Day, etc., which have boosted national resolve and increased defence awareness. This is not Beijing’s top-down initiative as evidenced by a discussion published on the theme of ‘Improving National Defence Education policy in the New Era’ on the website of the local municipal authority of Bazhou city in Hebei province. The directives state that the onus is on educational institutions to improvise the concept of national defence education and that it must be integrated into the examination system. The directives state that efforts should be made to explore whether retired military personnel can mentor youth in national defence education. This is a CCP initiative to socialise the GenNext in national defence thought before they are ushered into the PLA. Almost on cue, the revised regulations for military recruitment that came into force in May stipulate that local authorities must give wide publicity to conscription drives and organisations promoting them would be rewarded for enlisting “high-calibre soldiers”.

This is a CCP initiative to socialise the GenNext in national defence thought before they are ushered into the PLA.

In a nation, where the state decides what movies its population can see, celluloid serves as a powerful tool for the CCP to mould and mobilise young minds. The Chinese movie ‘Born To Fly’ released recently echoes the political themes of the CPC namely: China’s besiegement, technological blockade, and militarist confrontation with foreign powers among others. The core theme of the movie is that China puts together a crack team of pilots, who are selected through several endurance exercises, to test a 5th generation aircraft. Thus, Xi seeks to inject military values like patriotism, unity, and discipline to harden its society.

There is more in store for the military too. Xi inspected the PLA’s Southern Theatre Command and instructed his generals to improve the trainingof soldiers in actual combat conditions, further highlighting the need to improve research on combat issues while resolving deficiencies in training. He has also stated the PLA and the People’s Armed Police Force formulate integrated strategies and create a reserve force to protect national security.

China is preparing for war, and as a nation invested in studying conflicts of other nations, since its forces lack combat experience, China seeks to rectify Russia’s mistakes and harden its people.

To conclude, first, we must take note of the fact that China is creating a spectre of a looming besiegement and using the same argument that Russia put forth to justify the Russo-Ukraine conflict, namely NATO expansionism, paving the ground for military aggression. Russia may have not succeeded in “selling” war to its people which has led to many fleeing the nation. China is preparing for war, and as a nation invested in studying conflicts of other nations, since its forces lack combat experience, China seeks to rectify Russia’s mistakes and harden its people.

Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF.The views expressed above belong to the author(s).

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Iran Tramples Outside the Temple Walls: Revelation 11

The leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar hosts a meeting with members of Palestinian factions in Gaza City, on April 13, 2022. Photo by Attia Muhammed/Flash90.

Iran is stepping up pressure on its proxies to join forces against Israel

Tehran’s push to establish a “joint operational mechanism” in Lebanon for Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad is causing friction within the terror groups, especially Hamas.

By Baruch Yadid

(May 16, 2023 / JNS)

The leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip Yahya Sinwar hosts a meeting with members of Palestinian factions in Gaza City, on April 13, 2022. Photo by Attia Muhammed/Flash90.

Heavy Iranian pressure on Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to establish a “joint operational mechanism” to coordinate activities against Israel is reportedly causing internal divisions among the Iranian proxies.

The alliance of Iranian-backed terror groups known as the “Jerusalem Axis” is Iran’s counterweight to the Abraham Accords, and finds support in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen.

Arab and Lebanese sources indicate that Iran has been actively working towards establishing a shared operational headquarters for Hezbollah, Hamas and PIJ in southern Lebanon. There are indications of plans to create a joint center to coordinate rocket attacks on Israel.

While the move seeks to strengthen the Jerusalem Axis’s military capabilities, the terror groups themselves are reportedly less than enthusiastic about the plan.

Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, has expressed opposition to the initiative, preferring to maintain a more neutral stance. However, Saleh al-Arouri, an influential Hamas figure reportedly based in Turkey, supports closer ties with Iran and is leading the push for an “Iranian option.”

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, too, prefers to maintain his status as an independent proxy rather than fully aligning with Hamas.

As for PIJ, it is directly funded by Iran to the tune of some $100 million annually. Tehran gave PIJ permission to pursue the Egyptian-brokered ceasefire which ended a five-day conflict with Israel.

The heightened coordination between Iran and its proxies was evidenced by a series of meetings involving high-ranking officials earlier this year.

In one meeting of note, Esmail Ghaani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, held discussions with Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas deputy Arouri and senior officials from PIJ and Hezbollah at the Iranian embassy in Lebanon. On April 6, shortly after Ghaani’s visit, a barrage of rockets was fired at Israel from Lebanon, strongly suggesting a coordinated effort.

Israel responded to the rockets by targeting Hamas-affiliated sites in southern Lebanon. The following day, Hassan Nasrallah held a meeting with Haniyeh, further indicating Hezbollah’s involvement and approval of the rocket fire.

These events underscore the close coordination that already exists between Iran and its proxies, which Tehran is now seeking to extend to the operational sphere.

The establishment of an operational mechanism in southern Lebanon aligns with Iran’s broader objective with regard to Israel. It also potentially aligns with the goals of Hezbollah, as by activating Hamas from Lebanese soil, the Lebanese terror group can shield both its own assets and those of Iran from Israeli retaliation.

However, Hezbollah faces internal political pressure in Lebanon, including from its own Shi’ite community, discouraging any action that could potentially cause a destructive conflict akin to the 2006 war. Hezbollah’s delicate position in Lebanon may lead the terror group to seek an alternative solution.

For Hamas, however, the situation is far more complex; Tehran’s proposed coordination mechanism would potentially turn Hamas into a de facto proxy of Hezbollah.

Senior Hamas leaders, including Sinwar, who maintains close ties with Egypt, and Khaled Meshaal, the Hamas leader associated with Qatar, find such an arrangement to be unacceptable.

This is reportedly causing tension with the pro-Iran group in Hamas led by al-Arouri.

Which camp ultimately gets the upper hand remains to be seen.

The Implosion of the Pakistani Nuclear Horn: Revelation 8

The implications of Pakistan’s implosion

The implications of Pakistan’s implosion

Deepak Sinha

Much like in Pakistan, religion and ethnicity are increasingly seen as tools to spread divisiveness aimed at fulfilling political agendas

As we watch Pakistan crash and burn on live television, it is too early to say if we are witnessing the beginning of the end or just the end of the beginning. Even in this age of misinformation and deep fakes what can be said with certainty is that, much in the manner of Humpty Dumpty, Pakistan has had a great fall and all the Imrans, Shariefs, Bhutto’s and Asims put together, can never make Pakistan whole again.

Of course, none of this was unexpected. We have seen Pakistan slowly go bankrupt, with inflation soaring and its currency collapsing as the impact of climate change, the pandemic, endemic corruption and sheer mismanagement have taken their toll, leaving its economy in tatters. While always known for its rather rumbustious politics, with opposition parties at each other’s throats and the military always looming over their shoulders, this time things seem a bit different.

For one, the Army’s image has been badly scorched with public accusations of corruption against the top brass, which has lost much of its public support and created cracks within its ranks. Now, as per unconfirmed reports, dissensions at the very top, have adversely impacted its cohesion. Add to that increasing terror attacks by the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), radicalisation within and troubles in the provinces, especially Balochistan. All in all, it has been lashed by a perfect storm for some time now, and something had to give. So, it did, with Imran Khan’s arrest becoming the hair that broke the proverbial Camel’s back. 

From our point of view, Imran Khan’s arrest is not a bad thing. The charming, affable fun-loving cricketer of yore is long gone. Replaced by a born-again religious zealot who sees India as fair game and the stepping stone to fulfilling his ambitions of leading Pakistan once again. While he and his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) are extremely popular, taking on the Army publicly and showing its vulnerabilities is bound to end with a loss for all parties. In the circumstances, we obviously must err on the side of caution and be on the alert, as a terror strike against us to divert attention cannot be ruled out.

Apart from the childish desire to gloat at the situation Pakistan finds itself in, some issues of consequence emerge which we would do well to give serious thought to. Some worry, and rightfully so, that instability and the emergence of a failed state with nuclear weapons on our doorstep places us in a very tenuous security situation. Unfortunately, there is little we can do about that except guard our borders with even more care and leave it to those who have influence there, the United States and China, to neutralise the nuclear issue, as not only were they both complicit in Pakistan turning nuclear but are also not safe from what may occur there if that country becomes unmanageable.

The emergence of Bangladesh ushered in the death knell of the “two nation theory” which we believed had been formulated and promoted by Jinnah and had resulted in Partition, the prime reason for all our troubles since then. Nothing could be further from the truth and Jinnah was, in fact, only a cat’s paw for the British. As Narendra Sarila, former diplomat and author of The Shadow of the Great Game: The Untold Story of India’s Partition, puts it,

Partition was only just a means to an end for the British and Americans to pursue and protect their strategic interests in the region. As Prof. Antony Copley’s review of the book states: “With imperial control of the subcontinent clearly at an end (even if Linlithgow doubted this and Churchill even more so) Britain’s primary consideration became one of defence of her strategic interests in Persia and the Middle East together with meeting any post-war threat from the Soviet Union and China.

The Post-Hostilities Planning Staff of the Cabinet alerted Churchill to this need on 19 May 1945, it was echoed by the British Chiefs of Staff on 18 April 1946, and all were endorsed by Wavell and Auchinleck. Pakistan and partition were seen to be the answer and Attlee merely followed suit. Possibly Congress’s betrayal in 1942 pointed to Pakistan as the best prospect for Britain’s strategic defence needs though it was hoped these would be strengthened were India to be persuaded to join the Commonwealth. Here was indeed the future of the Baghdad pact and CENTO.” This British strategy, in retrospect, badly backfired, putting themselves at greater risk and now adding to Pakistan’s irrelevance.

Finally, what is most pertinent for us from these events in Pakistan is that they can well become a precursor of what we are likely to face in the not-too-distant future. Sadly, our developmental models since Independence have been quite similar little emphasis or attention given to education or health. Much like in Pakistan, religion and ethnicity are increasingly seen as tools to spread divisiveness and exclusion aimed only at fulfilling political agendas with little thought for our future. Clearly, without changes we are heading down that same road and it will be our future generations who will confront the same ignominy and shame that stare Pakistanis in the face today.

(The author, a military veteran is a Visiting Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation and a Senior Visiting Fellow with The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai)