Sloshing of Earth’s core may spike major earthquakesBy Paul VoosenOct. 30, 2017 , 1:45 PMThe number of major earthquakes, like the magnitude-7 one that devastated Haiti in 2010, seems to be correlated with minute fluctuations in day length.SEATTLE—The world doesn’t stop spinning. But every so often, it slows down. For decades, scientists have charted tiny fluctuations in the length of Earth’s day: Gain a millisecond here, lose a millisecond there. Last week at the annual meeting of the Geological Society of America here, two geophysicists argued that these minute changes could be enough to influence the timing of major earthquakes—and potentially help forecast them.During the past 100 years, Earth’s slowdowns have correlated surprisingly well with periods with a global increase in magnitude-7 and larger earthquakes, according to Roger Bilham of the University of Colorado (CU) in Boulder and Rebecca Bendick at the University of Montana in Missoula. Usefully, the spike, which adds two to five more quakes than typical, happens well after the slow-down begins. “The Earth offers us a 5-years heads up on future earthquakes, which is remarkable,” says Bilham, who presented the work.Most seismologists agree that earthquake prediction is a minefield. And so far, Bilham and Bendick have only fuzzy, hard-to-test ideas about what might cause the pattern they found. But the finding is too provocative to ignore, other researchers say. “The correlation they’ve found is remarkable, and deserves investigation,” says Peter Molnar, a geologist also at CU.The research started as a search for synchrony in earthquake timing. Individual oscillators, be they fireflies, heart muscles, or metronomes, can end up vibrating in synchrony as a result of some kind of cross-talk—or some common influence. To Bendick, it didn’t seem a far jump to consider the faults that cause earthquakes, with their cyclical buildup of strain and violent discharge, as “really noisy, really crummy oscillators,” she says. She and Bilham dove into the data, using the only complete earthquake catalog for the past 100 years: magnitude-7 and larger earthquakes.In work published in August in Geophysical Research Letters they reported two patterns: First, major quakes appeared to cluster in time—although not in space. And second, the number of large earthquakes seemed to peak at 32-year intervals. The earthquakes could be somehow talking to each other, or an external force could be nudging the earth into rupture.Exploring such global forces, the researchers eventually discovered the match with the length of day. Although weather patterns such as El Nino can drive day length to vary back and forth by a millisecond over a year or more, a periodic, decades-long fluctuation of several milliseconds—in particular, its point of peak slow down about every three decades or so—lined up with the quake trend perfectly. “Of course that seems sort of crazy,” Bendick says. But maybe it isn’t. When day length changes over decades, Earth’s magnetic field also develops a temporary ripple. Researchers think slight changes in the flow of the molten iron of the outer core may be responsible for both effects. Just what happens is uncertain—perhaps a bit of the molten outer core sticks to the mantle above. That might change the flow of the liquid metal, altering the magnetic field, and transfer enough momentum between the mantle and the core to affect day length.Seismologists aren’t used to thinking about the planet’s core, buried 2900 kilometers beneath the crust where quakes happen. But they should, Bilham said during his talk here. The core is “quite close to us. It’s closer than New York from here,” he said.At the equator, Earth spins 460 meters per second. Given this high velocity, it’s not absurd to think that a slight mismatch in speed between the solid crust and mantle and the liquid core could translate into a force somehow nudging quakes into synchrony, Molnar says. Of course, he adds, “It might be nonsense.” But the evidence for some kind of link is compelling, says geophysicist Michael Manga of the University of California, Berkeley. “I’ve worked on earthquakes triggered by seasonal variation, melting snow. His correlation is much better than what I’m used to seeing.”One way or another, says James Dolan, a geologist at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, “we’re going to know in 5 years.” That’s because Earth’s rotation began a periodic slow-down 4-plus years ago. Beginning next year, Earth should expect five more major earthquakes a year than average—between 17 to 20 quakes, compared with the anomalously low four so far this year. If the pattern holds, it will put a new spin on earthquake forecasting.doi:10.1126/science.aar3598
Day: December 21, 2022
We Will All Lose When Iran Goes Nuclear: Daniel 8
December 19, 2022 Topic: Iran Nuclear Deal Region: Middle East Tags: IranIran Nuclear DealIran Nuclear WeaponsJoint Comprehensive Plan Of ActionRegime ChangeIsrael
Iran Has Everything to Lose by Going Nuclear
Paradoxically, an Iranian attempt to prevent regime change by building the bomb could lead to regime change.
by Stefan Jojić
Concerns about the Iranian nuclear program are at their height today. Some observers wonder if Tehran has deliberately dragged out negotiations on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) to expand its status as a nuclear weapons threshold state. The Iranians could dare to irritate Washington, counting on the United States’ reluctance to engage militarily against them. In this scenario, the American and Israeli threat of military intervention only aims to push Iran to give up its demands and renew the 2015 deal—they are not ready to intervene. Due to the possibility of military escalation and the expected effects on the global energy market, the warnings coming from Washington and Tel Aviv could be no more than empty threats.
Others who believe the Iranians are eager to reach an agreement are worried that Tehran would be able to build nuclear weapons once the deal sunsets, or even while it is in force. The latter is feasible due to limits on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s ability to monitor Iran’s production of uranium enrichment centrifuges. These limits raised suspicions that Iran could (ab)use the temporary inability of the IAEA in order to move the centrifuges to clandestine sites. That being the case, Teheran could secretly enrich fissile material and ultimately build nuclear weapons.
Considering the pros and cons, however, the rationality of going nuclear is questionable. It is unlikely that Iran would get away with it as Israel, India, and Pakistan have. The world would react to the Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons as it did in the case of North Korea. What’s more, Tehran would not only fail to achieve any gains but would jeopardize its ability to realize its vital foreign policy goals, risking the very survival of the Islamic Republic.
Prestige and the desire for a status symbol could be among the motives for obtaining nuclear weapons. For Charles de Gaulle, the nuclearization of France was not only a security issue but also something to influence the French self-image as a great power. The acquisition of nuclear weapons could boost the perception of Iran as a regional power to a degree, but it has no profound effect today as in the 1960s. Although it is difficult to determine the precise impact of this political symbolism, it can hardly be worth the risks. Moreover, in light of strengthening the non-proliferation regime, going nuclear would tarnish Tehran’s image globally and cement the perception that Iran is a pariah state, as shown in the example of North Korea.
It is worth noting that nuclear weapons are not seen by experts as appropriate for offensive political goals in modern times. Iran’s paramount foreign policy goals are to export the Islamic revolution throughout the region and support actors with similar ideologies. However, nuclear weapons can hardly contribute to Iran’s ability to promote an Islamic awakening or back its allies. One could say that the Iranian nuclear umbrella could be a way to do so. But in fact, the weapons would be ineffective in protecting regional actors such as Hezbollah or Syrian president Bashar al-Assad against the threats they could face. Neither Israel nor the United States would be deterred from their actions against those foes if Iran had nuclear weapons.
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Providing material aid is a key component of Tehran’s support to friendly actors, and going nuclear would reduce its ability to do so. The expenses of maintenance and modernization of the nuclear arsenal and means of delivery, although not insignificant, are less important here. Rather than the cost of keeping nuclear weapons, what matters more is the economic retaliation that would follow Iranian nuclearization. Despite recent claims that Russia is helping Iran bolster its nuclear program, Moscow has no interest in seeing Tehran acquire nuclear weapons. The same is true for China, which would prefer an interim solution that could present the United States with a crisis every so often. For that reason, by going nuclear, Tehran would risk broader sanctions. Consequently, it would burden Iran’s already crippled economy and decrease its ability to support its allies in the Levant and Yemen.
The defensive function of nuclear weapons is yet another feature to consider. To decisionmakers in Tehran, state security is regime safety. Their rule, disputed ever since the Islamic Republic emerged, is particularly challenged today. Nationwide protests are shaking the system as the reign of Ayatollah Khamenei is nearing its end, inciting uncertainty and intrigue around the expected power transition. Nevertheless, nuclear weapons cannot help Iranian political structures maintain their power. They could not keep the Soviet Union together nor prevent the South African black majority from ending the apartheid regime. Similarly, the ultimate weapons would not help the Ayatollahs and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) preserve their rule.
Concerning external threats, nuclear weapons would enhance Iran’s security to some extent, so deterrence is the most credible motive for acquiring them. But is this additional security necessary, and what are the risks of achieving it?
Saudi Arabia is averse to conflict with Iran. Tehran has more than enough conventional weapons to inflict unacceptable damage to the energy infrastructure and economy of Saudi Arabia. It is highly improbable that the Saudis would accept the risks of initiating a war with Iran. On the other hand, geography limits large-scale Israeli attacks on Iranian territory. Sure, the Israelis target Iran with cyber-attacks and assassinations now and then—but nuclear weapons cannot help against asymmetric threats coming from Tel Aviv.
From Tehran’s perspective, the most acute threat to deter is the one coming from the United States. But Washington is reluctant to take the risks of war with Iran only to influence their usual behavior or change the regime. Since vast amounts of energy flow through the Strait of Hormuz, a conflict with Iran could be as harmful to the global economy as the war in Ukraine, not to mention their combined effect. Besides, considering both the defender’s capabilities and the dangers posed to American ambitions in other parts of the world, a war with Iran would be a more difficult challenge for the United States than those fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. If Washington has not attacked Iran before, it is unlikely to do so now, since it is pivoting to Asia and trying to cope with the China challenge. Therefore, Iranian deterrence already works.
The only thing that is likely to push the United States to face the dangers of war is its intention to prevent Tehran from weaponizing its nuclear program. Stopping another rogue state from acquiring the ultimate weapons could be worth the risks of escalation. After all, Washington has pledged to use all means available to prevent Tehran from making a nuclear bomb.
Considering Iran’s likely retaliation against American troops and allies in the region, the conflict could prove costly for the United States, but it would certainly hit Tehran harder. The war could end the Iranian nuclear program and devastate the economy. But more importantly, the conflict would provide fertile ground for regime change. Paradoxically, an attempt to prevent regime change by building the bomb could lead to its realization. An American attack would probably not follow an Iranian statement that it will make the bomb, but rather intelligence signaling that Tehran has crossed the red line. As intelligence can fail and mislead, an ill-informed attack might occur in times of mistrust.
The tragic nature of the Iranian nuclear issue goes beyond the possibility of premature war. The very roots of the current problem could be ill-conceived, as Iran most likely never needed more security. This example illustrates the malign spiral caused by the security dilemma, where a desire for more security could increase the level of threat, destroy prosperity, or even endanger the state’s survival. But even in a scenario of successful weaponization that would not provoke a military attack by the United States, nuclear weapons would jeopardize Iran’s capabilities to realize its interests in the region. Iran would not increase its security, the regime would not enhance its stability, and its ability to pursue its regional policy would decrease.
All in all, are the Iranians building a bomb behind the world’s back? Although their rationality and threat perception are biased and affected by negative historical experiences with the United States, Tehran can hardly ignore the high cost and risks of going nuclear. Indeed, while the Iranians continue to boost their nuclear program, they are cautious not to provoke a military response by America. Iran has not passed the threshold of 60 percent uranium enrichment and avoids employing its full capacities. Therefore, the Iranian breakout time has been fairly stable for some time.
The continuous advancement of the Iranian nuclear program below the red lines is a sort of pressure on Washington to make further concessions in the talks on the revival of the JCPOA. As with the unrealistic demands for guarantees that the next administration will not unilaterally pull the United States out of the deal again, the Iranians are trying to get more than they did under the 2015 deal. Although they are playing a dangerous game, whereby the worst-case scenario may easily prevail, the Iranians would likely be happy to see at least a small gesture from the United States to signal a political and moral victory over Washington. Since a minor back down is less costly than the undesired options, Washington should at least consider some alternatives to Iranian demands.
Russian Horn Should Nuke US: Revelation 16
Igor Girkin Says Russia Should Use Tactical Nuclear Weapons on NATO Members
BY BRENDAN COLE ON 12/20/22 AT 9:23 AM EST
Aprominent Russian military blogger critical of Moscow’s war effort has said that tactical nuclear weapons should be used in the conflict—but against NATO and not Ukraine.
Igor Girkin made the comments at the end of an interview on the YouTube channel of Russian businessman Andrei Kovalyov, during which he anticipated a swift response if such weapons were used.
Girkin, who is also known as Igor Strelkov, was a former agent with Russia’s FSB security services and played a key role in Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
Girkin has candidly criticized the way that Russian forces have fought in Ukraine, repeatedly outlining mistakes made in tactics and mobilization. Last week, he said that Ukraine had already dealt Russia a “strategic defeat.”
At the end of an interview that lasted more than one hour and 20 minutes, Girkin was asked about the prospect of nuclear weapons being used in the war.
“I believe that it we use nuclear weapons first, we will soon get a retaliatory strike,” he said. “I believe that we should use tactical nuclear weapons.”
He added that he was not concerned about “the moral aspect” of such a move, “because to hit our territory, Russian territory from Ukrainian territory, with nuclear weapons, or even to plan it, is a crime.”
But, he said that “we can hit only if we go to war with NATO,” and that it is “not Ukraine that should be hit by NATO countries if they launch aggression.”
He said that if Moscow used nuclear weapons, Ukraine would have access to such a weapon “within a month and use it in exactly the same way,” adding that “everyone in the West will applaud that.”
The clip was tweeted by Ukrainian internal affairs advisor Anton Gerashchenko, who wrote: “Terrorist Girkin-Strelkov said that nuclear weapons should be used not in Ukraine but in NATO countries.”
Rhetoric on Russian state television has repeatedly outlined how Russia could use nuclear weapons, but experts have expressed doubt that Putin would resort to such a measure and question the strategic value of doing so.
Girkin was sentenced in absentia by The Hague to life in prison for his role in shooting down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 on July 17, 2014, which killed 298 passengers. The plane bound for Kuala Lumpur was downed over eastern Ukraine amid fighting between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces.
Earlier in the interview, Girkin expressed his concern about what would happen to him if Putin’s forces were defeated in Ukraine.
“As soon as we lose this war, I will go to The Hague to serve a life sentence, after which I will be sent to Kyiv and hanged there, ” he said. “I have no doubts about this.”
The S Korean Horn is Ready to Nuke Up: Daniel 7
As Trump Looms, South Koreans Mull Their Own Nukes
November 24, 2022 5:22 AM
In December 2019, then-U.S. President Donald Trump was asked whether he thought it was worth it to have “all those” U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.
“It could be debated. I could go either way,” Trump answered.
The comments came at the height of tense negotiations over Trump’s demand that Seoul pay much more to host approximately 28,000 U.S. troops.
Trump’s answer did not come out of the blue. Throughout his time as president — and in fact, even before and after his presidency — Trump regularly questioned the value of the U.S.-South Korea alliance.
According to I Alone Can Fix It: Donald J. Trump’s Catastrophic Final Year, a 2021 book by two Washington Post journalists, Trump privately told close aides that he planned to “blow up” the U.S.-South Korea alliance if he won reelection in 2020.
In part because he lost that election, no one knows how serious Trump was about upending the U.S. relationship with South Korea.
Some analysts say Trump was only being transactional, as he was with many other allies, and that he never intended to abandon Seoul.
Others are not so sure, noting Trump once went so far as to suggest South Korea should get its own nuclear weapons so that Seoul could protect itself.
Faced with an increasingly hostile and nuclear-armed neighbor, South Korea can afford little ambiguity on the matter, which helps explain why a growing number of prominent voices in Seoul would like to see if Trump’s nuke offer still stands.
Going mainstream
One of the most outspoken advocates of South Korea getting its own nuclear weapons is Cheong Seong-chang, a senior researcher at the Sejong Institute, a nonpartisan foreign policy research organization outside Seoul.
Cheong spoke to VOA several days after Trump announced his 2024 presidential bid. He said it is not just the possible return of Trump that is concerning — it’s the chance that his America First ideas will have a lasting impact on U.S. foreign policy.
“The United States has a presidential election every four years…[it] may go back to isolationism, which is why South Korea’s own nuclear armament is essential to maintain stable security and deter North Korea,” Cheong told VOA.
Fringe figures have long called for South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons, but recently the proposal has gone mainstream. This year, several well-known scholars have proposed Seoul either acquire its own nuclear arsenal or request the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons that were removed in the early 1990s.
A poll published in May by the conservative Asan Institute for Policy Studies suggested that more than 70% of South Koreans support their country developing indigenous nuclear weapons — the highest level of support since the organization began asking the question in 2010.
Cheong is trying to turn that support into something more organized. In early November, he launched the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy, which promotes South Korea’s nuclear armament and discusses plans to make it happen. In its infancy, the group already has more than 40 members, according to Cheong.
Not just Trump
Trump is far from the only factor driving South Korea’s nuclear arms debate.
South Korean leaders are also alarmed at the rapid development of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. North Korea has conducted a record number of launches this year, including both long-range missiles that could reach the United States and shorter-range ones that threaten Seoul. U.S. and South Korean officials say North Korea could conduct another nuclear test soon.
North Korea has also embraced a more aggressive nuclear posture. In October, leader Kim Jong Un oversaw a series of launches simulating a tactical nuclear strike on South Korea. The North is likely moving ahead with deploying tactical nuclear weapons to frontline positions, analysts say.
In addition, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has underscored the risks that non-nuclear states face when confronted with an aggressive, nuclear-armed neighbor.
Although South Korea is protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, some South Korean analysts believe the United States may be reluctant to respond to a North Korean attack if Pyongyang has the ability to destroy a major U.S. city — in essence, the fear is that the United States would not want to risk San Francisco to save Seoul.
“North Korea believes there’s a slight chance that they could get away with a nuclear attack without getting a reprisal from the United States,” said Chun In-bum, a retired lieutenant general in the South Korean army.
Big obstacles
In Chun’s view, acquiring nuclear weapons is one way for South Korea to guarantee its security, although he acknowledges major barriers.
Among the uncertainties is the question of how China, Russia, and others in the region would respond. For instance, would Japan, another U.S. ally in Northeast Asia, feel compelled to get its own nuclear weapons?
Analysts are also unsure exactly how the United States would react if South Korea eventually did begin pursuing nuclear weapons. And many South Koreans who support acquiring nukes hint they would tread cautiously with that in mind.
“It’s not as if I’m going to risk the alliance in order to have South Korea get nuclear weapons. But what happens if the U.S. president says he’s going to pull U.S. troops from Korea? What if that becomes a reality?” asked Chun.
In some ways, the situation mirrors the 1970s, when South Korea briefly pursued a nuclear weapons program amid questions about the long-term U.S. security commitment.
Instead, South Korea ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It is now uncertain what consequences South Korea would face for abandoning its commitments under the pact.
Reassurance limits
When asked about the issue in recent months, Pentagon and State Department officials have ruled out the idea of returning tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea. Instead, they have focused on how the U.S. is prepared to use the full range of its capabilities, including nuclear weapons, to defend South Korea.
At a meeting earlier this month with his U.S. counterpart, Lloyd Austin, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup said Seoul is not considering the return of tactical nuclear weapons and remains committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
At that Pentagon meeting, both sides agreed to several measures meant to reinforce the U.S. security commitment. The steps included increasing the deployment of U.S. strategic assets, such as long-range bombers and aircraft carriers, to South Korea, and vowing that any North Korean nuclear strike “will result in the end of the Kim regime.”
What they didn’t discuss, at least according to the 10-page joint communique released following the meeting, was Trump or his America First ideas — perhaps the one area where U.S. officials can offer the least reassurance.
“You can’t,” said Jenny Town, a Korea specialist at the Washington-based Stimson Center.
“Democracies are democracies and policies can shift,” she said.
Much depends on how Trump and his ideas fare in the 2024 elections. But even if Trump loses again, Town said, many in South Korea will have concerns about the future.
“It isn’t business as usual anymore,” she said. “It’s recent memory, and it doesn’t fade very quickly.”
What the resignation of the Antichrist means in the Middle East
What the resignation of popular Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr means in the Middle East
August 30, 20224:05 PM ET
TAYLOR HUTCHISON
NPR’s Ailsa Chang talks to Sarhang Hamasaeed, director of Middle East programs for the United States Institute of Peace, about popular Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s resignation.
AILSA CHANG, HOST:
Violence in Baghdad has now killed at least two dozen people and injured hundreds in the last two days. Supporters of the popular cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, some of them armed, clashed with Iraqi security forces, which include members of Iran-backed militias. The fighting comes as a result of a deadlock in forming a government some 10 months after parliamentary elections. There’s a split between Sadr and Iran-backed groups. Sadr has now told his supporters to end their protests and to leave government areas that they have occupied. To understand more about the situation, we have reached Sarhang Hamasaeed, the Middle East Program’s director for the United States Institute of Peace. Welcome.
SARHANG HAMASAEED: Thank you – good to be with you.
CHANG: Good to have you. So can you just first help us understand better who Muqtada al-Sadr is? Like, he is one of Iraq’s most powerful leaders. What else can you tell us about him?
HAMASAEED: Muqtada al-Sadr comes from a religious family. His father and his uncle have been known as to be religious credentials. In recent years, he has been able to brand himself as a Iraqi leader who is against foreign interference, including Iranian interference, who stands for justice, for Iraqi nationalism. And Iraqi civil society leaders have allied with him in different elections. And the jury is still out how much do you believe this rebranding.
CHANG: Well, I understand that his bloc was the biggest winner in Iraqi elections last fall. But then this summer, all of his allies in parliament quit in protest. What happened there?
HAMASAEED: He formed an alliance with the Sunni Arabs of Iraq and a major force of the Kurds, the Kurdistan Democratic Party. That gave him enough votes in parliament to be able to form a government and appoint a prime minister. The Iranians and their allies in Iraq have managed to form what was known as the obstructing third in the parliament – so about 120, 130 votes that prevented al-Sadr from forming the government. The deadlock in the political process and in the electoral process led to, as you rightfully mentioned, Sadr to decide that he would actually ask all the MPs who are representing him in parliament to quit. And they did so in June. And that meant to this date, it is a huge point of surprise why did he give up this much parliamentary power in the system.
CHANG: Still, can you explain how this current power struggle in Iraq, how this current political situation could affect U.S. interests?
HAMASAEED: Yes. So the U.S. has several interests in Iraq. Obviously, from a national security standpoint, a stable, democratic Iraq serves in the way where Iraq does not become a place for terrorism. Second, Iraq is a major oil producer. So for the stability of the global economy and for U.S. allies, this is an important factor. And third, for regional stability, Iraq is an important country where the – Iraq and the countries of the region are unhappy with the expansion that Iran had in the region. So there are several factors that Iraq plays an important role for U.S. interests. But the U.S. leverage to affect those outcomes is far less today than it was some years ago.
CHANG: That was Sarhang Hamasaeed, the United States Institute of Peace’s Middle East Program’s director. Thank you very much for joining us today.
HAMASAEED: Thank you. Thank you for having me.
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Threats from the Iranian Nuclear Horn: Daniel 8
Iran says enriched uranium capacity hits record
By AFP
December 18, 2022
TEHRAN: Iran said on Saturday its uranium enrichment capacity has increased to record levels, a day before UN nuclear monitors are set to visit the country.
“Currently, the enrichment capacity of the country has reached more than twice the entire history of this industry,” Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, was quoted as saying by state news agency IRNA.
“Nuclear energy and atomic power production have great economic savings for the country and are effective in reducing fossil and non-renewable fuel consumption and environmental problems,” he added.
The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said on Wednesday that a technical team will visit Iran on Sunday to try to resolve a deadlock over the detection of traces of radioactive material at sites not declared as having hosted nuclear activities.
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi is not expected to be part of the delegation.
The UN nuclear watchdog has long called on Iran to explain the presence of man-made uranium found at three undeclared sites, requesting “access to locations and materials” as well as the collection of samples.
Eslami said on December 9 that the material detected at the three sites had been brought into Iran from abroad.
The issue has seriously hindered efforts to revive a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and major powers, which has hung by a thread since the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018 under then-president Donald Trump.
An IAEA delegation had initially planned to travel to Tehran last month, but the visit was postponed as the agency´s board of governors censured Iran for failing to provide “technically credible” answers.
Under the 2015 deal, Iran agreed to restrict its enrichment of uranium to just under four percent, well below the 90 percent level considered necessary for a nuclear warhead.
In return for that and other curbs on its nuclear activities, Iran was promised relief from international sanctions
Iranian Horn Hits a New Record: Daniel 8
Iran says enriched uranium capacity hits record
By AFP
December 18, 2022
TEHRAN: Iran said on Saturday its uranium enrichment capacity has increased to record levels, a day before UN nuclear monitors are set to visit the country.
“Currently, the enrichment capacity of the country has reached more than twice the entire history of this industry,” Mohammad Eslami, head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, was quoted as saying by state news agency IRNA.
“Nuclear energy and atomic power production have great economic savings for the country and are effective in reducing fossil and non-renewable fuel consumption and environmental problems,” he added.
The Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said on Wednesday that a technical team will visit Iran on Sunday to try to resolve a deadlock over the detection of traces of radioactive material at sites not declared as having hosted nuclear activities.
IAEA chief Rafael Grossi is not expected to be part of the delegation.
The UN nuclear watchdog has long called on Iran to explain the presence of man-made uranium found at three undeclared sites, requesting “access to locations and materials” as well as the collection of samples.
Eslami said on December 9 that the material detected at the three sites had been brought into Iran from abroad.
The issue has seriously hindered efforts to revive a 2015 nuclear deal between Iran and major powers, which has hung by a thread since the United States unilaterally withdrew in 2018 under then-president Donald Trump.
An IAEA delegation had initially planned to travel to Tehran last month, but the visit was postponed as the agency´s board of governors censured Iran for failing to provide “technically credible” answers.
Under the 2015 deal, Iran agreed to restrict its enrichment of uranium to just under four percent, well below the 90 percent level considered necessary for a nuclear warhead.
In return for that and other curbs on its nuclear activities, Iran was promised relief from international sanctions
The Prophecy Blog 