Economic Consequences of the Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

Scenario Earthquakes for Urban Areas Along the Atlantic Seaboard of the United States

If today a magnitude 6 earthquake were to occur centered on New York City, what would its effects be? Will the loss be 10 or 100 billion dollars? Will there be 10 or 10,000 fatalities? Will there be 1,000 or 100,000 homeless needing shelter? Can government function, provide assistance, and maintain order?
At this time, no satisfactory answers to these questions are available. A few years ago, rudimentary scenario studies were made for Boston and New York with limited scope and uncertain results. For most eastern cities, including Washington D.C., we know even less about the economic, societal and political impacts from significant earthquakes, whatever their rate of occurrence.
Why do we know so little about such vital public issues? Because the public has been lulled into believing that seriously damaging quakes are so unlikely in the east that in essence we do not need to consider them. We shall examine the validity of this widely held opinion.
Is the public’s earthquake awareness (or lack thereof) controlled by perceived low Seismicity, Seismic Hazard, or Seismic Risk? How do these three seismic features differ from, and relate to each other? In many portions of California, earthquake awareness is refreshed in a major way about once every decade (and in some places even more often) by virtually every person experiencing a damaging event. The occurrence of earthquakes of given magnitudes in time and space, not withstanding their effects, are the manifestations of seismicity. Ground shaking, faulting, landslides or soil liquefaction are the manifestations of seismic hazard. Damage to structures, and loss of life, limb, material assets, business and services are the manifestations of seismic risk. By sheer experience, California’s public understands fairly well these three interconnected manifestations of the earthquake phenomenon. This awareness is reflected in public policy, enforcement of seismic regulations, and preparedness in both the public and private sector. In the eastern U.S., the public and its decision makers generally do not understand them because of inexperience. Judging seismic risk by rates of seismicity alone (which are low in the east but high in the west) has undoubtedly contributed to the public’s tendency to belittle the seismic loss potential for eastern urban regions.
Let us compare two hypothetical locations, one in California and one in New York City. Assume the location in California does experience, on average, one M = 6 every 10 years, compared to New York once every 1,000 years. This implies a ratio of rates of seismicity of 100:1. Does that mean the ratio of expected losses (when annualized per year) is also 100:1? Most likely not. That ratio may be closer to 10:1, which seems to imply that taking our clues from seismicity alone may lead to an underestimation of the potential seismic risks in the east. Why should this be so?
To check the assertion, let us make a back-of-the-envelope estimate. The expected seismic risk for a given area is defined as the area-integrated product of: seismic hazard (expected shaking level), assets ($ and people), and the assets’ vulnerabilities (that is, their expected fractional loss given a certain hazard – say, shaking level). Thus, if we have a 100 times lower seismicity rate in New York compared to California, which at any given point from a given quake may yield a 2 times higher shaking level in New York compared to California because ground motions in the east are known to differ from those in the west; and if we have a 2 times higher asset density (a modest assumption for Manhattan!), and a 2 times higher vulnerability (again a modest assumption when considering the large stock of unreinforced masonry buildings and aged infrastructure in New York), then our California/New York ratio for annualized loss potential may be on the order of (100/(2x2x2)):1. That implies about a 12:1 risk ratio between the California and New York location, compared to a 100:1 ratio in seismicity rates.
From this example it appears that seismic awareness in the east may be more controlled by the rate of seismicity than by the less well understood risk potential. This misunderstanding is one of the reasons why earthquake awareness and preparedness in the densely populated east is so disproportionally low relative to its seismic loss potential. Rare but potentially catastrophic losses in the east compete in attention with more frequent moderate losses in the west. New York City is the paramount example of a low-probability, high-impact seismic risk, the sort of risk that is hard to insure against, or mobilize public action to reduce the risks.
There are basically two ways to respond. One is to do little and wait until one or more disastrous events occur. Then react to these – albeit disastrous – “windows of opportunity.” That is, pay after the unmitigated facts, rather than attempt to control their outcome. This is a high-stakes approach, considering the evolved state of the economy. The other approach is to invest in mitigation ahead of time, and use scientific knowledge and inference, education, technology transfer, and combine it with a mixture of regulatory and/or economic incentives to implement earthquake preparedness. The National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program (NEHRP) has attempted the latter while much of the public tends to cling to the former of the two options. Realistic and reliable quantitative loss estimation techniques are essential to evaluate the relative merits of the two approaches.
This paper tries to bring into focus some of the seismological factors which are but one set of variables one needs for quantifying the earthquake loss potential in eastern U.S. urban regions. We use local and global analogs for illustrating possible scenario events in terms of risk. We also highlight some of the few local steps that have been undertaken towards mitigating against the eastern earthquake threat; and discuss priorities for future actions.

Blame North Korea And China for the South Korean Nuclear Horn: Daniel 7

Blame North Korea And China If South Korea Builds Nuclear Weapons

ByRobert Kelly

11 hours ago

The last year has seen a rising debate aboutwhether South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons. The argument for this step is two-fold: First, North Korea acquired the ability to strike the US homeland in 2017 with a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). This automatically reduces the credibility of the US security guarantee to South Korea. America’s leadership will inevitably be warier about fighting North Korea now that it can range the continental US with nuclear weapons.

Second, the US and South Korea are starting to drift apart on security perceptions. South Korea wants the US alliance mainly focused on North Korea while it continues to trade warily with China.

The US, however, is increasingly moving toward what the Biden administration has called ‘great power competition’ with China. South Korea is ambivalent about lining up openly against China, if only because it must live next to China and, thus, prefers a less antagonistic relationship.

An small independent nuclear deterrent for South Korea is a helpful way to partially seal this alliance rift. But there is anxiety about how the region – North Korea, China, Japan – will respond.

Will Japan and Others in East Asia Nuclearize in Response to South Korea?

A long-standing argument in the nonproliferation literature is that one country’s nuclearization ignites other countries’ nuclearization in a ‘cascade.’ This is possible and seems to have occurred in a few cases. The USSR probably nuclearized in response to the US; China in response to the USSR; India in response to China; Pakistan in response to India. And South Korea may nuclearize in response to North Korea.

But nuclear weapons have not otherwise spread across the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, or Europe as a cascade model implies. This is because nothing is automatic about a step as momentous as developing nuclear weapons. South Korea, for example, has signaled since 1992, that it wants a denuclearized peninsula. It is only drifting toward nukes, because North Korea has adamantly refused to stop testing and building. Pakistan held off going nuclear until it felt it had no choice due to India nuclearization. The choice to build nuclear weapons usually reflects a deeply-felt security need.

In the Japanese case, South Korean nuclear weapons would not meaningfully change its security position. Indeed, South Korea and Japan do not cooperate well. But both are democracies, well-governed, and US allies. Their relations may be a cold peace, but a hot war between them is extremely unlikely. South Korea will not nuke Japan, nor vice versa. If Japan goes nuclear, it will be because of threats from North Korea and China. Similarly, South Korean nuclear weapons do not threaten Taiwan or Southeast Asia, so there is no reason to expect movement there either.

There is no reason to believe that a limited South Korean nuclear arsenal – very obviously designed around deterring North Korea after thirty years of exhaustion with Pyongyang’s nuclear shenanigans – would include sparking a cascade among Asian democracies.

North Korea is Backing South Korea into a Corner on Nuclear Weapons

More important is how North Korea and China will respond.

They will, of course, criticize it and call it destabilizing, aggressive, part of a wider American hegemonic conspiracy, and so on.

But this is crocodile tears and bad faith. If North Korea and China wanted a denuclearized region, there is much they could have done in recent decades to prevent this looming outcome.

The North Korean and Chinese position – that South Korea should remain non-nuclear – is akin to unilateral disarmament. This is a grossly unrealistic expectation, which Chinese elites particularly – because they are better connected to the rest of the world than the paranoid, secluded Kim regime of North Korea – should know. As North Korean nukes drive a wedge between the US and South Korea, it is only natural that South Korea would consider more radical options to defend. South Korea’s president, for example, suggested preemptive strikes on North Korean missile sites in a crisis. If North Korea and China reject this sort of talk, then North Korea could stop testing and give the region a breather to work toward a solution. Instead, it has done the opposite this year.

China had a choice. As North Korea’s patron since that country’s terrible famine in the late 1990s, China had the leverage to push North Korea to negotiate on nuclear weapons. It could have cracked down on North Korean money in Chinese banks, desperately needed energy imports, or sanctions violations. Beijing chooses not to do that. South Korea signaled its non-nuclear preferences again and again for thirty years. Yet still, China chose not to push North Korea very hard. And North Korea chose to gimmick negotiations for decades to buy time to develop its nukes.

In short, North Korea almost certainly played in bad faith – never intending to denuclearize, just flim-flamming negotiations to buy time to keep pushing forward. And China was never willing to really push North Korea, to really take sides against it to compel it to negotiate seriously.

So now, with South Korean cities extremely vulnerable to North Korean nuclear attacks, is it any wonder the South Koreans are thinking of counter-nuking?

So yes, the immediate decision to nuke up will be Seoul’s, and it will be criticized if it makes this choice. But the real reason, as in so many South Korean defense decisions, is North Korea and its relentless march toward nuclear weapons and missiles. Blame Kim Jong Un and his Chinese enablers.

Expert Biography: Dr. Robert E. Kelly ( is a professor of international relations in the Department of Political Science at Pusan National University and 19FortyFive Contributing Editor.

China, Russia, and the Bomb; Daniel 7

China, Russia, and the Bomb

Even international alliances can unravel when nations confront the insanity of a nuclear holocaust.

An illustration of this point occurred recently, after Vladimir Putin once again threatened Ukraine and other nations with nuclear war. “To defend Russia and our people, we doubtlessly will use all weapons resources at our disposal,” the Russian president said. “This is not a bluff.”

In response to this statement and to sharp UN condemnation of Russian nuclear threats, Chinese president Xi Jinping issued a public statement early this November, assailing “the use of, or threats to use nuclear weapons.” To “prevent a nuclear crisis” in Europe or Asia, he insisted, the world should “advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used” and “a nuclear war cannot be waged.”

Aren’t these two nuclear-armed nations currently aligned in their resistance to U.S. foreign policy? Yes, they are, and when it came to Putin’s war upon Ukraine, Xi refrained from suggesting a Russian withdrawal. But nuclear war, as the Chinese leader made clear, was simply not acceptable.

This was not the first time a Russian-Chinese alliance was ruffled by a dispute over the use of nuclear weapons. An even deeper conflict occurred during the late 1950s and early 1960s when, ironically, the roles of the two nations were exactly the reverse.

At that time, the Chinese government, led by Mao Zedong, was embarked on a crash program to develop nuclear weapons. In October 1957, China’s weapons program secured a major gain when the Russian and Chinese governments signed the New Defense Technical Accord, in which the Russians agreed to supplementing the nuclear assistance they had already provided to the Chinese by supplying them with a prototype atomic bomb, missiles, and useful technical data.

But Russian officials soon had reason to doubt the wisdom of assisting China’s nuclear weapons development program. As Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev recalled, the following month, at a Moscow conclave of Communist party leaders from around the world, Mao gave a speech on nuclear war that startled those in attendance.

According to the Soviet leader, the “gist” of Mao’s speech was: “We shouldn’t fear war. We shouldn’t be afraid of atomic bombs and missiles. No matter what kind of war breaks out―conventional or thermonuclear―we’ll win.” When it came to China, Mao reportedly said, “we may lose more than three hundred million people. So what? War is war. The years will pass, and we’ll get to work producing more babies than ever before.”

Khrushchev found Mao’s remarks “deeply disturbing,” and recalled with irritation: “Everybody except Mao was thinking about how to avoid war. Our principal slogan was ‘On with the Struggle for Peace and Peaceful Coexistence.’ Yet here came Mao . . . saying we shouldn’t be afraid of war.’ In early 1958, as Soviet doubts increased about the reliability of China’s leadership in dealing with nuclear weapons, Khrushchev decided to postpone shipment of the prototype atomic bomb to China.

Eventually, the Soviet government not only withdrew its assistance to the Chinese nuclear weapons program in 1960, but took steps that placed the Soviet Union at loggerheads with the Chinese leadership. Key among these steps was working out an agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty with the governments of the United States and Britain—an agreement that, in part, was designed to block the ability of China to become a nuclear power.

This Soviet shift toward a nuclear arms control and disarmament treaty with the West was bitterly opposed by China’s rulers, who were determined to develop nuclear weapons and, by 1964, succeeded in doing so. Meanwhile, the Sino-Soviet rift grew ever more heated, with the Chinese pulling out of the Soviet-dominated World Peace Council and ferociously competing with the Russians for leadership of the world Communist movement.

There are some lessons that can be learned from these incidents, in which major powers displayed signs of veering toward nuclear war. The obvious one is that even military allies might balk, at times, when they see an international confrontation slipping toward a nuclear disaster.

Another, less evident, is that nations with access to nuclear weapons are not necessarily restrained from threatening or waging nuclear war by the prospect of nuclear retaliation from other nuclear powers. Or, to put it another way, nuclear deterrence is unreliable. Above all, these events and others underscore the fact that, while nuclear weapons exist, the world remains in peril.

Fortunately, abolishing nuclear weapons before they destroy the world is not an utterly utopian prospect. Thanks to popular pressure and disarmament treaties, the number of nuclear weapons around the globe has been reduced since 1986 from about 70,000 to 12,700. Moreover, a UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, crafted and approved by an overwhelming majority of the world’s nations, went into effect in January 2021.

Unfortunately, none of the world’s nine nuclear powers has signed or ratified this nuclear weapons abolition treaty. Until they do so and, therefore, stop producing, stockpiling, and distributing nuclear weapons to other countries, the world will continue to live in a state of nuclear peril, subject only to occasional flashes of sanity by these same nuclear-armed nations.

Surely, people around the world deserve a better future.

Iranian Horn planning massive expansion of uranium capacity: Daniel 8

Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA speaks to journalists after the IAEA's Board of Governors meeting
Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, said Iran is planning a massive expansion of its enrichment capacity. Photograph: Joe Klamar/AFP/Getty Images

Iran planning massive expansion of uranium capacity – UN nuclear watchdog

Iran has begun producing enriched uranium at a second site, to a level one step away from weapons grade

Guardian staff and agenciesTue 22 Nov 2022 20.05 EST

The UN nuclear watchdog has confirmed Iran is enriching uranium to 60% at a second plant, amid the breakdown of the nuclear deal with major powers.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said on Tuesday that Iran was also planning a massive expansion of its enrichment capacity.

Iran said earlier on Tuesday that it had started to enrich uranium to 60% at the Fordo site, having already done so at its above-ground pilot plant at Natanz for more than a year.

Destroyed residential building

The increased enrichment was seen as a significant addition to its nuclear programme. Enrichment to 60% purity is one short technical step away from weapons grade, 90%. Nonproliferation experts have warned in recent months that Iran has enough 60% enriched uranium to reprocess into fuel for at least one nuclear bomb.

Iran has always denied any ambition to develop a nuclear bomb, insisting its nuclear activities are for civilian purposes.

Satellite image of Iran’s Fordo Fuel Enrichment Plant
Satellite images show Iran’s Fordo plant where it has begun producing uranium enriched to 60 percent. Photograph: Satellite image ©2021 Maxar Tech/AFP/Getty Images

The move was part of Iran’s response to the UN nuclear watchdog’s adoption last week of a censure motion drafted by western governments accusing it of non-cooperation.


It also comes as talks have stalled to revive a 2015 landmark deal that curbed Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for sanctions relief.

The deal started to unravel in 2018 when the US withdrew and reimposed sanctions. In response, Iran started to step up its nuclear programme.

A joint statement from Germany, France and Britain – the three western European countries that remain in the Iran nuclear deal – condemned Iran’s latest action to further expand its nuclear programme.

“Iran’s step is a challenge to the global non-proliferation system,” the statement on Tuesday said. “This step, which carries significant proliferation-related risks, has no credible civilian justification.”

This month, the IAEA has said it believes Iran has further increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. As recently as last week, the agency criticised Tehran for continuing to bar its officials from accessing or monitoring Iranian nuclear sites.

A separate report said the IAEA director general, Rafael Grossi, was “seriously concerned” that Iran had still not engaged with the agency’s inquiry into manmade uranium particles found at three undeclared sites. The issue has become a key sticking point in the talks for a renewed nuclear deal.

It has been nearly two years since IAEA officials have had full access to monitor Iran’s nuclear sites, and five months since IAEA surveillance equipment was removed.

Reuters and Associated Press contributed to this report

A Rare Look Inside Russia’s Massive ‘Satan’ Nuclear Missile: Revelation 8

The pictures from state TV are a look inside one of the world’s largest deployed nuclear weapons.

By Matthew Gault

November 23, 2022, 7:49am


In April 2022, two months after Russia escalated its invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin test fired a RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a weapon the West calls the Satan 2. After the test, Russian state TV showed off never before seen footage of the internal workings of the massive nuclear weapon the Satan 2 is meant to replace, the R-36M2. 

The world noticed the launch of the Satan 2 but the rare look at the Satan, NATO’s designation for the R-36M2, went largely unnoticed. Russian military blogger Dmitry Kornev captured still images from the video and posted them to his blog and twitter account on November 20. The images are an unprecedented look at the inner workings of one of the biggest deployed nuclear weapons in the world. The Satan missile is about 112 feet long and weighs just over 211 tons. America’s largest ICBM, the LGM-30G Minuteman III, is just short of 60 feet and only weighs around 40 tons. 

The images showed off the interior of the missile where its nuclear warheads are stored. ICBMs are capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads. An ICBM is launched from the ground, arcs through the atmosphere, and descends at its target. As it descends, multiple warheads break off of it and hit their targets. Satan can carry 14 nuclear warheads.

This kind of detailed view of a deployed Russian nuclear weapon is unprecedented. It’s part of a new kind of nuclear brinkmanship that is becoming increasingly common. In the past few years, Russia has repeatedly reminded America that it has gigantic nuclear weapons.

The Kremlin plans to replace the R-36M2 with the RS-28 Sarmat, a missile NATO has called the “Satan 2.” It’s a missile Putin praised during a 2018 video presentation where he showed off a computer visualization of the nuke wiping out Mar-a-Lago. In 2020, Moscow declassified footage of the Tsar Bomba, the largest nuclear weapon ever tested. The resultant fireball was five miles wide and the mushroom cloud was 42 miles high. Tensions between Russia and the West have gotten worse since the Kremlin escalated its war in Ukraine earlier this year. Putin has repeatedly invoked nuclear war when talking about Western involvement in the war. 

America has taken a more complicated approach to its nuclear signaling. Around the same time as Russia’s Satan 2 test, the Pentagon announced it would delay its own ICBM test. Then, in September, it notified Russia it was going to go ahead and test some ICBMs. A month later, U.S. Central Command revealed it has a secretive nuclear-armed submarine in the Arabian Sea. It did this in a tweet.

At the same time, Russia and America are set to sit down in Egypt later this year to hash out the details of the New START treaty. New START is the last remaining nuclear weapons treaty between the two countries. It limits the amount of deployed nuclear warheads in the world with the aim of reducing that number over time. The treaty was in doubt several times during the Trump presidency and enforcement, which relies on both countries inspecting each other’s nuclear sites, stopped during the pandemic

Hamas, other terrorist groups, praise Jerusalem bombing outside the Temple Walls: Revelation 11

Hamas, other terrorist groups, praise Jerusalem bombing attack


Published: NOVEMBER 23, 2022 17:08

Updated: NOVEMBER 23, 2022 17:10


The Hamas terrorist movement welcomed the attack on Wednesday, stating that Israel bears “full responsibility for the repercussions of the crimes of its army and the terror of its settlers against our Palestinian people, their land and their sanctities.”

The Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist movement called the attack a “natural response to the occupation.”

Iran is Nuclear Capable: Daniel 8


Iran a step away from weapons-grade uranium, nuclear watchdog says

IAEA says Iran plans expansion of its underground, commercial-scale Natanz fuel enrichment plant

Sravasti Dasgupta1 day ago

(RELATED) James Cleverly warns nuclear threat from Iran ‘more advanced than ever before’

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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has said that Iran is enriching uranium to 60 per cent purity at its Fordow plant as a part of an expansion of its enrichment capacity in defiance of objections raised by Western countries.

In a statement on Tuesday, IAEA director general Rafael Grossi said: “Iran has started producing high enriched uranium – UF6 enriched up to 60 per cent – using the existing two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges in the Fordow fuel enrichment plant (FFEP), in addition to such production that has taken place at Natanz since April 2021.”

Weapons-grade uranium is 90 per cent enriched or more, according to a report by the BBC.

Under its 2015 nuclear deal with China, France, Germany, Russia, the US and the UK, Tehran was allowed to enrich uranium up to 3.67 per cent purity.

Mr Grossi added in his statement that Iran had installed more “cascades of advanced IR-6 centrifuges” and planned a “significant expansion of low enriched uranium production – UF6 enriched up to 5 per cent or up to 20 per cent – at Fordow” (which is near the north-central city of Qom) through those advanced centrifuges, reported CNN.

Tehran’s move appears to be in retaliation to a resolution passed by the UN’s nuclear watchdog last week, in which the 35-nation board of governors ordered Iran to cooperate with the ongoing years-long probe into the origin of uranium particles found at three undeclared sites in the country.

According to the 2015 nuclear pact signed between Iran and the six countries, Tehran was permitted to use only first-generation IR-1 centrifuges.

After the deal fell through in 2018, with US president Donald Trump withdrawing from it, Tehran has installed more efficient advanced centrifuges, such as the IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6.

It has also resumed enrichment at Fordow, which was barred under the deal.

In the long run, the IAEA said, Iran planned an expansion of its underground, commercial-scale fuel enrichment plant at Natanz.

“Iran continues to advance its enrichment activities at the fuel enrichment plant in Natanz and now plans to install a second production building, capable of housing over 100 centrifuge cascades,” the statement added.about:blank

The IAEA statement came hours after Iran’s state media Press TV reported that Tehran had informed the UN’s nuclear watchdog that it would boost its uranium enrichment to the 60 per cent enrichment level.