The Ramapo Fault Line of the Sixth Seal (Revelation 6:12)

A Look at the Tri-State’s Active Fault Line

Monday, March 14, 2011

By Bob Hennelly

The Ramapo Fault is the longest fault in the Northeast that occasionally makes local headlines when minor tremors cause rock the Tri-State region. It begins in Pennsylvania, crosses the Delaware River and continues through Hunterdon, Somerset, Morris, Passaic and Bergen counties before crossing the Hudson River near Indian Point nuclear facility.

In the past, it has generated occasional activity that generated a 2.6 magnitude quake in New Jersey’s Peakpack/Gladstone area and 3.0 magnitude quake in Mendham.

But the New Jersey-New York region is relatively seismically stable according to Dr. Dave Robinson, Professor of Geography at Rutgers. Although it does have activity.

“There is occasional seismic activity in New Jersey,” said Robinson. “There have been a few quakes locally that have been felt and done a little bit of damage over the time since colonial settlement — some chimneys knocked down in Manhattan with a quake back in the 18th century, but nothing of a significant magnitude.”

Robinson said the Ramapo has on occasion registered a measurable quake but has not caused damage: “The Ramapo fault is associated with geological activities back 200 million years ago, but it’s still a little creaky now and again,” he said.

“More recently, in the 1970s and early 1980s, earthquake risk along the Ramapo Fault received attention because of its proximity to Indian Point,” according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website.

Historically, critics of the Indian Point Nuclear facility in Westchester County, New York, did cite its proximity to the Ramapo fault line as a significant risk.

In 1884, according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website, the  Ramapo Fault was blamed for a 5.5 quake that toppled chimneys in New York City and New Jersey that was felt from Maine to Virginia.

“Subsequent investigations have shown the 1884 Earthquake epicenter was actually located in Brooklyn, New York, at least 25 miles from the Ramapo Fault,” according to the New Jersey Geological Survey website.

The Idiocy of Trump’s Nuclear Policy

US-Iran nuclear tensions: Why is Donald Trump engaged in a war of words with Iranian president Hassan Rouhani?

Firebrand president issues strongly-worded tweet warning Tehran ‘never, ever threaten the United States again or you will suffer consequences’

Joe Sommerlad

The Independent Online

Donald Trump has again taken to Twitter to enter a war of words with a rival world leader.

Having previously traded insults with North Korean president Kim Jong-un, including a row over who has the biggest red nuclear button, the US president has turned his attention to his Iranian counterpart, Hassan Rouhani.

The feud relates to President Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the deal struck in 2015 with the Barack Obama administration, which saw international sanctions against the Middle Eastern power eased in exchange for its agreeing to greatly reduce its nuclear programme, the subject of Western suspicions since 2003.

What was said?

At a meeting of Tehran’s diplomatic corps, President Rouhani was quoted by the state news agency IRNA as saying: “America should know that peace with Iran is the mother of all peace and war with Iran is the mother of all wars”.

He also warned the US was “playing with the lion’s tail” in provoking Iran.

Angry enough to tweet his response with his caps lock on, President Trump wrote:


Why are US-Iran relations so tense?

Western powers and the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) have long feared that Iranian enrichment of uranium as part of its nuclear power generation programme was really being undertaken for use in the secret construction of a weapon of mass destruction.

The country’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, has consistently denied this, saying that the building of such a bomb would contravene Islamic strictures.

After halting enrichment as a gesture of good faith in 2003, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad quietly ramped up production before severing ties with the IAEA and its inspectors three years later. The UN Security Council responded by unanimously voting in favour of economic sanctions against Tehran in December 2006.

Suspicion over Iran’s intentions and an atmosphere of mutual mistrust prevailed until the EU announced a ban on the import of Iranian crude oil and petroleum in January 2012, a significant financial blow.

New president Hassan Rouhani reiterated Ayatollah Khamenei’s stance in an address to the UN General Assembly in September 2013: “Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction have no place in Iran’s security and defence doctrine and contradict our fundamental religious and ethical convictions.”

In July 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to control Iranian nuclear activity developed by the US, China, the UK, France, Germany and Russia was signed but, by the following spring, Tehran had begun testing ballistic missiles.

The new US president’s short-lived national security chief Michael Flynn said Iran was “on notice” as a result of the tests in January 2017, a prelude to Donald Trump’s decertification of US compliance in the agreement in May 2018, arguing it was never in America’s best interests and “the worst deal ever”.

In the interim, Mr Rouhani described his new adversary as a “rogue newcomer to the world of politics” and the pair have meanwhile clashed over other issues, including the US decision to move its Israeli embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and introduce a ban on citizens from several Muslim-majority countries, including Iran, from travelling to the US.

Could Iran develop a nuclear weapon?

Tehran has the centrifuges in place to enrich uranium for use in nuclear power generation, but whether its ultimate intentions for the technology are benign or more sinister remains the great unknown from a Western perspective.

The recent run of mid-range missile testing appears an ominous sign of the regime’s military ambitions but, prior to the 2015 deal, the country had only enriched the mineral to 20 per cent purity so it would need to massively ramp up production to be able to reach the 90 per cent needed to achieve weapons-grade potential.

In signing that agreement, Tehran also agreed to reduce its uranium stockpile by 98 per cent and cut its total number of centrifuges from 20,000 by two-thirds so significant rebuilding would be required, a process designed to take at least 12 months, giving the international community plenty of notice.

Whether its scientists even have the necessary expertise in place to carry out such a plan has been called into question, notably by the IAEA in a 2015 report.

The threat of sanctions are also a powerful deterrent. Many Iranians were optimistic about the Islamic Republic’s potential as an emerging market primed for growth when the 2015 deal was signed but the US withdrawal under President Trump risks leaving the country isolated once more.

Another is the regional military threat posed by Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which have ballistic missiles of their own capable of striking Iran, which does not at present even have a meaningful air force with which to retaliate.

Raining On the Australian Nuclear Horn (Daniel 7)

If the US nuclear umbrella folds … The choices for Australia

24 Jul 2018|Malcolm Davis

Rod Lyon’s thought-provoking article in The Strategist concludes with a sobering choice for Australian defence planners considering a post–San Francisco world without US extended nuclear deterrence, and suggests two basic choices for Australia, Japan and South Korea:

They can either head down the path of developing indigenous nuclear arsenals, or they can attempt to dilute the advantages that nuclear weapons confer—advantages which would otherwise accrue to a set of states that did not wish them well.

Both Japan and South Korea have the technological means to rapidly develop independent nuclear deterrent capabilities, though neither state would have strong popular support for such a move. For Australia, it’s a bit more complicated. The issue of Australia ‘going nuclear’ has already been considered in numerous articles, and 2018 began with a bang in The Strategist with a discussion on Australia’s nuclear options by key authors such as Hugh White, Andrew Davies and Stephan Frueling, and in an ASPI Strategic Insights report by Paul Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith. I contributed my thoughts, too.

The complexity and cost of getting the warheads and acquiring a credible delivery system would probably push Australian defence spending well past the 2% GDP target that we currently aspire to. Maybe President Donald Trump’s proposed 4% GDP target for NATO would be more appropriate as a starting point for an Australia considering nuclear weapons.

There would be political consequences for Australia of moving away from its traditional policy of fully supporting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Australia would violate the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty in getting nuclear weapons. Any Australian move towards nuclear weapons could prompt counter-responses from our immediate neighbours and accelerate the erosion of non-proliferation norms.

If we had to go nuclear, we’d not only need the infrastructure to develop and then sustain the nuclear forces we acquired (which means significant upfront and ongoing investment); we’d also have to think seriously about Australian nuclear strategy and doctrine to ensure we did deter effectively. Nuclear weapons and deterrence is a deadly serious business—it’s not about bluffing. An Australian nuclear option would have to embrace a warfighting capacity that we’d need to be willing to use.

The most obvious choice for force structure would be continuous at-sea deterrence on submarines. But the Shortfin Barracuda SSK isn’t designed for nuclear deterrence, and adding such a capability could limit its operational and tactical flexibility. And it takes time to develop such a capability, so if events continue to move quickly, we might simply be too late to respond and too slow to act.

If nuclear weapons are challenging, what about alternatives? Rod talks about trying to ‘dilute the advantages that nuclear weapons confer’. How Australia might achieve that objective goes to the question of whether non-nuclear capabilities can effectively deter nuclear threats.

A ballistic missile defence (BMD) system is commonly seen to be a non-nuclear counter to nuclear threats, but in reality the advantage always goes to the offence. It’s cheaper to build more missiles or equip existing missiles with MIRV capabilities and overwhelm missile defences. US national missile defence is hideously expensive and not that effective. Even the US Navy’s ship-based SM-3 interceptors are tested only under highly controlled conditions.

Certainly, there are options that under the right circumstances could allow pre-emptive strikes ‘left of launch’ to prevent use of nuclear weapons. That would demand intelligence which is persistent and penetrating of an adversary’s leadership and command and control, and that is exceedingly difficult with likely major power threats. It would also demand a prompt-strike capability, based on either effective offensive cyberwarfare or forward-deployed precision kinetic strikes against missiles. There’s no guarantee that such a capability could be developed, even by the United States, let alone Australia.

Rather than trying to counter nuclear threats symmetrically, an indirect and asymmetric approach might be better. Australia could consider acquiring the means to prevent a major-power adversary from projecting power against our vital strategic interests, including our air and maritime approaches, by developing anti-access and area denial (A2AD) capabilities that focus on the South China Sea and exploit vital maritime straits and chokepoints throughout Southeast Asia.

Australian A2AD would ideally focus on a tactical and operational offensive attack at source rather than maintain a traditional defence-in-depth strategy. It would imply the ADF acquiring substantial air and sea capabilities suitable for rapid long-range strikes with precision non-nuclear weapons in sufficient mass to generate a meaningful effect, alongside developing more robust cyber and electronic warfare attack capabilities.

The objective would be to rob an opponent of the military capability needed not only to project power aggressively against us, but also to weaken it in comparison with other regional actors, such that it then would be poorly placed to defend its other strategic interests. Striking at vital interests of the opponent could also imply attacking national economic resilience in a way that threatens the political survival of a regime. Together, these factors could raise the cost of aggression to unacceptable levels, and thus, hopefully, deter such aggression, without resort to nuclear weapons.

The problem with this indirect strategy is that it would require a substantial expansion of the ADF at great cost, and take considerable time. The nominal 2% of GDP target of the 2016 defence white paper would easily be breached. There’s also a risk that an adversary with far larger forces could do the same to us, and, as a smaller actor, we’re likely to be less resilient. Finally, in the absence of an Australian nuclear-weapons capability, the nuclear-armed major-power adversary always has escalation dominance.

Rod’s initial question therefore stands and poses a strategic dilemma for Australia in an unpredictable outlook. We could develop a combination of alternatives—BMD (accepting its limitations), ‘left of launch’ pre-emption, and A2AD—in the absence of US extended nuclear deterrence, at great cost. Yet that still leaves us potentially facing a serious nuclear threat with no guarantee that these non-nuclear options will work as an effective deterrent in a major crisis.


Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI.

More Dead Outside the Temple Walls (Revelation 11:2)

Palestinian protesters gather as tear gas canisters are launched by Israeli forces during a demonstration along the border between Israel and the Gaza strip, July 27, 2018. AFP

Three Palestinians, Including 2 Teens, Said Dead in Gaza Border Protest

90 Palestinians wounded by live fire, Gaza ministry says ■ IDF says struck group of Gazans who threw firebombs toward Israel ■ UN’s Middle East envoy: ‘killing of Palestinian boy by Israeli fire in Gaza is shocking and tragic’

Jack KhouryYaniv Kubovich

28.07.2018 | 10:51

Three Palestinian demonstrators, including two teenagers, were killed by Israeli army fire during Friday’s protests along the Israel-Gaza border, Gaza’s Health Ministry said. Muamen Fathi Elhamas, 17-year-old from Rafah, succumbed to his wounds Saturday morning, according to the health ministry. Those killed Friday were identified as Majdi al-Satri, 12, and Razi Abu Mustafa, 43.

Muamen Fathi Elhamas,17.

According to the ministry, a total of 264 Palestinian demonstrators were injured in clashes, 90 of whom were wounded by live fire. Of those wounded, tenare in serious condition.

On Saturday, UN’s Middle East envoy Nickolay Mladenov slammed Israel over the killing of the 12-year-old Palestinian, writing on Twitter that Israeli fire in Gaza is both “shocking and tragic,” and “it’s time for this to stop.”

Yesterday’s killing of a 12 year old #Palestinian boy by #Israeli fire in #Gaza is shocking and tragic. Children are #NotATarget! Too many lives have been lost. Its time for this to stop. My hearfelt thought and prayers go out to the bereaved family.

— Nickolay E. MLADENOV (@nmladenov) July 28, 2018

Nickolay E. MLADENOV


Yesterday’s killing of a 12 year old #Palestinian boy by #Israeli fire in #Gaza is shocking and tragic. Children are #NotATarget! Too many lives have been lost. Its time for this to stop. My hearfelt thought and prayers go out to the bereaved family.

According to a report in Gaza, a tank fired at a Hamas target in eastern Gaza City. No casualties were reported.

Palestinian protesters carry a youth injured during a demonstration along the border between Israel and the Gaza strip, July 27, 2018. Mahmud Hams/AFP Photo

Later on Friday evening, the Israeli military said it struck an observation post in northern Gaza in response to shots fired at Israeli forces. The strike caused no casualties or damage, the IDF added.

According to the IDF, some 7,000 Palestinians participated in demonstrations along the border, with several violent riots breaking out in which protesters threw stones and tear gas canisters, and burned tires.

A firebomb was found in an Israeli community in the Eshkol Regional Council near the border, which caused a small fire to break out. A second blaze erupted outside a greenhouse in the same area and minor damage to infrastructure was reported.

A Palestinian nurse reacts upon seeing the body of her husband who was killed by Israeli troops during a protest at the Israel-Gaza border, southern Gaza Strip, July 27, 2018. \ IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/ REUTERS

A number of protesters damaged the border fence before turning back and returning to the Strip, the IDF said, adding that it responded with riot-dispersal methods and live fire in accordance with regulations.

The IDF intends to respond with extra force against any attempt to damage the border fence or throw grenades or explosive devices at soldiers in order to make it clear to Hamas that it is a violation of the ceasefire reached earlier in July.

Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman addressed the situation during a visit to an Israeli community near the Gaza border, saying: “We really do not want to be drawn into a war, we are doing everything to prevent a wide-ranging campaign, but the ball is in the other court, not in ours.”

Lieberman added: “I strongly recommend to Hamas, also with regards to this weekend, to act wisely and quietly and not to force us to do that which we know how to do, but do not want to do.”

Based on data provided by authorities in Gaza, the most recent deaths bring the number of demonstrators who have been killed since border protests began at the end of March to 152.

Palestinians react next to a wounded man during a protest at the Israel-Gaza border, in the southern Gaza Strip, July 27, 2018. \ IBRAHEEM ABU MUSTAFA/ REUTERS

Babylon the Great must be careful with Iran

PHILIP A. DUR: We must be careful with Iran

This combination of two pictures shows U.S. President Donald Trump, left, on July 22 and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani on Feb. 6. In his latest salvo, Trump tweeted late on Sunday, July 22 that hostile threats from Iran could bring dire consequences. This was after Iranian President Rouhani remarked earlier in the day that ìAmerican must understand well that peace with Iran is the mother of all peace and war with Iran is the mother of all wars.î Trump tweeted: ìNEVER EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKE OF WHICH FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE.î [ AP ]

By Philip A. Dur | Guest Columnist

Posted at 9:00 AM

The recent decision by the president to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Iran Nuclear Deal, has rekindled debates about the merits of the agreement and the implications of our withdrawal for the future. To begin with, let’s posit here that the deal was imperfect in its content and unworkable as a check on Iran’s ambitions. Let us also note in passing that the agreement negotiated by Secretary of State John Kerry and “approved” by President Obama, was not binding on President Trump because it was never ratified by the Senate — as all real treaties must be pursuant to our Constitution. It was not submitted for ratification precisely because it certainly would have failed!

In the first place, the limits on Iran’s push to a nuclear capability to compliment its advanced missile delivery systems will expire in less than 15 years, with no restrictions beyond the agreed timeline. In the second place, what is there to prevent Iran in the meantime from covertly acquiring warheads to fit on their ballistic missiles from others potential collaborators, say North Korea or even Pakistan? After all, both of these countries have collaborated in the past to export their nuclear technology to Iraq and Syria, for example.

The most egregious and fatal flaw in the agreement was the refusal of the parties to make the removal of sanctions on Iran contingent on stopping its criminal behavior. The signatories knew that Iran was and is a major sponsor of international terrorist groups including Hamas in Gaza and Hizbollah in Lebanon and Syria. Iranian agents have ventured so far as to blow up a synagogue in distant Argentina. The parties obviously accepted these facts as givens and not negotiable in the “deal.”

As Premier Netanyahu told a joint session of Congress, Iran with nukes and missiles poses an existential threat to Israel, and only a slightly less portentous threat to the Arab states in the Persian Gulf. But there is much more in the malevolent history of the Ayatollah-led Islamic Republic:

• the capture and destruction of our embassy in Teheran in 1979, and the brutal imprisonment of our embassy staff during the Carter years.

• the explosive attacks on our embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 and 1984 killing more than 25 of our personnel.

• the destruction of the Marine barracks and the death of 241 Marines, sailors, and soldiers (and 58 French military) in Beirut in October 1983.

• the capture, imprisonment, torture, and murder of several American officials in Lebanon in 1984-85.

• the attack on the Kohbar Towers in Dharan, Saudi Arabia, in 1994, which took the lives of 20 U.S. Air Force personnel billeted there.

• the transfer of sophisticated Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) to Shiite militias in Iraq which resulted in a significant toll of US forces in Iraq.

Let us reflect on the fact that successive administrations did not retaliate forcefully in response to these murderous Iranian-sponsored attacks on Americans. Let us also take note that the favorite chant heard at pro-government demonstrations in Iran after the JCPOA was signed by our Secretary of State was “Death to America!”

To be clear, in cancelling the agreement and reimposing tough sanctions on Iran and other countries that do business there, we run a clear risk that Iran will resume work on nuclear weapons. We may also see a surge in Iranian-sponsored terrorist activity in Israel, Lebanon, Syria and beyond. And there could be a rise in public discontent in Iran as a result of a deteriorating economic situation.

On balance these outcomes are difficult, but manageable.

I believe that we have the military wherewithal to block the construction and coupling of nuclear payloads to Iranian missiles, however deep the tunnels that Iran uses to conceal this type of activity. In addition, critics of the action taken by the current administration point to Iran’s threat to close the straits of Hormuz in retaliation for a disarming attack. As unlikely as this seems, this too is a manageable threat. Where terrorist actions are concerned, we are not alone in countering them. Israel is watchful and skilled in responding to Iranian-led terrorism in their immediate neighborhood (Even the much criticized Russian government has expressed an interest in controlling Iranian sponsored threats to Israel!).

Finally, our fight is emphatically not with the Iranian people. If dissent against the Ayatollahs deepens and the people rise up — as they did against the late Shah in 1977 — and unlike the last administration’s “turn away” from the protesters after the elections in 2009, this time we might encourage the opposition and even help the cause. Of course with all the politically charged outrage with foreign interference in our own politics, we should probably tread very cautiously here.

Philip A. Dur, PhD, is a U.S. Navy Rear Admiral (retired) and a Destin resident. He can be reached at

The Islands Will Flee at the Seventh Bowl (Revelation 16)

Doomsday weapon’: How could the West respond to Russia’s nuclear underwater drone?

Published time: 31 Jul, 2018 16:55

US and British navies could counter Russia’s nuclear-powered autonomous torpedo, Poseidon, by using undersea sensors and anti-submarine aircraft, writes Covert Shores website. But is this really a viable tactic?

The development of the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), originally known as ‘Status-6’, was first mentioned in November 2015. Western media later dubbed the submarine drone a doomsday weapon.

On March 1, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin officially confirmed the weapon’s existence in his annual address to the Federal Assembly.

We have developed unmanned submersible vehicles that can move at great depths – I would say extreme depths – intercontinentally, at a speed multiple times higher than the speed of submarines, cutting-edge torpedoes and all kinds of surface vessels,” said Putin.

It is reported that the main goal of the torpedo is to deliver a thermonuclear warhead to enemy shores in order to destroy important coastal infrastructure and industrial objects, as well as ensure massive damage to the enemy’s territory by subjecting vast areas to radioactive tsunamis and other devastating consequences of a nuclear explosion

Another potential use for the Poseidon torpedo is to strike US aircraft carrier battle groups.

On December 8, 2016, US intelligence reported that, on November 27, Russia had conducted a test of a nuclear-powered UUV, launched from a B-90 Sarov-class submarine. In February, the Pentagon officially added Status-6 to Russia’s nuclear triad by mentioning it in the US Nuclear Posture Review.

At present, the technical specifications of Poseidon torpedoes are classified information. So far, it is known that the UUV is over 19 meters in length and almost two meters in width. Earlier, it was assumed that Poseidon would be equipped with a 100-megaton thermonuclear warhead that could obliterate entire coastal cities and cause destruction further inland, triggering tsunamis laden with radioactive fallout.

However, according to the latest information, the power of the Poseidon’s warhead is just two megatons. But this does not change much. This amount of nuclear material is still enough to destroy large coastal cities, naval bases and cause a tsunami.

In addition, a warhead of this class could easily wipe out any carrier strike group of the US Navy.

According to some reports, Poseidon can develop speeds up to 70 knots, which is faster than any US nuclear submarine or anti-ship torpedo. The operational depth of the Poseidon is more than a thousand meters, which also significantly exceeds the capabilities of US submarines.

According to Covert Shores, the new Russian UUV can be located with the help of Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV).

ACTUV drone is a DARPA-financed US project to develop an unmanned ship designed to detect and track enemy submarines with the help of sonars. It is assumed that the vessel will not be equipped with weapons of any kind and will be used solely for reconnaissance purposes – however, this may change in the future.

Sea floor sensor networks, including sonar buoys could also be deployed by maritime patrol aircraft, such as Boeing’s P-8 Poseidon, to locate the Russian UUV, according to Covert Shores.

Strangely enough, Covert Shores doesn’t mention the SOSUS system,” Rear Admiral Arkady Syroezhko, ex-chief of the autonomous vehicles program of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of Russia’s Armed Forces, told

SOSUS is the US sound surveillance system for detecting and identifying submarines. It should be noted, however, that this system will be deployed only on the frontiers – for example, in the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, and the UK) gap, along the North Cape – Medvezhy Island line, in the Denmark Strait, and in a couple of other places. So it would be a mistake to believe that the SOSUS system is deployed in all parts of the global ocean. In the Pacific, for instance, it is hardly used at all.

Syroezhko believes that, when it comes to tracking underwater objects, the key thing is to select the right location for the tracking system. But it’s very difficult to determine where Poseidon might appear, given its almost unlimited range and high speed.

Also, according to Syroezhko, tracking Poseidon is only half the battle. To destroy the UUV, you need to have a permanent and combat-ready counter system, which means having forces and equipment on constant alert and ready for deployment. But the US doesn’t have such a system yet. To deploy such a system would require substantial financial resources — even for the US.

As for the capabilities of our hypothetical enemies to destroy the Poseidon, they are extremely limited.

Today the MU90 Impact is the only NATO torpedo capable of reaching the depth of 1,000 meters,” Konstantin Makienko, deputy director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, told

The expert emphasizes that a single torpedo of this class costs over $2 million. Also, according to other military experts, even in a high-speed mode (92 km/h), which decreases its range significantly, this torpedo is still slower than the Poseidon.

Makienko says that the Mark 54, which is the fastest US Navy torpedo, operates at 74 km/h. He believes that it is not capable of catching up with Poseidon or reaching its operational depth.

Until we see a live experiment, any claims about the potential detection or destruction of the Poseidon are completely groundless. Thus far, all we hear is just words,” says the former Chief of Staff of the Russian Navy Viktor Kravchenko.

Currently no hypothetical adversary has a weapon capable of overtaking the Poseidon UUV at its operational depth or reaching its speeds, says Syroezhko.

Mikhail Khodarenok, military commentator for


Mikhail Khodarenok is a retired colonel. He graduated from the Minsk Higher Engineering School of Anti-Aircraft Missile Defense (1976) and the Command Academy of the Air Defense Forces (1986).

Commanding officer of the S-75 AA missile battalion (1980-1983).

Deputy commanding officer of a SAM regiment (1986-1988).

Senior officer at the High Command of the Air Defense Forces (1988–1992).

Officer at the main operational directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces(1992–2000).

Graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (1998).

Worked as an analyst at Nezavisimaya Gazeta (2000-2003) and editor-in-chief of Voyenno-Promyshlennyi Kuriyer (2010-2015).