Why South Korea will soon go nuclear (Daniel 7)

James Van de Velde
October 1, 2016
Japan ought to become a nuclear-weapons power as soon as possible. South Korea ought to begin a nuclear-weapons program.
The North Korean state is a national gulag. The regime is illegitimate, unstable and totalitarian—and a proliferator of nuclear-weapons technology. It brings nothing to the world but misery, widespread death to the Korean people, suffering and political instability.
Foolishly, the state is sustained by China, which thinks that it would be better to sustain North Korea than to facilitate its collapse, which might lead to a larger U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula. But this thinking is politically shortsighted: the collapse of the North Korean regime would allow the Republic of Korea to absorb the North, thereby ending the entire reason U.S. forces are on the Peninsula. American forces would likely leave Korea, not grow, once the Pyongyang regime collapses.
Further, it was China that gave North Korea many of the ballistic-missile technologies that it uses to threaten us and our allies. China is not timidly and reluctantly standing with North Korea; it is, as usual, actively contributing to the North Korean mess. China uses North Korea to shove the United States away from Asia and keep Western diplomacy off balance, defensive and uninitiated.
Nonproliferation zealots are making sure nuclear weapons now proliferate only to totalitarian states. Despite much rhetoric and sincere, well-intentioned efforts, the United States sat by as North Korea developed its nuclear weapons. It is not too late to disabuse China and North Korea of the idea that nuclear proliferation pays. Japan ought to begin a sincere program to build deliverable nuclear weapons to show China that China’s support to North Korea is counterproductive and strategically naive. The Republic of Korea ought to begin a nuclear-weapons development program.
Since China would greatly oppose Japan becoming a nuclear-weapons state, should Japan declare its intention to start a nuclear-weapons program in response to these repeated, unjustified and deeply threatening provocations by the Pyongyang regime, China might finally realize that it is in its interest to facilitate the collapse of the totalitarian regime in Pyongyang and allow the Seoul government to absorb the North. The United States could reassure China that U.S. forces are in Korea only to defend the South Koreans. And Japan could assure China that its program is entirely defensive and would likely be suspended, should the North Korean regime collapse and the peninsula become completely denuclearized. A Japanese nuclear-weapons program would be entirely within Japan’s constitutional rights, given the North Korean nuclear-weapons program.
The U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan is made credible by the presence of U.S. forces in Japan (which is declining, given our indebtedness and weakening of alliances), the presence of U.S. naval forces in the region (which is being challenged by China) and a strong commitment by the U.S. government (which is questioned these days). But if, of course, North Korea successfully develops an intercontinental ballistic missile and a compatible nuclear warhead that could be delivered to U.S. soil, then the same threat to the U.S. nuclear umbrella that occurred in Europe will occur for Japan and the Republic of Korea: North Korea might have the capability to strike either with a nuclear weapon and then deter the United States from retaliating with the threat of a North Korean nuclear weapon on top of an ICBM. The North Korean ballistic missile program threatens the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan and the Republic of Korea have every right—in fact, a duty and a UN-protected right—to self-defense.
In short, there is no future and no other solution to this regional problem other than the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. There is no historical model through which a totalitarian state like North Korea evolves. There is no confederation scenario that is possible with a totalitarian state. Unlike authoritarian states, totalitarian states cannot evolve; they implode. The best future—dissolution—should be something for China to seek, trigger and help manage.
Since the initiation of a Japanese nuclear weapons program would provoke China into concluding that North Korea is far more trouble than it is worth as a buffer against U.S. forces in the South, the people of North Korea would benefit the most, since they suffer daily. The goal is to collapse the Pyongyang regime peacefully, much like the East German regime collapsed. This is also the best means to effect true nuclear counter-proliferation; without it, the world will have to live with one more totalitarian nuclear state—a nuclear North Korea—forever.
If the Chinese played chess and not tic-tac-toe on the Korean Peninsula, they would maneuver to collapse the northern regime by first opening Chinese borders (like Hungary did to East Germany) and then provide asylum to the Northern political leadership and general officer corps and ask Seoul to assume economic and political responsibility for the entire Korean people, in exchange for a nuclear-free (and U.S.-military-free) Korean Peninsula. The Koreans (and Japanese) would jump at the deal. And the Japanese nuclear-weapons program would end.
At present, the Chinese wrongly think that they can tolerate the North’s antics and provocations, because they assume the Kim Jong-un regime is not serious with its threats to start large-scale conflict, and North Korea serves a purpose of keeping the Americans in the South. The North acts out with these threats to secure its continuation and appearance of legitimacy with the rest of the world, seeking a peace treaty/agreement with the United States that will allow it to continue unthreatened and deter Western designs for the Pyongyang regime’s collapse.
The Chinese government must conclude that North Korea is far more of a strategic danger to China than a unified and strategically neutral Korea under the governance of Seoul. A Japanese and South Korean nuclear-weapons program would bring a geostrategic situation clearly less favorable to China. At present, politicians in the West are too timid to recommend such a step, and cling to shallow arguments that the world should be rid of nuclear weapons—so that only rogue states will have them.
James Van de Velde is Adjunct Faculty at the National Intelligence University, the Center for Advanced Governmental Studies, Johns Hopkins University and the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or the National Intelligence University.

The increasing risk of nuclear war (Revelation 15)

OCTOBER 1, 2016
Norman Byrd
The United States announced this week that it would begin refurbishing its nuclear missile systems, an overhaul that is estimated to take roughly 20 years to complete, in a direct response to the upgrades made to the nuclear capabilities of Russia, China, and North Korea. And it did not push aside fears of a looming World War 3 when Defense Secretary Ash Carter made a speech at a nuclear missile silo this week where he called upon NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) members to “refresh their nuclear playbook.” In what looks to be nothing short of a re-establishment of the Cold War, events appear to signal a return to the days of nuclear weapons deterrence policies and the constant fear of some state player triggering World War 3.
As Agence France Presse (AFP) reported earlier in the week, the U.S. has plans to switch out over 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles in the next two decades, completely replacing the Minuteman III nuclear-tipped missiles now in secret silos across the U.S. with an as yet unnamed modern missile system. It is part of a refurbishing program of the military’s “nuclear triad (missiles, submarines, and bombs),” and its estimated cost is around $1 trillion, spent over the next 30 years.
“The Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans are upgrading all of their systems,” an Air Force official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told AFP. He went on to say that since the other powers were “upgrading all of their legs of the triad,” he did not believe that “in that environment, I am not sure it makes sense” to do nothing.
The Minuteman III missile system has been in place since the 1960s (some of the missiles and silos since the 1950s). As another Air Force official noted, a number of the vendors who constructed and equipped the nuclear weapons silos have gone out of business over the years. Finding replacement parts have become extremely difficult, so some type of refurbishing operation was in order.
But the modernization of the nuclear weapons of the U.S. would not in itself prompt fears of World War 3 and a multinational war that could lead to a potential nuclear exchange. Proper maintenance of war ordnance is as much a nod to safety as it is to preparedness. The political rhetoric that followed did.
Speaking to a group of “missileers” — Air Force airmen who handle the operations of land-based nuclear weapons — at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated, according to the Daily Star, that Russia was as much a “loose cannon” threat to global security as North Korea with regard to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on a resurgent Russia.
Carter said that NATO should not only “refresh their nuclear playbook” but also “plan and train like we would fight to deter Russia from thinking it can benefit from nuclear use in a conflict with NATO.”
Talk of a limited nuclear exchange in a constrained or localized war setting has become a point of acceptability of late, a tone that sparks fears in the hearts of those who would avoid World War 3 scenarios at all costs. With think tanks like the Atlantic Council, as reported by the Inquisitr, warning that Russia could invade and take over the Baltic States in a matter of days “with no warning,” fears that Russian military officials might resort to such nuclear tactics have proliferated. And then there was recently retired NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Breedlove, who warned the NATO nations, according to a separate Inquisitr report, that they were woefully unprepared for a concentrated Russian attack, that a sustained military offensive, coupled with Russia’s air and naval superiority, could potentially see Russia in control of helpless Europe with the Atlantic Ocean as a patrolled buffer zone to keep the U.S. and Canada from providing assistance.
Carter told the missileers, “It is a sobering fact that the most likely use of nuclear weapons today is not the massive ‘nuclear exchange’ of the classic Cold War-type, but rather the unwise resorting to smaller but still unprecedentedly terrible attacks, for example by Russia or North Korea. We cannot allow that to happen, which is why we’re working with our allies in both regions to innovate and operate in new ways that sustain deterrence and continue to preserve strategic stability.”
World War 3 sabre-rattling is nothing new between Russia and the United States, of course. The two superpowers have played the game of nuclear brinkmanship since shortly after 1949, when Russia detonated its first atomic bomb. Although the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Russia-dominated Union of Soviet Socialist Republics saw a lessening of tensions between the world’s two foremost nuclear superpowers, the rise of the Russian Federation under the leadership of Vladimir Putin has brought all the militarization and political posturing back into play.
The United States has apparently decided that continued Russian military aggression in various parts of Europe and the Middle East over the past few years has reached a point where nuclear weapons deterrence rhetoric must now become part of dealing with Russia — again. And so, too, must a commitment be made to the modernization of its nuclear defense capabilities. But a nuclear stand-off, at least to a great many, is a far better alternative to limited nuclear exchanges, or worse, the nearly assured destruction of the planet should World War 3 be waged with nuclear weapons.

The Scarlet Woman Gave Russia 20% Of Our Uranium

She could be the next US President.
He already was the President.
They’re married.
Cue the dawn sunrise and violins for the beautiful first couple of American politics.
But what about the uranium scandal?
The what?
Before I quote a NY Times piece on this, consider—-suppose, just suppose the beautiful first couple, Bill and Hillary, have been running a parallel operation to the government, in the form of a Foundation that is taking in major chunks of cash from people who want (and get) serious political favors.
Well, current news stories confirm that. We already know that.
Consider this plot line. Follow the bouncing ball.
The Canadian executives want to sell it to Putin.
But because uranium is a US “national security” product, various US federal agencies have to OK the deal. One of those agencies is the US State Department.
The State Department is headed up by Hillary Clinton. Her Department says yes to the uranium deal.
The kicker? Those Canadian mining executives, who wanted the sale to Putin to go through, donated millions to the Clinton Foundation.
Getting the picture?
Memory is short. On April 23, 2015, the NY Times ran a story under the headline: Cash Flowed to Clinton Foundation Amid Russian Uranium Deal.
The bare bones of the story: a Canadian company called Uranium One controlled a great deal of uranium production in the US. It was sold to Russia (meaning Putin and his minions). So Putin now controls 20% of US uranium production.
From the Times: “The [Pravda] article, in January 2013, detailed how the Russian atomic energy agency, Rosatom, had taken over a Canadian company [Uranium One] with uranium-mining stakes stretching from Central Asia to the American West. The deal made Rosatom one of the world’s largest uranium producers and brought Mr. Putin closer to his goal of controlling much of the global uranium supply chain.
“But the untold story behind that story is one that involves not just the Russian president, but also a former American president and a woman who would like to be the next one.
“At the heart of the tale are several men, leaders of the Canadian mining industry, who have been major donors to the charitable endeavors of former President Bill Clinton and his family. Members of that group built, financed and eventually sold off to the Russians a company that would become known as Uranium One.
“Since uranium is considered a strategic asset, with implications for national security, the deal [to sell Uranium One to Putin] had to be approved by a committee composed of representatives from a number of United States government agencies. Among the agencies that eventually signed off was the State Department, then headed by Mr. Clinton’s wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton.
“As the Russians gradually assumed control of Uranium One in three separate transactions from 2009 to 2013, Canadian records show, a flow of cash made its way to the Clinton Foundation. Uranium One’s chairman used his family foundation to make four donations totaling $2.35 million. Those contributions were not publicly disclosed by the Clintons, despite an agreement Mrs. Clinton had struck with the Obama White House to publicly identify all donors. Other people with ties to the company made donations as well.
“And shortly after the Russians announced their intention to acquire a majority stake in Uranium One, Mr. Clinton received $500,000 for a Moscow speech from a Russian investment bank with links to the Kremlin that was promoting Uranium One stock.”
If you’re Putin and you’re sitting in Moscow, and the uranium deal has just dropped this bonanza into your lap, what’s your reaction—after you stop laughing and popping champagne corks? Or maybe you never really stop laughing. Maybe this is a joke that keeps on giving. You wake up in the middle of the night with a big grin plastered on your face, and you can’t figure out why…and then you remember, oh yeah, the uranium deal. The US uranium. Who’s running the show in America? Ha-ha-ha. Some egregious dolt? Maybe he’s a sleeper agent we forgot about and he reactivated himself. And this Clinton Foundation—how can the beautiful couple get away with that? And she’s going to be the next President? Can we give her a medal? Can we put up a statue of her in a park? Does Bill need any more hookers?
You shake your head and go back to sleep. You see a parade of little boats carrying uranium from the US to Russia. A pretty line of putt-putt boats. You chuckle. Row, row, row your boat…merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily…life is but a dream.
Good times.
Final note: there is a great deal of difference between a major outlet like the NY Times running their Clinton/uranium piece for one day—and pounding on it for weeks and months. In the latter case, they would let loose the hounds, who would probe and push and interview relevant people and get confessions and parlay those confessions up the food chain—blowing the story into an enormous scandal—which it is.
The Times had its hands on a volcanic piece…and they let it drop. Because the ceiling and the limit had been reached. The Times basically executed what’s called a limited hangout, a partial exposure of a story that was getting too hot to suppress entirely.
The limited hangout allows the venting of steam—and then nothing more. In this case, the Clinton camp denies there was any quid pro quo, they assert Hillary had nothing to do with the uranium deal, and the curtain falls.
Thus you have the reality which the major media did expose, vs. the reality they could have exposed. The “could have” part would have changed current history—but it was squelched, and put under wraps.
Tossed on the junk heap.
Jon Rappoport